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Abstract 
This thesis addresses the traumata associated with Poland’s frontier changes 
in 1945, within a collective memory paradigm. These events include 
expulsions from German territories incorporated into Poland, and 
population transfers between Poland and the USSR. The thesis addresses 
two components: a central trauma complex, and the resulting collective 
memory discourse. Being a matter of historical record, the statistical details 
and chronology of these events are seldom contested, although they have 
often been instrumentalised by various stakeholders. Instead, the relevant 
collective memory discourse has focused on the production of broad, often 
exculpatory, narrative frameworks designed to explain a set of largely 
accepted facts. Accordingly, my thesis is primarily focused on this 
collective memory discourse. 
As an active phase, dominated by stakeholders with a high level of 
emotional investment in the narration and memorialisation of the relevant 
events, this collective memory discourse is currently undergoing a transition 
to the domain of History as a scholarly pursuit. This transition is best 
symbolised by the fact that, as of 2016, for the first time since 1945, all 
restrictions on the acquisition of agricultural land and forests in Poland’s 
former German territories, by Germans, will be lifted. Thus, for surviving 
expellees, the right of return, in conjunction with the potential to purchase 
any formerly held real estate and landholdings, will become a de jure 
reality, marking the end of the region’s long postwar period. Arguably, 
therefore, one can now engage, at a retrospective, analytical level, with the 
relevant collective memory discourse without being drawn into it.    
In order to navigate this complex discourse, I have developed a 
number of analytical and conceptual tools, which I hope may prove useful 
beyond this project. In this sense, this thesis can be viewed as a proof of 
concept. Chief among these tools are a novel working definition of 
collective memory as a discrete phase in the historification and 
mythologizing of traumatic events, and a three-level model designed for the 
consistent analysis of narrative texts, artefacts and cultural productions. By 
tracing the relevant collective memory discourse through a number of 
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disparate fields, including political myth-making, historiography, toponymic 
practice, cartography and literature, I have been able to test these analytical 
and conceptual tools to breaking point, often benefiting from the resulting 
heuristic gain wherever lived complexity defies simplistic analytic 
idealisation. 
To ensure a focused exposition of the theoretical framework and the 
sources analysed, this thesis is primarily centred upon Lower Silesia and the 
following broad research questions: what geo-socio-political power 
dynamics resulted in Poland’s postwar frontier changes and the associated 
traumata, and how were they justified at the time? How have historians 
reacted over time to Poland’s postwar frontier changes, and the 
humanitarian consequences, as well as to contemporary framework 
narratives relating to these events? How has the toponymic re-inscription of 
Poland’s former German territories influenced the relevant collective 
memory discourse, and to what extent have cartographic representations of 
postwar Poland been influenced by changing geo-political configurations? 
How have the prevailing socio-political conditions in postwar Germany and 
Poland constrained literary contributions to the relevant collective memory 
discourse? And, finally, in what ways, has literature contributed in turn, to 
the relevant collective memory discourse and the establishment of 
hegemonic historical narratives? 
This thesis presents a number of specific findings, the most 
significant of which is that political contingencies can result in a surprising 
deflection of collective memory discourse into seemingly unrelated fields, 
and can trigger a ripple effect, which has the ability to globalise collective 
memory discourse under certain circumstances. Similarly, my analysis of 
shared topoi in the works of German and Polish historians and literary 
authors demonstrates that, far from generating its own framework of 
reference based on specific traumatic events, collective memory discourse is 
exquisitely sensitive to broader socio-political narratives. In addition, I 
contend that mainstream historical narratives tend to simplify, for example, 
through the imposition of a chronology on multidirectional memories, and 
by focusing on homogenizing accounts of the collective at the expense of 
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individual narratives. In contrast, literature and local cultural performances 
often resist such simplification, thus preserving complexity. Viewed in this 
light, the pursuit of Cultural and Literary Studies addresses a clear problem 
within, and usefully augments, traditional historical scholarship. By 
carefully analysing a subset of Polish and German literature, historiography 
and cultural artefacts produced in response to the traumatic events in 
question, my thesis seeks to trace the transition from highly localised 
stakeholder-led collective memory discourses to hegemonic historical 
narratives developed and maintained in the service of broader geo-political 
agendas.  
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1: General Overview of the Thesis 
 
1.1 Introduction 
This thesis contributes to existing scholarship on collective memory studies, 
discourse analysis, narratology, cartography and toponymy, as well as 
comparative literature (East and West German, and Polish). In addition, it 
contributes, to varying extents, to the historical study of Poland, Ukraine and 
Great Britain, specifically in the context of the World War duplex (1914-1945), 
identity studies, and questions of German victimhood in the shadow of the 
Holocaust.1 It also relates to philosophical questions concerning epistemology and 
essentialism. The object of study comprises two distinct components: a central 
trauma complex; and the resulting collective memory discourse. In the following 
introduction I briefly introduce the general context (Part 1.2) before presenting my 
specific research questions (Part 1.3) and an outline of the structure of the 
remainder of the thesis (Part 1.4). This is followed by a note on terminology (1.5). 
I conclude this introduction with a critical review of some of the key secondary 
literature on this subject in which I summarise some of the areas in which existing 
scholarship can usefully be augmented and/or reconsidered (Part 1.6). 
 
1.2 General Context 
This thesis takes as its starting point the events concomitant to, and ramifications 
of, the redrawing of Poland’s national frontiers in the wake of World War Two 
(hereinafter ‘WWII’). The most noticeable of these to contemporary international 
observers was the flight and expulsion (Flucht und Vertreibung) of Germans from 
the so-called Regained Territories or Ziemie Odzyskane (ZO).2 These were the 
                                                 
1A number of historians have convincingly argued that the First and Second World Wars can reasonably be considered to 
be part of a continuum of events constituting what they have referred to as ‘the Second Thirty Years’ War’. Whilst I 
broadly agree with their analysis, I prefer to use the term ‘World War Duplex’ to express the same idea because it better 
encapsulates the global aspect of the conflict period. See: Bull, H., et al., The Challenge of the Third Reich: The Adam von 
Trott Memorial Lectures (Oxford: Clarendon, 1986), p. 10; Martel, G., The Origins of the Second World War 
Reconsidered: The A.J.P. Taylor Debate after Twenty-Five Years (Boston; London: Allen & Unwin, 1986), p. 57; 
Marwick, A., et al., Total war and Historical Change: Europe, 1914-1955 (Buckingham: Open University Press, 2008), p. 
42; Neubaur, M., Der zweite Dreißigjährige Krieg 1914 - 1945: Der Untergang des Abendlandes (Norderstedt: Books on 
Demand, 2010), pp. 5-10; Zemella, G., Deutschland im Fadenkreuz: Der zweite Dreissigjährige Krieg 1914-1945: 
Zwischen Lüge und Wahrheit (Wahlsburg: Klosterhaus-Verlag, 2013), pp. 18-25. 
2 Although I use the term Flucht und Vertreibung throughout this thesis to denote the specifically German experience of 
flight and expulsion in the wake of WWII, it should be noted that this term carries a certain amount of ideological baggage 
in that it has historically been used more often by one specific stakeholder community – the West German expellee groups 
– than others. Nevertheless, it is commonly used in relevant book and article titles as well as in more generalised German 
political discourse. My use of the term here reflects its wide currency within the associated discourse as well as its purely 
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parts of Germany annexed (de facto) by Poland in 1945.3 The population transfers 
that took place as a result of the Soviet Union’s (hereinafter ‘the USSR’) 
annexation of Poland’s eastern territories (an area collectively known as the 
Kresy) are less well documented in Anglophone histories. Even less has been 
written about anti-Polish pogroms carried out by Ukrainian nationalists (the OUN 
and UPA) in southern parts of the Kresy. These were particularly bloody in East 
Galicia, a region centred on the city of Lemberg (Polish Lwów; Ukrainian L’viv).4 
Yet all of these events are intimately connected. The ZO was resettled, inter alia, 
by Poles expelled from and/or relocated from areas incorporated into the USSR. 
These Polish refugees were joined by Ukrainians and members of lesser-known 
groups such as the Slavic Lemkos, forcibly relocated from the Carpathian 
Mountains.5 The matter is further complicated by the fact that some Germans 
were expelled from the ZO by other Germans.6  One of my objectives in the 
following study is to demonstrate the inadequacy of frequently evoked notions of 
distinct perpetrator and victim communities in relation to these events. Such a 
simplistic paradigm is incapable of encompassing the full complexity of the 
events themselves and the ensuing collective memory discourse. 
In the following chapters, I seek to explore some of the ways in which 
members of various stakeholder groups have participated in and contributed to the 
relevant collective memory discourse in three specific areas of cultural endeavour: 
                                                                                                                                     
semantic value. It does not imply any particular affinity with or preference for any one stakeholder group or their preferred 
narrative of the events in question. See Section I.5 below for more detail on this topic. 
3 The GDR recognised the Oder-Neisse line as the official border between Germany and Poland in the Görlitzer Vertrag 
(1950). The FRG followed suit in 1970 (Treaty of Warsaw). Other countries such as France waited until 1959 before 
recognising the new frontier. Therefore the earliest one could reasonably refer to the ZO as ‘Poland’ is 1950, by which time 
the major phase of the Vertreibungen had been completed. See: Theisen, A., Die Vertreibung der Deutschen: Unbewältigte 
Vergangenheit Europas, Kulturelle Arbeitshefte (Bonn: BdV, 1998), p. 3; Banchoff, T. F., The German Problem 
Transformed: Institutions, Politics, and Foreign Policy, 1945-1995 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999), p. 
71; Neubach, H., Kleine Geschichte Schlesiens, Kulturelle Arbeitshefte (Görlitz: Senfkorn, 2005), p. 32; Großbongardt, A., 
et al., Die Deutschen im Osten Europas: Eroberer, Siedler, Vertriebene (Munich: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2011), p. 42. 
4 Part of the former Polish Voivodeship of Lwów (East Galicia) is now incorporated with the Ukrainian Oblast of L’viv 
whilst a small part lies within the Podkarpackie Voivodeship in modern Poland. See: Wilson, A., The Ukrainians: 
Unexpected Nation (New Haven; London: Yale University Press, 2000), pp. 130, 73; Department of Field Support, U., 
Ukraine: Map No. 3773 Rev. 6 (United Nations, 2004); Jankowiak-Konik, B., et al., Atlas historii Polski: Mapy; 
Kalendaria; Statystyki (Warsaw: Demart SA, 2011), p. 116. 
5 The Lemkos (Polish: Łemkowie) are a small and distinct ethnic group within the larger Ukrainian culture, whose ancestral 
homeland was the Carpathian Mountains in Galicia. Most were forcibly resettled in the aftermath of World War Two, 
either in the ZO (1947) or in the Ukrainian SSR (as early as 1944). Of those transferred to the ZO some 3060 families were 
deported to Lower Silesia in 1947. Many of them were later relocated back to their place of origin in the Carpathians. 
Interesting insights into their current situation can be gleaned from the following sources: Potichnyj, P. J., Poland and 
Ukraine, Past and Present, Canadian Library in Ukrainian Studies (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 
1980), pp. 252-56; Lehmann, R., 'The Strength of Diversity: A Micro-History of Ethnic Conflict and Coexistence in Rural 
Southeast Poland', Anthropological Quarterly, 82 (2009), 509-45; Jasiewicz, J., 'Mapping the Activism of Ethnic and 
National Minorities in Poland', European Societies, 13 (2011), 735-56. 
6 The most notorious example of this occurred during the Siege of Breslau (15th of February to the 6th of May 1945) and 
forms the basis for my case study in Chapter 6. 
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the practice of popular history writing, geography (cartography and toponymy), 
and literature including life writing and fictions. To ensure a focused exposition of 
the theoretical framework and the sources analysed, the thesis is primarily centred 
upon Lower Silesia, although reference is also made to other regions for 
comparative purposes. 
My decision to focus on Lower Silesia is based on several considerations. 
Scholarly treatments of the history of the Flucht und Vertreibung of Germans 
from Central and Eastern Europe often concentrate on ‘ethnic Germans’ expelled 
from historical communities located far from the German Reich, such as the so-
called Wolgadeutschen.7 Others focus on populations from areas peripheral to but 
contiguous with Germany, such as the Sudetendeutschen.8 The Lower Silesians, 
by contrast, were Reichsdeutsche. Their legal status was the same as that of 
Hanoverians, Bavarians or Hessians. They were not expelled from some external 
state and ‘returned’ to Germany. Instead, they were moved from one region of 
Germany to another, which complicates the relevant collective memory discourse 
in interesting ways. Another compelling reason to concentrate on this province is 
that, of all the areas incorporated into the ZO by Poland in 1945, Lower Silesia 
had been the least historically contested region. Pre-war Polish nationalists had 
laid claim to parts of Upper Silesia, the site of the outbreak of WWII (Gleiwitz), 
but had rarely aspired to dominion in Lower Silesia. Historically, Silesia as a 
whole had always been ‘a border land marked by an overlap of cultures with no 
abrupt breaks between predominantly German-, Czech-, and Polish-speaking 
regions’. 9  Although always geographically peripheral to the polities that laid 
claim to it, Lower Silesia had been central to German culture at least since its 
incorporation into Prussia in 1763, and had been a rallying point for pan-German 
resistance to foreign invasion. Home to a plethora of artists, writers, scientists and 
other scholars of international standing, Silesia was also the site of significant 
                                                 
7 I explain the distinction between ‘ethnic Germans’ and German nationals in detail below in relation to the Bund der 
Vertriebenen (BdV). Simply put, ‘ethnic Germans’, in this context, are people with German ancestry but who were not 
citizens of the Third Reich. 
8 Some typical examples are: Eisfeld, A., Die Russlanddeutschen, Studienbuchreihe der Stiftung Ostdeutscher Kulturrat, 2 
vols (Munich: Langen Müller Herbig, 1999); Glotz, P., Die Vertreibung: Böhmen als Lehrstück (Munich: Ullstein, 2003); 
Jansen, H., et al., Spiegel Geschichte 1/2011: Die Deutschen im Osten: Auf den Spuren einer verlorenen Zeit, Spiegel 
Geschichte (Hamburg: SPIEGEL-Verlag, 2011). 
9 Thum, G., Uprooted: How Breslau Became Wrocław During the Century of Expulsions, trans. Tom Lampert, et al. 
(Princeton, Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2011), p. xvii. 
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socio-political events and the birthplace of historically important political parties 
(see Appendix B, Section B.4).10  
In short, Lower Silesia had been a rare centre of stability and prosperity in 
Central Europe with an international border that had remained unchallenged for 
some six hundred years.11 This era of stability ended in the closing months of 
WWII. Breslau, the capital of Lower Silesia and a cosmopolitan centre of 
European importance, was the site of the last major battle of WWII on German 
soil.12  After WWII and the Flucht und Vertreibung of many of the German 
residents, the Polish government implemented a series of measures designed to 
obliterate all traces of German settlement in the province.13 These included a 
comprehensive program of resettlement and a major project of toponymic re-
inscription (see Chapter 5). Lower Silesia, therefore, represents a microcosm of 
the complexity of postwar population transfers in Central Europe. 
 
1.3 Research Questions 
This thesis addresses the following broad questions, each of which encompasses a 
number of secondary questions which I introduce at the start of the relevant 
chapters: what geo-socio-political constraints and imperatives (power dynamics) 
resulted in the postwar changes to Poland’s frontiers and the two cases of 
sociocide with which this thesis is concerned, and how were they justified and 
understood at the time (Chapter 3)?14 How have historians reacted over time to 
Poland’s postwar frontier changes and the accompanying sociocide as well as to 
contemporary framework narratives relating to these events (Chapter 4)? To what 
extent and how has the toponymic situation in the ZO influenced the overall 
discourse concerning Poland’s annexation of the ZO and the concomitant Flucht 
und Vertreibung of Germans from this territory and its resettlement by Poles 
relocated from the Kresy, and how far have cartographic representations of the 
                                                 
10 For a comprehensive overview of prominent German Silesians see: Hartung, H., Deutschland deine Schlesier (Berlin: 
Rowohlt, 1989 [1975]); Białek, E., et al., SILESIA IN LITTERIS SERVATA: Paradigmen der Erinnerung in Texten 
schlesischer Autoren nach 1945 (Dresden: Neisse, 2009), 1; Kroneberg, L., et al., Weber-Revolte 1844: der schlesische 
Weberaufstand im Spiegel der zeitgenössischen Publizistik und Literatur (Cologne: Leske, 1979), pp. 215-17. 
11 Leuschner, M., Heimat und Schickal: Eine kurze Chronologie (Bonn: BdV, 2011), p. 20. 
12 Thum, G., Uprooted, p. 5. 
13  Bates, J. M., 'The PUWP's Preferences in the Contemporary Polish Novel, 1959-1985' (unpublished PhD thesis, 
University of Glasgow, Glasgow 1997), p. 43; Demshuk, A., 'Reinscribing Schlesien as Śląsk: Memory and Mythology in a 
Postwar German-Polish Borderland', History & Memory, 24 (2012), 39-86, pp. 41-42. 
14 Sociocide is an Anglicised version of the term 'Soziozid' used in the preface to: Brandes, D., et al., Lexikon der 
Vertreibungen: Deportation, Zwangsaussiedlung und ethnische Säuberung im Europa des 20. Jahrhunderts (Vienna: 
Böhlau, 2010), p. 7. See Section 1.5 A Note on Terminology for a fuller discussion. 
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local situation been influenced by changing geo-political conditions (Chapter 5)? 
How have different socio-political conditions constrained and shaped the 
production of literary contributions to collective memory discourses relating to 
postwar sociocide and territorial transfers, and how, and to what extent, has 
literature contributed in turn to the relevant collective memory discourse and the 
establishment of what I refer to throughout this thesis as ‘hegemonic historical 
narratives’ (Chapters 6 and 7)?15 
 
1.4 Thesis Structure 
This thesis is structured around six theme-based chapters, each of which focuses 
on a specific aspect of the collective memory discourse engendered by the 
sociocide with which this study is concerned.  
Chapter 2 sets out the theoretical framework within which I shall be 
presenting and analysing specific aspects of the relevant discourse. In particular, I 
present an original definition of collective memory and an original structural 
framework for the analysis of cultural artefacts and productions generated during 
collective memory discourse processes. 16  This framework provides a solid 
foundation for a consistent comparative analysis between separate collective 
memory discourses as well as between diverse expressions of collective memory, 
regardless of the different media in which they are encoded. This chapter 
contributes directly to collective memory studies, discourse analysis and 
narratology as academic disciplines. 
Chapter 3 comprises two main sections. In the first section, I provide an 
exposition of the overall context and trauma nexus which triggered the specific 
collective memory discourse that this thesis seeks to explore. The events in 
question are the Flucht und Vertreibung of Germans from Lower Silesia, and of 
Poles from East Galicia and their (the Poles’) subsequent resettlement in Lower 
Silesia in the wake of the Germans’ departure. In the second part of the chapter, I 
analyse the political circumstances under which these episodes of sociocide were 
                                                 
15 I define the term ‘hegemonic historical narrative’ in Section 2.1 ‘Trauma-Based Collective Memory Discourse’.  
16 With regard to collective memory as a putative phenomenon, my reason for presenting a specific and original working 
definition is motivated not by a lack of theory in this area, but rather by the wealth of (often contrasting) definitions that 
have been put forth in the relevant literature. That is, my purpose is clarity of exposition rather than originality for its own 
sake.  
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allowed to happen and provide an account of the postwar Polish government’s 
justification of them.  
Chapter 4 addresses some of the historical and historiographical aspects of 
the case and demonstrates how writers of popular history have contributed to the 
relevant collective memory discourse through their responses to specific historical 
problems. These historical problems are partly rooted in the contrast between the 
postwar status quo, the pre-war aspirations of Polish nationalists, and British war 
objectives. In addition, historians have struggled, to some extent, to deal with 
what James Bjork refers to as ‘retrospective normalisation’, i.e., the extrapolation 
of present-day geo-political boundaries to earlier periods of history. 17  This 
phenomenon is exemplified in the attempts described in Chapter 3 by the first 
postwar Polish government to explain and justify the loss of territory to the 
USSR, the annexation of parts of Germany as well as expulsions and other forms 
of population transfer with reference to Poland’s ‘deep history’.  
My analysis of historical texts includes works by Anglophone as well as 
German and Polish historians. This reflects my desire to demonstrate that the 
events in question have had far wider ramifications than is generally understood. 
An exclusive close reading of German and Polish historical texts would work to 
the detriment of my objective of transcending assumed bilateral perpetrator-victim 
discourses. The inclusion of Anglophone scholarship broadens my research base 
to take in the often surprising ‘ripple effect’ of traumatic events far beyond the 
immediate vicinity in which they take place. It demonstrates that the ensuing 
collective memory discourse is considerably more complex than the over-
simplistic German-versus-Polish or perpetrator-victim dichotomy so often 
encountered in the relevant scholarly texts. 
It is necessary to read Chapters 3 and 4 in conjunction with Appendices A, 
B, and C. These provide additional detail about the affected regions and, in 
particular two historic Polish polities which have traditionally provided alternative 
models for a modern Polish state: Piast Poland (1025-1370), and the 
Commonwealth of Poland-Lithuania (1596-1795). Each has been referenced in 
                                                 
17 Dr. Bjork (King's College, London) was asked to comment on the general thrust and concept of my thesis in the early 
stages of the project as he was able to provide a level of expert input that went beyond the then expertise of my supervisors. 
To that end I met with him on Friday the 20th of December 2013 (i.e., three months after starting my PhD) for an extended 
consultation and he provided extensive feedback by email some two and a half weeks later. See: Bjork, J., 06.01.2014: 
18:32, Feedback from Dr. Jim Bjork on Chapters 1 – 3 (Email). 
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interesting ways within the relevant collective memory discourse. As explained in 
Chapter 3, Piast Poland was instrumentalised to justify the annexation of the ZO 
(including Lower Silesia). A knowledge of the differential status of Poles and 
Ruthenians within the Commonwealth of Poland-Lithuania provides interesting 
insights into the historical causes of the Ukrainian-led pogroms against East 
Galician Poles and their eventual expulsion and then resettlement in Lower 
Silesia.18 It is also essential in terms of understanding the position in which the 
postwar Polish government found itself vis-à-vis the USSR’s annexation of the 
Kresy (including East Galicia), which it began in 1939 and completed in 1945. 
Chapter 5 focuses on the function of toponymy and cartography in the 
establishment of one specific narrative of these traumatic events as historical 
‘fact’. Specifically, this chapter discusses and analyses the toponymic 
Polonisation of the ZO in the immediate postwar period, and the production and 
meaning of cartographic representations of the area between 1945 and today.19 
Cartography is particularly interesting in the current context precisely because, 
between the dates in question, geographers in other parts of the world were 
obliged to take a stance on Poland’s postwar frontier shifts in a way that foreign 
historians and authors of literature were not. Thus, the production of maps of 
Poland’s postwar geo-political situation globalised the discourse engendered by 
the relevant events. With due consideration of the commercial and economic 
aspects of cartography, decisions taken by foreign geographers and cartographers 
(and publishing houses) provide interesting insights into the progress and 
parameters of the collective memory discourse in question. This is particularly 
true of those working in polities that may be loosely characterised as stakeholder 
collectives with regard to the specific trauma complex with which this thesis is 
concerned (Germany, Poland, and the USSR). Moreover, this globalisation of the 
relevant discourse is one of the key ways in which the collective memory 
discourse surrounding the postwar territorial settlement of Central Europe differs 
from other well-documented collective memory discourses.20  
                                                 
18 For a brief discussion on the historic use of the terms ‘Ruthenians’ and ‘Ukrainians’ see Appendix A. 
19 In 1990 the shared border between the reunited Germany and Poland was fixed in perpetuity along the so-called Oder-
Neisse line in the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany (Two Plus Four Agreement). See: 
Großbongardt, A., et al., Die Deutschen im Osten Europas, p. 42. 
20 To a large extent the concept of collective memory has been developed in relation to the Holocaust. It has also been 
applied to other historic traumas such as the Apartheid regime in South Africa. Neither of these involved geography to the 
same extent as the current example. Both cases relate to the creation of new polities (Israel and the South African Native 
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Chapters 6 and 7 are concerned with representations of the relevant 
collective memory discourse in literature. Literature in this context is understood 
in its broadest possible sense and includes life writing as well as fiction. In these 
chapters, I explore how authors from East and West Germany and Poland have 
presented certain narratives of the events in question and the extent to which they 
may have contributed to their respective national collective memory discourses.  
One reason for my decision to include a major section on literature is the 
assumption that the production of literature is far less costly than many of the 
other artefacts in which collective memories are encoded and contested. This 
circumstance, I argue, means that the production of literature is inherently more 
accessible to non-specialists rather than being the preserve of an elite. 
Specifically, the means of production, and therefore the ability to participate in 
collective memory discourses through the medium of literature, are available to 
more people than through the production of costly media such as memorials and 
similar high-status artefacts.21 Moreover, fiction and life writing also provide a 
useful counterbalance to historiography by embracing the ambiguities and 
contradictions of lived experiences.22  
The literary works selected include both popular and more ambitious 
works that already form part of the literary canon or are currently attracting 
scholarly attention.23 The two chapters within this section are based on specific 
case studies selected to demonstrate and problematise the irreducible complexity 
of the events in question. As the Polish and German texts referenced throughout 
this section rather surprisingly demonstrate, ‘the general hypothesis that texts 
published in […] Germany and in Poland during the Cold War reflected, 
respectively, two broadly national approaches’ is not supported by the evidence.24  
Chapter 6 surveys and analyses two key texts relating to the expulsion of 
German women and children from Breslau by Gauleiter Karl Hanke just prior to 
                                                                                                                                     
Homelands). However, these have not, to my knowledge, been considered in any analysis of the relevant collective 
memory discourses, although such an approach would certainly be productive.  
21 This is particularly the case following the advent of the Internet. 
22 I am indebted to Dr. James Bjork for this formulation. See: Bjork, J., Feedback from Dr. Jim Bjork on Chapters 1 – 3. 
23 For an excellent overview of some of the canonic literature relating to the Flucht und Vertreibung of Germans from 
Central and Eastern Europe in the wake of WWII see: Berger, K., Heimat, Loss and Identity: Flight and Expulsion in 
German Literature from the 1950s to the Present, Studies in Modern German and Austrian Literature (Bern: Peter Lang, 
2014), 2; Please note, however, that, unless stated otherwise, all references to Karina Berger throughout this thesis refer to 
a pre-publication copy of her PhD thesis, which she was kind enough to send me for use in my own thesis: Berger, K. L., 
'The Representation of the Expulsion of Ethnic Germans in German Literature from the 1950s to the Present' (unpublished 
thesis, University of Leeds, Leeds 2012). 
24 Bjork, J., Feedback from Dr. Jim Bjork on Chapters 1 – 3. 
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the siege of Breslau in 1945, an episode that confounds simplistic ethno-political 
victim-perpetrator discourses.25 Both texts are quasi-autobiographical, and I read 
them in conjunction with life writing and primary and secondary historical 
sources.26  
Chapter 7 studies Polish and German literature selected for the insights it 
provides into one specific aspect of these events, which is inadequately 
represented in the formal historical record, namely the arrival and integration of 
Poles in the ZO and Lower Silesia in particular.27 The corpus in question includes 
the novels by Janesch, Hen and Tokarczuk referred to above. All of these texts 
have been selected for their significant autobiographical content and the authors’ 
strong links to the regions in question (Lower Silesia and East Galicia).28 
Following a concluding chapter, this thesis is augmented by a set of 
appendices. These provide additional information and data not required to support 
the arguments and exposition set out in the main body of the thesis, but, 
nevertheless, useful for a fuller understanding of the context. In addition to 
Appendix A, which addresses Polish nation-building in pre-modern and modern 
eras, they include: a brief history of Silesia (Appendix B); a short study of the 
historical background to the anti-Polish pogroms in East Galicia, to which I refer 
in most chapters (Appendix C); a ‘distant reading’ survey of Anglophone 
historiography relating to the so-called Piast Formula, which I define in Chapter 3 
(Appendix D); a timeline centred on the conflict zones (Appendix E), and a 
selection of maps (Appendix F). 
 
1.5 A Note on Terminology 
                                                 
25 Hanke, K. A., Breslau, Anordnung zur Evakuierung am 26. Januar 1945 (Poster), (Breslau: NS Druckerei, 1945). 
26 What I mean by the term ‘quasi autobiographical’ is that in both cases the main protagonists are recognisably based on 
the authors as one can readily verify by reference to sources for the author’s lives. I do this in detail when I reintroduce the 
term in the Chapter in question. 
27 There are very few scholarly accounts of the subjective experience of Poles arriving in Lower Silesia and other parts of 
the ZO, which increases the importance of autobiographical and quasi-autobiographical accounts of this transitional period 
to historians. However, the following works provide a comprehensive overview of the political and pragmatic aspects of 
the 'Polonisation' of Lower Silesia and of the arrival and integration of Germans and ethnic-Germans in Germany: Siebel-
Achenbach, S., Lower Silesia from Nazi Germany to Communist Poland, 1942-1949 (Basingstoke: Macmillan; New York: 
St. Martin's, 1994); Autze, R., Treibgut des Krieges: Flüchtlinge und Vertriebene in Berlin 1945 (Berlin: Quadriga, 2001), 
pp. 17-49; Kossert, A., Kalte Heimat: Die Geschichte der deutschen Vertriebenen nach 1945 (Munich: Random House, 
2008), pp. 43-228; For a more general overview of the expulsion of Germans from annexed areas in Central Europe see: 
Douglas, R. M., Orderly and Humane: The Expulsion of the Germans after the Second World War (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2012). 
28 I also draw upon similar fictional works and life writing by authors with strong connections to other regions within ZO. 
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Throughout this thesis, I consistently use the German term Flucht und 
Vertreibung to refer specifically to the flight and expulsion of Germans and ethnic 
Germans from Eastern and Central Europe in the wake of WWII, i.e., beginning 
in 1944 and ending in 1952. This reflects common practice in the relevant 
literature. For other population transfers and/or expulsions I employ the 
appropriate English terminology with the exception of the euphemism ‘ethnic 
cleansing’ which I prefer to replace with the word ‘sociocide’. The term ‘ethnic 
cleansing’ is problematic for two reasons. Its well-dated entry into most European 
languages during the course of the Bosnian War (1992-1995) makes its use in 
historical contexts anachronistic. More importantly, the uncritical use of the term 
implies, at some level, a basic acceptance of the premise that removing specific 
ethnic groups, in certain socio-political situations, involves an act of ‘cleansing’. 
Whilst accepting the notion that some juxtapositions of mutually antagonistic 
ethnic groups can result in practically intractable socio-political tensions, I do not 
accept the corollary that the weaker groups in such difficult demographic 
configurations ought to be conceived of as contaminants. The word ‘sociocide’, 
by contrast, refers to the destruction of any social order by human agents. It 
adequately encapsulates all forms of social destruction, whether as a result of 
mandatory population transfers, expulsion, or mass flight in the face of actual 
violence or the credible threat thereof.29 In the absence of elaborating narratives 
pertaining to specific episodes, the word ‘sociocide’ is neutral with regard to 
reasons, causes, or perceived benefits to either party. In the current context, both 
the expulsion of Germans from the ZO and the population transfers associated 
with the transferal of the Kresy between Poland and various Soviet Socialist 
Republics (see Section 3.2 below) are examples of sociocide. As both of these 
examples demonstrate, the actual practice of sociocide, however pragmatic the 
longer-term socio-political objectives, can easily degenerate into genocide. Yet, 
the concept of sociocide also encompasses less murderous actions, a good 
example of which is the toponymic re-inscription of the ZO (see Chapter 5). 
                                                 
29 There is a growing agreement among international legislators that populations who flee in the face of the credible 
perception of approaching danger are victims of sociocide. On a case-by-case basis they can arguably be categorised as the 
victims either of those whose imminent arrival they have reason to fear, or of whichever state is ultimately responsible for 
bringing about the conflict situation that resulted in the insecure situation. See: Ziegler, K. S., Fluchtverursachung als 
völkerrechtliches Delikt: die völkerrechtliche Verantwortlichkeit des Herkunftsstaates für die Verursachung von 
Fluchtbewegungen (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2002). 
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My use of two other terms throughout the thesis also requires a short 
explanation. The term Ziemie Odzyskane has political and historical ramifications 
and is contested within the discourse concerning Poland’s de facto annexation of 
German territory in 1945 and concomitant expulsion of the resident population. 
Even during the Cold War, some Polish scholars preferred the term Ziemie 
Piastowskie (Piast territories) in an attempt to emphasise Poland’s historical 
continuity with the area rather than its recent annexation (‘regaining’).30 More 
recently, the term Ziemie Zachodnie i Północne (Western and Northern Lands) 
has found acceptance as a simple, apolitical geographic identifier, devoid of 
historical or political content.31  Nevertheless, due to its dominant role in the 
collective memory discourse with which this study is concerned, I shall use the 
acronym ‘ZO’ throughout this thesis to refer to all territories annexed (de facto) 
by Poland in 1945, which had formed part of the Third Reich until the 1st of 
September 1939. ‘ZO’ does not, therefore, refer to areas of Poland incorporated 
into or occupied by the Third Reich during WWII.  
The word Kresy (lost borderlands or districts – compare German Kreise) is 
similarly problematic. In the current context, Kresy refers to parts of Lithuania, 
Byelorussia and the Ukraine which had formed part of the Second Republic 
(Poland from 1918 to 1939) and were annexed by the USSR in 1945.32 According 
to Nathaniel Copsey, although the term Kresy remains in widespread use in 
Poland to refer to these territories, pogranicze is a ‘more politically correct’ 
alternative. 33  However, in Anglophone discussions on the subject the word 
pogranicze is rarely, if ever, used.34 I shall therefore continue to use Kresy, as a 
simple geographic identifier, throughout this thesis. 
I also use the terms ‘essentialism’ and ‘essentialist’ (the latter both as an 
adjective and a noun) to refer to a specific view of the world which is evident in 
                                                 
30 Chapter 3 explores the origins of this desire to emphasise continuity with the Piast Kingdom (1025-1370) among postwar 
Polish scholars. See Appendix A for historical detail of the polity in question. 
31 Kamusella, T., 'The Twentieth Anniversary of the German-Polish Border Treaty of 1990: International Treaties and the 
Imagining of Poland's Post-1945 Western Border', Journal of Borderlands Studies, 25 (2010), 120-43. 
32 Polish statehood was in abeyance between 1939 and 1945. For definition of 'Kresy' see: Brown, E. K., et al., Concise 
Encyclopedia of Languages of the World (Amsterdam; Oxford: Elsevier Science, 2009), p. 40. 
33 Copsey, N., 'Informed Public Opinion in South-Eastern Poland and Western Ukraine and the Making of Foreign Policy' 
(unpublished DPhil thesis, University of Sussex, Brighton 2007), p. 40. 
34 For example in a range of texts published between 1962 and 2012, a full-text search for the word Kresy found it in 2 
conference papers, 10 journal articles , 4 books, and 2 theses. A full-text search for the word pogranicze within the same 
sample found 4 instances in 1 journal article, 2 books, and 1 thesis. However in three instances the word formed part of a 
source reference written entirely in Polish. Copsey’s thesis was the only Anglophone text in which the word was used by 
itself and even there it only occurred once, in a footnote with no indication of a source. Copsey himself uses the word 
Kresy throughout his thesis. 
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much of the Anglophone secondary literature concerning German victimhood 
during WWII and its aftermath. According to the Oxford English Dictionary 
(hereinafter OED), essentialism is ‘the doctrine that essence is prior to existence’ 
whereby an essence is, inter alia, ‘the intrinsic nature or indispensable quality of 
something, which determines its character’ and a doctrine is ‘a set of beliefs or 
principles held and taught by a Church, political party or other group’.35  As 
applied to human beings, the concept of essentialism is the opposite of 
existentialism which the OED defines as ‘a philosophical theory which 
emphasizes the existence of the individual person as a free and responsible agent 
determining their own development through acts of the will’.36 
Essentialist thinkers, by contrast, view the actions of the group or polity as 
being of primary importance. Individuals are relegated to a subaltern position in 
which they are considered cellular parts of the primary organism (the group or 
polity) connected through the medium of a shared essence. The primary 
organism’s actions in international affairs are treated as a manifestation of the 
collective will of all of its cellular parts. To those who subscribe to this view, 
whether consciously or not, it follows that all members of a group or polity are 
jointly and severally responsible for its actions. As a logical corollary they can be 
considered legitimate targets in armed or economic conflicts and can be held 
collectively guilty of breaches of human rights and/or international law by the 
group or polity or any of its several cellular parts.37 Thus, in the mind of the 
essentialist, which conceptualises ‘states as composite individuals governed by 
compact executive agencies animated by an indivisible will’, it becomes 
legitimate to target civilians in war and economic conflicts solely on the basis of 
their belonging to a given group or polity either de jure or de facto in terms of 
ethnicity or nationality. 38  Similarly, Hitler and his supporters held all Jews 
responsible for slights and offences against them and the German nation by 
specific Jews. It is not relevant, in the current context, whether or not specific 
                                                 
35 Soanes, C., et al., eds., Concise Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 421, 88. 
36 Ibid. p. 499. 
37 For a stark exposition of essentialist thinking, in this case in relation 'the Jews' and the so-called 'Dolchstoßlegende' see: 
Hitler, A., Mein Kampf: Zwei Bände in einem Band Ungekürzte Ausgabe (München: Zentralverlag der NSDAP, 1943 [Vol 
I 1925, Vol II 1927]), pp. 2, 9, 78, 211-12 etc.,… 707. 
38 Clark, C. M., The Sleepwalkers: How Europe went to War in 1914 (London: Penguin Books, 2012), p. 168. 
 29 
Jews were guilty of the crimes of which they stood accused. The point is that the 
extrapolation of their actions to all Jews is a manifestation of essentialist thought.  
During my reading of the secondary literature on the subject of German 
victimhood in the course of WWII, and on the Flucht und Vertreibung of (ethnic) 
Germans from Eastern and Central Europe in particular, I have been struck by a 
pronounced tendency on the part of certain authors to analyse the events in 
question from within an essentialist paradigm. An important objective of this 
thesis, by contrast, is to deconstruct such essentialist thinking in relation to these 
events. 
 
1.6 Literature Review and Critique 
In this section I briefly summarise some key texts relating to Flucht und 
Vertreibung to demonstrate the current consensus amongst scholars as well as to 
draw attention to certain issues that need to be more thoroughly explored.  
There is no controversy about the fact that the expulsions took place. 
Certainly it remains the case that, given the fact that ‘the expulsions have been 
instrumentalised politically for decades, it is not easy to find a language that 
facilitates discussion, avoids becoming politically charged, and at the same time 
calls things by their real names.’39 Nevertheless, these events are well documented 
in a plethora of texts and scholarly works, one of the most useful of which is the 
Lexikon der Vertreibungen (2010), which represents the current international 
consensus amongst researchers working in this field. It is a collaborative work 
produced by 122 academics from 68 universities in 20 countries.40  The main 
contribution this compendious volume makes to the field is its exhaustive 
coverage of mass (primarily forced) population movements in twentieth-century 
Europe. Thus, it places the postwar Flucht und Vertreibung of Germans and 
ethnic Germans within a wider geo-political context as just one (albeit extreme) 
episode during ‘the century of expulsions’. 41  According to Lexikon der 
Vertreibungen, at least 15 million Germans and ethnic Germans and up to 6 
                                                 
39 Karl Schlögel in: Thum, G., Uprooted, p. 3. 
40 Brandes, D., et al., Lexikon der Vertreibungen. 
41 In the subtitle to: Thum, G., Uprooted. 
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million Poles and ethnic Poles were forcibly relocated between 1939 and the late 
1950s.42 
Moreover, the fact that these expulsions were taking place was known to 
contemporaries. Matthew James Frank’s Expelling the Germans: British Opinion 
and Post-1945 Population Transfer in Context (2007) provides compelling 
evidence that the British public and government officials followed these events 
with concern as they unfolded.43 One of the most interesting insights to be gained 
from Frank’s study is the degree of compassion displayed by the British public 
and their preparedness to differentiate between ‘ordinary Germans’ and ‘Nazis’.44 
According to Frank, some 17,000 food parcels were sent from Britain to Germany 
during the expulsion era, a remarkable display of empathy given that food 
rationing continued in Britain until 1954.45 Frank also provides copious detail 
about the British Army’s direct involvement in the movement of Germans from 
those parts of Germany under Polish control to the British Zone in early 1946 
(Operation Swallow).46 
Several important monographs have been written about the political, 
administrative and organisational transition of Silesia from a German province 
(Schlesien) to a Polish voivodeship (Śląsk).47 One of the most comprehensive 
studies is Lower Silesia from Nazi Germany to Communist Poland, 1942-1949 
(1994) by Sebastian Siebel-Achenbach. 48  More recently, Gregor Thum has 
focused on the transition of a single city in Uprooted: How Breslau Became 
Wrocław During the Century of Expulsions (2011).49 Andrew Demshuk published 
two works on the subject in 2012: a journal article entitled ‘Reinscribing 
Schlesien as Śląsk: Memory and Mythology in a Postwar German-Polish 
                                                 
42 Brandes, D., et al., Lexikon der Vertreibungen, pp. 509-10, 605; Potichnyj, P. J., Poland and Ukraine, Past and Present, 
pp. 252-56. 
43 Frank, M. J., Expelling the Germans: British Opinion and Post-1945 Population Transfer in Context, Oxford Historical 
Monographs (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
44 Although it is extremely common to see the word ‘Nazi’ used in Anglophone texts to refer to active members of the 
National Socialist German Workers’ Party or Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (NSDAP) and its associtated 
organs, I have chosen to use the less ideologically burdened ‘National Socialist’ throughout this thesis except in direct 
quotes. In common British parlance the term ‘Nazi’ is often restricted to members of such organisations as the notorious SS 
or ‘Protection Squad’ (Schutzstaffel), but not to the conventional German Armed Forces (Wehrmacht; literally ‘Defence 
Force’). However, usage varies and it is not uncommon to see it applied to the entire German wartime collective, in which 
context it is misleading and tendentious. 
45 Brown, M., et al., The Ration Book Diet (Stroud: Sutton, 2004), p. 35; Frank, M. J., Expelling the Germans, p. 216. 
46 Frank, M. J., Expelling the Germans, pp. 238-73; Brandes, D., et al., Lexikon der Vertreibungen, pp. 24-26. 
47 For reference, the former German region of Lower Silesia overlaps with, but is not coextensive with, three modern Polish 
Voivodeships: Lower Silesia, Lubusz, and Opole. See: Trierenberg, H., Schlesien heute. Eine Brücke zwischen Deutschen 
und Polen (Leer: Rautenberg, 1997). Map on inside cover; Jankowiak-Konik, B., et al., Atlas historii Polski, pp. 178-79. 
48 Siebel-Achenbach, S., Lower Silesia from Nazi Germany to Communist Poland. 
49 Thum, G., Uprooted
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Borderland’ and the monograph The Lost German East: Forced Migration and 
the Politics of Memory, 1945-1970.50 The first of these, like the monographs by 
Siebel-Achenbach and Thum, focuses on the situation in the region after the 
expulsions. The second broadens the scope to take in the history of Silesia and the 
post-Vertreibung situation of the expellees in the Federal Republic of Germany 
(FRG), which involved collective memorialisation, coming to terms with the loss 
of Heimat and political agitation for a right of return. 
These topics are studied comprehensively in publications by the German 
Federation of Expellees or Bund der Vertriebenen (BdV).51  This organisation 
(founded on the 27th of October 1957) represents the interests of three categories 
of German and ethnic Germans: Vertriebene, i.e., Germans and ethnic Germans 
driven out of their homes as an immediate consequence of WWII up to the 31st of 
December 1952; Aussiedler, i.e., Germans and ethnic Germans who made their 
way to either the FRG or the German Democratic Republic (GDR) between the 
31st of December 1952 and the 1st of January 1993; and Spätaussiedler, i.e., 
Germans and ethnic Germans who arrived in Germany after the 12th of December 
1992.52 In this thesis, I am solely concerned with the Vertriebenen.  
The BdV pursues two distinct objectives in its publications. First, it 
produces copious histories of the regions from which Germans and ethnic 
Germans were expelled in the wake of WWII. The so-called ‘Kulturelle 
Arbeitshefte’ is a comprehensive series of such histories.53 Second, it publishes 
widely on the subject of Flucht und Vertreibung and its political and social 
ramifications. The organisation is unequivocal in its condemnation of these events 
                                                 
50 Demshuk, A., 'Reinscribing Schlesien as Śląsk'; Demshuk, A., The Lost German East: Forced Migration and the Politics 
of Memory, 1945-1970 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
51 It is illustrative of the intractability of the collective memory discourse with which this thesis is concerned that some of 
the most relevant scholarship has been conducted on behalf of and by members of an organisation (Bund der Vertriebenen), 
whose views and raison d’être are challenged by other key stakeholders less interested in researching the German heritage 
of the regions in question. Whilst accepting the BdV’s version of history uncritically is problematic due to the fact that the 
organisation represents a specific, well-defined stakeholder collective, but not others, in many cases, other stakeholder 
collectives have either not conducted any research into the same questions, or have published narratives an uncritical 
acceptance of which is equally problematic. There is, in short, no entirely unbiased thread within the relevant collective 
memory discourse. 
52 These groups are defined in the German Federal Expellee Act or Bundesvertriebenengesetz (BVFG), which regulates the 
rights and status of those represented by the BDV within the FRG. Specifically the following paragraphs are relevant: 
Vertriebene (§ 1), Aussiedler (§ 1 Section 3), and Spätaussiedler (§ 4). See: Anon., Vertriebene, Aussiedler, 
Spätaussiedler: Tatsachen und Argumente, (Bonn: BdV, 2008), p. 2. 
53 Some examples are: March, U., Die deutsche Ostsiedlung, Kulturelle Arbeitshefte (Bonn: BdV, 1990); Biewer, L., 
Kleine Geschichte Pommerns, Kulturelle Arbeitshefte (Bonn: BdV, 1997); Mühlen, H. v. z., Die baltischen Lande von der 
Aufsegelung bis zur Umsiedlung, Kulturelle Arbeitshefte (Bonn: BdV, 1997), 15; Kirstein, P. R. H., Oberschlesien: Das 
Land und seine Menschen, (Bonn: BdV, 1998); Neubach, H., Geschichte Schlesiens. 
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as a ‘Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit’. 54  It is in these booklets and 
pamphlets that the BdV raises issues of compensation and the right to return 
home, and in which they hold the German political class and the general 
population to account for their perceived lack of interest in such issues.55 At the 
same time, the organisation is eager to present its pacifist credentials, for example 
by endorsing and reprinting the Charta der deutschen Heimatvertriebenen (5th of 
August 1950) which includes the statement: ‘Wir Heimatvertriebenen verzichten 
auf Rache und Vergeltung’.56 However, despite the pacifistic tone apparent in 
such statements, they do not imply acquiescence in the status quo. As late as 1995 
(i.e. five years after the final recognition of the Oder-Neisse Line by the Berlin 
Republic) the BdV reprinted the Deklaration zur Charta der deutschen 
Heimatvertriebenen (6th of August 1960). This text states more problematically 
that:  
Die Wiedervereinigung aller durch Wilkür und Gewalt 
voneinander getrennten Teile Deutschlands ist trotz aller 
Hemmungen und trotz aller Widerstände herbeizuführen. Dafür 
einzutreten und einzustehen ist den deutschen 
Heimatvertriebenen ernsteste Verpflichtung.57 
 
In many ways, the BdV’s role with respect to the Vertriebenen (but not 
necessarily to the Aussiedler and Spätaussiedler) has largely been obviated by 
wider geo-political developments. As Lynn M. Tesser rightly points out, 
following Poland’s accession to the European Union (EU) and the Schengen 
Agreement (1st of May 2004), any EU citizen, including former German residents, 
can live, work and own property in Poland. A twelve-year derogation which 
placed restrictions on the acquisition of agricultural land and forests in Poland’s 
western and northern territories (the ZO) elapses in 2016.58 Thus, as of 2016 there 
will be no further impediment to prevent survivors of Flucht und Vertreibung 
                                                 
54 Theisen, A., Die Vertreibung der Deutschen, p. 12. 
55 Theisen, A., Die Vertreibung der Deutschen: Ein unbewältigtes Kapitel europäischer Zeitgeschichte: Eine Ausstellung 
des Bundes der Vertriebenen - vereinigte Landsmannschaften und Landesverbände (Bonn: BdV, 1995), p. 46. 
56 Czaja, H., et al., Die Charta der deutschen Heimatvertriebenen 5. August 1950, (Bonn: BdV, 1995), p. 15. 
57 Ibid. p. 16. 
58 For details of Poland's accession to the EU and Schengen Agreement see: Piórko, I. D., 'Enlarging the Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice: Poland's Accession to the European Union in the Field of External Border Controls' (unpublished 
PhD thesis, University of Sussex, 2005); Tesser, L. M., Ethnic Cleansing and the European Union: an Interdisciplinary 
Approach to Security, Memory and Ethnography (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), p. 81. 
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from returning to their home regions and re-acquiring their lost real estate, should 
they wish to do so.59 
Tesser’s monograph on the Flucht und Vertreibung of Germans and ethnic 
Germans from Central and Eastern Europe in the wake of WWII is part of a 
broader comparative project. In her own words, her monograph 
 
offers the first multi-case analysis of […] the (re)integration of 
areas that experienced relatively recent and large-scale forced 
migration based on assumed religious, ethnic or national 
identity [and seeks to explain] variation in threat construction 
surrounding potential minority return [and] the broader impact 
of repeated international sanctioning of minority removal in the 
first half of the 20th century.60  
 
As such, Tesser seeks to detail the historic events in question before 
moving on to explain their impact on modern European society. She expands 
upon existing structural analytical concepts to develop a quadratic nexus in a 
largely successful attempt to find compelling explanations for historic episodes of 
sociocide and the related modern socio-political phenomena (securitisation issues) 
addressed in the book. 61  On the whole, Tesser’s work is convincing and 
informative. However, she misquotes the summary protocol of the Potsdam 
Conference which, she states, called for the ‘humane and orderly transfer of ethnic 
Germans from Poland’s former German territories, from other parts of Poland, the 
Free City of Danzig, from Czechoslovakia’s Sudetenland, and from Hungary’ (my 
italics).62 In fact, the protocol states that the territories referred to throughout this 
thesis as the ZO are to be placed under ‘the administration of the Polish state’ and 
that ‘the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should await the 
peace settlement’.63 With regard to the transfer of Germans the protocol records 
the following: 
 
The Three Governments, having considered the question in all 
its aspects, recognize that the transfer to Germany of German 
populations, or elements thereof, remaining in Poland, 
                                                 
59 71 years after the expulsions, the influx of returning Germans is unlikely to be overwhelming. 
60 Tesser, L. M., Ethnic Cleansing and the European Union, pp. 9-10. 
61 Ibid. pp. 17-29. 
62 Ibid. pp. 62, 208; Tesser also misattributes this to Article VII of the Potsdam Protocol whereas the section that deals with 
Poland is Article VIII. The 'Orderly transfer of German populations' is dealt with in Article XII. See: Anon., 'The Berlin 
(Potsdam) Conference, July 17-August 2, 1945 (a) Protocol of the Proceedings, August l, 1945', in The Berlin (Potsdam) 
Conference, (Potsdam, 1945). 
63 Anon., 'Potsdam Conference: Protocol of the Proceedings', p. VIII/B. 
 34 
Czechoslovakia and Hungary, will have to be undertaken. They 
agree that any transfers that take place should be effected in an 
orderly and humane manner.64 
 
Thus, it is Tesser who refers to these people as ‘ethnic Germans’ rather 
than simply ‘Germans’. This inadvertent, and seemingly minor, conflation 
between ‘ethnic Germans’ (i.e. minority populations within non-German titular 
states) and Reichsdeutschen has important ramifications within the collective 
memory discourse with which this thesis is concerned. It is, therefore, worth 
examining in detail the categories of people considered by the BdV to constitute 
the Vertriebenen. 
Among the Vertriebenen, the BdV recognises 22 distinct groups. Of these, 
17 can be classed as ethnic Germans, i.e., they had lived beyond the frontiers of 
the Third Reich prior to the outbreak of WWII. A subset of these, ‘[die] Waisen 
von Versailles’, (or their direct predecessors) had lived in Germany (i.e., within 
the Kaiserreich or Austria) before the end of the First World War (hereinafter 
WWI).65 This subset comprised the following groups (official BdV terminology): 
[die] Danziger, Sudetendeutschen, Deutschen aus dem Weichsel-Warthe-Gebiet, 
and Westpreußen. The remaining ethnic Germans were [die] Deutschbalten, 
Banater Schwaben, Bessarabierdeutschen, Buchenlanddeutschen, Dobrudscha- 
und Bulgariendeutschen, Donauschwaben, Karpatendeutschen in der Slowakei, 
Deutschen aus Litauen, Russlanddeutschen, Sathmarer Schwaben, Siebenbürger 
Sachsen, and Deutschen in Ungarn. The remaining five groups encompassed not 
ethnic Germans, but German citizens (Reichsdeutsche). These were [die] Ost-
Brandenburger, Ostpreußen, Pommern, Oberschlesier and the Lower Silesians 
(Schlesier) with whom this thesis is primarily concerned.66 
Thus, it is correct to categorise those ethnic Germans ‘stranded’ in Poland 
following the creation of the Second Republic in 1918 as a minority population of 
ethnic Germans. The same is true of those who had been forcibly relocated to new 
German states created by the NSDAP within conquered Polish territory between 
1939 and 1945 from the Baltic States, Galicia, West Volhynia, Bessarabia and the 
                                                 
64 Ibid. p. XII. 
65 For an overview of the main areas of German settlement in the Second Republic and German territorial losses to Poland 
following World War One see: Schmidt, C.-D., et al., Map: Historische Heimat in Spiegel Geschichte 1/2011: Die 
Deutschen im Osten: Auf den Spuren einer verlorenen Zeit, Spiegel Geschichte (Hamburg: SPIEGEL-Verlag, 2011), pp. 
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66 Anon., Vertriebene, Aussiedler, Spätaussiedler, p. 3. 
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Bukovina.67 In total 1,385,800 of this minority ethnic German population were 
expelled from Poland starting in mid 1944. 68  However, those Reichsdeutsche 
expelled from the ZO between 1944 and 1952 (a total of 6,981,000 by 1949) 
cannot reasonably be considered to have formed a minority within Poland and 
should not be referred to as ‘ethnic’ Germans. 69  They had been resident in 
territories that had been central to German culture and had formed part of 
Germany for centuries (in the case of Silesia since the Treaty of Trentschin in 
1335).70 Moreover, in a strictly legal sense, they were not expelled from Poland: 
they were forcibly relocated from specific German provinces to other parts of 
Germany. 
Another frequently encountered problem within the secondary literature 
relating to the Vertreibungen is the uncritical assumption that they were, largely, a 
response to the Holocaust.71 As I demonstrate in Chapter 3, this notion of an 
explicit causal link between the Holocaust and the Vertreibungen is wholly 
inadequate as an overarching explanatory framework at the geo-political level. 
The forced expulsion of Germans and ethnic Germans from Central and Eastern 
Europe in the wake of the War was not a response to the Holocaust but rather to 
German aggression against specific non-Jewish citizens of titular states such as 
Poles and Czechs. Indeed, the notion of Vertreibung as retribution for the 
Holocaust is particularly problematic with respect to Poland given the 
institutionalisation of anti-Semitism in Poland during the interbellum and postwar 
periods.72  
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1997), pp. 108-11. 
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vom Leben wie es damals war (Eggolsheim: Nebel, 2000), p. 207; Bahlcke, J., et al., Schlesien und die Schlesier (Munich: 
Langen Müller, 2004), p. 27; Neubach, H., Geschichte Schlesiens, p. 6; Werner, K., 'Schlesien unsere Heimat', Schlesische 
Nachrichten, April 01 2006, 11; Leuschner, M., Heimat und Schickal, p. 20. 
71 This issue has recently been problematised in: Tesser, L. M., Ethnic Cleansing and the European Union, pp. 62, 64; 
Eigler, F., Heimat, Space, Narrative: Towards a Transnational Approach to Flight and Expulsion (Rochester, New York: 
Camden House, 2014), p. 58. 
72 Smolar, A., 'Jews as a Polish Problem', Daedalus, 116 (1987), 31-73, pp. 192-93, 244, 51; Engelking, B., et al., 
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The publication in 2001 of the monograph Neighbors: The Destruction of 
the Jewish Community in Jedwabne, Poland by Jan Tomasz Gross triggered a 
nationwide debate about anti-Semitism in Poland. In it he alludes to the Polish 
‘inhabitants of Jedwabne who engaged in the murder of the Jewish people’ on the 
10th of July 1941.73 This episode also inspired Józef Hen’s Pinpongista (2008) 
which explores Polish anti-Semitism and the complicity of certain members of the 
Catholic clergy in anti-Jewish pogroms carried out under German occupation. 
However, by focusing the narrative on a Polish protagonist, Mike Murphy 
(formerly Michał Dembina), and including episodes of conspicuous bravery on 
the part of Poles who risked their lives to save Jews from the murderers, the 
(Polish-Jewish) author presents a highly complex version of the events in 
question.74 
According to Piotr Madajczyk, in addition to existing anti-Semitic 
sentiments in pre-war Poland 
 
auch die nationalsozialistische antijüdische Propaganda blieb 
nicht ganz wirkungslos. Insgesamt führte die deutsche Politik 
zur wachsenden Entfremdung zwischen Polen und Juden, das 
jüdische Schicksal wurde nicht als ‘polnisch’ angesehen.75 
 
Madajczyk goes on to argue that, from the perspective of the Polish 
underground organisations, the official end of WWII did not represent an obvious 
caesura. In many cases, they continued their activities which, during the war had 
been directed at foreign (i.e., non-Polish) elements in Poland. In this context, all 
non-ethnic-Poles, including Polish Jews, were regarded as invaders and occupiers, 
regardless of their actual status before the War. It was in this context that 
                                                                                                                                     
Poland: a Modern History (London: I.B.Tauris and Co Ltd, 2010); Fehr, H., Eliten und zivile Gesellschaft: 
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75 Piotr Madajczyk in: Frackowiak, J., et al., Nationalistische Politik und Ressentiments: Deutsche und Polen von 1871 bis 
zur Gegenwart, Berichte und Studien (Göttingen: V&R unipress, 2013), p. 226. 
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animosity towards Jews grew, who, far from eliciting a feeling of solidarity and 
sympathy as victims of the NSDAP genocide, were seen as foreigners.76 
Calls to juxtapose every exhibition relating to Flucht und Vertreibung with 
images and records of the Holocaust are, therefore, misleading at best, and 
essentialist at worst. Essentialist because associating the killing or expulsion of 
any randomly-selected set of (ethnic) Germans with the murder of Jews by 
specific Germans, especially in order to justify the former, assumes the collective 
guilt of all (ethnic) Germans, disregarding the role of personal agency in the 
question of guilt.77 
This undercurrent of essentialism in scholarly and popular accounts of 
German victimhood per se, and Flucht und Vertreibung in particular, is highly 
problematic. In general, much of the existing secondary literature on the subject of 
Flucht und Vertreibung suffers from a tendency to favour strategies of 
disambiguation in the search for identifiable perpetrators and victims. This 
observation is especially true of a significant proportion of the relevant 
Anglophone historiography, which takes as its starting point an axiomatic 
assumption of moral superiority vis-à-vis Anglo-American participation and 
actions throughout the World War Duplex. This attitude engenders a tendency to 
embrace reductionism, resulting in inadequacy at the explanatory level within the 
relevant narratives. In point of fact, the collective memory discourse pertaining to 
these events has been complicated by several factors, particularly in relation to 
perpetrator-victim narratives. For example, all of the events referred to in this 
thesis touch upon what is generally thought of as the thorny issue of German 
victimhood. The issue in question is predicated upon the idea that Germans living 
throughout the period during which the NSDAP rose to power and became the 
leading political body in Germany can legitimately be considered collectively 
guilty for NSDAP atrocities. Yet many Germans and ethnic Germans were 
themselves the victims of NSDAP policies. The fact that large numbers of 
Germans and ethnic Germans were forced out of their homes by the NSDAP 
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authorities confounds simplistic interpretations of these events in which the 
perpetrators and victims are conceived of in ethno-nationalist terms. I have 
already mentioned the victimisation of ethnic Germans from the Baltic States, 
Galicia, West Volhynia, Bessarabia and the Bukovina pursuant to the Hitler-Stalin 
Pact. Chapter 6 is concerned with another example of such German-German 
expulsions. 78  The situation with regard to the Polish government’s part in 
population transfers across the new Polish-Soviet frontier is equally problematic 
in terms of clear perpetrator-victim definitions.  
Yet, this tendency to simplify accounts of the War has not gone 
unchallenged. For example, supported by a cohort of Anglophone and German 
scholars, William (Bill) Niven has, over the past decade and a half, pioneered 
research into the postwar discourse on German victimhood.79 Niven has usefully 
drawn attention to the conceptual difficulties inherent in the use of such simplistic 
terms as ‘perpetrator collective’ to describe ‘the broad mass of [wartime] 
Germans’, and ‘liberator collective’ as applied to the Allies.80 The use of such 
terminology glosses over the actual complexity of the communities thus 
described. For example, the NSDAP came to power, not with the support of ‘the 
broad mass of Germans’, but rather in opposition to the wishes of some two thirds 
of voters in the two elections that marked the transition from the Weimar 
Republic to the Third Reich in 1932 and 1933.81  
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80 Niven, W. J., et al., Germans as Victims, pp. 15-16. 
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 39 
Another complicating factor that questions the legitimacy of the reference 
to Germans, who lived through the Third Reich and WWII, as ‘perpetrator 
collective’ is the fact that Hitler arguably carried out a coup d’état of sorts known 
in German historiography as the Machtergreifung. This political manoeuvre was 
enabled by a series of crises culminating in a final round of elections on the 5th of 
March 1933 and the so-called Ermächtigungsgesetz (24th of March 1933).82 This 
legislation, all of which was enacted in strict compliance with the Weimar 
constitution, effectively bestowed dictatorial powers on Hitler who then 
implemented a totalitarian regime aimed, among other things, at the suppression 
of all dissent among ‘the broad mass of Germans’. One of the first institutions to 
be implemented under Hitler’s new regime were concentration camps which were, 
initially, used for the incarceration of German political prisoners.83  
This tendency to exaggerate the level of support for Hitler among ‘the 
broad mass of Germans’ does not reflect contemporary views among non-German 
populations. Indeed, I have already noted above that many Britons differentiated 
clearly between ‘ordinary Germans’ and ‘Nazis’ in the immediate aftermath of the 
War.84 Yet, an ordinance issued by the Polish Ministerstwo Ziem Odzyskanych or 
Ministry for the Regained Territories (MZO) on the 6th of April 1946 went even 
further.85 Taking account of the fact that party membership was, in many cases, 
compulsory, the ordinance states, inter alia, that an individual’s proven 
membership in the NSDAP does not in and of itself debar him or her from being 
recognised as a Polish national.86 
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A final objection to the notion of Germans as an undifferentiated 
‘perpetrator collective’ arises logically from the conception of the Allies as a 
‘liberator collective’. For, this latter concept entails the notion that the Allies were 
liberating ‘the broad mass of Germans’ from their NSDAP oppressors.87  The 
logical corollary of this position is that ‘the broad mass of Germans’ constituted a 
‘victim collective’, which cannot be reconciled with representations of the same 
people as a ‘perpetrator collective’.  
Further complicating the concept of the Allies as a ‘liberator collective’ is 
fact that the Allies agreed to, and actively supported the new Polish authorities in 
executing the expulsions. This has specific ramifications for British 
historiography, because people who choose to portray the Allies as a ‘liberator 
collective’ must necessarily classify forced expulsion as an act of liberation.88 
Any such classification, however, is at odds with both popular and elite discourse 
in Britain throughout the interbellum period. According to Matthew Frank, 
contemporaries regarded such events as ‘monstrously wicked’ acts of ‘Asiatic 
abomination […] which all right thinking people regard as detestable’. 89 
Moreover, it is at odds with current international law and norms.90 It is because of 
Britain’s intimate involvement in both instances of sociocide with which this 
thesis is concerned that I treat Anglophone literature on the subject as part of a 
specific stakeholder narrative within the relevant collective memory discourse. 
Specifically, I treat this corpus as being on a par with scholarly works produced 
by all other stakeholders (Germans, Poles, Ukrainians, Soviets and so on).  
The subject of victim identification has also been complicated by arbitrary 
assignment of the affected populations to various identity categories, first by 
agents of the German Reich and later by the Polish government. The issue turns 
on the so-called Deutsche Volksliste (DVL) in which NSDAP officials 
categorised individuals in the occupied areas of Poland, grouping them in 
accordance with stated or perceived ethnic affiliations.91 Groups A and B were 
                                                 
87 I return to this them in Chapter 4 in relation to representations of one of the Allies, the Soviet Red Army, as a liberating 
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88 Unless specifically indicated I use the word historiography in the sense of the writing of history throughout this thesis. 
See: Soanes, C., et al., eds., Concise OED, p. 676. 
89 Frank, M. J., Expelling the Germans, pp. 10, 21. 
90 For a comprehensive exposition and discussion of the legal aspects of forced population transfers see: Drew, C. J., 
'Population Transfer: the Untold Story of the International Law of Self-determination' (unpublished PhD thesis, University 
of London, London 2005). 
91 Frackowiak, J., et al., Deutsche und Polen von 1871 bis zur Gegenwart, pp. 181-220. 
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reserved for people who had openly professed their German ethnicity prior to the 
German invasion, and those who had lived as Germans in private but not in 
public. Group C was for people of mixed race and/or with non-German spouses, 
and/or for non-Polish Slavs.92 Group D was reserved for the non-German spouses 
of ‘pure’ Germans (from Groups C) and for politically suspect ‘pure’ Germans 
(who would otherwise qualify for inclusion in Groups A or B). Neither German 
nor Polish Jews were eligible for inclusion in any category.93 During the period of 
German occupation, which at the time the DVL was compiled looked likely to be 
indefinite, there were obvious advantages to being included in one of the ‘safe 
groups’ in terms of citizenship, status, and treatment within the legal system.94  
However, after these lists fell into the hands of the Polish authorities in the 
closing months of WWII, those who had sought to improve their survival chances 
by denying their Polish identity were persecuted as traitors, collaborators, and 
enemies of the state.95 In addition, the Polish authorities implemented a process of 
national verification (weryfikacja narodowościowa) within the ZO beginning on 
the 22nd of March 1945.96 This process essentially mirrored the DVL in every way 
except that the focus was on Polish ethnicity.97 As had been the case with the 
DVL, the assignment of individuals to one or other of the available categories 
during national verification was often based on arbitrary decisions and political 
considerations. Skilled German workers in key industries were often ‘converted to 
Poles’ en masse. Far from being expelled, these workers were forced to remain in 
Poland and the annexed territories regardless of their personal preferences. 98 Coal 
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miners from Waldenburg (Wałbrzych), for example, were treated in this manner.99 
Another group of key German workers retained within the annexed territories 
were the railway workers. 100  Others affected in this way were the so-called 
autochthons, the allegedly aboriginal inhabitants of Upper Silesia, who were 
neither German nor Polish.101  
A further historic circumstance that has complicated the ensuing discourse 
is the changing role played by the USSR between 1939 and 1952 (when the 
Vertreibungen as defined by the BdV ceased). Having actively colluded with 
Germany in the invasion and partition of Poland in September 1939, the USSR 
advanced to become the leading partner among the Allies by the end of WWII. 
This assessment is true in terms of the USSR’s contribution to the military defeat 
of the Third Reich and of the part Josef Stalin played in establishing the postwar 
geopolitical situation in Central and Eastern Europe.102 By 1952, the so-called 
Cold War had already begun and the USSR was regarded by ‘the West’ (which 
included the FRG) as an enemy state.103 This state of affairs was reflected in the 
relevant historiography on both sides of the ‘Iron Curtain’ in various ways. In 
Chapters 3 and 4, I elaborate further on the historical situation and the relevant 
collective memory discourse. 
Thus, it is clear that all attempts to characterise any ‘broad mass’ of people 
in such simplistic terms as ‘perpetrator’, ‘liberator’, or ‘victim’ collectives are 
fraught with conceptual difficulties and tend to substitute analytical sophistication 
with conceptual simplification, which occludes, rather than illuminates, the 
relevant historic situation. In this thesis, I seek to build upon the work carried out 
in the field of German victimhood by Niven et al., augmenting it through a 
consideration of Polish discourse on German victimhood. Moreover, as I 
demonstrate in the following chapters, viewing WWII and its immediate 
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aftermath from a Polish perspective also problematises the general assessment of 
the Allies a ‘liberator collective’ in some interesting and productive ways. 
By contrast with much of the earlier nationally-based historiography and 
public discourse, with which Tesser, Eigler, Niven et al., have taken issue, the 
subject of postwar sociocide is treated with considerably more circumspection in 
recent collaborative work by European scholars based in the immediately affected 
regions. In addition to the Lexikon der Vertreibungen mentioned above, another 
recent excellent example of the collaborative scholarship currently taking place in 
this field is Nationalistische Politik und Ressentiments: Deutsche und Polen von 
1871 bis zur Gegenwart (2013) by Johannes Frackowiak (Editor) et al. This book 
presents a collection of essays based on papers presented by Polish, Czech and 
German historians and political scientists at an international workshop organised 
by the Hannah-Arendt Institut für Totalitarismusforschung (HAIT) on the 16th and 
17th of September 2011.104 The workshop was convened to explore the influence 
of nationalism and nationalist policy in historical relations between Germans and 
Poles. In addition, the delegates were interested in the question of whether, and to 
what extent, longer-term nationalist attitudes are still shaping political discourse 
in Poland, particularly in relation to the kind of anti-German resentment that 
surfaced there during the PiS regime under Jarosław Kaczyński.105The authors’ 
balanced contextualisation of events which are often discussed in highly charged 
emotional terms, such as postwar territorial and population transfers, opens up 
new perspectives and questions established narratives. Even the fact that 
Frackowiak has taken 1871 as his starting point usefully augments the usual 
periodization encountered in Polish historiography in which the entire period from 
1795 to 1918 is treated as a single epoch (The Partition Era).106 Frackowiak’s 
point of departure is interesting because 1871 is arguably the first time in history 
as of which one can talk in terms of ‘Germany’ in anything like its modern 
meaning. 107  I draw liberally on this source throughout the following study, 
particularly in Chapters 3 and 4.  
                                                 
104 Hannah-Arendt Institute for Research on Totalitarianism at the Dresden University of Technology 
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106 See, for example: Kuczyński, S. K., et al., A Panorama of Polish History (Warsaw: Interpress Publishers, 1982), pp. 83-
114; Davies, N., Heart of Europe: the Past in Poland's Present (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 138-244. 
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the Commonwealth of Poland-Lithuania (1772, 1792, and 1795) as an expression of German aggression per se. By 
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The foregoing discussion primarily relates to key secondary sources, 
whose object of study is either sociocide per se (e.g. Brandes et al.), longer term 
contextualising of Polish-German narratives (e.g. Frackowiak et al.), German 
victimhood during WWII per se (e.g. Niven et al.), contextualisation with respect 
to the Holocaust (e.g. Eigler), the process of territorial transition (e.g. Siebel-
Achenbach and Thum), and the current relationship between expellees and the 
titular states now incorporating their places of origin (e.g. Tesser). I have reserved 
discussion of the literature relating to the notion of collective memory for Section 
2.1 below, in which I review the development of the concept and clarify the way I 
shall be using the term throughout this thesis. 
 In the next chapter I turn to the theoretic paradigm within which I analyse 
the collective memory discourse pertaining to Poland’s annexation of parts of 
Germany, surrender of the Kresy to the USSR, and the concomitant population 
transfers. 
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least in terms of corporate responsibility). See: Schulze, H., Gibt es überhaupt eine deutsche Geschichte?, Corso bei 
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2: Theoretical Framework 
 
2.1 Trauma-Based Collective Memory Discourse 
The theoretical framework underpinning the following chapters is based on 
aspects of the phenomenon of collective memory. The concept of collective 
memory has been defined in a number of different ways, some of which are 
mutually exclusive. The concept is further complicated by the different meanings 
implied by the use of the grammatical article ‘the/a’ before ‘collective memory’. 
For example, it could be interpreted as having a genitive function, i.e., it refers to 
‘the/a memory of the/a collective’. Alternatively it could imply specificity, i.e., 
‘the/a specific instance of collective memory’. The use of the plural ‘collective 
memories’ can also be interpreted in several ways: ‘several collective memories 
relating to one incident’, ‘several instances of collective memory relating to 
different incidents’ and so on. Moreover, the term ‘collective memory’ by itself 
implies a phenomenon that can be discussed without reference to a specific 
incident. Therefore, extreme care is required when using the term. For the sake of 
clarity, I present below a working definition of the term ‘collective memory’ as 
used throughout this thesis. I first define ‘collective memory’ as a phenomenon 
and then discuss ‘collective memories’ relating to two specific instances of 
sociocide (i.e., potentially conflicting shared relevant memories espoused by 
several stakeholder communities). Before I do so, however, I will explore the 
problems of the concept as originally introduced by Maurice Halbwachs and 
survey more recent thought on the subject. 
The English term ‘collective memory’ is a translation of Maurice 
Halbwachs’ notion of mémoire collective. 108  Disputing Halbwachs’ claim to 
originality in conceiving of memory at a group level, Nicolas Russell argues that 
‘we can trace the notion of group memory to the earliest texts in Western 
civilization […although] the term collective memory appeared only recently’.109 
Pre-Halbwachsian French terms, such as la mémoire des hommes, la mémoire de 
la postérité, une mémoire éternelle or une mémoire perpétuelle, straddle a socio-
academic complex ranging from legend to recorded history and are arguably 
                                                 
108 Halbwachs, M., On Collective Memory, trans. Lewis A. Coser, The Heritage of Sociology (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1992 [1925]). 
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identical to Halbwachs’ concept of ‘collective memory’.110 Nevertheless, there is 
no doubt that it was Halbwachs who popularised ‘collective memory’ both as a 
concept and as a term. Yet, his definition of the term is by no means 
unambiguous, a fact that has resulted in disagreement within the field of collective 
memory studies and a proliferation of definitions.  
Lewis Coser, translator and editor of On Collective Memory (1992) which 
combines Halbwachs’ Les cadres sociaux de la mémoire (1925) and La 
topographie légendaire des évangiles en terre sainte (1941), states that ‘collective 
memory [as defined by Halbwachs] is essentially a reconstruction of the past in 
the light of the present’.111 Halbwachs argued that individuals remember only 
fragments of the past and that ‘the greatest number of memories come back to us 
when [others] recall them to us [… and that] it is in society that people normally 
acquire their memories’.112 He goes on to assert that 
 
[there] is no point seeking where [memories] are preserved in 
the brain […] for they are recalled to me externally [… and it] 
is in this sense that there exists a collective memory and social 
frameworks for memory; it is to the degree that our individual 
thought places itself in these frameworks and participates in this 
memory that it is capable of the act of recollection.113 
 
This apparent denial of the existence of individual memory outside of 
collective memory and social frameworks suggests that, for Halbwachs, collective 
memory is more than a convenient metaphor.114 It also places him at odds with 
mainstream neuroscience.115 Indeed, Halbwachs appears to be unconvinced by his 
own theory, and asks rhetorically whether explaining ‘the memory of an 
individual by the memory of others’ is not a tautology.116 However, he goes on to 
                                                 
110 Ibid. pp. 793-94. 
111 Lewis A. Coser in: Halbwachs, M., On Collective Memory, p. 34. 
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113 Ibid. p. 38. 
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116 Halbwachs, M., On Collective Memory, p. 38. 
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develop his theory whilst leaving this central tautology unresolved. This issue 
notwithstanding, by Halbwachs’ definition, collective memory is the primary 
phenomenon and personal memories – if they exist – are subjective perspectives 
not on the events in question but on the narrative created and sustained by the 
group.117  From a subjective perspective this is unconvincing. Logically too it 
cannot be correct because one remembers things that happen when one is alone, 
including certain things, such as dreams and the perception of qualia, which are 
irreducibly subjective and categorically inaccessible to the collective. 
A number of researchers, including Jan and Aleida Assmann, have put 
considerable effort into clarifying Halbwachs’ original ideas. The Assmanns have, 
for example, refined the entire field of trans-personal memory studies by 
introducing and defining a number of now standard terms designed to tease out 
and mobilise the various perspectives inherent, but not necessarily fully elucidated 
in, Halbwachs’ original concept. Jan Assmann identifies clear theoretical 
differences between cultural, communicative, and social memory. 118  Yet, Jan 
Assmann’s ideas remain axiomatically rooted in the paradigm established by 
Halbwachs. For example, he writes that ‘Maurice Halbwachs has shown, even our 
auto-biographical memory is a social construction that we build up in 
communication with others’ and that ‘[it] was Halbwachs’s great discovery that 
human memory depends, like consciousness in general, on socialization and 
communication’ (my italics). 119  Thus, Assmann argues that Halbwachs has 
‘shown’, i.e. demonstrated, the primacy of collective worldviews over personal 
memory and that this is a ‘great discovery’. As I have already argued above that, 
far from having demonstrated this relationship between social constructs and 
individual memory, Halbwachs asserted that it holds true, before recognising the 
tautological aspect of his own argument and leaving it unresolved. To that extent, 
I must conclude that those elements of Assmann’s exposition that wholeheartedly 
endorse Halbwachs’ core idea, treating it as axiomatic, are themselves built upon 
a central tautology. However, Jan Assmann then goes on to state explicitly that his 
own concept of cultural memory is not intended to replace Halbwachs’ notion of 
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2011), pp. 15-26; Jan Assmann in: Erll, A., et al., Media and Cultural Memory: An International and Interdisciplinary 
Handbook (Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2008), pp. 109-18. 
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collective memory, but rather to ‘distinguish between the two forms as two 
different […] ways of remembering’.120  Whilst this is certainly an interesting 
distinction, it does contribute to the terminological and conceptual imprecision in 
the field of trans-personal memory studies, which I address below. 
Many post-Halbwachsian collective memory researchers, by contrast, have 
admitted the existence and primacy of personal memory and argued for an 
understanding of collective memory as a phenomenon which augments it in some 
way. Nonetheless, defining the concept has proved challenging. For example, 
following Paul Ricoeur, Russell begins his review of the concept of collective 
memory pre- and post-Halbwachs with what he designates ‘a broad working 
definition’, namely that ‘memories attributed to more than one person are 
collective memories’, which he freely admits is ‘frustratingly simple’. Indeed, it is 
a simple tautology.121  
Halbwachs argued that every group of individuals can be thought of as 
having a shared identity based on its collective experiences and that no two group-
identities are ever exactly the same. As a result, each group has its own collective 
memory and these are largely unique.122 Assuming this is ever true, it is more 
likely to apply to groups that remain stable over time and share most experiences, 
such as isolated village communities. Halbwachs goes on to argue that group 
identity is based on collective memory and that, therefore, when the collective 
memory changes the group ceases to exist.123 However, this is another example of 
tautological reasoning: the group is identified as such because its members share a 
collective memory; but the collective memory is defined as such because it 
represents the version of events agreed upon by the group. Therefore, the group 
must pre-date the formation of the collective memory but at the same time the 
collective memory must pre-date the formation of the group. Moreover, according 
to the working definition I set out in detail below, the collective memory of any 
given event is a socio-political performative process actively expressed through 
the production of physical and cultural artefacts. It is, therefore, in a constant state 
of flux and subject to on-going renegotiation. Thus, collective memories change 
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continuously and, were Halbwachs’ assertion true that the group ceases to exist 
whenever they do so, the group would never form in the first place, or else it 
would be so ephemeral as to be almost meaningless as a focus for historical or 
cultural study.  
One crucial aspect of Halbwachs’ definition of the concept of collective 
memory, which was still current in the late twentieth century, is that it concerns 
knowledge (i.e. direct memories) of lived experience. Writing in 1998, Marie-
Claire Lavabre, for example, defined collective memory as, inter alia, ‘lived 
experience belonging to a specific group’.124 According to Jeffrey Olick, a similar 
level of knowledge about an event not acquired through subjective lived 
(‘organic’) experience constitutes knowledge of history. 125  Silke Arnold-de 
Simine, on the other hand, argues convincingly that ‘all memories are mediated 
experience [… and that] it is only a question of how many layers of mediation 
distance [one] from an event.’ 126  Indeed, in a recent work concerning the 
mediation of memory in museum settings, Arnold-de Simine asks rhetorically 
whether ‘collective memory’ even exists: perhaps, she suggests, it ‘[is] just a 
metaphor for certain forms of cultural representation … or simply a heuristic tool 
that helps us to distinguish these forms from other modes of engagement [with 
past events].’127 Several authors have suggested and used ‘collected memories’ as 
an alternative term.128  This is less reminiscent of Jungian mysticism and, by 
contrast with Halbwachs’ original concept, implies a specific physical repository 
of information rather than a phenomenon, however defined. 129  For Dutceac 
Segesten, on the other hand, the term ‘collective memory’ remains useful, but 
needs to be understood as a cultural practice that involves an element of political 
myth making. In this definition, collective memories are based on a selection of 
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past events, presented more or less accurately as required to support the prevailing 
shared group myth. The overall objective, she argues, is ‘to mobilize emotions 
and generate or modify attitudes among the members of [a] community.’130 Other 
researchers, such as Olick et al., suggest that, whilst the term ‘collective memory’ 
does refer to something real, the term is imprecise and could usefully be replaced 
by the expression ‘social memory’.131 Yet, as Arnold-de Simine rightly points out, 
the inherent imprecision of the concept is a function of the word ‘memory’, which 
 
has more than one referent … a neurophysiological capacity, 
which resides in the individual [… and] a formation of social 
and cultural practices […] which extend individual memory 
beyond first-hand experiences.132  
 
Thus, I argue, many problems with the concept of collective memory are 
rooted in the purported trans-personalisation of memory, not with the word we 
choose to represent this trans-personalisation (‘collective’, ‘social’, ‘cultural’ and 
so on). As if in response to this objection, Susan Sontag favours the use of the 
term ‘collective instruction’.133  This usefully emphasises questions relating to 
who is being instructed and by whom.  
To further complicate matters, the concept (or metaphor) of collective 
memory, however defined, is based on our understanding of personal memory 
gained through subjective experience. However, post-Halbwachsian scholarship 
has identified different types of personal memory, all of which have the potential 
to serve as the conceptual referent to which collective memory, as a metaphor, 
points. The two kinds of personal memory that are most relevant in the current 
context are episodic and semantic memory.134 Episodic memory is what most 
people mean when they talk about memory in a non-academic context. It ‘refers to 
the context-rich recollection of unique personal experiences’. 135  By contrast, 
semantic memory is neither experiential nor subjective, but rather it 
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deals with facts, knowledge about the world and objects, 
knowledge about language, knowledge about oneself, and 
conceptual priming. Information is represented in long-term 
memory as a network of associations among concepts.136  
 
According to Russell, ‘early modern collective memory greatly resembles 
semantic memory [in that it …] is not connected by nature to any particular 
individual’s or group’s memory or identity.’137 Thus, the story of some Herculean 
feat performed somewhere in the world is gradually disseminated to other places 
where it becomes part of the collective memory. However, Russell quickly falls 
foul of the terminological confusion surrounding collective memory discourse 
when he states: ‘I can remember [Alexander the Great’s] actions, but they are not 
part of my past experience’.138 Citing this as an example of semantic memory, he 
might more accurately have said: ‘I can remember learning about one culturally-
biased version of the history of [Alexander the Great’s] actions; they are not part 
of my past experience [therefore they are part of my semantic memory], but 
learning about them is [episodic memory].  
As the preceding paragraphs, which touch upon a tiny sample of the 
available literature on the subject, amply demonstrate, there is a considerable 
degree of terminological and conceptual imprecision within the field of collective 
memory studies, sufficient to warrant, not another attempt at an authoritative 
definition, but rather a specific working definition for the current thesis. For the 
sake of clarity, the exposition and arguments presented throughout the following 
chapters are predicated on a definition of trauma-based collective memory as a 
contested narrative discourse directed towards the establishment of a specific 
stakeholder narrative of a given traumatic event as historical fact.139 Thus, it 
encompasses three distinct aspects, namely a specific trauma, a set of stakeholders 
and a goal-oriented discursive process.  
Crucially, it is not only the victims of an event who form collective 
memories about it. Perpetrators or alleged perpetrators, if they form a collective, 
also participate in an analogous process to produce their own negotiated 
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explanatory model, or collective memory, of the events in question. At an 
analytical level, the subject of investigation is the entirety of the artefacts and 
performative acts in which the relevant discursive process, or more precisely, the 
various, competing strands of the associated discourse, are encoded.  
The concept of collective memory as used throughout this thesis is not 
based solely on episodic memory and therefore differs significantly from 
Halbwachs’ original concept. This does not imply that specific individuals within 
a given memory collective cannot have their own episodic memories of the events 
in question. Indeed, within the definition of collective memory presented in this 
thesis, episodic memory plays an important role although the crucial process 
involves the transition from episodic to semantic memory. Certainly, it is the case 
that those who do have episodic memories of the event in question often claim a 
privileged position within the on-going process of negotiating and contesting the 
relevant facts and information as they will eventually become ossified in the 
history books and in the built environment. However, it is worth noting in this 
context that eyewitnesses’ testimony can be limited both through what Erich 
Maria Remarque termed the ‘frog perspective’, or, to coin a phrase, the myopia of 
proximity, and by the conditions under which their memories were formed.140 
Battle conditions, for example, are not conducive to the formation of accurate 
memories because of the negative impact stress can have on the hippocampus 
upon the intact functioning of which episodic memory depends.141 In addition, an 
important concept within Mikhail Bakhtin’s philosophical system known as 
dialogism, which is highly relevant to the analysis of eyewitness testimony in 
collective memory discourses, is the ‘law of placement’. This emphasises the 
uniqueness of perception within a given existence and the fact ‘that the meaning 
of whatever is observed is shaped by the [mental, experiential, existential] place 
from which it is perceived’.142 
Collective memory, as I use the term in this thesis, is more than a 
collection of discreet personal (episodic) memories of a given event, regardless of 
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the extent to which these may converge. Thus, the term ‘collected memory’, as 
favoured by Young, Olick, and Browning, does not adequately express the 
concept.143  Indeed, one of its key characteristics is that witnesses of a given 
(usually traumatic) event strive to express, externalise, and share their personal 
memories with other victims. This initiates a process of expression (in the sense 
of uttering or ‘outing’ episodic memories to make them public) and negotiation in 
which a shared version of the memory is developed and agreed upon. It is this 
version that the collective espouses as a whole and which it strives to bring to the 
attention of a wider public (although I do not mean to imply that all, or even any, 
members of the group are conscious of this process). Thus, the process of 
collective memory, as defined here, begins with and continues, throughout its 
active phase, to involve a transition from a collection of isolated episodic 
memories to a single shared semantic memory of the event in question.  
This movement is essentially a process of narrative homogenisation 
whereby an assemblage of first-person singular narratives (what I saw was…; 
what I experienced was…; what I know is…) becomes one shared first-person 
plural narrative (what we saw was…). An interesting example of this process of 
homogenisation in action is the work of the Deutsch-polnische 
Schulbuchkommission between 1972 and 2008. The objective of the collaboration 
was to produce a negotiated version of German-Polish history acceptable to both 
nations. Certain aspects of the Commission’s work were received with 
consternation by representatives of the affected stakeholders, precisely because of 
the eradication of the particular through an artificial (if laudably conciliatory) 
focus on the generic.144  
Various stakeholder narratives are encoded in documents and artefacts 
ranging from eyewitness testimony in the form of legal affidavits and 
autobiographic writing, to scholarly studies or literary works either by 
eyewitnesses or others, to the presentation of a given version of the relevant 
discourse through museums and exhibitions. The layouts of these last two, as well 
as the materials included and excluded, represent a kind of walk-through 
narrative.145 Yet, collective memory narratives can also be represented in objects 
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within the built environment such as monuments, buildings and toponyms that 
favour or promote one strand of the relevant discourse over others.146  
Collective memory, as defined in the current thesis, is always trauma-
based. It is triggered by a specific trauma and represents an on-going attempt to 
express, explain and narrate the trauma in question. As is the case with the 
concept of collective memory, there is a vast literature on the subject of trauma; to 
review this in detail would go beyond the scope of the current study which is 
concerned with the concomitant collective memory discourse rather than with the 
trauma that triggered it. 147  Instead, I present in the following paragraphs a 
working definition of a specific type of trauma for the purposes of this thesis.  
Any given trauma can be categorised as either being man-made or the 
result of natural causes. I will suggest that because man-made trauma involves 
human victims and human perpetrators it involves symmetry of kind between the 
sufferer and the agent of the trauma. I shall therefore refer to this kind of trauma 
as ‘symmetric trauma’. By contrast, when humans become the victims of natural, 
often inanimate, agents of trauma, there is a difference in kind, or asymmetry, 
between victim and ‘perpetrator’. I therefore refer to it as ‘asymmetric trauma’.  
I argue further that, in addition to the basic categorical division between 
symmetric and asymmetric trauma, one can also identify two distinct modes of 
trauma: systemic and acute. Systemic trauma is sustained and involves an ever-
present threat, i.e., the cause of the trauma is integral to the system. Examples of 
systemic trauma are apartheid, slavery or long-term abusive relationships. Acute 
trauma, on the other hand, is the result of a specific occurrence or set of events 
that unfold over a relatively short period of time. Notwithstanding Van Den 
Berg’s comment in the footnote above, neither acute nor systemic asymmetric 
traumas usually give rise to the type of contested collective memory discourse 
with which I am concerned in this thesis.148 The opposite is true of symmetric 
trauma, which, I argue, tends overwhelmingly to result in a public search for, and 
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exposition of, the facts. This in turn leads to the generation of competing 
explanatory narratives and often to long-term acrimonious debates between 
different stakeholder groups. It is this reaction to symmetric trauma, to which the 
term ‘collective memory’ refers in the current context.  
As a minimum, any symmetric trauma will involve two stakeholder 
groups, the victims and perpetrators, whereby the categorisation of a given 
individual in these terms is often problematic, as are attempts by some individuals 
to appropriate the relevant identities for themselves.149 Crucially for the current 
definition of collective memory, I argue that this stakeholder discourse can be 
defined as a goal-oriented process, even if the participants are unaware of specific 
objectives or, for that matter, of their contribution to any specific discourse. The 
goal, or objective, is to establish hegemonic historical narratives dominated by 
one specific version of the relevant traumatic events. Such hegemonic historical 
narratives differ from the preceding collective memory discourse in two specific 
ways. The first difference is one of relative salience, which is to say that collective 
memory discourse, as opposed to the practice of History as an academic pursuit, is 
characterised by what Aleida Assmann has called ‘emphatic reverence’ vis-à-vis 
the events in question. 150  Assmann contrasts this visceral, emotion-laden 
engagement with the subject matter, with the ‘specialized historical curiosity’ of 
objective historians (see below). 151  The second difference between the active 
phase of collective memory discourse and subsequent hegemonic historical 
narratives involves relative rates of change within the overall narrative 
framework. Collective memory discourse is volatile, involving many, often 
contrasting narratives concerning the events in question, and, to a large extent, 
involves a process of narrative homogenisation, or winnowing, eventually 
resulting in fewer starkly contrasting narratives. It is this process of 
homogenisation that gradually leads to the establishment of hegemonic historical 
narratives, which hold sway in a given geo-political region. I do not mean to 
suggest that a point is ever reached at which the academic pursuit of History as a 
subject comes to a natural halt. I do, however, argue that historians gradually 
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develop orthodox views of historical events and that these become established 
over time, supported by a preponderance of (accepted) evidence and scholarly 
research, but also, significantly in the current context, encoded in high-status 
artefacts, such as monuments, the production of which is costly and therefore not 
equally open to all sectors of society.152 I argue that once such orthodox positions 
have taken root it is extremely difficult to replace them with contrasting or 
alternative views, regardless of the epistemological merits of the arguments in 
question. Collective memory discourse, as understood in the current context, takes 
place prior to the establishment of such entrenched, orthodox positions and is, I 
argue, an attempt to influence their content. This is explained in more detail 
below. 
Broadly, hegemonic historical narratives, as I use the term throughout this 
thesis, are established on the basis of, and bolstered by the record of, all artefacts 
relating to a given case, whereby the hegemonic influence of a given version of 
the events in question is largely a function of the cost of production (in terms of 
time, money and tangible and intangible resources) in conjunction with power, 
status and visibility. 153  Thus, an expensive set of history books produced by 
leading scholars at a high-status institution and forming part of the received 
academic canon can be considered part of a hegemonic historical narrative. 
Scholars working in the field, within the geo-political region in which this set of 
volumes is considered part of the canon, cannot ignore it and all other works on 
the subject are likely to have to take a stance on it in order to be taken seriously. 
When Edward Gibbon published his six-volume History of the Decline and Fall 
of the Roman Empire between 1776 and 1789, for example, he effectively shaped 
the course of Anglophone scholarship on the history of Rome for at least two 
hundred years.154 Similarly, a statue commemorating a given event and taking up 
expensive real estate in a capital city forms part of the relevant hegemonic 
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historical narrative. A good example of this is Trafalgar Square and Nelson’s 
Column in London.155  
What is at stake for the various stakeholder groups, therefore, is the 
version of the events in question that is propagated within the pages of high-status 
historiography or, quite literarily, set in stone on the plinth texts and in the 
symbolic elements of commemorative statues. The same applies to monuments, 
museums, commemorative naming (streets, buildings, schools and so on.), films, 
works of art and cartography. Thus, the conscious or tacit objective of collective 
memory discourse from a stakeholder perspective is to ensure that the version that 
comes to occupy this privileged position is the one espoused by the stakeholder 
(group) in question. Collective memory, as defined here, is, therefore, an 
inherently competitive process.  
In addition to exploring the ontological aspects of the trauma in question, 
collective memory discourses encompass a search for meaning. Victims attempt 
to understand the causes of their suffering; third party observers try to create 
explanatory models based on various socio-historical paradigms, and members of 
the perpetrator collective may also strive to understand their own psychological 
drivers and to explain or justify their actions. Clearly, the search for meaning 
always has the potential to degenerate into a fresh round of accusations and 
recriminations, which would in turn necessitate a reinvestigation of the facts of 
the case. Collective memory processes are, therefore, by no means linear; instead, 
they tend to oscillate and incorporate a pronounced iterative aspect. This can 
increase as new generations of scholars adopt their preferred positions in the 
relevant debates and the descendants of victims and perpetrators alike take up the 
cause and start contributing to the public discourse. Even first-generation victims 
may have to wait years or decades to achieve a public voice which, when finally 
exercised, can move the process back to an earlier stage, rekindle interest in some 
hitherto overlooked aspect or bring new facts to light. Michael Rothberg’s 
concept of ‘multidirectional memory’ reflects the non-linear nature of specific 
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collective memory discourses.156 Rothberg conceives of collective memories as 
being ‘subject to on-going negotiation, cross-referencing, and borrowing; as 
productive and privative’, which is very much in line with the definition I am 
proposing here.157 On the other hand, however, Friederike Eigler reminds us in 
Heimat, Space, Narrative (2014) that Rothberg introduced his concept of 
multidirectional memory specifically as an alternative to competitive memory 
concepts. My working definition of collective memory does not follow his lead in 
this respect.158  
Aleida Assmann, by contrast, does emphasise competition as a central 
aspect of collective memory. However, her focus is more on competition between 
the public attention given to completely different memory nexuses, for example, 
memories of German wartime suffering and the Holocaust. Moreover, citing 
Günter Grass, she suggests that this competition arises from the fact that such 
immensely traumatic events cannot be processed simultaneously in public 
discourse and, therefore, that the relevant memory discourses tend to push one 
aside to become the dominant mode of public remembrance for years at a time. 
Thus, Assmann talks in terms of cultural forgetting, counter-narratives, resurgence 
of suppressed memories, and similar concepts. 159  In essence, I agree with 
Assmann’s analysis, however my thesis, and therefore my working definition of 
collective memory, has a more narrow focus. I am interested in the collective 
memory discourse relating to Flucht und Vertreibung, not in questions of wider 
German suffering per se, which has been adequately treated by Niven et al., and 
not in the broader course of German postwar discourse, which necessarily 
includes the Holocaust and issues of German guilt. Within this thesis, therefore, 
the competitive aspect of the relevant memory discourse concerns different 
stakeholder narratives as distinct threads within the overall discourse. As the 
following chapters make clear, these competing narrative strands transcend 
national borders and therefore move beyond Assmann’s immediate focus in the 
quoted article. 
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Closer to my own ideas are those of Marianne Hirsch, who has focused 
much of her work on the notion of ‘postmemory’, which, she argues, 
‘approximates memory in its affective force and its psychic effects’.160 Moreover, 
she draws a clear distinction between postmemory and history based on the 
absence in the latter of ‘a deep personal connection’.161 To a certain extent, this 
understanding of the concept of postmemory maps on to my working definition of 
collective memory in two ways. First, my usage of the term ‘collective memory’ 
allows for the participation in the collective memorialisation of a given trauma by 
later generations and/or contemporaries not having direct experience of the trauma 
itself. Indeed, a key aspect of my working definition is the homogenisation of 
collected accounts of a given trauma to form a collective narrative: this process, 
the transition from episodic to semantic memories, transcends the group whose 
memories of the events in question are unmediated. Second, I use the term 
‘collective memory’ to describe a post-traumatic discourse that takes place prior 
to, and which can, therefore, be usefully analysed separately from, the treatment 
of the relevant events as ‘History’ in the academic sense (see above). Like Hirsch, 
I identify the difference between History and collective memory, inter alia, with 
respect to the salience of the narrative to the individual concerned. In other words, 
those having ‘a deep personal connection’ to the relevant events are, in my 
definition, participating in a collective memory discourse, whilst others, for whom 
the subject is of academic interest only, are practicing History as a scholarly 
endeavour. As with all such binary distinctions, part of the value of this one lies in 
its heuristic productivity and I am a long way from claiming that any given person 
can, in every case, be assigned to one or other of these categories and no other. 
Another interesting aspect of Hirsch’s concept of postmemory, is that, whilst she 
has specifically developed the concept in relation to the Holocaust, she speculates 
that it may also ‘usefully describe other second-generation memories of cultural 
or collective traumatic events and experiences’.162 Thus, it could potentially be 
applied in relation to German Vertriebenen, or, more controversially, to the 
decedents of perpetrator groups, who may well be traumatised by the 
‘postmemory’ of their ancestors’ crimes. 
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162 Ibid. 
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Yet, there are differences between my working definition of collective 
memory and Hirsch’s notion of postmemory, the most important of which is that I 
am discussing a wider discourse which not only includes the second generation of 
trauma sufferers (the focus of Hirsch’s work), but the actual sufferers, in addition 
to contemporary witnesses and even the perpetrators. In short, I am interested in 
the complete discourse rather than a specific thread within this wider discourse. 
This notwithstanding, Hirsch’s concept of postmemory is certainly useful in terms 
of its clear delineation of one specific type of contribution to, or experience of, the 
relevant discourses, and can easily be accommodated within my own working 
definition. Another aspect of Hirsch’s concept of postmemory, which certainly 
warrants further study, but transcends the scope of this thesis, is the extent to 
which the kind of postmemory scenarios, to which Hirsch refers, can themselves 
be thought of as a traumatic setting for the people concerned (e.g. the children of 
Holocaust victims). I refer interested readers to the excellent work carried out in 
this field by, inter alia, Gerard Fromm.163 
Despite its inherent multi-directionality and iterative tendency, no 
collective memory discourse continues indefinitely. The production of artefacts, 
including those referred to above but also newspaper and magazine articles, 
photographs, and even stamps as well as active cultural productions such as re-
enactments, plays and teaching events throughout the relevant discourse, tends 
towards the eventual convergence on a small number of ‘grand narratives’.164 I 
argue that even the most self-consciously balanced account will tend, however 
slightly, to support one version of events at the expense of others. Indeed, such a 
balanced account is itself just a ‘version of events’. Thus, within a given geo-
political region, a dominant version is constructed over time which, albeit still 
contested in some quarters, is supported by a preponderance of accepted evidence, 
or majority opinion. The gradual accumulation of high-value, high-status artefacts 
in support of a given version of events is highly likely to result in the creation of 
an barrier of sorts, which other, less well-positioned stakeholders with contrasting 
                                                 
163 Fromm, G., Lost in transmission. 
164 On the intrumentalisation of stamps in German collective memory discourse see: Fendl, E., Zur Ästhetik des Verlusts: 
Bilder von Heimat, Flucht und Vertreibung, Schriftenreihe des Johannes-Künzig-Instituts (Schriftenreihe des Johannes-
Künzig-Instituts): 12 (Münster, Germany: Waxmann, 2010), pp. 48-53. 
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views may eventually be unable to cross to gain an effective public voice.165 This, 
I argue, amounts to the production of a hegemonic historical narrative. It is 
important to note that, whilst this process is likely to involve a certain amount of 
public discourse and stakeholder negotiation, economic and socio-political factors 
can easily come to dominate.166 As such there is no guarantee that any hegemonic 
historical narrative, as one may encounter it at any particular time or within a 
given socio-political situation, will represent the ‘truth’ in any epistemologically 
meaningful sense. Nevertheless, a point is usually reached at which it makes more 
sense to talk of the historical record of a given event rather than thinking about it 
in terms of an on-going, active collective memory discourse. 
The point at which collective memory makes the final transition to 
‘history’ is also influenced by the overall subjective salience of the events in 
question. Aleida Assmann also addresses the importance of salience as a 
diagnostic difference between what she calls ‘cultural working memory’ and 
‘reference memory’, which roughly map onto collective memory, as I use the term 
in this thesis, and History as an academic pursuit. In her own words: 
 
While emphatic appreciation, repeated performance, and 
continued individual and public attention are the hallmark of 
objects in the cultural working memory, professional 
preservation and withdrawal from general attention mark the 
contents of the reference memory. Emphatic reverence and 
specialized historical curiosity are the two poles between which 
the dynamics of cultural memory is played out.167  
 
First-generation victims and perpetrators inevitably die; their descendants 
lose interest as new, more pressing needs vie for their attention, and the 
practitioners of History eventually come to consider the matter closed for all of 
the reasons alluded to above.168 This transition can be ragged and uneven. It can 
                                                 
165 A useful analogy from the field of economics is the concept of 'market entry barriers'. See: Stokes, D., et al., Small 
Business Management and Entrepreneurship (Andover: South-Western Cengage Learning, 2010), pp. 73-75. 
166 Examples of the kind of socio-political factors to which I refer here are state propaganda, censorship and the work of the 
deutsch-polnische Schulbuchkommission (see above). 
167 Aleida Assmann in: Erll, A., et al., Media and Cultural Memory:, p. 101. 
168 To be clear, it is not my intention, in this thesis, to declare a ‘winner’ in terms of which stakeholder narrative is likely to 
become enshrined in some generally acknowledged, definitive version of the relevant events. Instead, my thesis concerns 
certain aspects of the relevant discourse that took place prior to the notional transition between collective memory (as 
defined for the purposes of this thesis) and History as an academic discipline. The basic facts have been acknowledged by 
scholars throughout the world. In terms of pure statistics, for example, I do not expect any significant challenges to those 
presented in Lexikon der Vertreibungen (see above). The crucial point, with respect to the transition between collective 
memory discourse and History as an academic discipline, is that, in the latter phase, one expects to see a more ponderous 
and more carefully argued move towards international (or stakeholder) consensus than that which takes place during the 
earlier, more emotionally-driven stage of collective memory discourse. As with all History, the record of the Flucht und 
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involve significant status changes as erstwhile champions of a popular cause come 
to be viewed as anachronistic diehards. It can result in a loss of information as 
well-informed stakeholders and an interested public gradually fade from the scene 
and leave the field open to impartial academics with completely different life 
experiences and agendas. It is certainly not necessarily the case that the transition 
from collective memory to History will always involve resolution or the 
dispensation of justice. However, the transition period itself does present an 
opportunity to document the ways in which the collective memory discourse has 
played out in a given case. Eyewitnesses may still be alive; the artefacts produced 
during the discourse process can still be read and interpreted by those with 
sufficient cultural proximity to the times and events in question, and an 
examination of the post-traumatic discourse is as relevant to the subsequent 
historification of the episode as a record of the events themselves.  
At the time of writing, accounts of the postwar Vertreibung of Germans 
from the ZO in Poland and its resettlement by Poles expelled from the Kresy are 
arguably traversing the final stages of the transition between an active collective 
memory discourse and history as received wisdom. According to Johannes 
Frackowiak, nationality-based antagonisms between Poles and Germans are 
regarded increasingly as anachronistic in both countries. Vestigial ressentiments 
are maintained by ‘bestimmten gesellschaftlichen Gruppen, die in Deutschland 
relativ schwach, in Polen etwas stärker sind’.169 However, as Tytus Jaskułowski 
argues in the same volume, these are unlikely to jeopardise relations between the 
two countries and ‘[solange …] die Bürgerkontakte stark sind, werden die 
Ressentiments die Tagespolitik nie entscheidend belasten können’.170 There are 
several indicators that, at least the territorial aspect of the collective memory 
discourse is no longer an active issue within Germany. One of these is the fact 
that, despite an alarming increase in right-wing radicalism throughout Germany, 
the relevant debates concern elements of social-Darwinism (Sarrazin debate) and 
a yearning for ethnic and cultural homogeneity, but are not concerned with 
                                                                                                                                     
Vertreibung of Germans and ethnic Germans from Central and Eastern Europe, and from German Silesia in particular, will 
remain exquisitely sensitive to contemporary contingencies. In the final analysis, as argued above, the difference between 
the relevant collective memory discourse and the future writing of History, will turn upon the relative salience of the 
subject material to those involved in this particular field of research.  
169 Frackowiak, J., et al., Deutsche und Polen von 1871 bis zur Gegenwart, p. 20. 
170 Tytus Jaskułowski in: ibid. p. 303. 
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territorial expansion or recovery.171 Any such territorial aspirations on the part of 
Germans would, in any case, be baseless as recent Polish-German treaties have 
removed the legal basis for any German territorial claims against Poland.172 One 
of the tangible results of the finalisation of Central European frontiers, which 
coincided with the end of the Cold War, is that government denial and secrecy 
over the Vertreibung of Germans and Poles in the wake of WWII ceased in 
1990.173  In addition, state-level initiatives such as the abolition of all border 
controls between Germany and Poland in 2007, have rendered the Oder-Neisse 
Line less visible and, therefore, less likely to re-emerge as a political issue.174 
Whilst Lynn Tesser, in Ethnic Cleansing and the European Union, does discuss 
continuing Polish fears of widespread German land acquisition within the ZO, she 
also points out that these are rooted in the convergence of the four elements of 
what she calls the ‘quadratic nexus’ in the wake of Poland’s accession to the 
European Union (EU).175 Thus, such concerns are engendered not by a fear of 
state-led revanchism, but rather by new opportunities for personal mobility within 
the EU. One clear indicator that the Polish government is confident in the stability 
of the German-Polish border region is their recent decision to withdraw the 
majority of troops stationed along the frontier and concentrate them along the 
Polish-Ukrainian border.176  
Beyond territorial issues, there are other signs that the Vertreibungen are 
becoming a matter of History rather than the source of an on-going collective 
memory discourse. The most visible of these is the Deutschlandhaus in Berlin. 
This is currently undergoing restoration and re-purposing to house a permanent 
archive and exhibition centre focused on postwar sociocide. This Zentrum gegen 
Vertreibungen was first suggested by the BdV in 1999. Initially, the proposed 
memorial site divided public opinion in Germany and Poland. However, 
                                                 
171 Wodak, R., et al., Right-wing Populism in Europe: Politics and Discourse (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), pp. 149-58. 
172 Brandt, W., et al., Vertrag zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Volksrepublik Polen über die Grundlagen 
der Normalisierung ihrer gegenseitigen Beziehungen vom 7. Dezember 1970 ("Warschauer Vertrag") (Bonn: Das 
Auswärtige Amt, 1970); Genscher, H.-D., et al., Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany September 12, 
1990 (Bonn: Das Auswärtige Amt, 1990). 
173 Ther, P., Deutsche und polnische Vertriebene: Gesellschaft und Vertriebenenpolitik in der SBZ-DDR und in Polen 1945 
- 1956 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1998), p. 21. 
174 Trierenberg, H., Schlesien heute, pp. 233-43; Großbongardt, A., et al., Die Deutschen im Osten Europas, p. 42. 
175 Tesser's quadratic nexus builds upon and expands theoretical work by Rogers Brubaker and involves securitisation 
issues within states from which former populations were expelled within living memory. It concerns matters of geography, 
activism for a right of former minority return, memory, and external anti-separation pressures. Accession to the EU 
involves accepting anti-discrimination laws and other institutional pressures that run counter to state policies designed to 
promote ethnic separation. Tesser, L. M., Ethnic Cleansing and the European Union, pp. 55-82. 
176 Anon., Poland to move thousands of troops to border with Ukraine, <http://on.rt.com/glln8y>, Accessed on: 29.10.2014. 
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following widely publicised, often acrimonious public debates, leading Polish and 
German politicians have now embraced the idea, diffusing its potentially divisive 
aspects in the process.177 The new centre is due to open its doors in 2016 under 
the new name of Sichtbares Zeichen gegen Flucht und Vertreibung.178 With the 
active support of the Polish government, it is being constructed under the auspices 
of a German government foundation known as the Stiftung Flucht, Vertreibung, 
Versöhnung.179  
The collective memory discourse concerning the Flucht und Vertreibung 
of Germans from the ZO is, therefore, coming to an end in terms of Aleida 
Assmann’s ‘emphatic reverence’ vis-à-vis the events in question, and is giving 
way to the ‘specialized historical curiosity’ of objective historians. 
For the potential participants in the relevant collective memory discourse, 
visceral memories of the events in question are giving way to a preoccupation 
with more pressing current issues. 180  Accordingly, one can find a wealth of 
accounts of the events in question from all of the relevant stakeholder groups, as 
well as a plethora of cultural artefacts that have been produced during the ensuing 
collective memory discourse. One indication of the mature state of research in this 
area, and a good example of the kind of high-value, high-status cultural artefact 
referred to above, which tends to ‘raise the entry barrier’ for competing narratives, 
is the Lexikon der Vertreibungen to which I have already referred in the literature 
review above.181  
However, the current thesis is one of very few accounts of how different 
stakeholder groups have influenced the public discourse on the transition of 
Lower Silesia from a German to a Polish cultural landscape, and how these events 
would eventually be ‘remembered’ in the relevant hegemonic historical narratives, 
rather than simply what each group has said and/or done in relation to this 
process. 
 
                                                 
177 For a reasonably comprehensive overview of some of the ways in which the proposed centre has been understood by 
various stakeholders see: Breuer, L., et al., Jenseits von Steinbach: Zur Kontroverse um ein Vertreibungszentrum im 
Kontext des deutschen Opferdiskurses, (Berlin: Arbeitskreis Geschichtspolitische Interventionen (AGI), 2010); Anon., 
Zentrum gegen Vertreibung, <http://www.z-g-v.de/>, Accessed on: 25.06.2015. 
178 For the latest news of the activities and status of this foundation see: Kossert, A., et al., Stiftung Flucht, Vertreibung, 
Versöhnung, <http://www.sfvv.de/>, Accessed on: 25.06.2015. 
179 Tesser, L. M., Ethnic Cleansing and the European Union, pp. 79-80. 
180 Aleida Assmann in: Erll, A., et al., Media and Cultural Memory:, p. 101. 
181 Brandes, D., et al., Lexikon der Vertreibungen, pp. 13-16, 801. 
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2.2 Analytical Reference Framework 
In order to investigate different aspects of how various stakeholder groups have 
influenced hegemonic historical narratives throughout the collective memory 
discourse triggered by the two specific episodes of sociocide that form the central 
focus of this thesis, I employ an original analytical framework which I describe in 
the following paragraphs.  
My initial intention was to adopt the three-layer model presented by Mieke 
Bal in Narratology: Introduction to the Theory of Narrative (1997). According to 
Bal, a narrative text tells a story, which ‘is a fabula presented in a certain manner 
[whereby a] fabula is a series of logically and chronologically related events.’182 
The fact that the same story can be related in different texts demonstrates that the 
story and the text are not identical. Because the story is one of several possible 
ways of presenting the fabula, the story is not identical to the fabula.183 Therefore, 
Bal argues, any narrative text can be analysed with reference to three distinct 
layers. At the textual layer one can assess the extent to which it compares with 
other narrative texts that tell the same story. One can examine its formal structural 
elements, either by comparison with other texts or on its own, and one can 
comment upon its linguistic aspects. The text can also be analysed at the story 
layer. Specifically, one can ask which fabula is being presented and in what 
manner. The manner in which the story presents the fabula relates to questions of 
completeness and viewpoint vis-à-vis the fabula. And finally, one can analyse the 
fabula upon which the story and therefore the text is based. Fundamental 
questions pertaining to the fabula are whether or not it is wholly or partially 
fictional, its degree of verisimilitude in relation to the natural world and/or reality, 
and its material basis (sources, artefacts). In a short essay appended to the second 
edition of Narratology, Bal helpfully pointed out the potential of using her three-
layer model beyond literary analysis, in the field of Cultural Studies.184  
I concur that any field of study that incorporates a narrative element is 
amenable to study through the tools of narratology. This applies to collective 
memory as defined for the purposes of this thesis (a contested narrative discourse 
                                                 
182 Bal, M., Narratology: Introduction to the Theory of Narrative, trans. Christine Van Boheemen (Toronto; London: 
University of Toronto Press, 1997), pp. 4-8. 
183 Ibid. pp. 5, 6. 
184 Ibid. pp. 220-24. 
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directed towards the establishment of a specific stakeholder narrative of a given 
traumatic event as historical fact). During the course of my analysis, however, I 
found it necessary to expand on Bal’s model in a number of significant ways. 
Rather than attempt to stretch her model beyond what it was designed to 
accommodate I formulated my own analytical model, which I explain below with 
all due acknowledgement to Bal as my initial inspiration.  
At a superficial level I have modified the basic terminology. Whereas 
Bal’s model incorporates the three well-defined layers described above, I shall 
refer to the ‘ontological’, the ‘explanatory’, and the ‘narrative’ levels respectively. 
In this context ‘level’ denotes an aspect rather than a hierarchical layer. There are 
two reasons for this: first, to avoid confusion with Bal’s use of the terms ‘fabula’, 
‘story’, and ‘text’, which are likely to remain closely associated with her specific 
model; second, some of her terminology has already been used slightly differently 
by other scholars. In addition to the more restricted sense in which Bal uses the 
word ‘fabula’, for example, the Russian Formalists defined the fabula as ‘the way 
in which an event unfolds as a brute chronology’. They used it interchangeably 
with the word ‘story’. They distinguish this word pair from the ‘syuzhet’ (plot), 
which refers to the way in which this basic assumed chronology is distorted 
(reversed, varied, reordered) in any given text.185 In this approach, the literariness 
or textuality of a text is revealed by studying the differences between the plot and 
the hypothetical fabula.186  
In my proposed model, analysis at the ontological level concerns 
(purported) facts and events; it therefore touches upon issues of objective and 
subjective reality. The ontological level addresses questions such as who/whom, 
what, where, and when. In relation to literature the ontological level encompasses 
direct speech and touches upon matters of author/narrator identity. Lies and 
deception can be analysed at the ontological level (because they are amenable to 
analysis vis-à-vis specific facts and events), as can matters of direct perception 
and, crucially in the current context, intent. The main difference between the 
ontological level, as defined here, and Bal’s fabula layer is that the ontological 
level encompasses all aspects of being rather than just ‘a series of logically and 
                                                 
185 This understanding of the Russian ‘syuzhet’ does not necessarily exhaust the potential translations of the term, a full 
consideration of which is outwith the scope of the current thesis. 
186 Holquist, M., Dialogism, p. 113. 
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chronologically related events.’ Thus, whilst it fully incorporates Bal’s fabula 
concept, it can also apply to political realities as well as to the material aspects of 
an artefact or cultural production.  
There are ontological aspects to all of the fields addressed within the 
current thesis. In terms of history these are straightforward enough. What 
happened, where and when ought to be answerable questions but, as will be 
shown in the following, the lived complexity of real events often confounds this 
expectation. Issues of toponymy are intimately related to historical fact, and 
cartography is, in essence, an attempt to depict some version of reality, which is to 
say that it revolves around questions of ontological status. In literary analysis one 
can raise ontological queries at various levels including, inter alia, narrator-author 
identity, verisimilitude or degrees of similarity between a given literary world 
(World2) and real life (World1), and anything relating to accounts of specific 
events.  
The explanatory level, in the current analytical framework, equates 
roughly to Bal’s story layer, but rather than simply accepting a given story as ‘a 
fabula presented in a certain manner’ it specifically relates to the question of why 
a specific event occurred or why a given artefact is as it is and where it is. In 
literature, it is the level at which one can recognise and analyse any plot. In works 
of history it relates to interpretation. Whereas the ontological level works at the 
perceptual level (who, what, where and when are all questions to which one could 
respond by pointing to a specific person, action, place and time: the target of the 
‘point’ can be directly perceived by the questioner), the explanatory level of 
analysis appeals to the intellect and reason.  
The explanatory level is crucial in historical and historiographical 
analysis: History without interpretation and explanation is merely statistics. A 
basic assumption underlying the entire study of history is that those involved in 
specific historical events or situations were faced with certain fundamental 
choices and that the choices they made were reasonable (or at least explicable) 
from a given point of view.187 History can, therefore, be studied as both a series of 
effects and happenings (ontological level analysis) and a series of reasons 
                                                 
187 For some contrasting views about what 'History', as an academic discipline, entails (or ought to entail) see: Black, J., et 
al., Studying History (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000); Curthoys, A., et al., Is History Fiction? (Sydney: UNSW Press, 
2006); Mix, A., 'Zivilisiertes Erinnern. Jede Menge Konflikstoff: Eine Konferenez zur Geschichtspolitik in Deutschland, 
Polen und Frankreich', Berliner Zeitung, 12.11.2007 2007. 
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(explanatory level analysis). The explanatory level is less relevant to, but not 
completely irrelevant for the study of, cartography and toponymy. Historical 
atlases, for example, could simply juxtapose a series of political status quos, but 
usually they explicitly acknowledge previous or other potential status quos in the 
form of additional text (e.g. to ‘to Poland 1366’), notes (e.g. z. Zt. unter 
polnischer Verwaltung) or legend entries (e.g. Verwaltungsgrenze). 188  The 
explanatory level is all but de rigueur in literature. In fiction it helps the reader to 
make sense of the protagonists’ actions and in (auto-) biography it is required to 
turn a simple timeline of events into a reasonable account of a life (even the most 
sober biography must be regarded as a cultural construct shaped by the need to 
explain rather than simply to report). Even in works of literature in which 
explanations are famously absent, such as Uwe Johnson’s Mutmassungen über 
Jakob (1978), the text can still be analysed at the explanatory level, as a search for 
meaning (hermeneutic analysis). This means that the explanatory level, like the 
ontological and narrative levels, is integral to the analytic model presented here 
but not necessarily explicitly expressed within the narrative artefact being studied.  
In the model developed throughout this thesis, the narrative level 
addresses the question of ‘how’: how an event unfolded; how a specific act was 
performed, but also, crucially, how a given account of an event is presented, 
symbolised or inscribed. This differs significantly from the explanatory level, 
which addresses the question of why certain events occurred as they did. It is 
therefore descriptive, and, in written narratives, often involves the use of adverbs 
and adjectives. But the question ‘how’ can also be answered with reference to a 
comparison, either in the form of a simile or metaphor, or even, symbolically, 
through association. Therefore, the narrative level often works through the 
emotions, evoking archetypal associations and the concomitant visceral responses. 
A key finding of the current study is that specific authorial choices at the narrative 
level can significantly affect the emotional impact of facts perceived at the 
ontological level and the intellectual acceptability of accounts posited at the 
explanatory level. Analysis at the narrative level therefore goes beyond the facts 
of a given case (ontological level) and any explanations offered to account for 
them (explanatory level) to illuminate the effect of a given rendition of these. It is, 
                                                 
188 Barraclough, G., The Times Atlas of World History (London: Times, 1997), p. 139; Anon., Deutscher General Atlas 
(Stuttgart: Mairs Geographischer Verlag, 1967/68). 
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therefore, relevant to reception studies and for assessing the impact of a given 
narrative artefact on an on-going collective memory discourse. This is the level at 
which one might discern aspects of literariness, tendentiousness or ‘spin’ in a 
given text.  
It is important to note that the analytical framework outlined above is not 
intended to suggest that the authors of texts or artefacts that play a role in a 
specific collective memory discourse necessarily create their products with the 
foregoing analytical levels in mind. Thus, whilst my analytical goal is to identify 
objective aspects inherent in specific artefacts and texts, and to comment upon 
their contribution to the overall collective memory discourse under consideration, 
the degree to which I ascribe their presence to authorial intent will differ from 
case to case.189 
It may not prove possible, in a given case, to clearly categorise every 
aspect of the text or artefact under analysis in accordance with the three-level 
model developed above. An adjective used at the narrative level may well give a 
certain slant to a text, but it could, in some circumstances, also be understood as a 
statement of fact best analysable at the ontological level. Similarly, explanations 
are seldom presented neutrally. Their authors generally believe them to be 
accurate, which again entails issues of factuality and therefore the ontological 
level. Likewise, with the exception of subjective experiences, direct perception 
and first-hand participation in events, ontological issues must be communicated, 
i.e., narrated, if they are to become part of a given discourse. Yet, narratives of 
ontological matters often entail an explanatory aspect. The model presented above 
recognises such ambiguities and can therefore, I argue, contribute significantly 
towards an understanding of the issues in question. For, if one cannot say exactly 
what a certain thing is, it is nevertheless useful to be able to say what it is not and 
a common framework of reference enables one to do this productively. As a 
minimum, this model can fulfil a heuristic function, specifically where the 
theoretical interfaces between the different analytical levels are most difficult to 
delineate 
  
                                                 
189 NB: It is not my intention to systematically analyse each of my selected sources at all three analytical levels. Instead, I 
present my analytical framework as a point of reference, to which I return at certain crucial points throughout the thesis, at 
which I consider an analysis in these terms to be productive. 
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2.2.1 The Corpora 
In terms of my choice of corpora, I could have chosen examples from any amount 
of cultural categories of performance, representation, and historification, such as 
coins and banknotes, museum displays, national holidays, films and TV 
programmes or even stamps, and ephemera produced for the tourist trade. 
However, a selection has to be made and, as I have outlined a new theoretical 
framework based on three discrete levels, I considered it appropriate to focus on 
those areas of cultural production, which, arguably, best exemplify the three 
analytical levels in question. As indicated above, toponymy and cartography 
operate primarily at the ontological level, history mainly concerns the explanatory 
level, and literature can be productively approached at the narrative level. Of 
course, certain aspects of each of these broad subject areas are amenable to 
analysis at all three levels, which would also be true of the other examples of 
cultural performance, representation, and historification alluded to above. 
Nevertheless, the three broad areas around which this thesis is constructed, tend to 
transcend parochial, national borders in way in which stamps, banknotes and 
national holidays, for example, do not, and therefore provide a reasonable basis 
for cross-cultural comparisons in relation to the same set of traumatic events.190 
In the following chapter I turn to the historical detail of the events in 
question. 
                                                 
190 For a more granular justification of my chosen sources, please see the relevant chapters below.  
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3: Prawo i pięść191 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Building upon the definition of collective memory presented in Chapter 2, this 
chapter presents an overview of the specific acute symmetric trauma complex that 
informs the collective memory discourse with which this thesis is concerned 
(hereinafter ‘the Ur-trauma’).192 In addition, I present an overview of the political 
situation appertaining to these events and an exposition of the way in which the 
first postwar Polish government sought to justify them. This chapter contributes to 
my overall thesis by providing the historical background necessary for a clear 
appreciation and understanding of the subsequent discourse. It contributes to 
existing scholarship in this field by analysing the underlying causes within a 
transnational framework centred on Polish state-building narratives, and 
ideological differences between various parties vying for power in Poland in the 
closing stages of WWII. This contrasts with the majority of existing studies 
concerning Flucht und Vertreibung from the ZO, which invariably treat it as a 
problem of German history. However, I contend that it is precisely this one-sided 
approach that can result in the de-contextualisation of German victimhood on the 
part of some German writers and the kinds of problems in Anglophone treatments 
of the subject identified in my literature review (see Section 1.6 Literature Review 
and Critique). 
In my literature review I have already noted certain untenable claims 
according to which the Flucht und Vertreibung of native Germans from the ZO 
was either a direct response for the Holocaust (Eigler et al.,) or was to some 
degree justifiable on the grounds that ‘the broad mass of Germans’ had voted for 
Hitler (Niven et al.). However, the actual situation was more complex. The Polish 
government (TRJN) which oversaw the expulsion of Germans from the annexed 
territories also acquiesced in, and actively supported, the transfer of eastern 
Poland (the Kresy) to the USSR and the accompanying sociocide on either side of 
                                                 
191 The Law and the Fist. Title of a Polish film about the Poland's annexation of German territory in 1945 based on the 
novel 'Toast' to which I refer in Chapter 7. My analysis is based on the only version I was able to obtain, which is an 
authorised Dutch translation. See: Hen, J., De Wet en de Vuist, trans. Pszisko Jacobs (Haarlem: In de Knipscheer, 1964). 
192 From the German Ur = primary/original. 
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the new frontier. This placed the TRJN at odds with Polish traditionalists who 
continued to imagine the Kresy as an inalienable part of Poland.  
On the face of it, there was no reason for the Polish government to offer 
any other justification of their actions than that of simple pragmatism in the face 
of unfavourable Realpolitik, i.e., for raisons d’état. Their apparent lack of 
opposition to Soviet annexations in the east seems understandable given the 
USSR’s overwhelming presence in Central Europe after 1944. In addition, 
notwithstanding the non-tenability of such a position, many people, even in the 
successor states of the German Reich, accepted Poland’s territorial adjustments at 
Germany’s expense as, to some degree, justifiable in light of German wartime 
atrocities. Once again, therefore, there appears to have been little demand for 
alternative explanations. Viewed in this light, the fact that the postwar Polish 
authorities actually did seek to explain these events on the basis of an alternative 
central narrative – the restoration of Piast Poland, the original Kingdom of Poland 
(1025-1370) – raises a number of interesting issues.  
To explore the ramifications of these, this chapter addresses a range of 
questions: how did it serve the postwar Polish government’s interests to explain 
the expulsion of Germans from the ZO with reference to Piast Poland rather than 
to recent atrocities committed by agents of the Third Reich? How did it serve their 
interests to underplay the Ukrainian-Polish sociocide in East Galicia and the loss 
of the rest of the Kresy to the USSR? Both of these questions point to two further 
questions: who was speaking for Poland on the international stage in the closing 
months and immediate aftermath of WWII, and how had they risen to power? 
Before attempting to answer these questions, I shall delineate the Ur-trauma in 
more detail. 
 
3.2 Acute Symmetric Trauma 
As stated above, the exposition and arguments presented throughout the following 
are predicated on a definition of trauma-based collective memory as a contested 
narrative discourse directed towards the establishment of a specific stakeholder 
narrative of a given traumatic event as historical fact. The acute symmetric trauma 
complex (Ur-trauma) in the current case involved two specific episodes of 
sociocide that took place during and in the wake of WWII. One of these affected 
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some 2,519,000 Germans, who were compelled to flee or were forcibly expelled 
from their homes in Lower Silesia, mostly during 1945. Hundreds of thousands 
were murdered en route or died of exposure.193 The majority of these people 
either fled in advance of the Red Army or were forcibly expelled by irregular and 
regular Polish forces.194 The other episode affected Poles living in East Galicia. 
Between 1941 and 1946, Ukrainian partisans from the OUN-UPA drove a total of 
around 200,000 Poles out of this region, murdering tens of thousands in the 
process.195 
These events begun as a series of, from the Allies’ perspective, 
uncontrollable local events – spontaneous popular pogroms against Germans 
during late 1944 to early 1945. These are often referred to in the German 
secondary literature as wilde Vertreibungen. 196  However, by the end of the 
Potsdam Conference at the latest (2nd of August 1945) this process of sociocide 
had been incorporated into the internationally ratified postwar settlement for 
Central Europe.197 The westward shift of the USSR-Polish frontier to bring it into 
rough alignment with the course of the River Bug and the so-called Curzon Line 
lent an air of teleological legitimacy to both the wilde Vertreibungen and similar 
actions directed against Poles.198 This impression was reinforced by the fact that 
the postwar Polish government ratified a number of border treaties with the 
Byelorussian, Ukrainian, and Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republics (SSRs). These 
agreements included provisions for the bilateral exchange of populations along the 
frontier, based on ethno-linguistic criteria.199  
What links these two episodes of sociocide is the fact that the majority of 
Poles expelled from East Galicia at that time were relocated to Lower Silesia, 
where their arrival overlapped with the departure of the native German 
population.200 
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The examples of sociocide outlined above were two relatively small (in 
terms of the overall numbers of people involved) episodes in a much larger 
sociocide at the end of WWII. According to official figures published by the 
Statistisches Bundesamt in 1958, a total of 11,603,400 Germans and ethnic 
Germans were driven out of their homes in Central and Eastern Europe as well as 
within the German Reich between 1944 and 1950.201 Not including prisoners of 
war (POWs), some 6 million Poles were directly affected by forced relocations 
resulting from upheavals ultimately caused by WWII during the 1940s and 
1950s.202 These figures do not include forced migrations carried out pursuant to 
the Hitler-Stalin Pact (23rd of August 1939) nor internal deportations within the 
USSR, which affected ethnic Germans and Poles both prior to, during, and after 
the War. 203  Whilst this thesis is solely concerned with the two episodes of 
sociocide in Lower Silesia and East Galicia, this wider context has certainly had 
an impact on the relevant collective memory discourse and must be borne in 
mind. The same is true of the Holocaust. Although not causally related (in the 
sense that the Vertreibung of Germans and ethnic Germans was by no means 
conceived of as revenge for the Holocaust), collective memories and widespread 
cultural knowledge of the Holocaust have nevertheless had an impact on the 
subsequent discourse relating to German victimhood in general and Flucht und 
Vertreibung in particular as the examples alluded to in the Literature Review 
amply demonstrate. 
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3.3 The Grand Narrative 
Today, the expulsion of Germans from the ZO is frequently portrayed as both a 
reprisal for German wartime atrocities, and a pragmatic solution to the problem of 
ethnic German minorities in Central and Eastern Europe.204 Accounts of these 
events by the main actors and contemporary observers confirm that such ideas did 
indeed inform the decision-making process.205 An additional consideration for the 
British government was the need to accommodate a functioning Poland within a 
Europe that was much reduced in size as a result of Soviet encroachments since 
1939. However, the postwar Polish government originally emphasised an 
alternative explanation with far-reaching ramifications for the relevant collective 
memory discourse. They justified the expulsions, with reference to Poland’s ‘deep 
history’, as the unfortunate result of a necessary realignment of Poland’s borders 
with those of the original Kingdom of Poland or ‘Piast Poland’ (hereinafter ‘the 
Piast Formula’).206 Essentially, they argued that they had seized the opportunity 
brought about by the collapse of the Second Republic (1918-1939) in 1939 to 
rectify a historical mistake.207 
In this version of history, long-standing ethno-political tensions between 
Germany and Poland, ultimately rooted in an unwarranted ‘Drang nach Osten’ on 
the part of Germany, had resulted in various failed attempts at Polish state-
building. These had taken place under inauspicious circumstances and beyond 
Poland’s ‘natural boundaries’. Braving short-term opprobrium, therefore, the 
postwar government had now rectified this situation by expelling all German 
intruders and re-establishing an ethnically pure Polish nation state within natural, 
defensible boundaries. This ‘grand narrative’ had the added merit of explaining 
why it had also been necessary to accept the expulsion of Polish residents from 
the region annexed by the USSR in 1945 (the Kresy). It followed logically that if 
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Piast Poland, the original west-facing Kingdom, had been the true home of the 
Poles, then ‘the whole history of Polish expansion eastwards from the mid-
fourteenth century was […] an imperialist aberration’.208 This eastward expansion 
coincided with the establishment of the so-called Commonwealth of Poland-
Lithuania (1569-1795). The foregrounding of the Piast Kingdom in favour of the 
Commonwealth is sometimes referred to in the secondary literature as the 
‘Teheran Formula’. 209  Because it originated in the struggle for political 
dominance between two distinct Polish power collectives during WWII, a brief 
excursus is necessary to explain who they were and which constituencies they 
represented.210  
Despite the German and Soviet incursions in September 1939, as a result 
of which the Second Republic ceased to function as a territorially-based polity, it 
had not ceased to exist de jure.211 At the behest of Władysław Raczkiewicz, then 
President of the Second Republic, a Continuation Polish Government in Exile was 
legally constituted in France on the 30th of September 1939. The first Prime 
Minister in exile was General Władysław Sikorski. On the 18th of June 1940, 
during the Battle of France (10th of May to 22nd of June 1940), Sikorski was 
airlifted to London followed shortly by the remaining members of the exile 
government.212 For the sake of brevity, and in keeping with existing secondary 
sources, I refer to this group as the ‘London Poles’ in the following chapters.213  
                                                 
208 Bates, J. M., 'PUWP's Preferences in the Contemporary Polish Novel', p. 43. 
209 Sharp, T., 'The Origins of the 'Teheran Formula' on Polish Frontiers', Journal of Contemporary History, 12 (1977), 381-
93; Karski, J., The Great Powers and Poland: From Versailles to Yalta (Lanham: University Press of America, 1985), p. 
399. 
210 Because the postwar Polish government initially appealed to ‘deep history’ to explain these episodes of sociocide, even 
while they were still on-going, they can only be studied with reference to the history of Poland. Therefore, as this thesis is 
based on an analysis of the concomitant collective memory discourse, I have included a brief, but ‘dense’, overview of 
Polish history in Appendix A. It cannot be stressed enough that a full appreciation of this history is a necessary 
prerequisite, firstly for obtaining answers to the foregoing questions, and secondly as a foundation for the remaining, 
analytical chapters. As I argue below, the rise to power of one of the competing Polish political camps, at the expense of 
the other, in 1945 is explicable only in relation to the successful instrumentalisation, by one of these, of Piast Poland in 
preference to the Commonwealth of Poland-Lithuania. Similarly, a basic knowledge of the position and aspirations of 
Ruthenians within the Commonwealth is necessary for an understanding of the motivating factors behind the Ukrainian-led 
pogroms in East Galicia.  
211 Prażmowska, A., Britain and Poland, 1939-1943: The Betrayed Ally (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 
pp. 1-27; NB: '1939/1945' refer to the de facto/de jure situations respectively. See: Hillier, T., Sourcebook on Public 
International Law (London: Cavendish, 1998), pp. 221-22. 
212 Sword, K., 'British Reactions to the Soviet Occupation of Eastern Poland in September 1939', The Slavonic and East 
European Review, 69 (1991), 81-101, p. 97; Prażmowska, A., The Betrayed Ally, pp. 26, 138; Tendrya, B. I., 'General 
Sikorski and the Polish Government in Exile 1939-1943: A Study of Polish Internal Émigré Politics in Wartime' 
(unpublished PhD thesis, University of London, 1999), pp. 34-41. 
213 To review the complex composition of this government in terms of party membership would neither add to nor subtract 
from my main argument, but interested readers may refer to the following for more detail: Tendrya, B. I., 'General Sikorski 
and the Polish Government in Exile 1939-1943', pp. 41-49; Davies, N., Heart of Europe, pp. 73-75. 
 77 
Another power collective, to whom I refer in the following as the ‘Lublin 
Poles’, grew out of resistance groups within occupied Poland and the many Poles 
who fled, or were deported from, Poland during the so-called September 
Campaign (1939). Of these, a large number ended their journeys in the USSR, as 
PoWs, civilian deportees, forced labourers, political prisoners, and ‘ideological 
refugees’.214 A politically schooled cadre among them eventually formed the core 
of an alternative Polish government with strongly Communist leanings. Because 
some of its constituent groups contributed separately to the events described 
below a very brief overview of the main developments is necessary.215 It will also 
be illuminating in relation to the extreme socio-political complexity that arose in 
the wake of the September Campaign.216  
The Polish Workers' Party (PPR) was founded on the 28th of December 
1941. Just over two years later, the foundation of the Union of Polish Patriots 
(ZPP) was ‘heralded’ in Moscow on the 31st of March 1943 around the same time 
as the Workers' Party of the Polish Socialists (RPPS) began underground 
operations within occupied Poland. Less than a year later, the PPR established the 
Homeland National Council (KRN) in Warsaw on the 31st of December 1943, 
followed in January 1944 by the Central Bureau of Communists from Poland in 
the Soviet Union (CBKP) in Moscow. This organisation only remained 
operational until August 1944. In June 1944, certain members of the KRN 
travelled to Moscow to help organise the Polish National Committee of Liberation 
(PKWN), although its formal inauguration as the so-called ‘Lublin Committee’ 
was delayed until the 22nd of July 1944. Later that year on New Year’s Eve, the 
PKWN restyled itself as the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity or 
Tymczasowy Rząd Jedności Narodowej (TRJN). The British and Americans 
agreed to and accepted this designation at the Yalta Conference.217 
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3.4 Polish Nation Building in the Modern Era 
 
3.4.1 The Second Republic (1918-1939) 
Notwithstanding the existence of the five post-Partition Polish polities briefly 
mentioned in Appendix A (Section A.4), the founding of the Second Republic 
(1918-1939) is regarded in popular Polish historiography as the end of a 123-year 
struggle for national independence.218 The concept of a new Polish state emerged 
during the course of WWI on the basis of plans tabled by Austria-Germany as 
well as corresponding ideas put forward by Russia, first Tsarist then 
Communist.219 These were picked up by President Woodrow Wilson following 
his intimate talks with the composer, pianist, and politician Ignacy Jan 
Paderewski. In Point XIII of his Fourteen-Point Speech (8th of January 1918), 
Wilson specifically called for the establishment of ‘[an] independent Polish state 
[…] which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish 
populations’.220 The new state, which had existed de facto since 1918, was duly 
vouchsafed in the Treaty of Versailles (28th of June 1919) which, however, only 
regulated the boundary between Poland and Germany.221  
Finalising the eastern, southern, and northern frontiers involved a series of 
military campaigns against neighbouring states.222 These were not always under 
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central control but were always prosecuted with the connivance of government 
officials and even certain Allied powers (notably the French), against five of the 
adjoining states. The common objective of these border wars was territorial 
expansion and consolidation. 223  Between 1918 and 1938, Polish forces, both 
regular and irregular, took to the field against Germany, Russia, Lithuania, 
Czechoslovakia and the Ukraine (which existed in various ‘incarnations’).224 In 
summary, these campaigns were fought against the following: The Western 
Ukrainian People’s Republic (1918-1919); Lithuania (1920); in an alliance with 
the Ukrainian People’s Republic against Soviet Russia (1920-1921), and Germany 
for parts of Upper Silesia (1920-1921).225 The Second Republic’s final campaign 
before the German-Soviet invasion was fought against Czechoslovakia for the 
Teschen Region in 1938.226  
However, despite the Polish victories and territorial consolidation that 
these military campaigns and associated plebiscites brought about, the Second 
Republic lasted just over twenty years before being partitioned and occupied once 
again. On the 1st and 17th of September 1939 respectively, Germany and the 
USSR invaded and conquered Poland.227 The Second Republic surrendered on the 
27th of September 1939 and ceased to exist de facto on the 28th of September 
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1939.228 Eastern Poland was annexed by the Soviet Union whilst parts of the 
remainder were integrated into the Greater German Reich.229 
 
3.4.2 The Polish People’s Republic (1945/52-1989)230 
By the 6th of May 1945 at the latest, Stalin and the Red Army were in control of 
all Poland. Despite his having been one of the invaders of September 1939, the 
heads of state of the Western Allies had been meeting with Stalin since November 
1943 (Tehran Conference) and making decisions of fundamental importance on 
the future of Poland. However, in contradiction to commitments made by the 
Allies, including the London Poles, in the Atlantic Charta (14th of August 1941) to 
the effect that ‘they desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the 
freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned’, postwar Poland’s territorial 
coverage was strikingly dissimilar to what it had been in September 1939.231 Its 
ethnic composition was also fundamentally different to that of the Second 
Republic. Moreover, the newly appointed (later elected) Polish government 
presided over the two major episodes of sociocide with which this thesis is 
concerned (see Introduction). So what had happened? 
In part, this question is easily answered: by the 1st of February 1945 the 
Red Army held all of Poland up to the German border, and Stalin was able to 
dictate his own terms in relation to the Soviet-Polish frontier.232 He was prepared 
to tolerate a Polish state of unspecified dimensions, though not large enough to 
pose a direct threat to the Soviet hegemony in Eastern and Central Europe, and 
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constitutional type, but only to the west of the so-called Kresy.233 In the German-
Soviet Non-Aggression Pact (23rd of August 1939), the two powers had agreed 
that the demarcation line between their discreet spheres of interest (the 
Ribbentrop-Molotov Line) would follow the northern frontier of Lithuania and cut 
through Poland along the River Vistula and its tributaries the Narew, and the 
San.234 This coincided with the Curzon Line which had originally been proposed 
as a frontier between Soviet Russia and Poland by the Allied Supreme Council on 
the 8th of December 1919 in the context of the Polish-Soviet War (1919-1921).235 
Following Germany’s invasion of the USSR (i.e., Germany’s violation of the 
Ribbentrop-Molotov Line) on the 22nd of June 1941 and the signing of the Anglo-
Soviet Agreement (12th of July 1941), the USSR was pushed out of Poland but 
began making plans for its eventual return.236 An integral part of these plans was 
the annexation of those parts of Poland that lay to the east of the Curzon-
Ribbentrop-Molotov Line.237 Operating from a position of complete domination, 
Stalin set out his specific demands during the Yalta Conference (4th-11th of 
February 1945).238 Soviet aspirations in Eastern Poland happened to coincide with 
Ukrainian nationalist ambitions in East Galicia, which, for the reasons set out in 
Appendix C below, included the full integration of this region into an independent 
Ukrainian nation state. These irregular forces were bent on creating a fait 
accompli by carrying out pogroms and expulsions among the resident Poles whilst 
these major geopolitical conferences on the frontiers of postwar Poland were still 
taking place.239 
Churchill (and later Clement Attlee) and Roosevelt (and later Harry S. 
Truman) agreed to the eastern frontier proposed by the Soviet regime because to 
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oppose it may well have meant war with the USSR.240 Lacking the forces and 
political mandate for such a confrontation, they were forced to wait until Stalin  
 
felt like telling [them] what he thought about … what was 
necessary for the defence of the western frontiers of Russia [… 
and] were also obliged to consider that the eastern frontier of 
Poland should follow the Curzon Line with digressions from it 
in some regions of five to eight kilometres in favour of 
Poland.241 
 
Politically, this left Britain and France in a difficult position. Both 
countries had pledged to protect Poland against external aggression in 1939 and 
had declared war on Germany in fulfilment of their pledges. Winston Churchill is 
very clear about the fact that Britons ‘wanted the Poles to be able to live freely 
and live their own lives in their own way [and it] was for this that we had gone to 
war against Germany in 1939.’242 It was, therefore, not politically acceptable to 
end the War without a functioning Polish state.243 However, taking into account 
Stalin’s territorial demands, the Poland that would have emerged from the War 
would have been barely viable without territorial compensation elsewhere. Prior 
to the German-Soviet invasions in 1939, Poland had encompassed an area of some 
389,617 km2. The USSR was determined, and in a position, to annex circa 
178,709 km2 of that territory. This would have left a tiny rump state of just 
210,908 km2, or 54 per cent of its former size.244 This is not much smaller than the 
United Kingdom, but with a coastline of around 150 km, most of it would have 
been landlocked.245 Within this space, the government would have had to find 
room for all of the returning émigré Poles and those expelled from the annexed 
regions. In short, the Allied governments would have had to admit to their own 
war-weary peoples that they had failed to achieve the very objective for which 
they had declared war on Germany.  
                                                 
240 Attlee (1883-1967) succeeded Churchill as Prime Minister and was present at the Potsdam Conference, as was his US 
colleague President Truman (1884-1972). 
241 Stalin, J., et al., Yalta Conference: Protocol of the Proceedings. VII Declaration on Poland; Churchill, W., The Second 
World War, p. 733; Brandes, D., et al., Lexikon der Vertreibungen, pp. 353-55. 
242 Churchill, W., The Second World War, p. 883. 
243 Kuczyński, S. K., et al., A Panorama of Polish History, p. 130; Emsley, C., et al., The Impact of World War II, Total 
War and Social Change in Europe 1914-1955 (Milton Keynes: Open University, 2006), p. 143; Hürten, H., ed. Weimarer 
Republik und Drittes Reich, pp. 337-38. 
244 Poland, A. C. i., 'Poland's New Frontiers: Losses in the East and Gains in the West', The Times, 14.12.1945 1945, 5. 
245 Bruckmüller, E., et al., Putzger Historischer Weltatlas, p. 198. 
 83 
However, the issue turned on more than simply what ‘Britons wanted’. 
Article 1 of the Anglo-Polish Agreement of Mutual Assistance (25th of August 
1939) states unequivocally that:  
 
Should one of the Contracting Parties become engaged in 
hostilities with a European Power in consequence of aggression 
by the latter against that Contracting Party, the other 
Contracting Party will at once give the Contracting Party 
engaged in hostilities all the support and assistance in its 
power.246 
  
Article 7 states that:  
 
Should the Contracting Parties be engaged in hostilities in 
consequence of the application of the present Agreement, they 
will not conclude an armistice or treaty of peace except by 
mutual agreement.247  
 
When German troops crossed the Polish border on the 1st of September 
1939, the British government had responded swiftly with an ultimatum, which 
fully honoured this agreement, and had followed it up with a declaration of war 
and the opening of hostilities against Germany on the 3rd of September 1939.248 
However, the situation was entirely different just over two weeks later when the 
Soviet Army launched a sudden attack on Poland on the 17th of September 
1939.249 Minute 8 of a meeting of the War Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street on 
Sunday the 17th of September 1939, records the government’s decision to regard 
the provisions of the Anglo-Polish Agreement as not being applicable to the 
USSR on the grounds that the agreement had bound 
 
His Majesty’s Government only if Poland suffered aggression 
from a European power [and that] there was a further 
understanding between the two Governments that the European 
power in question was Germany250  
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On the face of it then, Great Britain had failed to meet its commitments to 
Poland, prompting criticism among contemporaries and into the post-Wende 
era.251 In addition, there can be no doubt that Britain had failed to achieve that 
perennial object of its foreign policy and diplomacy, the balance of power in 
Europe. At the end of 1945 the Red Army was firmly in control of an area of 
Western Europe that extended as far as west as Schwanheide less than 65 
kilometres from the centre of Hamburg.252  Worse still, from a purely British 
perspective, was the notion that the nation’s sacrifices both on the field of battle 
(250,000) and on the home front (60,000) had been in vain.253 Clearly then, the 
British government, represented by Churchill then Attlee, needed to secure 
territorial compensations for Poland to counter the impression that the entire War 
had been an unmitigated disaster.254 The only viable source of territory that could 
potentially be appended to the narrow strip of land that Stalin had left the Poles 
was Germany.  
It was against this background that the so-called ‘Piast concept’, first 
promulgated by Roman Dmowski during the Paris Peace Conference (1919), was 
resurrected. 255  Dmowski’s insistence on the inclusion of Upper Silesia in the 
Second Republic, based on the territorial extent of a Polish polity that had ceased 
to exist in the Middle Ages, had been ignored at Versailles. It had also been 
ignored by Józef Piłsudski whose ‘Denken war vielmehr auf die Grenzen der 
polnischen Adelsrepublik (Rzeczpospolita) von 1772 fokussiert’. 256  However, 
Dmowski’s concept had been taken up in the interbellum period by a group of 
Polish enthusiasts centred on Zygmunt Wojciechowski a professor of history and 
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political agitator. This group advocated the ‘liberation’ of the whole of East 
Prussia, Danzig, and the remainder of German Upper Silesia.257  
According to Tony Sharp, as early as the 4th of December 1941 at a 
meeting in Moscow, Stalin took up the ‘Piast concept’ and broached it in a 
meeting with Sikorski, then head of the exile government in London. However, 
Sikorski avoided serious talks on territorial issues during his visit, an issue for 
which he was severely criticised upon his return to London.258 Like Dmowski and 
Wojciechowski, Stalin envisaged a Polish state extending to the banks of the Oder 
in the west. Unlike them, his imagined state was to be bordered in the east by the 
River Bug (the Curzon-Ribbentrop-Molotov Line).259 However, also unlike them, 
by the end of the War Stalin was in a position to enforce such a vision. It was in 
this context that Churchill made his famous after-dinner quip to Stalin to the 
effect that he personally ‘thought Poland might move westward, like soldiers 
taking two steps “left close” [and that if] Poland trod on some German toes [in the 
process] that could not be helped’. He demonstrated the concept to a ‘pleased’ 
Stalin with the aid of three matchsticks on the table top.260  
Churchill’s proposal to Stalin was typical of the casual, even reckless, 
attitude certain British statesmen displayed towards Central European affairs 
throughout the Great Conference Era (arguably 1815-1945). According to Keith 
Sword, ‘[many] British politicians and officials seemed to feel they had a God-
given right to dispose of Poland as circumstances dictated’.261 The suggestion 
simply to move Poland to the west, made with no real understanding of the 
historical development of the region, and the prevailing conditions, resulted in 
misery. In Churchill’s own words, it unfortunately initiated and lent the weight of 
British government support to an idea that left Poland ‘quivering in the Russian-
Communist grip’, to say nothing of the fate of the German population it 
affected.262 
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It is not hard to imagine that most Polish politicians may have been easily 
persuaded to accept a certain amount of German territory (in the event, Poland 
acquired around 108,780 km2 at Germany’s expense). However, what was 
required to keep the peace between the Western Allies and the USSR was a Polish 
government that would also agree to the loss of the Kresy (i.e., eastern Poland 
beyond the River Bug, at about 178,700 km2). 263  Accordingly, on the 1st of 
December 1943, the final day of the Tehran Conference (28th of November to 1st 
of December 1943), Winston Churchill approached the London Poles with the 
offer of a postwar state bounded in the west by the River Oder and in the East by 
the Curzon-Ribbentrop-Molotov Line. The territories to the east of the Bug and 
the northern half of East Prussia around Königsberg, he told them, would be 
ceded to the USSR. This concept, a slightly modified version of Dmowski’s and 
Wojciechowski’s ‘Piast concept’ or ‘western concept’ is what is often referred to 
as the ‘Teheran Formula’.264 However, the London Poles continued to regard the 
pre-war frontiers as sacrosanct (the ‘Jagiellonian concept’).265  
According to Churchill, the postwar settlement in Poland could have been 
completely different had the London Poles accepted the Curzon-Ribbentrop-
Molotov Line ‘as a basis of frontier between Russia and Poland’ with no caveats. 
Had they done so, he reports, Stalin would have been quite willing to accept 
Stanisław Mikołajczyk, Prime Minister in Exile from the 14th of July 1943 to the 
24th of November 1944, at the head of the new Polish government.266 During a 
meeting in Moscow on the 13th of October 1944 with Churchill and Stalin, the 
Russians formally proposed the Curzon-Ribbentrop-Molotov Line ‘as a basis of 
frontier between Russia and Poland’.267 Mikołajczyk, on the other hand, insisted 
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on referring to it ‘as a line of demarcation between Russia and Poland’ (my italics 
in both quotations). He also opposed the surrender of East Galicia to the 
Ukrainian SSR. 268  Churchill pressed the issue with Mikołajczyk and tried to 
convince him that de facto acceptance of Stalin’s proposal was only intended as a 
provisional measure, designed to remove obstacles preventing a cessation of 
hostilities. Mikołajczyk was encouraged to view it ‘as a working arrangement, 
subject to discussion at the Peace Conference’.269 However, when Mikołajczyk 
sounded his government on the subject upon his return to London, his apparent 
lack of resolve on this point cost him his position. 270  Tomasz Arciszewski 
replaced him as Prime Minister in Exile on the 29th of November 1944 and the 
London Poles continued to pursue an intransigent policy vis-à-vis the eastern 
frontier. At the Yalta Conference (4th-11th of February 1945) they protested 
vigorously against the Allies’ acceptance of the Curzon-Ribbentrop-Molotov Line 
as the eastern frontier of the new Polish state.271 
At the same time, the London Poles were by no means completely 
enamoured with the thought of annexing the major part of Lower Silesia and other 
heavily populated parts of Germany. Eighteen days after taking office, 
Arciszewski had disavowed any intention or desire to annex the areas around 
Breslau and Stettin in interviews published in The Sunday Times and The 
Observer on the 17th of December 1944. His objection turned on the fact that the 
area in question was populated by some eight to ten million Germans.272  
The known territorial aspirations of the London Poles, the retention of the 
Kresy coupled with an ambivalent attitude towards the acquisition of densely 
populated German areas in the west, demonstrate that they were operating within 
a traditional paradigm – the ‘Jagiellonian concept’ – which was based on the 
restoration of the Commonwealth. Insurrection aimed at the restoration of Polish 
dominance within the former Commonwealth territories was a perennial Polish 
obsession during the Partition Era (1772-1918) and dominates the country’s 
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literature and historiography.273 It was precisely this paradigm that had motivated 
Piłsudski’s attempt to establish an eastern frontier well into what is today 
Byelorussian, Ukrainian, Russian, and Lithuanian territory during the period of 
state formation earlier in the century (1918-1921).274 The immediate consequence 
of the London Poles’ adherence to this eastward-looking tradition was that they 
were unceremoniously dropped by the Western Allies during the course of the 
Yalta Conference. Roosevelt and Churchill were more interested in pragmatic 
solutions than unachievable pipe dreams, which is what these aspirations 
amounted to in the face of Stalin’s intransigence and ability to enforce his will 
militarily. It is also undeniable that their insistence on retaining East Galicia 
contributed to an intensification of the Ukrainian-led pogroms there.275 
Through their close collaboration with the Moscow elite, the Lublin Poles, 
on the other hand, were highly conscious of the fact that the eastern territories 
were about to be annexed irreversibly by the USSR. At the same time, they were 
aware of the potential of territorial gains in the west to both bolster their own 
claims to power and reconcile the majority of Poles to the loss of the Kresy. The 
leadership of the ZPP had been among the earliest to grasp this and made calls ‘to 
wipe out the Jagiellonian traditions and revert to the great traditions of the Piasts’ 
in their first published documents in late 1943.276 The KRN published a series of 
documents in early 1944 amounting to a full political manifesto. 277  Their 
programme was based on the restoration of an independent Poland, democracy 
and social justice, placing power in the hands of the workers, agrarian reform, 
friendship and cooperation with the USSR, territorial adjustments in the East 
based on ethnic concentrations and the ‘restoration of Poland’s former Piast 
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territories in the North and West’.278 Similarly, in their manifesto from the 22nd of 
July 1944 the PKWN called upon all Poles to fight for the return of ‘polnischer 
Gebiete wie Pommern, Oppelner Schlesien, Ostpreußen, um breiten Zugang zum 
Meer und um polnische Grenzsäulen an der Oder’.279 Later that year in October 
1944, Bolesław Bierut, the then leader of the PKWN, used the same meeting with 
Churchill and Stalin at which Mikołajczyk had proven intransigent on frontier 
adjustments in the east, ‘to demand on behalf of Poland that Lvov [in East 
Galicia] shall belong to Russia.’280  
Until this time, Churchill had regarded the Lublin Poles as nothing more 
than ‘an expression of the Soviet will [… and] a kind of Quislings’. 281 
Nevertheless their cooperation on the matter of the eastern frontier rendered them 
indispensable under the circumstances. On their part, the Lublin Poles accepted 
Stalin’s and Churchill’s offer of a west-shifted Poland for the simple reason that it 
was their only route to power in the short term. Despite a tangible presence in 
Poland, where they advanced in line with the Red Army, their prolonged 
collaboration with the Soviet Union, one of the invaders of September 1939, made 
them highly unpopular with many Poles, both within Poland and abroad. 282 
Considerable numbers of Poles had remained in exile in Britain, the British 
Commonwealth and in other enclaves such as Belgium, and could have posed a 
serious threat to the members of Lublin Committee had they failed to take power 
prior to the exiles’ return.283 Thus, the position of the Lublin Poles and their 
successors was by no means as strong as a superficial analysis of the situation 
might suggest. Had these exiles ever returned to power during the lifetimes of 
Poland’s postwar leaders, there is every chance that the latter would have been 
executed, or imprisoned, for high treason. In the event, by acquiring power during 
the Yalta Summit, they were able to turn the tables on the hostile exiles. Of those 
exiles who returned to Poland after the War, many were themselves arrested and 
executed as traitors. Others ‘lingered in gaol in the company of Nazi war 
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279 Elżbieta Opiłowska in: Frackowiak, J., et al., Deutsche und Polen von 1871 bis zur Gegenwart, p. 246. 
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281 Ibid. p. 857. 
282 Kuczyński, S. K., et al., A Panorama of Polish History, p. 137. 
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criminals and other “enemies of the people” [and] were tried and condemned in 
secret in trials continuing into the 1950s’, which demonstrates how high the stakes 
were for both parties.284 
Given Stalin’s strong position going into the Yalta Conference (which 
began on the 4th of February 1945), the London Poles never had any realistic 
chance of obtaining concessions. Shortly after its inauguration on the 22nd of July 
1944, the so-called ‘Lublin Committee’ (PKWN) had formally ratified the 
USSR’s annexation of the territory beyond the Curzon-Ribbentrop-Molotov Line 
(the Kresy) on the 27th of July 1944. 285  In return, Moscow had formally 
recognised them as the Polish government on the 31st of December 1944.286 By 
the end of the Yalta Conference (11th of February 1945), the TRJN had replaced 
the London Exile Government as the de facto representatives of Poland on the 
international stage. The Protocol of Proceedings issued after the conference on the 
24th of March 1945 merely called for the reorganisation of the provisional 
government ‘on a broader democratic basis’.287 In the same month, long before 
the area east of the Oder-Western Neisse line had been occupied by Polish forces, 
the ‘government in waiting’, already had plans to divide the area into several 
administrative units: Masuria (Mazury), Western Pomerania (Pomorze 
Zachodnie), Lower Silesia (Dolny Śląsk) and Upper Silesia (Górny Śląsk). As 
soon as the Red Army captured Danzig on the 30th of March 1945, the Soviet 
authorities established the Prefecture of Gdańsk.288 
Augmented by representatives from across the political spectrum, but still 
dominated by Communists, the TRJN formally took office on the 28th of June 
1945 and remained constituted until the 17th of January 1947 when the 
Democratic Bloc won the elections and Bierut became President. 289  It was 
officially recognised by Paris on the 29th of June 1945, and by London and 
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Washington on the 5th of July 1945.290  On the same day, recognition of the 
government in exile (London Poles) was formally withdrawn.291 
 
3.4.3 Consolidation and Transition 
Having agreed to redraw Poland’s frontiers in compliance with Stalin’s wishes, it 
was clear to all that the political transition of sovereignty would be easier to 
achieve if the territorial extent of the new Poland were co-extensive with the 
demographic distribution of Poles in Europe, whereby the former took priority 
(i.e., the state boundaries were given and populations would have to be moved to 
fit with these).292 This was very different to the circumstances prevailing at the 
end of WWI. At that time, a Polish state had been envisaged that coincided with 
the actual distribution of ethnic Poles in Central Europe, i.e., whose borders were 
to be drawn around those areas ‘inhabited by indisputably Polish populations’, in 
other words those in which ethnic Poles were numerically dominant. 293  This 
policy had resulted in a Polish state comprising significant minority populations 
including over 6 million Ukrainians, one million Byelorussians, and around one 
million Germans (the ‘Waisen von Versailles’).294 However, in the wake of the 
Yalta and Potsdam Conferences, and the population-transfer agreements signed 
between Poland and the various SSRs, it was the Poles/ethnic Poles who had to be 
moved to fit within prescribed borders. 295  At the same time, other ethnic 
populations within Poland’s new frontiers would have to be expelled.296 Non-
Poles, and those deemed as such, living in the area designated as Poland 
(including areas of Germany placed ‘under the administration of the Polish state 
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[…] pending the final determination of Poland’s western frontier’) were therefore 
expelled to make room for incoming Poles.297 
Under these circumstances, the TRJN had no choice but to consent to 
sweeping population exchanges, and expulsions (sociocide). Having risen to 
power without the broad-based consent of the Polish people, this, initially 
unpopular, government would have been too weak to assert control in the annexed 
territories had the native population (9.3 million Germans in the ZO and 1.4 
million ethnic Germans in the rest of Poland) remained in place.298 Not only was 
there the potential of hostility on the part of these Germans, Ukrainians and White 
Ruthenians, but, as I have already mentioned, significant numbers of Poles had 
remained in exile, in many cases in organised formations.299 At the same time, it 
would have been extremely difficult to rehouse Poles displaced from the Kresy or 
returning from German and Soviet captivity (the survivors of the 6 million Poles 
displaced after September 1939) had the postwar government decided to retain 
non-Polish populations within the boundaries of the new state.300 Therefore, the 
TRJN, with the backing of the Allies, took the decision to expel the native 
population from the newly acquired German territories.301 At the same time, they 
acquiesced to bidirectional population exchanges along the new Soviet frontier.302 
An important fact, in terms of the creation of the framework paradigm within 
which historians from all stakeholder groups would subsequently work, was the 
active participation of the British government in physically expelling Germans 
from the ZO (Operation Swallow).303 
At the beginning of this chapter I asked who was speaking for Poland on 
the international stage in the closing months and immediate aftermath of the War, 
and how they had risen to power. As the foregoing exposition has shown, Poland 
was represented on the international stage (i.e., at the Yalta and Potsdam 
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Conferences) by the Communist-dominated, Soviet-backed PKWN-TRJN at this 
time. They had risen to power as the willing instruments of Stalin’s strategic plans 
for Central Europe. However, the extent to which specific actors played an active 
role in exploiting the growing rift between the exile government and the British 
government should not be overlooked. Many of the men who would go on to play 
a significant role within the Polish People’s Republic held key positions within 
the PKWN-TRJN and the precursor organisations. There can be no doubt that 
they saw the potential for exploiting Poland’s westward shift to their own ends. 
As early as the 20th of May 1945 Władysław Gomułka, for example, assured the 
plenary of the Central Committee of the PPR that territorial expansion in the west, 
coupled with land reform, would neutralise dissenting voices and win broader 
support for the government among the populace.304 In the final analysis, the TRJN 
came to power through a combination of accommodating to the contingencies of 
the prevailing Realpolitik, and a certain amount of ruthlessness vis-à-vis Polish 
tradition and the immediate needs of Central European populations, particularly 
within the ZO and Kresy. 
 
3.5 Concluding Remarks 
 
3.5.1 Summing Up 
The state the TRJN were given to rule over under Soviet suzerainty, the Polish 
People’s Republic, was very different from the one destroyed by the joint 
German-Soviet invasion in 1939, (the Second Republic). Vast territories to the 
east of the River Bug, which had animated the imaginations of generations of 
Polish patriots, had been surrendered to the USSR. The western and northern 
frontiers had been extended to encompass broad swathes of German territory. 
Millions of people had been forcibly expelled from the country or else had been 
‘encouraged’ to migrate to new areas both within its borders and beyond. The 
demographic situation was also unrecognisable, with none of the cultural diversity 
remaining that had characterised Polish life for centuries. So how do these 
observations bear on the research questions set out in the introduction to this 
chapter? 
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3.5.2 Owning the Grand Narrative 
With an, as yet, fully intact exile government in London, it would have been 
political (and for many of the actors, actual) suicide to deliberately forfeit the 
support of their Soviet backers. Thus, it served their interests to underplay the 
Ukrainian-Polish sociocide in East Galicia and the loss of the rest of the Kresy to 
the USSR for reasons of naked survival. Their dependence on continued Soviet 
support also explains why postwar Polish governments consistently underplayed 
the Soviet invasion of the 17th of September 1939 and subsequent Soviet atrocities 
against the Polish populace. For, as Norman Davies rightly points out, any 
differences between NSDAP and Soviet atrocities committed in Poland during the 
pre-Barbarossa era (1st of September 1939 to 22nd of June 1941) were minor. 
 
At a time when the Germans were still refining their 
preparations for Auschwitz or Treblinka, the Soviets could 
accommodate a few million Polish and West Ukrainian 
additions to the population of their ‘Gulag archipelago’ with 
relative ease [… and of] the estimated two million Polish 
civilians deported to Arctic Russia, Siberia, and Kazachstan in 
the terrible railway convoys of 1939-40, at least one half were 
dead within a year of their arrest.305 
 
Moreover, having risen to power through their acquiescence to the 
territorial losses in the east and acceptance of the Piast Formula, the TRJN had no 
choice but to take ownership of the grand narrative this implied. Not to have done 
so would have meant publically accepting the role of ‘puppet government’ (which 
is how they have often been characterised right up to the present day).306 It was 
therefore vital for the TRJN and subsequent postwar governments to continue to 
promote an interpretation of history in which Piast Poland, with its claims to the 
territories encompassed by the ZO, truly did provide a credible model for the 
modern state, whilst justifying the loss of the Kresy along with the concomitant 
episodes of sociocide. As a logical corollary, the Commonwealth of Poland-
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Lithuania, which had covered all of the areas incorporated into the USSR (and 
more) had to be portrayed as a historical aberration. If Piast Poland had been the 
ideal Polish state then the Commonwealth, which eventually replaced it, was 
rooted in historical contingencies and the temporary, but doomed ascendancy of 
the land-owning classes over the proletariat, whose members the Communist 
government claimed to represent. This explains how it served the postwar Polish 
government’s interests to justify the annexation of Lower Silesia and the rest of 
the ZO with reference to Piast Poland. But why not also blame it on recent 
atrocities committed by agents of the Third Reich as one might have expected?307  
In fact, the answer to that flows logically from the necessity to embrace 
the grand narrative outlined above and to forget the USSR’s original role in the 
conquest and partition of the Second Republic in September 1939. One recalls 
that this was part of a joint effort by the USSR and the Third Reich executed 
pursuant to the Hitler-Stalin Pact. It would have been difficult for the TRJN to 
present the territorial acquisitions at Germany’s expense as just retribution for 
German atrocities against Poles between 1939 and 1945, without also demanding 
retribution from the USSR for similar atrocities between 1939 and 1941. Not only 
was the TJRN not in a position to demand such retribution from the USSR from 
an objective standpoint, but they had also actively acquiesced in the secession of 
territory to the USSR in their own bid for power. 
All things considered then, it was better for the TRJN to portray their 
ascent to power, subservience to Moscow, and active participation in the 
redrawing of Poland’s frontiers as a historical mission to restore Poland’s former 
Piast territories in the North and West rather than as an act of revenge and 
reprisal. This version of events was indeed adopted as the official narrative. It is, 
however, important to note the fact that the instrumentalisation of Piast Poland to 
this end was only ever intended for immediate Polish ‘consumption’. It is for this 
reason that I have chosen to work with Polish texts in translation throughout this 
thesis. This corpus, which was approved by the censor for international 
consumption, represents the least extreme version of the TRJN’s Piast Formula 
and constitutes a condensed summary of the officially sanctioned historiography 
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of Poland during the Communist period. In other words, the pre-Wende Polish 
texts quoted in the following chapters represent the Polish government’s official 
contribution to the international discourse relating to the subject of Poland’s 
postwar frontier changes and the concomitant sociocide. This narrative was never 
presented to the wider world as a legitimate claim that would stand up to 
historical scrutiny, and the censor never forced serious Polish historians to 
espouse this tactical version of events in publications subject to international peer 
review.308 It is also important to note that the current consensus among Polish 
historians is that the TRJN’s Piast Formula was based on a myth. Indeed, as 
Elżbieta Opiłowska explains, the Communists’  
 
Verleugnung des deutschen Erbes in den Nord- und 
Westgebieten, das Beharren auf dem Mythos von den 
‘Wiedergewonnenen Gebieten’ […und] die Tabuisierung der 
verlorenen Heimat in den polnischen Ostgebieten […] trugen 
dazu bei, dass nach 1989 die Geschichte der Regionen aufs 
Neue aufgearbeitet werden musste.309 
 
Thus, Polish scholars have been working since 1989 to deconstruct the 
TRJN’s Piast Formula. It is, therefore, not the case that Polish and German 
historians harbour radically different views either on the history of the ZO or of 
the circumstances appertaining to its de facto annexation by Poland in 1945 or the 
Flucht und Vertreibung of the German population. Nevertheless, this central 
narrative – the Piast Formula – survived long enough to leave a discernible trace 
in the ensuing collective memory discourse. In the following chapter I explore 
some of the ways in which Polish, German and Anglophone historians have 
responded to some of the issues and ramifications of the TRJN’s early espousal of 
the Piast grand narrative. 
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4: Historians’ Discourse 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I analyse a selection of secondary sources to explore some of the 
ways in which specific stakeholders – Polish, German, and Anglophone historians 
– have responded to some of the issues and ramifications of Poland’s postwar 
frontier changes, particularly the TRJN’s espousal of the ‘Piast Formula’.310 As 
previously argued, what is at stake during such ‘contested narrative discourses’ is 
dominance within what I refer to as ‘hegemonic historical narratives’.311  The 
following analysis is structured around four specific research questions: how has 
the situation changed between the postwar era and the post-Wende era in terms of 
the relevant historiography produced by historians operating within various 
stakeholder communities? How have historians from different stakeholder 
collectives responded to the invocation of Piast Poland as a model for the Polish 
People’s Republic and justification for the two cases of sociocide with which this 
thesis is concerned? What narrative strategies have historians employed to 
influence the relevant collective memory discourse? What tropes and topoi have 
emerged and been most persistent during the collective memory discourse, and 
what (implicit or explicit) purpose(s) do they serve? Attempting to answer these 
questions will illuminate some of the ways in which historians have contributed to 
the relevant collective memory discourse.  
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4.2 The Piast Formula in Post-War Propaganda 
Having explained the annexation of parts of Germany and the loss of the Kresy as 
necessary expedients in a historical mission to reinstate the Piast Kingdom of 
Poland, the TRJN needed to substantiate their claims. To this end it was necessary 
to construct a history in which the ZO had formed part of the Piast Kingdom and 
the Kresy had not. According to Johannes Frackowiak this is ‘ein geradezu 
klassisches Beispiel für eine “Erfindung von Traditionen” im Sinne Eric 
Hobsbawms’.312 As Anna Wolff-Powęska explains: 
 
[die] Geschichtsdarstellung wurde eilig, sozusagen auf 
Bestellung, produziert. Die Menschen brauchten einfach 
Material, um ihre Identität zu untermauern, die ja nun mit dem 
neuen Wohnsitz verbunden war, und um ein Gefühl der 
Sicherheit zu erhalten.313 
 
As early as March 1945 (i.e., over a month before the German surrender) 
an article in Głos Ludu (The People’s Voice) claimed that the Polish people 
understand that the return of the ZO to the motherland is not only economically 
beneficial to Poland, but is also a matter of historic justice.314 Later that year, the 
Polish government founded the Ministerstwo Ziem Odzyskanych or Ministry for 
the Regained Territories (MZO) on the 13th of November 1945. Headed by 
Władysław Gomułka, then General Secretary of the PPR, this organisation was 
responsible for all matters relating to the ZO. It collaborated with the Instytut 
Zachodni or Western Institute (IZ) and the Polski Związek Zachodni or Polish 
Western Federation (PZZ) which provided propagandistic materials designed to 
support the Piast Formula. 315  The historical content of this propaganda was 
provided by Polish academics, such as Zygmunt Wojciechowski, who produced 
scholarly arguments in support of the claim that the ZO had been part of the Piast 
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Kingdom. 316  Literary authors were also pressed into service for propaganda 
purposes.317 Several historical novels were published in the immediate aftermath 
of the Vertreibungen which emphasised the ‘Ur-Polishness’ of the ZO.318 Other 
academics, such as Krzysztof Skubiszewski and Alfons Klafkowski, published on 
the legal basis of the annexation. Despite a tendentious misreading of the Yalta 
and Potsdam Treaties, Klafkowski’s work remained influential until the early 
1970s.319  
I argue that these observations support the claim that Polish historians 
working in Poland in the immediate aftermath of the War can be considered a 
distinct stakeholder collective for analytical purposes. This does not mean that 
individuals within this group did not espouse contrasting private views on any 
given subject. However, these historians were pressed into service by the 
government to provide support for the Piast Formula and, in the immediate 
postwar period, any publically expressed dissent was vigorously suppressed.320 At 
stake for those who refused to collaborate on this project was their personal 
freedom.321 For those who supported the regime, the objective was the successful 
integration of the ZO into Poland and preventing the overthrow of the TRJN.  
This stakeholder collective responded to the Piast Formula by producing 
scholarly texts that supported the government narrative. In addition to its 
explanatory content, this government narrative entailed an ontological claim about 
the Piast Kingdom, namely that it had been largely coextensive with the Polish 
People’s Republic, and Polish historians focused their research on proving this. 
                                                 
316 Frackowiak, J., et al., Deutsche und Polen von 1871 bis zur Gegenwart, p. 247. 
317 I use the word 'pressed' advisedly in this context. Since the Partitions Polish authors had seen themselves as 'spokesmen 
for the victimized collective' and worked in opposition to state authority. Bates, J. M., 'PUWP's Preferences in the 
Contemporary Polish Novel', pp. 43-45. 
318 Some examples are: Dzikowy skarb (1945) by Władysław Jan Grabski, Ojciec i syn (1946) by Karol Bunsch and 
Bolesław Chrobry (1947) by Antoni Gołubiew. To my knowledge, none of these novels are currently available in English. 
The titles can be translated as: Wild Treasure, Father and Son, and Boleslaus the Brave respectively. Frackowiak, J., et al., 
Deutsche und Polen von 1871 bis zur Gegenwart, p. 251. 
319 The Yalta Agreement did not establish the border between Germany and Poland, nor the extent of Germany's territorial 
losses to Poland, merely stating that 'the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should thereafter await the 
peace conference'. See: Stalin, J., et al., Yalta Conference: Protocol of the Proceedings. Section VII. Polan; Nor was the 
German-Polish frontier settled during the Potsdam Conference. On the contray, the conference protocol records that 'three 
Heads of Government reaffirm their opinion that the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should await the 
peace settlement'. See: Anon., 'Potsdam Conference: Protocol of the Proceedings'. Section VIII. Polan; Wiewióra, B., et al., 
Polish-German Frontier from the Standpoint of International Law (Poznan: Wydawnictwo Zachodnie, 1959); Klafkowski, 
A., The Potsdam Agreement, trans. Aleksander Trop-Kryński (Warsaw: PWN, 1963); Klafkowski, A., Die deutsch-
polnische Grenze nach dem II. Weltkrieg, trans. Janusz Sikorski (Poznan: Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, 1970); Čepič, Z., 
1945 - A Break with the Past, pp. 95-96. 
320 See my discussion of Witold Kula below. 
321 Ostrowski, M., 'To Return to Poland or Not to Return'; Davies, N., Heart of Europe, p. 85. 
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Therefore, the resulting historiography contributed to the subsequent collective 
memory discourse at the ontological level. 
The epitome of the Polish government’s (known as the Democratic Bloc 
since the 17th of January 1947) efforts to lend credibility to the Piast Formula was 
the ‘Exhibition of the Regained Territories’ in Wrocław in 1948.322 Its primary 
objective was to justify the Oder-Neisse Line historically, politically and 
economically. Whilst emphasising the Piast claims to the ZO, the organisers were 
careful to avoid mentioning any historic expansion by Piast princes into those 
regions now encompassed within the USSR.323 Omissions of this nature are a 
characteristic narrative strategy within the collective memory discourse 
engendered by the shifting of Poland’s frontiers and the concomitant sociocides 
(see Section 4.5.2 below). This, I argue, is another example of a direct effort to 
influence the collective memory discourse at the ontological level by tailoring the 
hegemonic historical narrative of the Piast Kingdom to better match the TRJN/ 
Democratic Bloc’s explanatory narrative. For, as explained in Chapter 3, restoring 
the Piast Kingdom as it had actually been at the time of its maximum cultural and 
political development prior to the decline of the dynasty would have required the 
retention of East Galicia, which the TRJN did not have the power to do.324 
Around 1.5 million people, mostly schoolchildren and workers, attended 
the exhibition in organised groups. 325  Thus, the exhibition served a didactic 
purpose and catered to the Polish public. This observation supports the point I 
made in Chapter 3 to the effect that the Piast Formula primarily served the TRJN/ 
Democratic Bloc’s domestic agenda of political legitimation and justifying the 
frontier changes and concomitant sociocide to the Polish population, not to the 
international community. Indeed, writing a decade later, in 1958, not long after 
the start of the so-called ‘Thaw’ which took hold in Polish politics in 1956, Polish 
historian Witold Kula explicitly criticised the exhibition as propaganda for the 
Piast Formula which, he wrote, sought to instrumentalise emotion-laden cultural 
                                                 
322 Čepič, Z., 1945 - A Break with the Past, p. 95. 
323 One such incursion was Bolesław Chrobry’s (967-1025) military campaign against Kiev (1015-1019). See quotes from 
Witold Kula in: Frackowiak, J., et al., Deutsche und Polen von 1871 bis zur Gegenwart, p. 254. 
324 I am referring here to the Kingdom of Kazimierz III Wielki (1333-1370). See: Kuczyński, S. K., et al., A Panorama of 
Polish History, pp. 24-44; Davies, N., Heart of Europe, pp. 245-55; Jankowiak-Konik, B., et al., Atlas historii Polski, pp. 
14-15, 186. 
325 Ordinance of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers dated 05.11.1948 (Staatsarchiv Lubań, Starostwo Powia towe w 
Zgorzelcu: Okólniki władz zwierzchnich 1945–1948, Sign. 29/6). Cited in: Frackowiak, J., et al., Deutsche und Polen von 
1871 bis zur Gegenwart, pp. 253-54. 
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memories of popular figures from Polish history, such as Bolesław Chrobry, to 
promote trust in the current regime.326 The government’s strategy succeeded and, 
according to Kula, ‘[eine] marktschreierische Berufung auf die ersten Piasten 
beherrschte Polen’ in the immediate wake of the exhibition.327 Yet, the fact that 
Kula was able to publish such a critical analysis just ten years after the exhibition 
suggests that, whilst the TRJN/Democratic Bloc did succeed in establishing a new 
state within the borders that had been established de facto by the end of 1945, 
neither their espousal of the Piast Formula nor their attempt to fully control the 
historiography of the country went unchallenged by Polish historians in the longer 
term.328 
Nevertheless, by 1948, the Democratic Bloc was convinced of the success 
of the integration of the ZO and dissolved the Scientific Council for the Regained 
Territories. 329  The MZO was abolished a year later in 1949. 330  Although the 
Polish government never publically rescinded the Piast Formula, their 
preparedness to invoke it as a historical justification for the postwar frontier 
adjustments declined markedly after this time. Since the early 1950s, Polish 
historiography that fully endorses the Piast Formula has become increasingly rare. 
By the 1970s, the justification for retaining the ZO as part of Poland no longer 
depended upon proving the Ur-Polishness of the area. An entire generation of 
Poles had been born and raised in the ZO since 1945 and considered it to be their 
natural home. To forcibly relocate them would itself have constituted an act of 
sociocide. In addition, Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik, particularly the Treaty of 
Warsaw (1970), which guaranteed the existing German-Polish frontier, had in fact 
eliminated the need to further justify the region’s retention within Poland.331  
In the introduction to this chapter, I asked how historians from different 
stakeholder collectives have responded to the TRJN’s invocation of the Piast 
                                                 
326 For a concise introduction to the so-called 'Polish Thaw' that accompanied the return to power of Władysław Gomułka 
in 1956, see: Werblan, A., 'Władysław Gomułka and the Dilemma of Polish Communism', International Political Science 
Review / Revue internationale de science politique, 9 (1988), 143-58. 
327 Witold Kula quoted in: Frackowiak, J., et al., Deutsche und Polen von 1871 bis zur Gegenwart, p. 254. 
328 Indeed, Kula’s open criticism of the regime contradicts Richard F. Staar’s statement that ‘Communist control over 
Poland in early 1958 was virtually absolute but not yet fully open and acknowledged’. See: Staar, R. F., 'New Course in 
Communist Poland', The Journal of Politics, 20 (1958), 64-88, p. 64. 
329 Elżbieta Opiłowska in: Frackowiak, J., et al., Deutsche und Polen von 1871 bis zur Gegenwart, p. 255. 
330 Ther, P., Deutsche und polnische Vertriebene, p. 155. 
331 In Article I of the Treaty, Poland and Germany ‘bekräftigen die Unverletzlichkeit ihrer bestehenden Grenzen jetzt und in 
der Zukunft und verpflichten sich gegenseitig zur uneingeschränkten Achtung ihrer territorialen Integrität’. Furthermore 
‘[sie] erklären, daß sie gegeneinander keinerlei Gebietsansprüche haben und solche auch in Zukunft nicht erheben werden’. 
See: Brandt, W., et al., Warschauer Vertrag, 1970. 
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Formula to justify Poland’s postwar territorial configuration and the sociocides 
with which this thesis is concerned. Thus far, I have argued that Polish historians 
in the immediate postwar era responded by producing a historiographical corpus 
that supported the ontological claim implicit in the Piast Formula, i.e., that the 
Piast Kingdom was largely coextensive with the Polish People’s Republic. The 
situation with regard to the later Polish and German historiography has been 
complicated by the work of the Deutsch-polnische Schulbuchkommission between 
1972 and 2008 (see Chapter 2). Rather than pursuing historical research in an 
objective manner, this group served a political agenda designed to promote peace 
and reconciliation between Germany and Poland.332 Notwithstanding the laudable 
intent, this still amounts to the production of propaganda, and not all German 
historians have welcomed the initiative. Ignoring the work of the Deutsch-
polnische Schulbuchkommission, many German scholars have focused on 
producing a large corpus of work designed to demonstrate the Ur-Germanness of 
the ZO. I have already mentioned the BdV’s research activities in this context, 
much of which is presented in the ‘Kulturelle Arbeitshefte’ series.333 I discuss 
further examples in Section 4.3 below. This corpus implicitly contradicts the Piast 
Formula at the ontological level, that is, if one accepts the axiom that the 
annexation of the ZO was justifiable because it involved Ur-Polish territory, then 
proving it to have been Ur-German nullifies the justification. 334  To my 
knowledge, Anglophone historiography has not directly addressed the Piast 
Formula.335 Nevertheless, as I demonstrate below (Sections 4.4.2 and 4.5.2), much 
of this corpus does reflect Polish propaganda both with respect to Piast history in 
the ZO and to long-standing German-Polish border conflicts. 
Brandt’s Ostpolitik eliminated the legal basis for any vestigial threat of 
German revanchism, which arguably existed, at least in principle, until 1970. This 
development was good for Poland but not necessarily for the Polish government, 
                                                 
332 Brandes, D., et al., Lexikon der Vertreibungen, pp. 205-07. 
333 Some examples relevant to the ZO are: March, U., Die deutsche Ostsiedlung; Biewer, L., Geschichte Pommerns; Mast, 
P., Kleine Geschichte West- und Ostpreußens, Kulturelle Arbeitshefte (Bonn: BdV, 1997); Mast, P., Brandenburg, 
Kulturelle Arbeitshefte (Bonn: BdV, 1998); Pawelitzki, R., Oberschlesien: Das Land und seine Menschen, Kulturelle 
Arbeitshefte (Bonn: BdV, 1998); Neubach, H., Geschichte Schlesiens. 
334 It is worth remembering the fact that, despite the amount that has been written by Polish and German historians on the 
original status of Silesia (and other areas in the ZO), ancient ownership does not provide legal grounds for annexations in 
the modern period. What counts in international law is recent de facto juridical control over a substantial period of time 
rather than alleged rights derived from feudal contracts. See the International Court of Justice's decision in 'France v United 
Kingdom [1953]', a case involving disputed sovereignty over the Minquiers and Ecrehos islands in the English Channel. 
See: Hillier, T., Sourcebook on Public International Law, pp. 236-38. 
335 See Appendix D for more detail on Anglophone responses to the Piast Formula. 
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which had drawn sustenance from the putative threat scenario that had allegedly 
existed before the ratification of the Treaty of Warsaw. For it was precisely the 
imagined danger of a German re-annexation of the ZO that had bound the settlers 
to the regime and, ultimately, to the USSR as guarantors of their personal safety 
and welfare. These settlers, therefore, represented a significant element in the 
government’s power base. As Elżbieta Opiłowska explains: 
 
[von] Anfang an bildeten die Grenzfrage und eine antideutsche 
Haltung für die kommunistische Regierung wichtige Quellen 
der Legitimation. Allein die neuen Machthaber sollten als 
einziger Garant der Unantastbarkeit der Grenze betrachtet 
werden.336 
 
Without the German threat, the settlers no longer had any reason to 
support a government which had positioned itself as their protector whilst 
curtailing their freedoms in various spheres of activity. Thus, Brandt’s Ostpolitik 
inadvertently weakened the Polish government’s power base.337  
These geopolitical developments had an impact on Polish government-
sponsored historiography after 1970. Continuing to justify the annexation of the 
ZO as part of a historic mission to restore the Piast Kingdom had become 
anachronistic. Yet, the government’s original motivation for the propagation of 
the Piast Formula (the need for legitimation in the absence of a popular mandate) 
still obtained. The censor, therefore, continued to favour historiography that 
portrayed Germany and Germans as the long-term enemy and potentially 
dangerous. Given the existence of the Warsaw Treaty, which demonstrated the 
Federal Republic of Germany’s pacifistic intent and aspirations towards Poland 
and its commitment to preserving Poland in its current territorial configuration, 
this narrative had to be constructed around an understanding of Germany and the 
Germans as being prone to treachery. Moreover, it needed to emphasise the long-
term nature of the threat and portray Germany as a potential annihilator of Poland 
per se, rather than a mere competitor for frontier territory. The construction and 
propagation of this narrative enabled the government to explain the continued 
presence in Poland of the Soviet Army (the Northern Group of Forces or NGF) as 
                                                 
336 Elżbieta Opiłowska in: Frackowiak, J., et al., Deutsche und Polen von 1871 bis zur Gegenwart, pp. 243-45. 
337 Whilst establishing the degree to which this effect was or was not ‘inadvertent’ would be highly interesting for the study 
of German-Polish relations as well as the collapse of the Communist Bloc in the late twentieth century, it is outwith the 
scope of the current thesis.  
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a necessary evil in the face of a persistent German threat that had been set aside 
only temporarily under Brandt’s chancellorship. 338  It also helped deflect 
suspicions that one of the main reasons for Soviet Army’s presence in Poland was 
to help secure the Communist’s hold over the country.339 Government-sponsored 
historiography after 1970 focused more on the Red Army’s services to Poland 
during the War and the fraternal bonds between the Warsaw Bloc countries.340 
This effectively meant writing the Soviet Union’s invasion of Poland in 1939 out 
of Polish historiography. In the following sections, I analyse some of the ways in 
which this discourse of danger with respect to Germany and the Germans, and of 
Soviet benevolence, has been reflected in Polish, German, and Anglophone 
historiography. 
 
4.3 Discourse Deflection 
The historiography of Poland’s annexation of the ZO and loss of the Kresy and 
the concomitant sociocide falls into two distinct categories: direct and indirect 
histories. To a significant extent, direct histories work at the ontological level. 
That is, they include factual descriptions either of episodes of sociocide or of 
specific measures taken to incorporate territories annexed from Germany into 
Poland and to manage the political ramifications of territorial losses to the USSR. 
Alternatively, they treat the Vertreibung from the German perspective, for 
example by analysing the subsequent experience of the Vertriebenen in terms of 
their integration into East and/or West Germany. The material is often presented 
in conjunction with statistical summaries and reproductions of primary documents 
such as photographs, contemporary official documentation, and affidavits.341 The 
titles of such direct histories hint at some of the key questions that have been 
raised in relation to the events in question. Alfred-Maurice de Zayas, for example, 
appears certain that the motive for the Vertreibungen was revenge.342 Karsten 
                                                 
338 Staar, R. F., 'New Course in Communist Poland', p. 70. 
339 Prażmowska, A., Poland: a Modern History, p. 161; Elżbieta Opiłowska in: Frackowiak, J., et al., Deutsche und Polen 
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342 Zayas, A.-M. d., A Terrible Revenge: The Ethnic Cleansing of the East European Germans, 1944-1950, trans. John a. 
Koehler (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993 [1986]). 
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Kriwat characterises them as a second Holocaust. 343  Steffen Prauser et al., 
question the identity of those affected by placing the word ‘German’ in inverted 
commas.344 In the introduction to his PhD thesis, Steffen Harmel expands upon 
the title which includes the subheading ‘Verbrechen oder Kollektivschuld’ and 
asks: 
Kann man die Vertreibung der Deutschen nach 1945 aus 
angestammten Siedlungsgebieten im Osten vor allem als Sühne 
für die Taten der Nationalsozialisten rechtfertigen oder muss sie 
eher als Verbrechen an unschuldigen Zivilisten gesehen 
werden?345 
  
Questions of this kind are raised in relation to alternative explanatory 
narratives. As such, they can be explored at the explanatory and narrative levels. 
Nevertheless, all such questions primarily address ontological issues i.e., they ask 
‘what is and what is not true’ about various aspects of the Vertreibung. Is it a fact 
that the motive for the Vertreibung was revenge? Is it a fact that the Vertreibung 
was a second Holocaust? Is it a fact that the Vertreibungen can be justified ‘als 
Sühne für die Taten der Nationalsozialisten’ or is it a fact that they represent a 
‘Verbrechen an unschuldigen Zivilisten’? Even a superficial reading of such direct 
histories will show that the closed questions implicit in the titles are often posed 
for purely rhetorical reasons, whereby the author’s preferred answer forms the 
axiomatic framework of his or her explanatory narrative.346 Nevertheless, I would 
argue that, as a corpus, direct histories can be analysed most productively at the 
ontological level, not least because each of the implicit framework axioms is 
likely to be true to some extent or with respect to some subset of actors and/or 
events.  
Indirect histories, by contrast, barely mention the events that triggered the 
collective memory discourse to which they contribute. Instead, they function 
primarily at the explanatory level to construct broad historical framework 
narratives within which the relevant events can be contextualised and therefore 
                                                 
343 Kriwat, K., Der andere Holocaust. 
344 Prauser, S., et al., 'The Expulsion of the ‘German’ Communities from Eastern Europe at the End of the Second World 
War: EUI Working Paper HEC No. 2004/1', (Florence: European University Institute, 2004). 
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explained. Such indirect histories tend to support specific stakeholder standpoints 
implicitly rather than explicitly, a strategy that takes account of the fact that, 
because ‘the expulsions have been instrumentalised politically for decades, it is 
not easy to find a language that facilitates discussion, avoids becoming politically 
charged, and at the same time calls things by their real names.’347 The explanatory 
frameworks implicit in such indirect histories can serve various purposes in 
addition to the primary objective of contextualising the events in question. They 
may, for example, fulfil an exculpatory, accusatory, or reconciliatory function 
depending upon the historian’s understanding of the events in question and/or the 
socio-political constraints acting upon him or her at the time of writing. It is this 
corpus that is of most interest for my current study, as it represents a little-studied 
phenomenon which I shall term ‘discourse deflection’. 
‘Discourse deflection’ is a narrative-level strategy in which alternative 
points of view (explanations) about a given event are suggested rather than stated 
outright. It is left to the reader to draw conclusions about the events in question 
from the material presented in relation to longer-term, even seemingly unrelated, 
issues.348 Nevertheless, I argue, by creating the historical framework within which 
private and public discourses on the subject are conducted, these historians 
effectively channel and constrain the production of hegemonic historical 
narratives.  
‘Discourse deflection’ is characteristic of the collective memory discourse 
relating to Poland’s annexation of the ZO and loss of the Kresy and the 
concomitant sociocide. By explaining their actions with respect to the ZO and the 
Kresy as a mission to right a series of historical wrongs and aberrations, the TRJN 
set the resulting collective memory discourse on just such a deflected trajectory, 
even while the events were still unfolding. In this discourse, the ‘historical wrong’ 
refers to Germany’s allegedly wrongful acquisition of the territories encompassed 
                                                 
347 Karl Schlögel in Thum, G., Uprooted, p. 3. 
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within the ZO in the course of a long-term colonial project (‘Drang nach Osten’). 
Poland’s unwarranted oppression of Ruthenians and Lithuanians during the 
Commonwealth and Second Republic Eras is viewed as a historical aberration. 
Accordingly, historians, who are arguably (and often self-consciously) 
representative of competing stakeholder perspectives, have produced a broad 
range of indirect histories which have contributed to the deflected discourse. The 
following examples may suffice to illustrate the general trend.  
As the title suggests, A Panorama of Polish History presents a wide-
ranging account of Polish history from the earliest times to the year of publication 
(1982). However, the only thing that the authors, Stefan Krzysztof Kuczyński et 
al., write about the expulsion of the German population from the ZO is that no 
such expulsion took place. Instead, they assert, the Germans had already fled of 
their own accord by the time the Red Army and Polish forces had arrived. 
Echoing Klafkowski, the same authors explain the loss of the Kresy by stating that 
its retention was ‘at variance with the main lines of the Great Powers’ policies’.349 
In another example, Norman Davies reveals a similar apparent lack of interest in 
the postwar frontier changes and the associated sociocides in Heart of Europe 
(2001), a substantial monograph on Polish history. In 483 pages, in which he 
covers the history of Poland and the Poles from the earliest documentary evidence 
(and beyond) to the year of publication, he devotes just 3 pages to the postwar 
population transfers. By comparison, he devotes over 2 pages to the ‘prehistory’ 
of the Poles and the settlement of the ‘great Polish plain’.350 Similarly, Joachim 
Bahlcke et al., devote just 3% of their equally broad-ranging Schlesien und die 
Schlesier (2004) to the subject of Flucht und Vertreibung. 
A superficial reading of this corpus could create the impression that the 
historians in question are simply not interested in the postwar frontier changes and 
the concomitant sociocide. Yet, I argue, a deconstructive close reading reveals a 
number of consistently used narrative strategies that converge to support several 
tropes and topoi which in turn influence the readers’ understanding of the 
historical situation of the affected regions (the Kresy and the ZO) and of long-
term relations between Germany and Poland. This understanding, I argue, then 
forms the framework or paradigm within which the reader seeks to characterise, 
                                                 
349 Kuczyński, S. K., et al., A Panorama of Polish History, pp. 141, 44. 
350 3 pages = 0.62% of the entire text. See: Davies, N., Heart of Europe, pp. 88-90, 247-49. 
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evaluate, categorise and judge the events in question. Therefore, these narrative 
strategies (see Section 4.5 below) serve a tendentious function within the overall 
collective memory discourse. It is this kind of implicit, thought-shaping narrative 
content to which I apply the term ‘discourse deflection’. In the next section I 
deconstruct some of the most persistent tropes and topoi that have emerged during 
the relevant collective memory discourse, and analyse the ways in which they 
might influence a reader’s understanding of the events in question.  
 
4.4 Tropes and Topoi 
 
4.4.1 Poland, the ‘Christ of Nations’ 
One of the most frequently encountered tropes in Polish historiography and 
popular culture involves the notion of Poland as ‘the eternal victim’ or ‘Christ of 
Nations’.351 In a travel guide written for the Lonely Planet series, for example, 
Krzysztof Dydyński informs his readers (under the heading ‘Facts about Poland’) 
that ‘[nearly] all the historical wrongs and atrocities the world could inflict have 
been experienced by Poles.’352  
In addition to historic traumata such as the Partitions of 1772-75, the 
wretched state of the country by 1945 and the horrors the population had suffered 
at the hands of the Axis Powers (Germany) and Allies (the USSR) between 1939 
and the end of the War have left a lasting impression of Poland as a victim state. 
Yet, like most other nations and states, Poles and Poland have participated in 
many un-Christ-like acts of aggression in the past. Less than a year before the 
outbreak of WWII, for example, the Polish army had invaded Czechoslovakia 
with a view to capturing the Zaolzie District (Teschen Region) in October 
1938.353 Contemporary western observers found it difficult to distinguish between 
German expansionism and Poland’s hunger for new territory.354 In his memoires 
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of WWII, Churchill expressed his chagrin over the fact that the same Polish state, 
for the protection of whose sovereign integrity Neville Chamberlain had offered 
guarantees of British support on the 25th of August 1939 (Polish-British Treaty of 
Mutual Assistance) was ‘that very Poland which with hyena appetite had only six 
months before joined in the pillage and destruction’ of Czechoslovakia, displaying 
a ‘shameful attitude’ towards the principle of territorial sovereignty by annexing 
the Teschen Region.355  
Regardless of its historic merits, it is illuminating to analyse the discourse 
value of the trope of Poland as the eternal victim and ‘Christ of Nations’ from a 
functional perspective. In Christian tradition, Christ was a fundamentally good 
being. His role on Earth was to show mankind, by example, how to live in peace 
and harmony among themselves and in accordance with God’s will. He allowed 
himself to be betrayed and murdered in order to atone for the sins of all humanity. 
He was then resurrected to eternal life. Linking Poland to this legend, therefore, 
emphasises the state’s fundamental righteousness and exemplariness. In addition, 
it suggests that betrayal has played a significant role in the nation’s history. At a 
more fundamental level, the implicit identification with Christ’s resurrection, that 
this metaphor suggests, serves to meld the historical fact of Poland’s 
‘resurrection’ as an independent polity in 1918 and again in 1945 with a 
mythological understanding of Poland as an eternal and, therefore, indestructible 
and naturally ordained entity. 
This notion of Poland as the victim of betrayal is particularly interesting in 
the postwar context. With a fully functioning, legally constituted Polish 
government in exile in London, and having ‘no known measure of popular 
support’ the TRJN had an urgent need for legitimation when they assumed power 
in 1945.356 One of the ways in which they attempted to legitimise their regime 
was by casting the London Poles in the role of traitors. In the TRJN’s narrative, 
the pre-war government had already betrayed the international proletariat by 
                                                                                                                                     
Czechs Accept All Demands' (Oct 03); 'Poland's Economic Gains: Coal and Steel' (Oct 05); 'Polish-Czech Agreement: 
More Cessions' (Nov 01); 'Czechoslovakia's Loss' (Nov 04)', pp. 12, 13, 12, 13, 13, 13. respectively 
355 Chamberlain, N., British Guarantee of Polish Independence; Churchill, W., The Second World War, pp. 144-45; Bethell, 
N. W., Gomułka, p. 106; For a detailed overview of Polish territorial acquisitions and losses between 1916 and 1945 see: 
Bruckmüller, E., et al., Putzger Historischer Weltatlas, p. 131. This map can usefully be compared with the map of Piast 
Poland (p. 71) and of the Commonwealth of Poland-Lithuania at its greatest extent (p. 115) and at the time of the partitions 
(p. 131). 
356 Davies, N., Heart of Europe, p. 66; For a more in-depth overview of the degree of support enjoyed by Communists in 
interbellum Poland, see: Kopstein, J. S., et al., 'Who Voted Communist? Reconsidering the Social Bases of Radicalism in 
Interwar Poland', Slavic Review, 62 (2003), 87-109. 
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waging war against the Soviet Union in the Polish-Soviet War (1919-1921).357 
The fact that they had aligned themselves with the Capitalist West after 1939 was 
further proof of their base treachery.358 According to Davies: 
 
The more prominent among them [i.e., Poles returning from 
exile in Britain], having lingered in gaol in the company of Nazi 
war criminals and other ‘enemies of the people’, were tried and 
condemned in secret in trials continuing into the 1950s.359  
 
Kuczyński et al., on the other hand, emphasise the TRJN’s Christ-like 
forgiveness. According to them, the TRJN proclaimed an amnesty ‘for those who 
had participated in the conspiracy that supported the émigré government in 
London’ (my italics).360 Other Polish historians, such as Anita Prażmowska and 
Mark Ostrowski, agree that Poland was betrayed during WWII, but view the 
London Poles as the injured party, betrayed by Great Britain and the TRJN.361  
The functional effect of the trope of Poland as the ‘Christ of Nations’, 
therefore, is to romanticise Polish suffering whilst lending an air of righteousness 
and legitimacy to the state’s actions. This has two important ramifications for the 
collective memory discourse with which this thesis is concerned. First, it implies 
that the annexation of the ZO and expulsion of the resident population must have 
been fundamentally righteous, because Christ (Poland) is not capable of evil. 
Second, it implies that the decision to cede control over the Kresy to the USSR 
must have been inspired by a kind of divine wisdom, because Christ (Poland) 
cannot err. 
 
4.4.2 German-Polish Territorial Struggle 
One of the most influential topoi encountered in the deflected discourse, with 
which this chapter is concerned, involves the notion of an age-old struggle for 
territory between Germany and Poland.362 The editors of A Panorama of Polish 
                                                 
357  For a detailed study of Poland's part in preventing the ascendancy of the international proletariat under Soviet 
leadership, see: Croll, K. D., 'Soviet-Polish Relations, 1919-1921'. 
358 The anti-Western, anti-Capitalist argument became easier for the Communist government to support the more the former 
Western Allies waged war against emerging Communist states in the postwar era. 
359 Davies, N., Heart of Europe, p. 85. 
360 Kuczyński, S. K., et al., A Panorama of Polish History, p. 144. 
361 Prażmowska, A., The Betrayed Ally, p. 217; Ostrowski, M., 'To Return to Poland or Not to Return', pp. 71, 155, 82, 322, 
82; Blackwell, J. W., 'The Polish Home Army and the Struggle for the Lublin Region'. 
362 Indeed, one of the TRJN’s primary objectives in organising the ‘Exhibition of the Regained Territories’ was to support 
the narrative of a long-standing German-Polish conflict. For the Polish government's instrumentalisation of the notion of a 
long-term latent threat emanating from Germany see Piotr Madajczk and Elżbieta Opiłowska in: Frackowiak, J., et al., 
Deutsche und Polen von 1871 bis zur Gegenwart, pp. 229-30, 42-49. 
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History, for example, reinforce this topos by using a reproduction of Death of 
Wanda, a painting by Aleksander Lesser, as a narrative device. The painting 
concerns the legend of a Polish girl, who killed herself rather than marry a 
German prince. This, they suggest, is ‘proof of an early origin of Polish-German 
conflicts’.363 Similarly Plates 4 and 5 refer to the ‘threat of German invasions’ and 
‘numerous victorious wars against the [German] Empire’.364 This topos, of a long-
term struggle between ‘Poland’ and ‘Germany’, has also gone largely 
unchallenged in British historiography. Davies, for example, summarises his 
discussion on the Partitions as follows:  
 
[the] German Kings of Prussia, the German Habsburgs of 
Austria, and the German Empress of Russia had assumed power 
in Poland at the end of a long series of assaults and 
humiliations’ (my italics).365  
 
This is a clear example of using a narrative device – the repeated use of 
the ethnic identifier ‘German’ in conjunction with retrospective ethnicization – to 
suggest an explanation of the ontological situation (the Partitions) which is in fact 
untenable (i.e., that they were the result of a concerted German effort to annihilate 
‘Poland’).366 For, whilst the basic observation that these people were German is 
true, this fact had no bearing on the decisions they made with regard to the 
Commonwealth of Poland-Lithuania.367  
It is important to my argument to demonstrate the way in which such a 
specific, but, I contend, irrelevant historical detail can be used to support the topos 
of a long-term territorial struggle between Germany and Poland, which in turn 
lends weight to the TRJN’s justification for Poland’s territorial gains at 
Germany’s expense and their treatment of Germans and ethnic Germans. I shall, 
therefore, include a short digression to qualify the statement I made above to the 
effect that the fact that the Kings of Prussia, the Austrian Habsburgs, and the 
                                                 
363 Plate 2 in: Kuczyński, S. K., et al., A Panorama of Polish History. 
364 Plates 4 and 5 in: ibid. 
365 Davies, N., Heart of Europe, p. 213. 
366 The reductionist conflation of Poland with the Commonwealth of Poland-Lithuania is itself problematic. I address this in 
more detail below. 
367 The Austrian Habsburg who presided over the Second and Third Partitions, France II (Holy Roman Emperor 1792-1804 
/ Emperor of Austria 1804-1835) was half Spanish on his mother's side. See: Hartmann, G., Die Kaiser des Heiligen 
Römischen Reiches (Wiesbaden: Marix, 2008), p. 174. 
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Empress of Russia were ethnically German had no bearing on the decisions they 
made with regard to the Commonwealth of Poland-Lithuania. 
Catherine the Great of Russia, for example, was indeed of German stock, 
having been born in Stettin in German Pomerania (now Szczecin, Poland). 
Nevertheless, having ascended to the Russian throne through a series of highly 
contingent occurrences, the Empress’s foreign policy was entirely devoted to 
maintaining her own position and, where possible, promoting the interests of 
Russia.368 She regarded herself as having been born to rule Russia for its own sake 
‘[und hat] tausendmal gesagt: ich gehöre nach Rußland’.369  
Nor did Prussia and Austria cooperate to their mutual advantage. On the 
contrary, the two states were frequently at war, for example, over the ownership 
of Silesia (1740-1742, 1744-1745, and 1756-1763).370 Following the defeat of 
Austria in the last of these wars, Frederick II the Great of Prussia gloated over the 
fact that ‘Austria [will never] get over the pain of Silesia’s loss […never] will it 
forget that it must now share its authority in Germany with us’.371 
Indeed, it was Frederick the Great who effectively split the German 
Empire by assuming and asserting the title King of Prussia under which he ruled 
both his Imperial and extra-Imperial territories as of 1772. 372  According to 
Christopher Clark  
 
the Francophone Frederick the Great […] was famously 
dismissive of contemporary German culture and believed in the 
primacy of the state, not that of the nation.373 
 
Furthermore, from the inception of the Holy Roman Empire to the 
founding of the Second German Reich in 1871, the particularistic tendencies of 
Imperial princes were diametrically opposed to concepts of pan-German 
cooperation.374 This particularism ‘penetrated political, social and cultural life’ 
                                                 
368 Massie, R. K., Catherine the Great: Portrait of a Woman (London: Head of Zeus, 2012). 
369 Kaus, G., Katharina die Grosse (Stuttgart & Hamburg: Deutscher Bücherbund, 1935), pp. 5-31, 313-46. 
370 Neubach, H., Geschichte Schlesiens, p. 8; Großbongardt, A., et al., Die Deutschen im Osten Europas, p. 41. 
371 Quoted in: Clark, C. M., Iron Kingdom: the Rise and Downfall of Prussia, 1600-1947 (London: Allen Lane, 2006), p. 
216. 
372 Morby, J. E., The Wordsworth Handbook of Kings & Queens (Ware: Wordsworth Reference, 1994), p. 137; Clark, C. 
M., Iron Kingdom, p. 229. 
373 My italics. See: Clark, C. M., Iron Kingdom, p. 233. 
374 Several of the Germans to whom Davies refers as the partitioners of Poland were Imperial princes. These included 
Frederick II the Great and Frederick William (reigned 1744-1797) both of whom ruled as Electors of Brandenburg (i.e., as 
Imperial princes) as well as King of Prussia in which capacity they owed neither loyalty to the Empire nor fealty to the 
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and generated resistance to pan-Germanic tendencies in law, historiography and 
even language.375 Long before the abolition of the Empire in 1806, the authority 
of the German Kaisers, and therefore the cohesion of the Reich, had been 
challenged on many occasions and in many ways.376 The independence of the 
Hanse towns in the Middle Ages, for example, called the entire concept of the 
German Empire, and by extension, of German unity, into question. The most 
important of these towns, such as Lübeck, frequently conducted their own foreign 
policy in defiance of the Empire. 377  Similarly, many of the German polities 
encompassed within the Empire where difficult to control. During the Thirty 
Years War (1618-1648), for example, the Kaiser was moved to wage war against 
a coalition of German polities, nominally held either in feu or as appanages of the 
Empire, but now backed by external powers in defence of their religious and 
political freedoms.378 Even before this period, individual states within the Empire 
had regularly fought among themselves. 379  Later, the War of the Austrian 
Succession (1740-1748), in which Prussia, Bavaria and Saxony joined forces with 
(inter alia) France, Spain, and Sweden against the Austrian Habsburgs, further 
demonstrates the lack of loyalty and solidarity among German potentates in the 
period just prior to the Partitions.380 Finally, the lack of unity among Imperial 
princes resulted in the abolition of the Holy Roman Empire during the so-called 
French Period (arguably 1792-1813).381 Yet, the start of this period coincided with 
the Second and Third Partitions.382 
                                                                                                                                     
Emperor. The ‘Habsburgs of Austria’ to whom he refers are Maria Theresa (1717-1780), Joseph II (1741-1790), Leopold II 
(1765-1792), and Francis II (1768-1835).Hartmann, G., Die Kaiser des HRR, pp. 165-86. 
375 Beutin, W., et al., A History of German Literature: From the Beginnings to the Present Day (London; New York: 
Routledge, 1993), pp. 44, 299, 335. 
376 Whaley, J., Germany and the Holy Roman Empire: 1493-1648 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 1, p. 38. 
377 Zimmerling, D., Die Hanse: Handelsmacht im Zeichen der Kogge (Düsseldorf: Econ, 1976), pp. 44-46, 124-32, 70, 279-
301; Stoob, H., Die Hanse (Graz: Styria, 1995), pp. 158-284. 
378 Huch, R. O., Der grosse Krieg in Deutschland (Leipzig: Insel, 1931), pp. 7-108; Schiller, F., Die Geschichte des 
Dreißigjährigen Krieges, Schillers Werke, 10 vols (Basel: Birkhäuser, 1946 [1792]), 9, pp. 3-107; Roberts, M., Sweden as 
a Great Power, 1611-1697: Government, Society, Foreign Policy (London: Edward Arnold, 1968), pp. 138-63; Wilson, P. 
H., Europe's Tragedy: a History of the Thirty Years War (London: Allen Lane, 2009), pp. 197-622. 
379 Haller, J., Die Epochen der deutschen Geschichte (Munich: Paul List, 1962 [1923]), p. 164. 
380 Hartmann, G., Die Kaiser des HRR, pp. 164-67; Whaley, J., Germany and the Holy Roman Empire: 1648-1806 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2013), 2, pp. 158-19. 
381 Measured from France’s declaration of war against Austria and Prussia in April 1792 to the Battle of Leipzig in October 
1813. 
382 Leopold II (reigned 1790-1792) almost saved the Empire by brokering two defensive treaties against France: the 
Pillnitzer Konvention (27th of August 1791) and the Defensivbündis (7th of February 1792). On this basis the entire Reich 
entered the War of the First Coalition against France (1792-1797). However, Prussia (under the rule of Frederick William 
II 1786-1797) pulled out of the coalition in 1795 just as the Third Partition was being carried out. Under the reign of 
Frederick William III (1797-1840) Prussia also remained neutral during Wars of the Second and Third Coalitions (1798-
1802 and 1805 respectively). Baden, Bavaria, Württemberg, Hesse and Nassau all fought on the French side in 1805. 
Sixteen Imperial polities placed themselves under Napoleon’s protectorate on the 12th of July 1806 and notified the Kaiser 
of their secession from the Empire on the 1st of August 1806. Less than a week later (8th of August 1806) Francis II/I, who 
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Thus, Davies’ implied characterisation of the Partitions as being the result 
of a concerted ‘German’ assault on the Commonwealth of Poland-Lithuania is 
highly misleading.383 It is the result of an untenable conflation of Prussia and 
Austria with ‘Germany’ per se. As I demonstrate in Section 4.5.1 below, 
reductionist conflation of this type is common in the deflected discourse with 
which this chapter is concerned. The frequent, conflation of the Commonwealth 
of Poland-Lithuania with Poland per se, for example, is equally untenable.384  
Nevertheless, the topos of a long-term German-Polish struggle for 
territory, supported and sustained by reductionist conflation of this type, is 
influential within the historiographical corpus relating to German-Polish relations. 
Within the collective memory discourse currently under consideration, the 
functional effect of this topos is to help contextualise Poland’s annexation of the 
ZO as a necessary expedient in the face of a persistent, long-term German 
menace. In addition, it supports the topos of Poland’s having been ‘wiped off the 
map’, with Germany’s active involvement to which I now turn. 
 
4.4.3 Poland Wiped off the Map 
It is frequently asserted that Poland has been ‘wiped off the map’ or annihilated 
several times in history, always with Germany’s active involvement.385 The gist of 
this topos, within the collective memory discourse with which this thesis is 
concerned, is that the de facto abolition of the Second Republic between 1939 and 
1944 was just the latest in a series of such events. Prior to 1939, according to this 
topos, German aggression had already climaxed in the Partitions between 1772 
and 1795. Thus, this topos reinforces the topos of a long-standing territorial 
conflict between Germany and Poland. It also supports the trope of Poland as the 
‘Christ of Nations’. It maps onto the legend of Christ in two ways.386 First, Christ 
                                                                                                                                     
had already taken the title of Kaiser von Österreich on the 8th of August 1804, declared the end of the Holy Roman 
Empire. See: Hartmann, G., Die Kaiser des HRR, pp. 175-80. 
383 For a more detailed exposition of the Partitions see Appendix A, (Section A.3). 
384 See Appendix A, Section A.2 and Chapter 3, Section 3.4.1. The Commonwealth was a multinational polity. As such, in 
addition to Poland, three sovereign states (Byelorussia, the Ukraine, and Lithuania) could, with equal justification, claim 
continuity with the Commonwealth. Whilst it is true that the seat of government lay within modern Poland, there were no 
ethnic or national restrictions on the elected monarch. Consequently, just four of the Commonwealth’s eleven elected kings 
between 1573 and 1574 were ethnically and culturally Polish. The remainder being French and Hungarian (one of each), 
Swedish (three consecutive kings from the Vasa Dynasty) and two Saxons (agnates of the Wettin Dynasty). See: 
Kuczyński, S. K., et al., A Panorama of Polish History, p. 23; Davies, N., Heart of Europe, p. 263. 
385 Dydyński, K., Poland, p. 13; Zamoyski, A., Rites of Peace: the Fall of Napoleon & the Congress of Vienna (London: 
Harper Perennial, 2008), p. 18. 
386 Following the OED I use 'legend' in this sentence to refer to ‘a traditional story popularly regarded as historical but 
which is not authenticated’. See: Soanes, C., et al., eds., Concise OED, p. 814. 
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was annihilated by his enemies and, therefore, suffered the same fate as Poland. 
Second, Christ rose from the dead, thus defying his enemies, just as Poland did in 
1918 and again in 1945. 
Undeniably, Germany collaborated with the USSR in the active 
annihilation of Poland as a sovereign state in 1939. Following the partition of 
Poland between the USSR and Germany on the 28th of September of that year, the 
German government created several administrative units within its zone, the 
overall status of which was that of a Reichsprotektorat. On the 8th of October 
1939 the south eastern part of this area was redubbed the Generalgouvernement 
and four days later on the 12th of October 1939 the remainder, which was known 
as the eingegliederte Ostgebiete to mark its closer integration within the Reich, 
was subdivided into two Reichsgaue, Danzig-Westpreußen and the Wartheland 
(often referred to as the Warthegau), and two Regierungsbezirke, Kattowitz and 
Zichenau. 387  Thus, this topos approaches historical fact. It is, however, 
problematic in two respects. First, it implies historical continuity between the 
Commonwealth of Poland-Lithuania and the Second Republic which, as I have 
already argued (see Section 4.4.2), is an untenable conflation. Second, it ignores 
the proliferation of Polish polities that existed between the demise of the 
Commonwealth and the founding of the Second Republic.388 Functionally, within 
the collective memory discourse concerning the Flucht und Vertreibung of 
Germans from the ZO, this topos establishes territorial acquisition as a matter of 
national defence rather than expansion. 
Together, these tropes and topoi combine to create an impression of 
Poland as an embattled redoubt struggling for existence against an aggressive 
Germany bent on its destruction. I argue that ‘inhabiting’ this narrative helped the 
TRJN, and subsequent Communist Polish governments, to legitimise their rule 
and justify their treatment of German residents in the ZO, and that this strategy 
largely succeeded. Moreover, as I demonstrate below, one can still find traces of 
these tropes and topoi in Polish and Anglophone historiography published right up 
to the second decade of the twenty first century. They all find expression in and 
                                                 
387 On the basis of two Hitler-Erlasse (issued on the 8th and 12th of October 1939), occupied Poland was divided into two 
large areas: the General Government, and the so-called eingegliederte Ostgebiete. The later comprised two Reichsgaue 
(Danzig-Westpreußen and Wartheland) and two Regierungsbezirke (Kattowitz and Zichenau). See: Sommer, R. L., et al., 
Atlas of World War II, pp. 14-15; Grunwald, A., et al., Chronik der Weltgeschichte, p. 286; Keegan, J., ed. Atlas of WWII, 
pp. 90-91; Brandes, D., et al., Lexikon der Vertreibungen, p. 713. 
388 See Appendix A, Section A.4 
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are reinforced by a number of narrative strategies, which include conflation, 
omission, ahistoricism, vagueness and the use of non sequiturs.389 In the following 
section I analyse the two narrative strategies most frequently encountered within 
the deflected collective memory discourse with which this chapter is concerned: 
conflation and omission.390  
 
4.5 Narrative Strategies 
 
4.5.1 Conflation 
The most frequently encountered narrative strategy in the collective memory 
discourse triggered by Poland’s postwar frontier changes and the concomitant 
sociocide is conflation. In the deflected discourse, for example, historians 
frequently conflate historical Polish and German polities with the modern titular 
states of Germany and Poland.391 Specifically, it is often implied that actions by, 
or insults to, certain historical polities can be understood as having been 
perpetrated by, or against, modern Poland and Germany. The implied corollary is 
that actions by these modern states can be explained and or justified as being 
reactions to these historical events. 
For example, the Teutonic Knights fought against the Commonwealth of 
Poland-Lithuania on several occasions for control over Prussia.392 In the context 
of ‘discourse deflection’, many historians have a tendency to conflate the State of 
the Teutonic Order (1226-1561) with the Holy Roman Empire (hereinafter HRE), 
or simply with Germany per se.393 At the same time, they frequently conflate the 
Commonwealth of Poland-Lithuania with Poland.394 In both cases, the conflation 
                                                 
389 Ahistoricism: 'a system of thought or analysis which fails to view persons, texts, cultural phenomena, etc., within their 
historical context' see: OED-Online, 'Oxford English Dictionary Online'; Ahistorical: 'lacking historical perspective or 
context' see: Soanes, C., et al., eds., Concise OED, p. 27. 
390 Space restrictions prevent me from presenting examples of every type of narrative strategy, but focusing on the role 
played by the use of conflation and omission within the collective memory discourse with which this thesis is concerned 
will suffice to illustrate my arguments. 
391 In this context ‘the modern period’ means 1919 to the present. Three Polish titular states have existed during this period: 
the Second Republic (1918-1939), and the People’s Republic (1945-1989), the Republic of Poland (1989 to present). 
Germany has been constituted in several forms during the same period: Imperial Germany or the Second Reich (1871-
1918), the Weimar Republic (1919-1933), the Third Reich (1933-1945), the Federal Republic of Germany (1949-1990), the 
German Democratic Republic (1949-1990), and the Berlin Republic (1990 to present). Both notional states ceased de facto 
to exist for significant periods during this era: Poland (1939-1945); Germany (1945-1949). 
392 State of the Teutonic Order: 1226 – Konrad of Masowia's transfers Kulmerland to the Order, the Pope grants the Order 
the right to conquer Prussia in the Golden Bull, and Kaiser Friedrich II grants sovereignty over all conquered areas in 
Prussia to Hermann von Salza, the Grand Master of the Order. See: Grunwald, A., et al., Chronik der Weltgeschichte, pp. 
122, 69; Whaley, J., Holy Roman Empire: 1493-1648, pp. 22-23. 
393 Plate 10 in: Kuczyński, S. K., et al., A Panorama of Polish History. 
394 For example, when talking about ‘Poland’ having been wiped off the map when referring to the dissolution of the 
Commonwealth of Poland-Lithuania (see below). 
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is untenable. I have already alluded above to the situation as regards Poland and 
the Commonwealth, i.e., that any simplistic equation of the two polities cannot be 
supported by the historical evidence. Similarly, any conflation of the State of the 
Teutonic Order with any other German polity is ahistorical. 395  Whilst the 
historiography relating to the Teutonic Knights may appear to have nothing to do 
with the subject of this thesis, my argument is precisely that such arcane detail is 
often instrumentalised within the deflected discourse which serves to 
contextualise the events of 1945. More specifically, I argue that the use of certain 
narrative strategies in connection with this deflected discourse – conflation in 
conjunction with ahistoricism – can significantly influence a reader’s perception 
of the historical framework situation appertaining to the TRJN’s decisions and 
actions in the immediate postwar era.  
Functionally, this ahistorical conflation of the State of the Teutonic Order 
with the HRE/Germany and of the Commonwealth with Poland per se has several 
specific ramifications for the collective memory discourse engendered by the 
annexation of the ZO and the Vertreibungen. At the ontological level, it 
contributes to the topos of a long-term territorial conflict between Germany and 
Poland, the functional effect of which, as I argued above, is to explain Poland’s 
annexation of the ZO as a necessary expedient in the face of persistent German 
aggression. Moreover, at the explanatory level, it supports the TRJN’s 
characterisation of the annexation of this part of Germany as regaining or 
restoring lost Polish territory.396 
Another ontological-level conflation frequently encountered within the 
secondary literature, which I argue constitutes the deflected discourse relating to 
Poland’s annexation of the ZO and Vertreibung of the German residents, concerns 
the historic province of Silesia. By the outbreak of WWII, the greater part of 
Silesia (all of Lower Silesia and over half of Upper Silesia) was an integral part of 
                                                 
395 None of the lands held by the Teutonic Knights were imperial fiefs. Under the Golden Bull of Rimini (1226), they owed 
loyalty (i.e., in fulfilment of a treaty commitment), but not fealty (i.e., loyalty arising from a feudal obligation) to the 
Emperor. In 1525 the Order was secularized and their Prussian lands became the (Polish) Duchy of Prussia. The Grand 
Master of the Teutonic Order, Albrecht von Hohenzollern (1490-1568), became the Duke of Prussia, now owing fealty (as 
opposed to allegiance as in 1466) to the King of Poland, not to the Kaiser. Their landholdings in what is now Lithuania 
became the Duchy of Kurland in 1561, which was never part of the German Reich. Thus the Knights of the Teutonic Order 
were originally beholden to the Pope, not the Kaiser, and were not acting in the interests of ‘Germany’ as such. See: Clark, 
C. M., Iron Kingdom, pp. 9, 12-13; Du Boulay and Boockmann in: Whaley, J., Holy Roman Empire: 1493-1648, pp. 22-23. 
396 Because German East Prussia was largely coextensive with Ducal Polish Prussia for which the ‘German’ Teutonic 
Knights had owed fealty to the King of Poland. 
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Germany.397 Some of Upper Silesia had been integrated into the Second Republic 
in the wake of WWI. 398  Another part, Cieszyn Silesia, formed part of 
Czechoslovakia. 399  However, this complexity is often ignored in the relevant 
historiography, much of which conflates these various Silesian provinces and 
refer simply to ‘Silesia’ with no qualifying adjectives such as German, Polish, 
Upper, Lower, historic and so on (see below). 
This conflation has several ramifications for the deflected discourse under 
discussion in this chapter. First, it suggests a level of continuity between the 
territorial aspirations of the leaders of the Second Republic (who coveted parts of 
Upper Silesia and Cieszyn Silesia but not Lower Silesia), and the TRJN, who 
annexed Lower Silesia.  
Second, it suggests continuity between Polish Silesia (i.e., the parts of 
Upper Silesia acquired during the interbellum period) and German Silesia. The 
narrative function of the first of these notions is to underplay the marked policy 
differences between the TRJN and the Piłsudski/Sanacja regime and, by 
extension, between the TRJN and the London Poles.400 Yet, as I have already 
demonstrated in Chapter 3, the TRJN’s annexation of Lower Silesia (and their 
surrender of the Kresy) represented a significant caesura in post-Partition Polish 
state-building objectives. Functionally, this narrative sleight of hand could affect 
one’s perception of the ontological situation (no difference in policy rather than a 
radical break with tradition) which may in turn influence one’s understanding at 
the explanatory level (the annexation as the culmination of long-term state-
building aspirations rather than as a contingency measure in response to non-
negotiable geo-political changes imposed by the Allies). In addition, the 
ontological-level conflation between Polish Silesia and German Silesia has a 
                                                 
397 Barraclough, G., Atlas of World History, pp. 260-61; See Map 4 and 5 in: Pittaway, M., et al., Maps Booklet for Total 
War and Social Change in Europe 1914-1955 (Milton Keynes: The Open University, 2003), pp. 8-9. 
398 Davies, N., Heart of Europe, p. 59; Bahlcke, J., et al., Schlesien und die Schlesier, pp. 121-33; Neubach, H., Geschichte 
Schlesiens, p. 17; Waites, B., et al., The Impact of World War I, Total War and Social Change in Europe 1914-1955 
(Milton Keynes: The Open University, 2006), pp. 70-72; Brandes, D., et al., Lexikon der Vertreibungen, pp. 160-63; 
Leuschner, M., Heimat und Schickal, pp. 22, 36. 
399 This was the de jure status of Cieszyn Silesia. De facto Germany had annexed Bohemia and Moravia on March 15, 
1938, after which Poland occupied the Cieszyn Silesia between October 2 and 9 the same year. Slovakia then declared 
independence on March 14, 1939 effectively abolishing Czechoslovakia. See: Ostrowski, M., 'To Return to Poland or Not 
to Return', p. 146; Kamusella, T., Dynamics of the Policies of Ethnic Cleansing in Silesia in the 19th and 20th Centuries, p. 
308; Stackelberg, R., et al., The Nazi Germany Source Book, pp. xviii, 219-21; Hegenscheidt-Nozdrovická, E., 'Die 
Slowakei den Slowaken!' Die separatistischen Strömungen in der Slowakei zwischen 1918 und 1939 (Hamburg: Diplomica, 
2012), pp. 88-89. 
400 Polonsky, A. B., 'Piłsudski and Parliament', pp. 374-442; Holzer, J., 'The Political Right in Poland, 1918-39', Journal of 
Contemporary History, 12 (1977), 395-412. 
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direct bearing on how one seeks to understand or explain the TRJN’s actions in 
the immediate postwar era. For if one overlooks or accepts the conflation then 
reports of German troops crossing the frontier into ‘Silesia’ in 1939 appear to 
suggest that ‘Silesia’ had been part of pre-war Poland.401 If this were so then one 
need look no further for an explanation of the TRJN’s annexation of ‘Silesia’: 
they were simply restoring the pre-war frontier. However, the annexation 
encompassed several hundred thousand square kilometres of land that had lain 
beyond Poland’s pre-war frontier. This conflation also disguises the referent of 
‘the Regained Territories’ (Ziemie Odzyskane/ZO) as it implies that what was 
regained was territory which had been part of the Second Republic until 
September 1939. In fact what was ‘regained’ was territory that had last been 
Polish in 1335 (see next section).  
As both of these examples demonstrate, the functional effect of conflation, 
used as a narrative device within the deflected discourse, is to imply a certain 
ontological situation which, if true, must necessarily influence one’s 
understanding of the postwar situation as explained by the TRJN.  
 
4.5.2 Omission 
If one accepts the notion that the TRJN had the right to restore the Piast Kingdom 
of Poland, it follows that all of the areas annexed from Germany ought to have 
been constituent parts of this ancient polity at the time of its demise (1370).402 It 
also follows that, if the restoration of the Piast Kingdom justifies the TRJN’s 
acceptance of the USSR’s annexation of the Kresy, then this region ought not to 
have been a constituent part of this polity at the time of its demise. However, three 
key pieces of information demonstrate that neither of these two conclusions are 
correct, which is why it is common for both Polish and German historians to talk 
in terms of the ‘Piast myth’ today.403 First, Silesia as a whole no longer formed 
                                                 
401 Andrzej Ajnenkiel, for example, states that the front line in the early days of WWII ran ‘through Silesia and down to the 
Carpathians’. This creates the completely false impression that Silesia per se must have been part of Poland at that time, as 
it is clear from the context that the battle front referred to is within Poland and that the German forces had already 
penetrated deep into the country. In fact, what he is referring to is the tiny enclave of Polish Upper Silesia awarded to 
Poland following the plebiscites held in the wake of World War One. The majority of Upper Silesia and all of Lower 
Silesia still formed part of the German Reich at that time (1939). See Andrzej Ajnenkiel in: Kuczyński, S. K., et al., A 
Panorama of Polish History, p. 131. 
402 There was no demise of the Kingdom of Poland at this time, but rather it ceased to be ruled by members of the Piast 
Dynasty and underwent a significant constitutional reform (see Appendix A). 
403 Saldern, A., Mythen in Geschichte und Geschichtsschreibung, pp. 113-31; Kamusella, T., Dynamics of the Policies of 
Ethnic Cleansing in Silesia in the 19th and 20th Centuries, p. 174; Demshuk, A., 'Reinscribing Schlesien as Śląsk', p. 63; 
Frackowiak, J., et al., Deutsche und Polen von 1871 bis zur Gegenwart, pp. 18, 246-48. 
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part of the Piast Kingdom by 1370.404 Second, East Prussia never formed part of 
the Piast Kingdom.405 Third, Kazimierz III Wielki, the last of the Piast kings, had 
incorporated the principality of Halych (roughly co-extensive with East Galicia) 
into his Kingdom by the time of his death in 1370.406 However, despite the fact 
that, as the works cited in the footnotes show, all of this is well documented, the 
first two of these facts are omitted from much of the Polish and Anglophone 
historiography which constitutes the deflected discourse with which this chapter is 
concerned.407  
The third fact – the incorporation of East Galicia into the Piast Kingdom – 
is discussed but not evaluated with reference to the TRJN’s Piast Formula.408 To 
take just one example, the Treaty of Trentschin (1335), is one of a number of key 
documents in which successive Polish monarchs renounced all claims to 
Silesia. 409  Yet, the Treaty of Trentschin is rarely mentioned in the relevant 
historiography.410 However, neglecting to mention the Treaty of Trentschin in 
relevant histories – an ontological-level omission – has significant ramifications at 
the explanatory level, as it fails to dispel the notion (implicit in the Piast Formula) 
that Silesia always formed part of the Piast Kingdom and ought, therefore 
(assuming the TRJN’s right to restore this ancient kingdom in 1945), to be 
annexed in the context of the Piast Formula. 
Just as there is a tendency, in both the direct and indirect historiography, to 
omit important information about the status of those territories claimed by the 
TRJN under the Piast Formula, mention of the USSR’s role in the annihilation of 
                                                 
404 See Appendix B: A Brief History of Silesia (Section B.3). 
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406 Grünhagen, C., et al., Lehns- und Besitzurkunden Schlesiens, pp. 3-6; Patterson, E. J., Poland (1934), p. 7; Reddaway, 
W. F., et al., The Cambridge History of Poland: From the Origins to Sobieski (to 1696) (Cambridge University Press, 
1950), pp. 169-70; Bethell, N. W., Gomułka, p. 106; Halecki, O., History of Poland, pp. 54-55; Potichnyj, P. J., Poland and 
Ukraine, Past and Present, p. 6; Kuczyński, S. K., et al., A Panorama of Polish History, pp. 33-39; Zamoyski, A., The 
Polish Way, pp. 40-42; Czapliński, W., et al., Atlas historyczny Polski, pp. 12-13; Siebel-Achenbach, S., Lower Silesia 
from Nazi Germany to Communist Poland, p. 7; Barraclough, G., Atlas of World History, p. 139; Kamusella, T., Dynamics 
of the Policies of Ethnic Cleansing in Silesia in the 19th and 20th Centuries, p. 18; Schwarz, W., Bilder aus Schlesien, p. 
207; Davies, N., Heart of Europe, p. 251; Bahlcke, J., et al., Schlesien und die Schlesier, pp. 6, 27, 39-40, 150; Neubach, 
H., Geschichte Schlesiens, p. 6; Werner, K., 'Schlesien unsere Heimat'; Leuschner, M., Heimat und Schickal, pp. 20, 34. 
407 Frackowiak, J., et al., Deutsche und Polen von 1871 bis zur Gegenwart, p. 254. 
408 See, for example: Kuczyński, S. K., et al., A Panorama of Polish History, p. 52; Davies, N., Heart of Europe, p. 253. 
409 See Appendix B: A Brief History of Silesia (Section B.3). 
410 For the results of a ‘distant reading’ exercise designed to assess the presence of the Treaty of Trentschin in the relevant 
historiography, see Appendix D. 
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the Second Republic and its subsequent annexation of formerly Polish territory is 
often omitted.  
The historiography of the part played by USSR in WWII is complex and 
subject to multiple interpretations. With the Red/Soviet Army permanently 
stationed in Poland from 1945 to 1989, it is easy to understand why the Polish 
censor between these dates favoured an interpretation of the USSR as a friendly 
power. 411  In this interpretation, the Polish government had fled the country 
following the German invasion, abandoning the populace to its fate. Stalin 
decided to intervene to create a safe haven to the East of the Bug and San Rivers, 
beyond which the German forces could not advance. 412 The Hitler-Stalin Pact, if 
mentioned at all, is portrayed as a clever ruse on Stalin’s part to gain time in the 
face of German aggression. Following the launch of Operation Barbarossa, the 
Red Army had fallen back to regroup and wait until the Soviet armaments 
industry could produce the necessary ordnance to drive the Germans out of the 
Slavic homelands. Having arrived back at the Bug and San River line 
(coincidentally the old Curzon-Ribbentrop-Molotov Line), Stalin pointed out that 
the majority of people to the East of this line were not Polish. The Polish 
Communists who had fought their way back to Poland alongside the Red Army 
agreed that this was the case and that Poland had no natural claim to these 
territories.413 Those who had enforced Polish control over these areas in the past 
were the enemies of ordinary Byelorussians, Lithuanians, and Ukrainians and, 
ultimately therefore, of the international proletariat. By contrast, there is no doubt 
that the Polish government in exile considered themselves to be at war with the 
USSR. Zygmunt Graliński, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs in the exile 
government, confirmed this unequivocally at a meeting of the Polish National 
Council on the 16th of April 1940 when he stated that:  
 
                                                 
411 Bates, J. M., 'PUWP's Preferences in the Contemporary Polish Novel', pp. 199, 286. 
412  In a speech delivered to the Polish Workers' Party or Polska Partia Robotnicza (PPR) on December 07, 1945, 
Władysław Gomułka (1905-1982) justified the Soviet invasion of Poland on September 17, 1939. He asserted that the pre-
war Sanacja regime had rejected ‘all Soviet offers of an anti-Nazi pact’ and that by the time of the invasion the ‘Polish state 
apparatus had already collapsed and the government [had] fled into Romania’. He went on to say that the French and 
British governments had displayed a clear intention to redirect German aggression towards the USSR. Finally, he 
explained, ‘the territories the Red Army [had] occupied were inhabited mainly by Ukrainians and Byelorussians, whom the 
Soviet government had a moral right and duty to protect.’ Quoted in: Bethell, N. W., Gomułka, pp. 117-18. 
413 Kuczyński, S. K., et al., A Panorama of Polish History, pp. 54, 139. 
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[in] all our statements we have held to the position that a state 
of war exists between Poland and the Soviet Union and we have 
presented the matter quite clearly.414 
 
In British historiography, the situation is similarly problematic. Having 
chosen to interpret the Anglo-Polish Agreement as not being applicable to the 
USSR, the British government continued to ignore Soviet atrocities such as the 
Katyń Forest Massacre and finally signed the Anglo-Soviet Agreement (12th of 
July 1941).415  
Subsequent Soviet atrocities were Allied atrocities for which all of the 
Allies, including Britain, shared corporate responsibility. This reading of history 
does not sit easily with Britain’s national WWII mythology, the gist of which is 
that Britain noticed Poland’s peril and took immediate, morally righteous, and 
ultimately successful action to thwart overwhelming German forces, both in 
Poland and throughout Europe. Coupled with Britain’s powerlessness to oppose 
Stalin’s postwar plans and the USSR’s subsequent dominance in Eastern Europe, 
this problematic wartime alliance became a national embarrassment, best not 
examined too closely.416 In many ways therefore, British historiography vis-à-vis 
the Soviet Union, particularly in relation to Poland, converges on that produced in 
Poland during the Communist Era (1945-1989). It selectively omits certain 
aspects of the USSR’s conduct towards Poland, both in 1939 and in 1945.417 
In both East and West Germany, the historiography of WWII in general is 
heavily overshadowed by the Holocaust and other atrocities committed by 
German forces. There is an overwhelming pressure on German historians to, as it 
were, accept full responsibility for the War on behalf of Germany. German 
historians who attempt to point out the wrongdoings of other belligerents run the 
risk of being castigated as NSDAP apologists, revisionists or worse. German 
historiography on WWII is equally ambivalent about the Red Army. Historians in 
                                                 
414 Quoted in: Sword, K., 'British Reactions to the Soviet Occupation of Eastern Poland', p. 98. 
415 65/1/18, War Cabinet Response to Soviet Attack on Poland September 17, 1939; Cripps, R. S., et al., Anglo-Soviet 
Agreement 1941, Accessed on: 30.08.2014; Marwick, A., et al., Total war and Historical Change, pp. 223-37; Weber, C., 
Krieg der Täter: Die Massenerschießungen von Katyń (Hamburg: Hamburger Institut für Sozialforschung, 2015). 
416 On British powerlessness against Stalin see: Churchill, W., The Second World War, p. 733. 
417 Some popular accounts of the War, such as Forgotten Voices of WWII, simply omit any reference to the USSR as an 
aggressor. In this particular instance, the first mention of the Soviet Union appears a quarter of the way through the book. It 
is made in the context of the non-explanation of Operation Barbarossa having been the result of Hitler’s having been 
thwarted in his ambition to invade Britain. Neither the Soviet invasion of Poland in 1939 nor Soviet war crimes in Poland 
are mentioned. See: Arthur, M., Forgotten Voices of the Second World War: in Association with the Imperial War Museum 
(London: Ebury, 2004), p. 120. 
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the GDR were under the same pressures as their Polish colleagues to forget Soviet 
atrocities against other Slavic nations.418 In popular culture within the GDR, the 
Red Army was portrayed as the liberator of Germany whereby any undeniable 
excesses against Germans were treated as understandable under the circumstances 
and primarily directed at NSDAP activists, not ordinary Germans. In popular 
West German historiography and the type of populist literature (including ‘pulp 
fiction’) it inspires, there is a tendency to characterise the Russian Campaign as a 
‘Katastrophe’ in which both the Soviet people and German soldiers were the 
victims of Hitler’s ‘wahnwitzige Forderung’ and Stalin’s mistake ‘in 
Unterschätzung des Gegners die eigenen Kräfte zu zersplittern’ as well as 
overwhelming impersonal natural forces (such as General Winter).419  German 
historiography is often frank about Stalin’s collusion with Hitler, but rather silent 
on the Soviet annexation of Eastern Poland in 1945. The otherwise very 
comprehensive Historischer Bildatlas, for example, completely omits the Soviet 
attack on Poland in 1939. The timelines and related text on the relevant pages 
leap, in one example, from the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact (23rd of 
August 1939) to the German invasion of the USSR (22nd of June 1941), and, in 
another example, from the German Blitzkrieg in Poland (1st-27th of September 
1939) to Stalin’s attack on Finland (30th of November 1939).420 
As with conflation, the functional effect of omission, used as a narrative 
device within the deflected discourse, is to imply a certain ontological situation 
which, if true, must necessarily influence one’s understanding of the postwar 
situation as explained by the TRJN.  
 
4.6 Concluding Remarks 
Summarising the arguments presented above, it is now possible to address the 
specific research questions set out in the introduction to this chapter. I first asked 
how the situation has changed between the postwar era and the post-Wende era in 
terms of the relevant historiography produced by historians operating within 
                                                 
418 Lokatis, S., 'Die Zensur historischer Literatur in der DDR unter Ulbricht', Historische Zeitschrift. Beihefte, 27 (1998), 
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420 Bertin, P. V.-N. J., Historischer Bildatlas (Munich: Orbis, 1991), pp. 274, 78. 
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various stakeholder communities. The situation is, in fact, completely different 
and it is important to note that there is no longer any serious debate among Polish 
and German historians concerning the details of Poland’s annexation of the ZO 
and loss of the Kresy in the wake of WWII and the concomitant sociocide. Nor is 
the broad history of the region contested as such. Consequently, it is common for 
both Polish and German historians today to talk in terms of the ‘Piast myth’. I 
have already quoted Gregor Thum’s assessment that ‘[among] historians of 
[Germany and Poland], nationally-based standpoints have disappeared [and joint] 
German-Polish research projects and publications … are today in fact a matter of 
course’.421 This is partially the result of the collaborative, non-confrontational 
historiography produced by the Deutsch-polnische Schulbuchkommission.  
However, even without this corpus and the channelling of history that it 
entailed, it is doubtful whether the Piast Formula would have ever become part of 
any hegemonic historical narrative in the longer term. As I argued in Chapter 3, 
this was never the TRJN’s intention. Instead, their instrumentalisation of the Piast 
Formula was only ever intended for immediate Polish ‘consumption’ in the 
context of legitimisation. Indeed, the Polish government’s efforts to lend 
credibility to the Piast Formula largely ceased after the ‘Exhibition of the 
Regained Territories’ in 1948. There has, in fact, been little explicit Polish 
government support or propaganda for the Piast Formula since 1949 when the 
Scientific Council for the Regained Territories and the MZO were abolished. In 
addition to a lack of Polish governmental propaganda in support of the Piast 
Formula and increased collaboration between Polish and German researchers 
since the Wende, it is becoming increasingly difficult, and indeed anachronistic, to 
talk in terms of nationality or ethnically defined stakeholder groups. Multi-
national collaborative volumes, such as Lexikon der Vertreibungen and 
Nationalistische Politik und Ressentiments, both of which I have cited frequently 
throughout this thesis, represent non-partisan efforts to delineate the relevant 
history rather than contributions to an on-going debate between antagonistic 
nationality-based stakeholder collectives. Today, the relevant discourse is neither 
contested nor can one clearly differentiate between specific stakeholder narratives. 
                                                 
421 Thum, G., Uprooted, p. 3. 
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Nevertheless, I also asked how historians from different stakeholder 
collectives have responded in the past to the TRJN’s invocation of Piast Poland as 
a model for the Polish People’s Republic and justification for the two cases of 
sociocide with which this thesis is concerned, and one can still draw some broad 
conclusions from the available corpus. As the results of my ‘distant reading’ (see 
Appendix D) demonstrate, Anglophone historiography has not directly addressed 
the Piast Formula. I have, however, demonstrated that there is a tendency within 
this corpus to uncritically reflect early (pre-Wende) Polish propaganda both with 
respect to Piast history in the ZO and to long-standing German-Polish border 
conflicts. I have, therefore, devoted the majority of this chapter to the relevant 
Polish and German historiography, which is more informative in relation to an 
analysis of the collective memory discourse.  
In the immediate aftermath of the War (until around 1950), certain Polish 
historians (those subject to censorship by the TRJN/Democratic Bloc) responded 
to the Piast Formula by producing scholarly texts that supported the government 
narrative. In addition to its explanatory content vis-à-vis the two cases of 
sociocide with which this thesis is concerned, this official narrative entailed an 
ontological claim about the Piast Kingdom, namely that it had been largely 
coextensive with the Polish People’s Republic. In the early postwar period, Polish 
historians focused their research on proving this, the culmination of their efforts 
being the ‘Exhibition of the Regained Territories’ in Wrocław in 1948. 
Later (between 1972 and 2008), some (West) German and Polish 
historians responded, not only to the TRJN’s Piast Formula but also to longer-
term Polish-German political issues, by coordinating their historiographical output 
in the context of the Deutsch-polnische Schulbuchkommission. The historiography 
produced by this organisation was specifically designed to produce a non-
contested hegemonic historical narrative of the German and Polish past. Thus, in 
terms of the definition of collective memory presented in Chapter 2 of this thesis, 
this corpus represents a conscious effort to expedite the transition of the public 
and private understanding of the events in question from being a matter of 
collective memory to a subject of History. Not only was this joint narrative not 
contested, but the boundaries between German and Polish historians as 
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identifiable stakeholder groups was deliberately blurred, such that the terms of my 
working definition no longer apply in this context. 
At the same time, other German historians, such as those affiliated with 
the BdV, have countered the Piast Formula implicitly rather than explicitly by 
focusing their efforts on demonstrating the Ur-Germanness of the ZO. This 
historiography, I have argued, contributes to what I have called the ‘deflected 
discourse’. Although at a superficial level the deflected discourse appears to have 
little to do with addressing the Piast Formula and the episodes of sociocide that its 
realisation entailed, I have argued that by creating the historical framework within 
which private and public discourses on the subject are conducted, historians who 
contribute to this corpus effectively channel and constrain the production of 
hegemonic historical narratives. Accordingly, I devoted over half of this chapter 
to analysing the deflected discourse in an attempt to answer my third and fourth 
research questions, the first of which asked what narrative strategies historians 
have employed to influence the relevant collective memory discourse.  
I have argued that historians have employed a number of narrative 
strategies within the relevant historiography, including ‘discourse deflection’ 
itself. As a narrative strategy, ‘discourse deflection’ can best be understood as a 
kind of outer shell within which other more specific narrative strategies are 
deployed. Considered together, such narrative strategies, which include 
ahistoricism, vagueness, conflation, omission, and the uncritical inclusion and 
acceptance of non sequiturs in the relevant texts, have the potential to 
substantially alter one’s perception of the ontological aspects of the events in 
question and therefore one’s preparedness, and ability, to accept or refute 
competing stakeholder narratives presented at the explanatory level. In particular, 
I discussed examples, and the functional effects, of conflation (of ancient and 
modern polities, and of different historical and modern Silesian polities) and 
omission (of relevant information about the Piast Kingdom such as its precise 
relation to Silesia and other areas within the ZO, and to Galicia and the rest of the 
Kresy, as well as of the role of the USSR in the destruction of Poland in 1939 and 
its geo-political and territorial configuration after 1945) within the relevant 
historiography. I have argued that the functional effect of both conflation and 
omission, used as narrative devices within the deflected discourse, is to imply 
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certain ontological situations which, if accepted as fact, must necessarily influence 
one’s understanding of the postwar situation as explained by the TRJN.  
I also asked what tropes and topoi have emerged and been most persistent 
during the relevant collective memory discourse, and what (implicit or explicit) 
purpose(s) they serve, and went on to identify a number of them that bear directly 
on the deflected discourse analysed above. The most persistent of these are the 
notion of Poland as ‘the Christ of nations’, the functional effect of which is to 
romanticise Polish suffering whilst lending an air of righteousness and legitimacy 
to the state’s postwar actions, and the myth of a long-term territorial struggle 
between Germany and Poland, centred on the areas encompassed within the ZO, 
which serves to contextualise Poland’s annexation of the ZO as a necessary 
expedient in the face of a persistent German menace and also supports the topos 
of Poland’s having been ‘wiped off the map’, with Germany’s active involvement. 
This topos, in turn, contributes to an understanding of Poland’s territorial 
acquisitions at Germany’s expense as a matter of national defence. Such tropes 
and topoi, I have argued, combine to create an impression of Poland as an 
embattled redoubt struggling for existence against an aggressive Germany bent on 
its destruction. I have argued that ‘inhabiting’ this narrative helped the TRJN, and 
subsequent Communist Polish governments, to legitimise their rule and explain 
their annexation of parts of Germany, surrender of the Kresy to the USSR (and the 
continued presence of the Soviet Army in Poland), and the harsh treatment of 
German residents in the ZO as necessary, historically justified expedients. 
Thus, a careful textual analysis reveals a complex feedback loop at all 
three of the analytical levels I defined in Chapter 2. Narrative devices (conflation 
of different polities, vaguely drawn maps, omission of relevant information) 
influence the reader’s ability to assess the facts of the case at the ontological level 
(the status of Lower Silesia and other parts of the ZO in relation to Piast Poland, 
the Second Republic and the territorial aspirations of pre-war Poles). This, in turn, 
affects the extent to which one can critically evaluate the merits of arguments 
presented at the explanatory level (e.g., that Poland’s annexation of Lower Silesia 
was justified because the province had formed part of Piast Poland and because 
pre-war Poles had attempted to annex ‘Silesia’ by force and plebiscite). 
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In the next chapter I turn to some of the practical measures taken by the 
TRJN to ‘Polonize’ the ZO, and how these actions impacted the wider world and, 
in a sense, globalised the collective memory process triggered by the postwar re-
configuration of Poland and the concomitant sociocide. 
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5: Toponymy and Cartography 
 
5.1 Introduction 
An important aspect of the working definition of collective memory that I have 
adopted for the purposes of the current thesis is its inherently competitive nature, 
which, I argue, involves conscious and unconscious attempts to influence what I 
have termed ‘hegemonic historical narratives’. One way in which hegemonic 
historical narratives are stored and propagated is in the artefacts of geography 
including toponymic inscriptions and cartographic texts. The manifestation of 
toponymic decisions in the built environment (signage) and the production of 
maps depicting political narratives (past and present) are both high-cost 
endeavours resulting in cultural artefacts with a significant historical impact. It 
therefore makes sense for stakeholders in collective memory discourses who wish 
to influence subsequent hegemonic historical narratives to focus on the production 
of geographic artefacts that support their preferred version of the events in 
question. This chapter addresses past (1945-1989) and present (1990-present) 
toponymic practice within the ZO in addition to the globalisation of the collective 
memory discourse triggered by Poland’s annexation of German territory in 1945 
through the requirement for cartographers around the world to map the region 
affected.  
This chapter is structured around two main thematic complexes, the first 
of which addresses the importance of toponymy in political discourse and the 
ramifications of the TRJN’s toponymic re-inscription of the ZO. This section 
begins with a general overview of toponymy and its potential impact on the 
creation of historical narratives. Using specific examples, I demonstrate that, far 
from being an incidental aspect of life, place naming is a fundamental expression 
of socio-political aspirations, and is often fiercely contested. I then move on to 
discuss the subject in more detail with specific reference to Lower Silesia. The 
section includes a brief review toponymic issues in postwar German and Polish 
literature. 
Based on the assumption that ‘[maps] are more than simply innocent 
repositories of name data’, the second main division in this chapter then presents 
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an overview of postwar cartography in relation to the ZO.422 Drawing upon Polish 
atlases produced in the postwar period, I demonstrate how Polish cartographers 
reacted to the toponymic changes discussed in the previous section, as well as 
their approach to mapping Poland’s post-1945 de facto national boundaries. I then 
analyse a series of maps produced by cartographers in East and West Germany as 
well as elsewhere in Europe and beyond to identify specific differences and the 
political positions implicit in them within the broader collective memory 
discourse associated with Poland’s annexation of the ZO in 1945 and the 
concomitant trauma. 
 
5.1.1 Research Questions: Toponymy 
With respect to toponymic practices within the ZO, this chapter address the 
following specific research questions: what re-naming strategies have been most 
important in the postwar toponymic re-inscription of Schlesien as Śląsk? To what 
extent did the postwar toponymic situation in the ZO take into account the 
linguistic, cultural and political needs and aspirations of minority groups? How 
has the toponymic situation in the ZO influenced the overall discourse concerning 
the Flucht und Vertreibung of Germans from the ZO and its resettlement by Poles 
relocated from the Kresy? Are there discernible differences between the 
toponymic situation in Poland, and the ZO in particular, during the postwar period 
and the post-Wende period? How has the toponymic situation in the ZO been 
reflected in the relevant literature? 
 
5.1.2 Research Questions: Cartography 
With respect to cartographic representations of the ZO, this chapter address the 
following specific research questions: how have Polish, German and other 
cartographers reacted to Poland’s annexation and resettlement of parts of 
Germany in 1945 and to the TRJN’s toponymic re-inscription of the ZO? To what 
extent are political developments in relation to the Polish frontiers and other 
postwar geo-political configurations reflected in the mapping of the ZO by 
cartographers around the world?  
 
                                                 
422 A. Melville in: Reuben Rose-Redwood, et al., 'Geographies of Toponymic Inscription: new directions in critical place-
name studies', Progress in Human Geography, 34 (2010), 453-70, p. 463. 
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5.2 The Importance of Toponymy in Political Discourse 
 
5.2.1 General Overview 
Researchers in the field of onomastics and toponymy have discerned and 
expressed their concern about ‘a tendency to focus on theory at the expense of 
empirical evidence’.423 As a result, in the estimation of Michael F. Goodchild, the 
field of toponymy is ‘old and largely discredited’.424 This chapter addresses this 
issue and contributes to the field by providing a specific case study against which 
existing theories can be tested and evaluated. In addition, toponymic research is ‘a 
field that has traditionally been characterized by political innocence’.425 However, 
the toponymic activities carried out within the ZO, i.e., the re-inscription of 
Schlesien as Śląsk following the annexation of the region by Poland in the wake 
of WWII, were overtly political.426 An exposition and analysis of the relevant 
process in terms of the practicalities, conventions and political paradigms 
involved, therefore, presents a further opportunity to expand the field in a useful 
direction. In addition, a significant proportion of the texts produced in the field of 
toponymy over the past 30 years relate to post-colonial re-naming practices. 
However, the question as to whether Poland’s annexation and Polonisation of the 
ZO represents a post-colonial situation or was itself a colonial enterprise is one of 
the outstanding explanatory-level issues in the relevant historical discourse (see 
Chapter 3). This situation implicitly questions the assumed dichotomy between 
colonial and post-colonial naming practices as the toponymic re-inscription of the 
ZO can be, and has been, interpreted as both. An analysis of the measures taken 
during the toponymic re-inscription of Lower Silesia therefore contributes to the 
fields of collective memory studies and toponymy in relation to post-colonial 
paradigms. 
Places and topographic objects are often referred to by different allonyms 
for historical, cultural and linguistic reasons. However, the choice of which 
allonym to use in a given publication or public utterance can be, and often is, 
                                                 
423 Berg, L. D., et al., Critical Toponymies: the Contested Politics of Place Naming (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009), p. 1. 
424 Michael F. Goodchild in: Reuben Rose-Redwood, et al., 'Geographies of Toponymic Inscription', p. 455. 
425 Berg, L. D., et al., Critical Toponymies, p. 1. 
426 Demshuk, A., 'Reinscribing Schlesien as Śląsk'. 
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politically motivated or can be interpreted as being so.427 This is particularly true 
where places have been occupied, reoccupied, shared, obliterated, or rebuilt by 
different ethno-linguistic groups, or are subject to competing claims by two or 
more titular states. In such cases, ‘debates about place names are entangled with 
all the most difficult questions of cultural identity, ownership rights and 
recognition’.428 The political importance of toponymy and the inherent potential 
for conflict in relation to certain place names was recognised by the United 
Nations in 1960 through the inauguration of the Group of Experts on 
Geographical Names (UNGEGN). 
UNGEGN’s mission is ‘to further the national standardization of 
geographical names and to promote the national and international benefits to be 
derived from standardization’, which it achieves by facilitating  
 
the development and dissemination of principles, policies and 
methods suitable for resolving the problems of consistency in 
the use of geographical names. It [also] encourages the 
collection of locally used names and their storage, 
authorization, dissemination and systematic Romanization 
where necessary.429  
 
Today, the group issues toponymic guidelines and standards for most of 
the world’s countries. These documents are published in English, French, 
Spanish, Russian, Chinese and Arabic. In addition, they publish reference works 
such as a glossary of standard terms for use in toponymic publications.430 Many of 
their publications are based on information provided by state organisations. For 
example, UNGEGN Working Paper No. 27: Toponymic guidelines of Poland for 
map editors and other users (2011) is a short, 8-page document based on the 110-
page, bi-lingual (Polish-English) Toponymic Guidelines of Poland for Map 
Editors and Other Users (2010) produced by the Polish Head Office of Geodesy 
and Cartography or Główny Urząd Geodezji i Kartografii (GUGiK).431 
                                                 
427 Yoshioka, J., 'Imagining Their Lands as Ours: Place Name Changes on Ex-German Territories in Poland after World 
War II', Acta Slavica Japonica, 15 (2008), 273-87, p. 273. 
428 Berg, L. D., et al., Critical Toponymies, p. 137. 
429 Anon., Geographical names as vital keys for accessing information in our globalized and digital world, (New York: 
United Nations, 2007), p. 1. 
430 See: Kadmon, N., Glossary of Terms for the Standardization of Geographical Names (ST/ESA/STAT/SER.M/85) (New 
York: United Nations Group of Experts on Geographical Names [Department of Economic and Social Affairs Statistics 
Division], 2002). 
431 Wolnicz-Pawłowska, E., et al., Toponymic Guidelines of Poland for Map Editors and Other Users, trans. D. Bryl, et al. 
(Warsaw: Główny Urząd Geodezji i Kartografii (GUGiK), 2010); Working Paper No. 27, Toponymic Guidelines of Poland 
for Map Editors and Other Users, Poland United Nations Group of Experts on Geographical Names, Working Paper. 
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5.2.2 What is at Stake 
Place names, the names of topographic features, and elements of the built 
environment constitute repositories of historic information. Scholars are interested 
in ancient toponyms as a source of information about how specific regions have 
been used over long periods of time.432 Others are interested in the preservation of 
‘emotional landscapes’ in toponyms that ‘tell of dangers, but also of ownership, 
quality of farmland, and could even explain why those huge stones were set up on 
the moor’.433 This data can potentially be used to achieve a better reconstruction, 
and therefore, understanding of the past.  
Yet all of this information can be lost, either when linguistic drift within 
the local language renders place name elements no longer intelligible to modern 
speakers, or, more permanently, when place names are consciously changed for 
political purposes. Such political re-naming projects are often designed to 
reinforce claims of national ownership and to assert state power. Renaming 
projects may also be undertaken to better reflect pre-colonial situations, for 
example, by reinstating aboriginal toponyms. Alternatively, toponymic changes 
may be made to accommodate the needs of minority language speakers.434 All 
such toponymic re-inscription takes place at the ontological level in that it implies 
that a specific situation – and no other – holds true with respect to the places in 
question. Simultaneously, however, the insistence on the use of a specific set of 
toponyms within a given territory functions at the explanatory level, underpinning 
a broader political and/or historical narrative about the region concerned. Thus, 
toponymic systems can and do serve as arenas of cultural competition, i.e., ‘as 
sites of contest, debate, and negotiation as social groups compete for the right to 
name’. 435  Toponymic choices, therefore, have a direct bearing on hegemonic 
historical narratives and consequently have interesting ramifications in collective 
memory discourses involving territorial transfers. 
  
                                                 
432 Kosian, M., Mapping the Immaterial, (Vienna: Cultural Heritage Agency, 2008), p. 1. 
433 Kosian, M., Handling Intangible Data, (Vienna: Cultural Heritage Agency, 2008), pp. 2, 8. 
434 Lawrence D. Berg and Robin A. Kearns in: Berg, L. D., et al., Critical Toponymies, p. 20. 
435 Reuben Rose-Redwood, et al., 'Geographies of Toponymic Inscription', p. 462. 
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Consequently, there are two things at stake in relation to toponymic usage, 
both of which have implications for the collective memory discourse with which 
this thesis is concerned. First, the preservation or loss of cultural information in 
the landscape can affect one’s ability to identify with ancestral populations in a 
given region. Being able to read and navigate a toponymic system is a vital aspect 
of feelings of belonging and therefore of Heimat.436 Second, having the ‘right to 
name’ identifies a given community as the owners of, and/or the rightful heirs to, 
the region in question. As I demonstrate in the following, toponymic policy within 
the ZO as a whole, and Lower Silesia in particular, has impacted stakeholders in 
both of these ways. It has, therefore, had a significant effect on the collective 
memory discourse surrounding the Flucht und Vertreibung of Germans from the 
region. In the next section I show how the TRJN expedited the toponymic re-
inscription of the ZO to overwrite its German history and support their 
explanatory narrative to the effect that the region in question had been, and still 
rightfully was, Polish. 
 
5.3 The Toponymic Re-inscription in the ZO 
 
5.3.1 Summary of Events 
As noted in Chapter 3, the TRJN’s hold on power in postwar Poland was tenuous 
and their annexation of the ZO was rooted in the pragmatics of Realpolitik. They 
adopted a three-part strategy aimed at securing power which, in the final analysis, 
was directed at subduing the expression of revisionist aspirations vis-à-vis the 
Kresy among the Polish population, whilst simultaneously obtaining international 
recognition for Poland’s territorial annexation of parts of Germany. The first part 
of the strategy was to derive the moral justification for the territorial changes by 
appealing to Poland’s ‘deep history’ in the form of the Piast Formula (see Chapter 
3). The second was to bring about a fait accompli by expelling Germans from the 
ZO and encouraging ethnic groups on either side of the new Polish-Soviet border 
to relocate to corresponding ethno-cultural regions. Among other things, this 
                                                 
436 This does not imply that people can necessarily decipher place name based on their etymological elements. I merely 
mean to suggest that by the time one reaches adulthood, having grown up within a specific region, one tends to know the 
names of places and topographic features and, with greater and lesser degrees of precision, how they relate to one another 
spatially. Whilst it would be interesting to consider the use of toponymic reminders of lost Heimat by expellees resettled in 
Germany, and the extent to which this practice may have helped inculcate a new sense of belonging, this subject goes 
beyond the scope of my current thesis. Work in this area, however, certainly represents a promising avenue for further 
research. 
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involved the rapid resettlement of the ZO with Poles from the Kresy and 
elsewhere.437 The TRJN’s third strategic decision, which mirrored NSDAP policy 
in Poland between 1939 and 1945, was ‘to obliterate the former national character 
of the regions’.438 One of the methods employed to achieve this final objective 
was to implement a policy of toponymic re-inscription throughout the ZO. By the 
end of 1950, a total of 32,138 traditional German place names in these regions 
had been replaced with Polish alternatives.439 
 
5.3.2 Schlesien to Śląsk: Strategies of Toponymic Re-Inscription 
Just as the first wave of expulsions, the so-called ‘wilde Vertreibungen’, was 
carried out without official assistance, the initial phase of toponymic re-
inscription within the ZO was carried out in an informal, unofficial manner. Both 
processes resulted in chaos. New arrivals in the ZO adopted a range of ad hoc 
strategies to denote distinct elements of their new surroundings in a meaningful 
way. Sometimes they retained existing German names, especially when the 
etymological roots of these were Slavic, but changed the spelling and/or 
pronounced them in accordance with modern Polish orthographic rules (e.g., 
Zechow-Czechów, Boyadel-Bojadła, Poberow-Pobierowo, Duchow-Duchowo, 
Grabow-Grabowo, Albertinenhof-Albertynów). This linguistic strategy has been 
practiced for many centuries when new language communities have come to 
occupy a region with an existing toponymic system in place. ‘Berlin’, for 
example, is meaningless in modern German, but ‘Brlin’, from which the modern 
toponym is derived, meant ‘the area fenced for cattle’ in the Slavic language 
originally spoken in the area (possibly Sorbian or a related dialect). Today it is 
spelt ‘Berlin’ and is pronounced in accordance with standard German orthography 
(IPA: bɛɐ̯ˈliːn). Its Slavic roots attest to the fact that the region had originally been 
home to a Slavic population.440  Other toponyms were transliterated based on 
recognised or imagined place name elements, for example Eichberg-Dębogóra 
(oak mountain), Glashütte-Huta Szklana (glass factory), Linde-Lipka (linden), 
                                                 
437 Ciesielski, S., Umsiedlung der Polen aus den ehemaligen polnischen Ostgebieten nach Polen in den Jahren 1944 - 
1947, Quellen zur Geschichte und Landeskunde Ostmitteleuropas (Marburg: Herder-Institut, 2006), pp. 1-75. 
438 Zayas, A.-M. d., A Terrible Revenge, p. 29. 
439 Siebel-Achenbach, S., Lower Silesia from Nazi Germany to Communist Poland, p. 274; Yoshioka, J., 'Imagining Their 
Lands as Ours', p. 284. 
440 Horne, W. R., et al., Germany (New York: Chelsea House, 2007), p. 58; Brown, E. K., et al., Languages of the World, 
pp. 991-94. 
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Neudorf-Nowawieś (new village). This kind of transliteration is also a well-
attested toponymic practice around the world. One well-known example is 
Dunedin in Scotland, which has been transliterated to today’s Edinburgh (both 
meaning ‘fortification at Eidyn’).441 Some toponyms were formed by appending 
modern Polish naming elements to existing German place names to reflect 
topographical characteristics or important events or people associated with the 
feature or place in question. This practice resulted in mixed-language toponyms 
such as Bergkolonie-Górki (Mountain Colony Hilly), and Plätzig-Piaseczno 
(Sandy-Sandy).442 Another strategy was to rename a place using an existing Polish 
toponym from the settlers’ region of origin.443 In some cases, different groups of 
settlers bestowed different names on one and the same place. Reichenbach im 
Eulengebirge (Lower Silesia), for example, was known variously, during this 
period, as Rychbach, and Drobniszew before it was officially renamed as 
Dzierżoniów.444 
These ad hoc solutions met the immediate requirements of the settlers, but 
ran counter to the TRJN’s need to implement an efficient administrative structure 
within the region. Most of them were later replaced in the course of more 
ambitious re-naming campaigns organised by semi-official and official bodies. 
Some of these began drawing up plans for the toponymic re-inscription of vast 
swathes of German territory well in advance of the Potsdam Conference (17th of 
July to 2nd of August 1945) at which Poland was placed in administrative charge 
of those areas to the East of the Oder-Neisse Line ‘not considered as part of the 
Soviet zone of occupation in Germany’.445 As early as the 27th of February 1945 
the Institute for Western Affairs or Instytut Zachodni (IZ), under the directorship 
of Professor Zygmunt Wojciechowski, a mediaevalist from the University of 
Poznan (Uniwersytet Poznański), began researching Polish-German relations in 
what Wojciechowski considered to be Poland’s Western and Northern 
territories.446 The IZ inaugurated an Onomastic Section in July 1945. Under the 
                                                 
441 Nicolaisen, W. F. H., Scottish Place-Names: their Study and Significance (Edinburgh: Donald, 2001), p. 88; Mills, A. 
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guidance of linguist Mikołaj Rudnicki, another professor from the University of 
Poznan, this section surveyed the existing and emerging toponymic situation in 
the German border regions. The results were published in The Pocket Dictionary 
of Place Names (Słowniczek nazw miejscowych) in late 1945.447  
Wojciechowski’s (and therefore the IZ’s) agenda was a continuation of 
longer-term geo-political aspirations aimed at the incorporation of German 
territory into Poland.448 However, other centrally-organised bodies had a more 
mundane interest in the unambiguous naming of specific places. One of these, the 
Regional Administrative Bureau of the National Railway (hereinafter RABNR), 
was among the first to advocate the establishment of a more consistent approach. 
In April 1945 the RABNR in Poznań ‘organised a commission on the revival of 
Slavic names in the area along the Oder’. 449  Interestingly, German railway 
workers were among several groups of key workers actively prevented from 
leaving Lower Silesia and obliged to work for the Polish authorities in the 
immediate aftermath of WWII. The role they played in the topographic re-
inscription of their own country is significant in terms of cultural continuity, 
which has ramifications for the collective memory discourse under discussion, 
especially with regard to identity politics.450  
Following the Potsdam Conference, the TRJN immediately moved to 
implement official re-naming policies throughout the ZO, and scheduled a series 
of onomastic conferences.451 The first of these convened in Szczecin (Stettin) 
between the 11th and 14th of September 1945. It was attended by political 
representatives and academics from various relevant disciplines such as 
Linguistics, Slavic Studies, and Cartography.452 Its immediate purpose was the 
toponymic Polonisation of Poznan, but it established a number of principles that 
served as a guideline for similar endeavours in other areas of the ZO. One of the 
more interesting aspirations of the conference was to expunge traces of non-
standard dialects in Polish place names. Where several historic Slavic allonyms 
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existed for a given place, the conference delegates agreed to use whichever one 
was closest to modern Polish. Thus, the notion of Polonisation had ramifications 
that went beyond expunging traces of German cultural heritage. Far from taking 
the linguistic, cultural, and political needs and aspirations of non-German 
minority groups into account, the toponymic re-inscription of the ZO specifically 
pushed these aside in favour of a linguistic homogenisation of the region. 
Delegates to the initial onomastic conference developed a set of principles 
which were later applied throughout the ZO.453 One of the most important of these 
was to use the Dictionary of Geographical Names of the Kingdom of Poland and 
Other Slavic Lands (Słownik geograficzny Królestwa Polskiego i innych krajów 
słowiańskich) as the main source for historical Slavic place names. This 
dictionary was compiled between 1880 and 1902, i.e., prior to the end of the 
Partition Period (see Appendix A). 454  Another important source for Slavic 
allonyms for German settlements and topographical features was the Atlas of 
Geographical Names of Western Slavs (Atlas nazw geograficznych 
Słowiańszczyzny Zachodniej).455 This was published between 1934 and 1937 by 
another delegate from the University of Poznan, Stanisław Kozierowski, a 
historian, linguist, and Catholic priest who sometimes used the pseudonym 
Dołęga. 456  The fact that these pre-war sources provided names for recently 
occupied German territories suggests that these authors had regarded parts of 
Germany as ‘other Slavic lands’ prior to overt German aggression against Poland 
during WWII. This is remarkable in the context of the current collective memory 
analysis. The final volume of the Dictionary of Geographical Names of the 
Kingdom of Poland and Other Slavic Lands predates the TRJN’s assertion of 
historic Polish claims to the same territories by at least 43 years suggesting that 
the origin of the Piast Formula was rooted in a broader narrative that transcended 
the considerations of Realpolitik with which the TRJN was confronted in 1945. In 
the absence of Slavic allonyms for a given settlement or topographic feature, the 
decision was taken either to extend the Slavic names of surrounding settlements 
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or to replace German place names with the names of the places of origin of the 
majority of settlers, often with a slight change (e.g. Kalisz-Kaliszany).457  
By contrast with the less ideological practice of early settlers in the ZO, 
the decision was taken, during this first onomastic conference, to avoid the 
translation or transliteration of German names into Polish. However, a 
comparison between German and Polish toponyms in the region demonstrates that 
this rule was not always enforced. For whilst examples such as Polish ‘Zielona 
Góra’ and German ‘Grünberg’ both meaning ‘Green Mountain’, and the pairing 
Karlsdorf-Weinberg, – Winna Góra (Wine Mountain, in the sense of Vineyard, in 
both languages) reflect traditional toponymic practice, which involves a 
significant descriptive element – the mountain is green so it is called ‘Green 
Mountain’ – others are more obviously pure transliterations. The coincidence 
between German ‘Hirschberg’ and Polish ‘Jelenia Góra’, both meaning ‘Stag 
Mountain’, for example, is less likely to have come about as a result of 
convergent observations of an outstanding feature of the landscape.458  
The toponymic re-inscription of Poznań was completed by the 8th of 
November 1945 when the Governor of the Voivodeship and the Onomastic 
Section of the IZ issued a joint statement confirming the new official Polish 
toponyms to be used henceforth.459 The conventions developed during the first 
onomastic conference in Poznań were then applied systematically throughout the 
ZO. This project was coordinated by the Commission for the Determination of 
Place Names or Komisja Ustalania Nazw Miejscowości (KUNM) which was 
inaugurated in January 1946 as an advisory body to the Warsaw-based 
Department of Public Administration.460 The toponymic re-inscription of German 
Silesia was the responsibility of the Kraków Commission I under the auspices of 
the KUNM. Much of the relevant work was carried out by the Silesian Institute or 
Instytut Śląski (IS), which was based in Katowice but covered the whole of Lower 
and Upper Silesia (the Wrocław and Katowice Voivodeships respectively).461 
                                                 
457 Yoshioka, J., 'Imagining Their Lands as Ours', p. 281. 
458 It is improbable that both the original German settlers and the Polish incomers in 1945 noticed an unusual abundance of 
stags on the mountain in question. The Polish toponym looks like a transliteration of the German and, in the absence of 
evidence to the contrary, it seems likely that this is indeed what it is. See: Zedlitz, A., et al., Schlesien: alle Orte, Accessed 
on: 09.04.2013. 
459 Yoshioka, J., 'Imagining Their Lands as Ours', p. 282. 
460 Ibid. 
461 Ibid. p. 283. 
 140 
New toponyms within the ZO required the approval of the Minister of Public 
Administration and Ministry for the Regained Territories or Ministerstwo Ziem 
Odzyskanych (MZO), and were published in an official gazette.462 The KUNM 
first convened from the 1st of the 4th of March 1946 to determine the names of all 
of the Polish Voivodeships and some 220 cities and transportation hubs with 
populations in excess of 5000. Further meetings were held from the 1st to the 3rd 
of June and the 26th to the 28th of October 1946 to agree on Polish toponyms for 
smaller towns and villages (1000-5000 and 500-1000 residents respectively). By 
the end of December 1946 the KUNM had re-named 4400 places in the ZO, and 
the original names of all important stations along the railway network had been 
replaced with Polish alternatives by June 1947.  
 
5.3.3 Historic Polish Toponyms in Lower Silesia 
The guidelines developed during the first onomastic conference in Szczecin in 
September 1945 were easier to apply in regions such as Poznań, which, unlike 
Lower Silesia, had a lengthy and relatively recent history of Polish administration 
(latterly as the Grand Duchy of Posen: 1815-1848) and was therefore replete with 
historically attested Polish names. 463  By contrast, the etymological origins of 
place names and topographic object names in Lower Silesia prior to the Polish 
annexation in 1945 had been mixed. Whilst a few had had Proto-Slavic roots (e.g., 
Jetsch-Laskowitz, Liegnitz, Nimptsch), the majority were based on Proto-
Germanic and older German (c. 1200-1933) elements (Wohlau, Frankenstein, 
Landeshut). A few were modern German constructs (c. 1933-1945) invented at 
the behest of the NSDAP authorities to replace historic names that struck them as 
being too Slavic (e.g., Polkwitz, Pohlom, and Polnisch Peterwitz changed to 
Heerwegen, Ostwalde, and Petersweiler respectively by the NSDAP).464 In many 
cases, therefore, the toponymic re-inscription of Silesia involved the invention of 
new place names rather than the discovery of existing historic Polish allonyms. 
Not all Poles supported these efforts and some, notably the so-called autochthones 
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in Silesia, actively opposed them by tearing down newly erected signposts and 
refusing to adopt the new place names in their daily speech.465 Their resistance 
was based on a conscious rejection of the, certainly in the case of Silesia, 
unhistorical notion of re-Polonisation.466 Thus, the TRJN’s toponymic practice in 
the ZO has played a significant role within the collective memory discourse 
following Poland’s annexation of the region and expulsion of most of its native 
population. It supported a historical narrative in which the majority of the native 
population were classed as Germans (which they were) and non natives (which 
they were not), and a minority (the autochthones) were classed as Poles (which 
significantly strained the definition of what it meant to be Polish) but whose 
linguistic practice was deemed foreign, and was therefore regarded as dispensable. 
 
5.3.4 Breslau or Wrocław? New Toponyms in Practical Discourse 
Whatever the perceived merits of the TRJN’s toponymic re-inscription of the ZO, 
it was and is a historical fact and one that has had an important impact on the 
relevant collective memory discourse. In this section I briefly address two of the 
issues that have arisen in this context. 
 
5.3.4.1 Political Correctness? 
In an article for a special edition of Der Spiegel: Geschichte dedicated to an 
exploration of the German presence in Eastern Europe, Annette Grossbongardt 
marvels at the fact that several young German authors are turning to this history 
as background material for their novels in a way that is ‘[ganz] unverkrampft’. 
This relaxed attitude, she explains, contrasts markedly with the pre-Wende 
situation ‘in denen bereits der Gebrauch alter Ortsnamen einen politischen Streit 
auslöste’.467 Joachim Rogall agrees: 
 
Da wurde schon die Gesinnung daran festgemacht, ob man 
Breslau oder Wrocław sagte [… in] Polen hätte man vor 1990 
nicht von Danzig gesprochen, weil man den Deutschen keine 
Argumente zuspielen wollte, und bei uns hat man nicht Danzig 
gesagt, damit die Polen nicht denken, wir wollten es 
wiederhaben.468 
                                                 
465 For many of the autochthones, daily speech was as likely to be Polish as German and, in many cases, was a Polish 
dialect with a strong German admixture known colloquially as Wasserpolnisch. 
466 Yoshioka, J., 'Place Name Changes on Ex-German Territories in Poland after World War II', p. 285. 
467 Annette Grossbongardt in: Jansen, H., et al., Die Deutschen im Osten: Auf den Spuren einer verlorenen Zeit, p. 14. 
468 Joachim Rogall in: ibid. 
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This politicisation of allonymic preference was fuelled by statements such as the 
following by Carlo Schmid, then Vice President of the German Bundestag: 
 
Ich will meine Stellung hier noch einmal genau präzisieren: 
Was man 1945 östlich der Oder und Neiße getan hat, ist 
Unrecht gewesen. Kant ist nicht in Kaliningrad geboren, 
sondern in Königsberg, und Eichendorff - weiß Gott einer der 
deutschesten der deutschen Dichter - hat in Breslau gelebt und 
nicht in Wroclaw. Das ist wahr, das soll man nicht vergessen, 
und das werden wir nicht vergessen.469 
 
In this statement, Schmid explicitly links his moral and judicial judgement 
of the situation ‘östlich der Oder und Neiße’ (Unrecht) with toponymic choice 
(Königsberg not Kaliningrad; Breslau not Wrocław). He goes on to embed these 
historical ontological-level observations, i.e., what is or is not true about the 
nature of ‘[was] man […] getan hat’ and of the circumstances of Kant’s birth and 
Eichendorff’s Germanness and residential history, in an explanatory-level 
manifesto (‘das soll man nicht vergessen, und das werden wir nicht vergessen’).470 
At the same time, however, Schmid’s assessment of the importance of historic 
toponyms in relation to specific ethno-cultural periods within a given region 
presaged later developments in the relevant collective memory discourse. Based 
on the observation that ‘[names] and the nomenclatures they belong to occupy a 
central place in any cultural system’, it became increasingly common, during the 
postwar period, for German authors to match their toponymic choices to the 
official form applicable during the period and prevailing cultural system under 
discussion.471 
It is against this ‘politically correct’ strategy, in which one may, for 
instance, talk about Breslau rather than Wrocław in relation to any period up to, 
but not beyond 1945, that Grossbongardt’s mild astonishment at young German 
authors’ ‘[ganz] unverkrampft’ treatment of toponyms within the ZO is to be 
understood. In the novel Katzenberge (2011), for example, Sabrina Janesch’s 
toponymic practice neither reflects any specific political outlook nor does it 
                                                 
469 Carlo Schmid (SPD) Vice President of the German Bundestag, quoted in: Anon., 'Das böse Tabu: Kernsätze Carlo 
Schmids zur Oder-Neiße-Frage', in Der Spiegel, (Hamburg: SPIEGEL-Verlag, 1956), p. 17. 
470 Incidentally, the fact that Schmid was a long-term member of the left-wing Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands 
(SPD) and was only half German (his mother was French and he was born in France) gives the lie to the notion that the 
espousal of expellee issues (as, for example, practiced by the BdV) is an inherently right-wing preserve. This is important 
in the current context, because this accusation (i.e., that of espousing extreme right-wing views) has frequently been leveled 
at those who promote expellee interests. 
471 Reuben Rose-Redwood, et al., 'Geographies of Toponymic Inscription', p. 458. 
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genuflect at the altar of ‘political correctness’. Her casual, non-problematizing, 
attitude is amply demonstrated in a scene at the beginning of the main 
protagonists’ journey to Schlesien (not Śląsk as pre-Wende ‘political correctness’ 
would demand) to attend her grandfather’s funeral. Nele, the first-person narrator, 
asks a German railway worker at Berlin’s Ostbahnhof for directions to the 
platform for the train to ‘Wrocław’. ‘Nach Breslau?’ he answers (my italics): 
‘Meinetwegen auch dorthin’ she responds, seemingly disinterested in the veiled 
challenge implied in the railway worker’s answer (i.e., to adopt a firm stance 
either for Breslau or Wrocław as the proper toponym for the city in question).472 
Such a nonchalant attitude towards the transition of German territory to Poland 
and its subsequent re-inscription or Polonisation was, by contrast, still unthinkable 
in 1978 when Leonie Ossowski published her quasi-autobiographical 
Weichselkirschen (1978).  
Recounted by a third-person omniscient narrator, Ossowski’s 
Weichselkirschen presents a snapshot of the postwar German geopolitical 
situation: it involves two sisters, erstwhile members of the landed gentry, expelled 
from their ancestral home, one living in the GDR, the other living in the FRG, 
both of whom undertake a journey to their former family seat, now incorporated 
into Poland. It shares many of the topoi typical of German Vertriebenenliteratur 
and the literature of Heimattourismus involving postwar cross-border journeys. 
Just as in Janesch’s Katzenberge, the main protagonist in Weichselkirschen, Anna, 
combines a visit to Poland with a journalistic mission. And, like the first-person 
protagonist in Christa Wolf’s Kindheitsmuster (1976), Anna’s daughter serves as 
a foil to her own personal involvement with her private lieu de mémoire, 
providing a second-generation perspective on the current (i.e. early 1970s) 
geopolitical situation in Poland’s former German territories. 473  The general 
storyline in Weichselkirschen is based on a trip Ossowski undertook to Poland in 
1974 and reportedly contains a plethora of autobiographical elements. 474 
However, despite the author’s well-documented pro-Polish attitude, she appears to 
feel constrained to continuously re-emphasise her political position on the current 
                                                 
472 Janesch, S., Katzenberge (Berlin: Aufbau, 2011), p. 20. 
473 Wolf, C., Kindheitsmuster (Darmstadt: Luchterhand, 1976). 
474 Berger, K. L., 'The Representation of the Expulsion of Ethnic Germans in German Literature from the 1950s to the 
Present', p. 137. 
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status quo throughout the novel.475 One example of this, in which she specifically 
refers to the region’s toponymic transition to make her point, is when the heroine 
Anna decides that she will ‘nach Hause fahren, nach Rohrdorf, das nicht mehr 
Rohrdorf heißt, sondern Ujazd und natürlich auch kein Zuhause mehr ist’.476 This 
somewhat defensive clarification reflects and responds to the collective memory 
discourse taking place in the contemporary real world rather than arising naturally 
from within the novel, in which it is superfluous as it already explicit in the plot 
itself. 
One interesting strategy authors occasionally employ as a way of avoiding 
the choice between Polish and German toponyms altogether is to use a third 
language, usually Latin, as a sign of good faith, before proceeding to write about 
the ZO in their native language. It is significant, for example, that the Borussia 
Foundation, which is concerned, inter alia, with the German-Polish history and 
culture of Prussia, uses the Latin version of Prussia – Borussia – in its name rather 
than the more familiar German or Polish allonyms. In a similar vein, a collection 
of essays by Polish and German academics on postwar literature produced by 
Silesian-born authors, all of whom share the ‘kaum überwindbaren Trauma’ of 
Heimatverlust, bears the Latin title Silesia in litteris servata, which obviates the 
need to choose between German ‘Schlesien’ and Polish ‘Śląsk’.477 However, this 
strategy is not always an option. One situation in which its use would be 
questionable and is, in fact, rarely encountered, is in literary translations. In the 
following section I discuss the difficulties for translators engendered by the 
fraught, politicised discourse pertaining to German- Polish allonyms in the ZO. 
 
5.3.4.2 Toponymy in Translation 
According to Tatiana Nazarenko, ‘the theme of the Regained Territories and the 
impact of the redrawing of state borders on people’s lives [is] quite new for 
                                                 
475 Ossowski reputation among Polish critics is particularly high and the Polish government has officially recognised her 
contribution to the long-term process of reconciliation between Germany and Poland, in the post-War period for which she 
was awarded the ‘Zasłużony dla kultury polskiej’ in 2007. See: Anon., Kulturpreis Schlesien des Landes Niedersachsen at 
Niedersächsischen Ministerium für Inneres und Sport [online], 
<http://www.mi.niedersachsen.de/portal/live.php?navigation_id=15012&article_id=62795&_psmand=33>, Accessed on: 
16.02.2013; Anon., Niemiecka pisarka otrzyma polskie odznaczenie at Polska News, 
<http://www.poland.bizseek.eu/2007/08/31/niemiecka-pisarka-otrzyma-polskie-odznaczenie/>, Accessed on: 16.02.2013. 
476 Ossowski, L., Weichselkirschen (Munich: Piper, 1978), pp. 49-50. 
477 Białek, E., et al., SILESIA IN LITTERIS SERVATA, p. 7. 
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contemporary Polish literature’.478 Nevertheless, several Polish novels have been 
published in recent times that do engage with the subject. One of these is Dom 
dzienny, dom nocny (1998) by Olga Tokarczuk, which appeared in German 
translation in 2001 (as Taghaus, Nachthaus) and then in English as House of Day, 
House of Night in 2002.479 Tokarczuk is extremely frank about the mechanics of 
the toponymic transition between German Schlesien and Polish Śląsk. In one 
passage she refers to a ‘guy who spent his nights changing German place names 
into Polish ones’ and finds that not all of his creations were successful.480 This 
acknowledgement of the need to create new names for formerly German villages, 
towns and cities contrasts markedly with the ‘official’ view of Silesia as a re-
conquered territory in which old Polish allonyms simply needed to be 
remembered and reinstated.481 Rather than accepting this narrative, Tokarczuk 
emphasises the lengthy German presence in the area. The von Goetzen family, for 
example, had lived in the same mansion ‘[for] centuries’.482 Moreover, she writes, 
they had had ‘no warning that they would have to leave their mansion. The very 
idea was … absurd’.483 
In the English version of the book, the narrator invariably uses the original 
German names for towns and cities when discussing specifically German 
experiences in the region. Thus, in the chapter concerning the German Peter 
Dieter, Nowa Ruda is referred to as Neurode, and Kłodzko is called Glatz. Later, 
in the chapter on the German Franz Frost, Klotzsche is called by its old name of 
Königswald. 484  According to Antonia Lloyd-Jones, who authored the English 
translation, this practice precisely reflects Tokarczuk’s toponymic choices in the 
original. Lloyd-Jones, who knows the author well and has stayed with her in the 
house that inspired the novel, believes that Tokarczuk’s toponymic choices are 
                                                 
478 Nazarenko, T., 'House of Day, House of Night by Olga Tokarczuk', The Slavic and East European Journal, 48 (2004), 
324-26, p. 324. 
479 Tokarczuk, O., Dom dzienny, dom nocny (Wałbrzych: Ruta, 1998); Tokarczuk, O., House of Day, House of Night, trans. 
Antonia Lloyd-Jones (London: Granta, 2002 [1998]); Tokarczuk, O., Taghaus, Nachthaus, trans. Esther Kinsky (Munich: 
Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2001). 
480 Tokarczuk, O., House of Day, House of Night, pp. 176-77. 
481 See for example: Bator, J., Sandberg, pp. 15, 25, 37; Stańczyk, E., 'Polish Contact Zones: Silesia in the Works of Adam 
Zagajewski and Tomasz Różycki', Slovo, 21 (2009), 50-63, pp. 54, 57, 61-63. 
482 Tokarczuk, O., House of Day, House of Night, p. 193. 
483 Ibid. p. 198. 
484 Ibid. p. 93 & 126. 
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designed to reflect how the German characters would think of these places.485 
Indeed, the relevant section in the book supports this view: 
 
First came Karpacz, which was full of souvenir kiosks, then 
Szklarska Poręba, which Peter insisted on calling Schreiberhau, 
as if afraid to tackle the new Polish name. But in fact all they 
could think of was finally getting to Neurode and Glatz, and 
whether they would manage to see everything.486 
 
Interestingly, however, the only exception to this general rule is Breslau. 
This city is invariably referred to as Wrocław even when seen through the eyes of 
German protagonists, whose real-life counterparts would certainly know it by its 
German allonym. 487  This special-handling of Breslau possibly reflects the 
continuing psychological importance of Breslau within Silesia and Poland as a 
whole: ‘Breslau ist Schlesien!’ (my italics).488  If Breslau is generally seen to 
represent Silesia as a whole, as the foregoing assertion by Hugo Hartung suggests, 
then it is understandable that Polish authors may resist referring to it by its 
German name ‘weil man den Deutschen keine Argumente zuspielen [will]’.489 
Indeed, until recently the only community still using the allonym ‘Breslau’ non 
problematically and routinely were the expatriate Breslau Jews in Israel.490 It is, 
however, remarkable that this reluctance to use the German allonym for the most 
important city in Lower Silesia appears to have been shared by the translator. For 
Wrocław is not a common allonym in English texts, although Anglophone 
cartographers have been using it increasingly without its German allonym in 
atlases published since the Wende (see below for a more detailed analysis of 
toponymic practice in cartography).491 Lloyd-Jones’ decision to follow the author 
in using ‘Wrocław’ rather than ‘Breslau’ draws attention to the status of allonyms 
                                                 
485 Lloyd-Jones, A., 11.08.2014, Response to Questions on the Toponymic Issues Involved in Translating Dom dzienny, 
dom nocny (House of Day, House of Night) 
486 Tokarczuk, O., House of Day, House of Night, p. 93. 
487 Ibid. p. 92. 
488 Hartung, H., Der Himmel war unten (Berlin-Grunewald: Non Stop-Bücherei, 1951), p. 156. 
489 Joachim Rogall in: Jansen, H., et al., Die Deutschen im Osten: Auf den Spuren einer verlorenen Zeit, p. 14. 
490 For more detail on the Breslau Jews as an expatriate community in Israel, see: Siebel-Achenbach, S., Lower Silesia from 
Nazi Germany to Communist Poland, p. 23; Kossert, A., Kalte Heimat, p. 29. 
491 The following atlases by UK-based publishing houses all refer to the city as Wrocław (Breslau): Bartholomew, J. G., et 
al., The Citizen's Atlas of the World (Edinburgh: 1952); Bartholomew, J., The Times atlas of the world, Volume IIII, 
Northern Europe (London: Times Publishing Company, 1955); Bickmore, D. P., et al., Concise Oxford Atlas (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1961); Philip, The International Atlas (London: George Philip & Son, 1969); Philip George, et 
al., Philips' New Practical Atlas (London: G. Philip, 1981); The following post-Wende UK atlases, by contrast, simply 
refer to the city as 'Wrocław', although they consistently use twin allonyms throughout the atlas: Kindersley, P., Dorling 
Kindersley World Atlas (London: Dorling Kindersley, 1997); Reader's Digest, A., Reader's Digest illustrated Atlas of the 
World (London: Reader's Digest Association, 1997); Anon., The Times Desktop Atlas of the World (London: Times Books, 
2012). 
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as translations of, rather than simply alternatives to, specific toponyms. The 
English translation of ‘Wrocław’ is ‘Breslau’ (as is the German). Polish readers of 
Dom dzienny, dom nocny would read ‘Wrocław’ as familiar and ‘Neurode’, 
‘Glatz’, and ‘Königswald’ as foreign. For English readers of House of Day, House 
of Night, by contrast, Lloyd-Jones’ decision to use precisely the same toponymic 
choices as Tokarczuk reverses the experience. ‘Wrocław’ becomes the foreign 
element whilst ‘Neurode’, ‘Glatz’, and ‘Königswald’ are familiar. Thus, by 
attempting to navigate the political ramifications of toponymic choice in relation 
to the ZO, Lloyd-Jones has been forced to adopt a foreignising translation strategy 
in the sense described by Lawrence Venuti.492 The fact that this was unintentional 
is demonstrated by a comment made by Lloyd-Jones in a private communication 
in which she writes: 
 
Polish writers very often put all the German place names in 
Polish, whatever historical period they're describing - it is a real 
trap for translators, and one I have learned not to fall into (my 
italics)493 
 
Referring to her earlier translation of Paweł Huelle’s novel Castorp 
(2004), Lloyd-Jones goes on to elaborate:  
 
All the place names are in Polish! so I had to research them to 
put them back into German […] I have often had this 
experience when translating Huelle in particular, but it isn’t 
exclusive to him. It would seem absurd and confusing to me to 
leave them in Polish494 
 
More recent examples of Polish literature that have appeared in translation 
suggest that the perceived need to emphasise the Polishness of Breslau-Wrocław 
is currently abating among Polish authors, but that the general toponymic 
situation remains challenging for translators. Piaskowa Góra (2009) is a Polish 
novel by Joanna Bator set in Wałbrzych, formerly Waldenburg in Lower Silesia, 
which lies just to the southwest of Breslau, the author’s own birthplace. It outlines 
the fortunes of three generations of a Polish family traumatised by their 
experiences during and in the aftermath of WWII, the worst of which, according 
to the text, was their forced resettlement in Lower Silesia following the 
                                                 
492 Venuti, L., The Translator's Invisibility: a History of Translation (London: Routledge, 1995). 
493 Lloyd-Jones, A., 09.08.2014, Translating House of Day, House of Night (Email). 
494 Lloyd-Jones, A., Toponymic Issues Involved in Translating Dom dzienny, dom nocny. 
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Vertreibung of the native German population.495 It was translated into German in 
2013 as Sandberg by Esther Kinsky (who also produced the German translation of 
Dom dzienny, dom nocny) a German-born Slavic Studies specialist. Herself a 
prize-winning author, Kinsky’s detailed notes together with her short analysis of 
the plot and the historical context, which she provides as a postscript, are 
extremely illuminating and helpful.496 By contrast with Tokarczuk (and Lloyd-
Jones), Bator (and Kinsky) uses the new Polish names for almost every location 
mentioned in the book except for Wrocław, which is referred to as ‘Breslau’ 
throughout the book.497  
This on-going toponymic ambiguity and the challenge it presents for 
translators working from Polish into German and/or English mirrors shifting 
official attitudes to place naming throughout Poland. In the following section I 
briefly outline the current situation with reference to the use of non-Polish 
toponyms in the ZO and elsewhere in Poland. 
 
5.3.5 Current Toponymic Practice in the Ziemie Odzyskane 
The current situation in Poland is considerably more pluralistic, tolerant, and 
inclusive than it had been in the postwar period and prior to the country’s 
accession to the EU in 2004. 498  Polish authorities currently recognise seven 
different dialect groups, which make up the modern Polish language and reflect 
various aspects of Polish history and culture. 499  In addition, The Polish 
government now officially recognises the fact that: 
 
                                                 
495 Bator, J., Sandberg. 
496 Esther Kinsky in ibid. pp. 483-92. 
497 See for example ibid. p. 164. 
498 Determining the extent to which this reflects shifting cultural attitudes among ordinary Poles and in Polish institutions or 
the need to comply with externally enforced conditions (for example, those pertaining to EU membership) is beyond the 
scope of this thesis. 
499 Kashubian, which is spoken to the west of Gdańsk, bears witness to the subsumption of the Kashubian tribe in the 
historical formation of Poland. Mazovian (spoken throughout a region centred on Warszawa and extending from Olsztyn in 
the north to Białystok in the east) preserves the memory of the Mazovians in the same way. The Greater (spoken around 
Bydgoszcz, Toruń, Poznań and Łódż) and Lesser (spoken around Kielce, Lublin, Kraków and Rzeszów) Polish dialects 
preserve one of the earliest known socio-political organising principles of Polish territory (Wielkopolska and Małopolska 
respectively). There are a range of traditional mixed dialects spoken along the River Bug and in a small enclave in the 
Carpathians. These are the ‘linguistic fossils’ of a long-term borderland situation in which the linguistic and political 
boundaries were not clearly defined until the early twentieth century. A set of new mixed dialects, which reflect the mixed 
origins of the residents (some of which were not natural Polish speakers at the time of their forced relocation), has 
developed throughout the ZO since 1945. And finally there is a Silesian dialect that is still spoken along the upper Oder 
basin. There is no indication in the official Polish documentation on the subject as to whether this Silesian dialect is 
identical with the so-called Wasserpolnisch spoken in the same region. The Wasserpolnisch incorporates such a significant 
German substrate that it borders on a creole. See: Brown, E. K., et al., Languages of the World, p. 877; Figure 1 in: 
Wolnicz-Pawłowska, E., et al., Toponymic Guidelines of Poland, p. 25. 
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Some geographical names, especially those near the borders, 
have a foreign origin and are a witness of old linguistic contacts 
of Poles with other nations. A majority of foreign geographical 
names in Poland are Germanisms, i.e. names with a German 
origin. They can be found not only in the North and the West of 
Poland where they are a heritage of times when those territories 
belonged to Germany (Prussia), e.g. Olsztyn, Grunwald, 
Malbork. Such names can also be found in the South of Poland 
along the main mountain range – Karpaty, e.g. Rychwałd, 
Grybów, Łańcut, Szymbark, Czorsztyn, Melsztyn, etc. These 
names were given by German settlers who have been coming to 
Poland since the 13th century. One can see Polonized German 
words, such as: Wald, Burg, Stein, in these names.500 
 
There are currently nine officially recognised national minorities in 
Poland, namely: Armenians, Byelorussians, Czechs, Germans, Jews, Lithuanians, 
Russians, Slovaks, and Ukrainians.501 In addition, there are four ethnic minorities, 
the Karaims, Lemkos, Roma, and Tartars.502 In recognition of this cultural, ethnic, 
and linguistic diversity, the Polish Sejm (the lower house of the Polish parliament) 
enacted the Act on national and ethnic minorities and on the regional language 
(2005). This legislation, the first of its kind in postwar Poland, ‘comprehensively 
regulates the issues related to national, ethnic and language minorities.’503 It has 
far-reaching implications for the collective memory discourse relating to Poland’s 
postwar frontier changes and the concomitant flight, expulsions, and population 
transfers. For the first time since 1945, this act stipulates that, in addition to Polish 
toponyms,  
traditional names [in minority languages] may also be used as 
additional names for localities, physiographical objects and 
streets […which] are established upon a motion of the 
commune council and have to be approved by the Commission 
on Names of Localities and Physiographic Objects504 
 
The key word in this passage is ‘traditional’, which adequately reflects the 
historical (ontological) reality of the regions in which such minority language 
toponyms are likely to be encountered. The early postwar government had 
                                                 
500 Wolnicz-Pawłowska, E., et al., Toponymic Guidelines of Poland, p. 30. 
501 Ibid. pp. 38-40. 
502 ‘The difference between a national and an ethnic minority is that a national minority may identify itself with a nation 
with its own independent state whereas an ethnic minority may not.’ Ibid. p. 33. 
503 This legislation (Polish: ustawa o mniejszościach narodowych i etnicznych oraz o języku regionalnym) was approved on 
January 06, 2005 and entered into force on May 01, 2005. See: ibid. pp. 32-36. 
504 In places in which the minority does not equal or exceed 20 per cent of the population, non-Polish toponyms may be 
introduced alongside their Polish counterparts provided that 50 per cent or more of the local population agrees to it. See: 
ibid. p. 35. 
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espoused an explanatory narrative in which these toponyms were deemed to be 
markers of an illegitimate intrusion into Polish territory, which the annexation of 
the ZO and expulsion of the native population had reversed. The wording of the 
quoted passage implies a different narrative in which these place names were 
‘traditional’ and, by implication, historically legitimate. 
The Act on national and ethnic minorities and on the regional language 
(2005) contains some interesting caveats, which also have a direct bearing on the 
official narratives of, and therefore on the collective memory discourse relating to, 
both WWII and the postwar settlement from a Polish perspective. For example, it 
states that ‘names in minority languages may not refer to the names used in the 
years between 1933-1945 given by the authorities of the German Third Reich or 
the Soviet Union’.505 Thus, provided the criteria set out in the act were met, it 
would be legitimate to introduce the German ‘Alt Schalkowitz’ as an additional 
name alongside Polish ‘Stare Siolkowice’ as this had been the legitimate toponym 
of the place until 1936. But it would inadmissible to adopt ‘Alt Schalkendorf’ as 
an allonym, as this was introduced by the NSDAP in 1936 who deemed the 
traditional German toponym to be too Slavic.506 This restriction on the use of 
NSDAP terminology is not unexpected: what is more interesting is the equal 
rejection of Soviet-coined toponyms. This runs completely counter to the to pre-
Wende historical and official Polish discourse (see Chapters 3 and 4) by implicitly 
recognising the role of the USSR as aggressor in WWII and placing it on the same 
footing as the Third Reich. 
The change of attitude towards Polish Germans and other minority groups 
signalled by the Act on national and ethnic minorities and on the regional 
language (2005) represents a significant concession and effectively marks the end 
of any vestigial postwar hostilities. For, as noted above, the ‘right to name’ 
identifies a given community as the owners of, and/or the rightful heirs to, the 
region in which they are permitted to exercise the right.507  Further linguistic 
concessions underpin this new of era of détente. For example, Polish is still the 
only language permitted for ‘contacts with public administration offices’, but 
otherwise ‘there are no limitations on the use of any language in both private and 
                                                 
505 Ibid. p. 36. 
506 Zedlitz, A., et al., Schlesien: alle Orte, Accessed on: 09.04.2013. 
507 Reuben Rose-Redwood, et al., 'Geographies of Toponymic Inscription', p. 462. 
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public life’. Moreover, minority languages can now be used as supporting 
languages in contacts with ‘third-order administrative units’ at the communal 
level as long as the speaker community constitutes no less than 20 per cent of the 
local population and has been recorded in the ‘Official Register of Communes, 
where a supporting language is used’.508 Figure 3 in Toponymic Guidelines of 
Poland for Map Editors and Other Users (2010) shows a small area in what used 
to be Oberschlesien in which German is registered as a supporting language.509 
Figures 2 and 4 in the same source show that the only official German minority 
currently recognised by the Polish government is located in this region, which is 
also the only area in which German toponyms are currently used alongside their 
Polish counterparts.510  
In the remainder of the chapter I analyse shifting representations of 
Poland’s territorial and toponymic situation in cartographic texts produced in the 
postwar and post-Wende eras. 
 
5.4 Aspirational Cartography: Mapping Political Paradigms 
 
5.4.1 General Overview 
The role of cartography in collective memory discourses has hitherto been largely 
neglected, possibly because many of the episodes of acute symmetric trauma that 
have triggered collective memory discourses, such as the Holocaust, have not 
involved changes to international frontiers. The fact that the postwar 
Vertreibungen did take place in conjunction with permanent territorial transfers, 
and that these are reflected in maps, is one of the things that make the relevant 
collective memory discourse so interesting from a comparative perspective. For, 
according to A. Melville:  
 
[maps] are more than simply innocent repositories of name 
data. They work – through their textual authority and repeated 
use – to normalize certain ways of knowing and naming the 
landscape over others.511 
                                                 
508 German is currently used as a supporting language in 22 communes of Opolskie. Moreover, 286 German allonyms have 
been introduced throughout this region as well as in two communes in the Śląskie Voivodship. See: Wolnicz-Pawłowska, 
E., et al., Toponymic Guidelines of Poland, pp. 38-40. 
509 Figure 3 in: ibid. p. 34. 
510 Figures 2 and 4 respectively in: ibid. pp. 33, 35. 
511 A. Melville in: Reuben Rose-Redwood, et al., 'Geographies of Toponymic Inscription', p. 463. 
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Mark Monmonier is even more explicit about the power of maps to shape 
one’s understanding of history and therefore to bolster hegemonic historical 
narratives and the potential for manipulation that this entails: 
 
There’s no escape from the cartographic paradox: to present a 
useful and truthful picture, an accurate map must tell white lies. 
Because most map users willingly tolerate white lies on maps, 
it’s not difficult for maps also to tell more serious ones.512 
 
This is particularly significant in the current context given that the 
 
spate of newly independent states formed after World War II 
revived the national atlas as a symbol of nationhood … [and] 
between 1940 and 1980 the number of national atlases grew 
from fewer than twenty to more than eighty.513 
 
It is also the case that ‘[that] which is marked on the map is affirmed as 
real and changes to the map are important matters’ and that, among other 
considerations, ‘[the] reality that is given on the map is influenced by … the 
deliberate strategies of the cartographer [… and] by the world-views of particular 
cultures’.514  
Thus, the ways in which cartographers choose to depict the world can have 
a significant impact on hegemonic historical narratives and must therefore be 
considered as part of a given collective memory discourse if it involves territorial 
transfers and frontier changes.515  
Not only are cartographers obliged to adopt a specific position on 
toponymic issues, but they also need to address purported political situations, e.g., 
questions of de facto versus de jure sovereignty, the permanence or otherwise of 
borders, or whether or not a given region is contested between different powers. 
This is important in the current context because, whilst it is by no means 
                                                 
512 Monmonier, M., How to Lie with Maps (Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press, 1991), p. 1; for a more 
lighthearted example of historical inaccuracies in cartography see: Grolle, J., et al., 'Hobbits im Weltatlas', in Der Spiegel, 
(Hamburg: SPIEGEL-Verlag, 2006), p. 155. 
513  Monmonier, M., How to Lie with Maps, pp. 89-90; See also R. Helgerson in: King, G., Mapping Reality: An 
Exploration of Cultural Cartographies (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996), p. 99. 
514 King, G., Mapping Reality, pp. 2, 18. 
515 The process of cartographic publication is constrained in many ways, including economic and political pressures. 
Politically, the censor often plays a significant role and can intervene either to dictate what should be shown on a given 
map or else to prevent the publication of maps that do not represent the regime’s favoured view of the word. Economic 
constraints on specific cartographers can include the availability of materials such as engraved plates and current data, but 
also the marketing objectives or raison d’être of the institute or publishing house for whom they work. Therefore, it is not 
always true to say that a specific cartographer chooses to depict the world in a certain way. Nevertheless, unless otherwise 
stated, I use the expression here, in conjunction with a hypothetical or ‘apocryphal’ cartographer, as a short-hand proxy for 
all of the forces that converged upon and informed the production of any given map. 
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incumbent upon historians or literary authors around the world to address the 
postwar expulsions, all cartographers wishing to depict the postwar world, by 
contrast, necessarily have to take a stance on the concomitant geo-political 
changes. Thus, the relevant collective memory discourse is globalised in the 
artefacts produced by cartographers in a way that is not true of other cultural 
artefacts. Moreover, the public understanding of these changes in any given 
polity, which is inevitably informed to some degree by maps, has a direct bearing 
on the status and reception of expellees and their cultural products (including their 
historical narratives). To be specific, my argument is that, even in cases in which 
a given cartographer or cartographic institute has no direct interest in the area in 
question, their chosen approach to contested toponyms and territorial issues 
cannot but be, at least partially, informed by their political and cultural paradigm 
and the information available to them. I would like to introduce a new term 
‘quasi-political discourse’ to refer to this situation in which any position one 
adopts towards a given political or politicised issue must necessarily align with a 
specific stakeholder narrative regardless of the fact that one has no interest in the 
matter and nothing to gain one way or the other.516 
In many cases, cartographic institutes and publishing houses have rules in 
place prior to the emergence of any specific geo-political issue, which are then 
consistently applied to all situations arising. Addressing the Crimea’s accession to 
the Russian Federation following the referendum on 21st of March 2014, for 
example, the National Geographic Society (NGS) decided to shade the peninsula 
in grey to indicate ‘that it is a disputed territory’.517 This course of action, the 
organisation states, is in line with its existing policy which ‘is one of portraying 
the world from a de facto point of view; that is, to portray to the best of our 
judgement the current reality’.518 However, to those who voted in favour of the 
accession and to many other observers and governments around the world the 
                                                 
516 To fulfil the definition of ‘quasi-political discourse’ as I shall use the term throughout the remainder of this thesis, the 
following conditions must be met: all aspects of the relevant discourse must be governed by an all-encompassing socio-
political or geo-political paradigm, where assessments are informed by the same, and where there is no immediately 
obvious political benefit to be gained by espousing a particular view in relation to the events in question, but where the 
views expressed correlate to some definable position within a politicised discourse. 
517 Any assessment as to the legality and circumstances of this referendum is entirely beyond the scope of the current thesis. 
See: Conant, E., 'How Should Crimea Be Shown on National Geographic Maps?', National Geographic, (2014) 
<http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2014/03/140319-national-geographic-maps-crimea-annexation-russia/> 
[accessed 20.03.2014] 
518 Anon., 'National Geographic Society's Cartographic Policy', National Geographic, (2014) 
<http://maps.nationalgeographic.com/maps/maps-policy.html> [accessed 20.03.2014] 
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status of the territory is not disputed (or rather, it is indisputable). Moreover, the 
NGS’s decisions on the status of any given territory are made by the Map Policy 
Committee and are informed by ‘a number of external entities [including] the 
United Nations, the European Community, as well as the [US] Board on 
Geographic Names’.519 They are, therefore, political in nature. Were the NGS to 
accept the assessment of those states which have already formally recognised the 
transfer of Crimean sovereignty to the Russian Federation they would have to 
represent the area as ‘not disputed’. Their actual decision to depict the region as 
‘disputed’ reflects a US-centric worldview as expressed by Peter Valesco, a 
spokesman for the US State Department, who stated, prior to the referendum, that 
the US would neither honour the referendum nor reflect even a de facto change to 
the Crimea’s sovereign status in US government maps.520 Thus, any institute or 
cartographer wishing to represent the current de facto status of the Crimea must 
first decide whether or not to accept that the territory is disputed. It is my 
contention that this binary decision will be informed by an explicit or tacit socio-
political and cultural paradigm, and that this is inherently problematic.  
Furthermore, I argue that one can extrapolate from this specific example to 
recognise the unavoidability of working within a specific socio-political and 
cultural paradigm as a general, systemic issue applicable to the entire field of 
international cartography. Therefore, the decision to represent any given area as 
‘disputed’ or ‘not disputed’ is unavoidably political as are decisions relating to the 
presentation of information having a bearing on the political and cultural status of 
territories such as the ZO. As such, a close reading of maps of postwar Poland 
produced within different stakeholder communities, in conjunction with those 
produced in polities less directly affected by specific events, can provide 
interesting insights into the development of relevant socio-political and cultural 
paradigms over time. Moreover, it reveals narrative shifts within the relevant 
collective memory discourse over time and between stakeholder communities. 
Such narratives function primarily at the explanatory level, but can strongly 
influence one’s understanding of the ontological status of the ZO or its historical 
                                                 
519 Ibid. 
520 Conant, E., 'How Should Crimea Be Shown on National Geographic Maps?'. 
 155 
relationship to Germany and Poland as well as its de jure situation at various 
times during the postwar period.521 
According to Geoff King ‘[the] most important line on the postwar map 
was drawn between East and West Germany’.522 Eventually, this line became a 
permanent political reality when each of the two German states formally 
recognised the other as de facto sovereign states in the Grundlagenvertrag signed 
on the 21st of December 1972.523 However, I would argue that the Oder-Neisse 
Line was a far more significant geo-political boundary. Provisionally allowed to 
stand after being drawn in on maps during the Potsdam Conference at the 
insistence of the Soviet delegation, pending ratification or revision at a peace 
conference to be convened in the near future, its ramifications for global 
diplomacy and policymaking far outreach the impact of the inner German border. 
For, whereas the Inner German Border was originally conceived of as a line of 
demarcation between (at that time still) collaborating, allied occupying powers, 
the Oder-Neisse Line first came into being as one of the limit-lines of Poland’s 
annexation of German territory, i.e., it was the result of an act of war. It is true 
that the Inner German Border, which began as an imaginary line pencilled in for 
the sake of administrative convenience, was subsequently reinforced by troops, 
then with barbed wire, and finally, in some places, concrete walls.  
However, the Oder-Neisse Line was reinforced through more drastic 
means including multiple waves of sociocide, expropriation of the native 
population on the side of the divide occupied by Poland, the installation of 
military garrisons and concentration camps, toponymic re-inscription, and 
propaganda in support of the ahistorical Piast Formula. Thus, whilst the FRG’s 
ultimate recognition of the Inner German Border simply meant recognising the 
GDR’s right to an autonomous political and cultural development, the formal 
recognition of the Oder-Neisse Line (1950, 1970 and 1990) was tantamount to 
recognising the right of states to acquire foreign territory by force of arms and to 
commit acts of sociocide and oppression against the native population. 
                                                 
521 The postwar de jure status of the ZO has always been clear, and has changed over time in conjunction with the relevant 
international treaties. However, the issue here concerns the extent to which ordinary people within the various stakeholder 
communities could have been able to understand the present de jure and historical status of the annexed territories during 
the period in question, based on the information presented in high-value, authoritative sources, such as atlases. 
522 King, G., Mapping Reality, p. 99. 
523 Kühnl, R., Nation, Nationalismus, Nationale Frage: was ist das und was soll das?, Kleine Bibliothek (Cologne: Pahl-
Rugenstein, 1986). 
 156 
Unsurprisingly then, attempts to map the Oder-Neisse Line and the 
previously German territories to the east of it have involved an ideological aspect. 
Identifiable differences to the ways in which the region has been mapped in 
different stakeholder communities and changes to such maps over time can, 
arguably, stand as a proxy for long-term trends in the collective memory discourse 
with which this thesis is concerned. In the following three sections, I turn to 
specific cartographic representations of the ZO in the pre- and post-Wende eras in 
order to delineate and analyse such long-term differences and changes. 
 
5.4.2 Drawing the Future (1945-1970) 
Despite a significant loss of life among Polish geographers during WWII, they –
and more specifically cartographers – played an important role in delineating and 
defining postwar Poland.524 In addition to existing cartography departments in 
universities in Warszawa, Kraków and Poznań, all of which were operating 
normally by the end of 1945, new ones were rapidly established in Toruń, Łodż, 
Lublin and Wrocław.525 Polish cartographers attended peace conferences where 
they were instrumental in ‘defending Poland’s western boundaries in the 
international arena’.526 They were intimately involved in the issues of resettlement 
and regional planning.527 After publishing widely on the ‘geographical assets of 
the new territories’ they devoted their efforts to ensuring that the general 
population became familiar with them through the production of detailed maps 
and atlases.528 
An early example of the presentation of an aspirational, rather than the 
actual, political status quo in the ZO and along Poland’s frontiers is the Atlas 
Polski (1953).529 In this atlas, the relevant plates include nothing to indicate that 
the ZO was still only under Polish administration pending a final peace 
                                                 
524 Kostrowicki, J., 'Geography in Poland Since the War', The Geographical Journal, 122 (1956), 441-50, p. 442. 
525 Leszczycki, S., 'The Application of Geography in Poland', The Geographical Journal, 126 (1960), 418-26, p. 418. 
526 Ibid. 
527 Ibid. pp. 419-23. 
528 Ibid. p. 418. 
529 The year in which the Atlas Polski was published, 1953, is significant in the history of the Eastern Bloc. It was the year 
in which Stalin died and in which a popular uprising broke out in the German Democratic Republic, directed against the 
imposition of Walter Ulbricht’s (1893-1973) form of Socialism. Conceivably, the Polish censor – and therefore the 
publishers of the atlas (Centralny Urząd Geodezji i Kartografii) – were concerned about the stability of the region and 
therefore chose not to portray direct challenges to the status quo by including notes about the contested nature of the Oder-
Neisse Line and the ZO. For the time being, however, that remains speculation and any in-depth investigation of the 
question goes beyond the scope of this thesis. See: Burant, S. R., 'East Germany: a Country Study', (Washington, USA: 
Library of Congress Federal Research Division, 1988), pp. 230-31; Judt, T., Postwar: a History of Europe since 1945 
(London: Heinemann, 2005), pp. 177-310. 
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conference and that its status as part of Poland was still fiercely contested by the 
Adenauer government in the FRG.530 The Oder-Neisse Line is depicted as a state 
border with nothing to indicate its provisional status. In addition, none of the 
previously German toponyms are shown alongside newly coined Polish place 
names. Major cities like Görlitz and Breslau, both of which had been given both 
their German names and their Polish allonyms (Zgorzelec and Wrocław) in pre-
war Polish maps like the Mapa Taktyczna Polski (the cartographic plates for 
which were produced between 1928 and 1936), have also been replaced by their 
Polish allonyms in the Atlas Polski.531  Moreover, the plate bears no trace of 
several earlier Polish toponyms in the region. A Prussian document from 1750, 
for example, shows existing Polish allonyms for 109 towns and cities in Prussian 
Silesia. One of these is Hyrszberga (Hirschberg).  
However, this appears in the 1953 atlas as Jelenia Góra .532 Hyrszberga, an 
etymologically German Polish allonym, was, presumably, considered too German 
and has been transliterated to Jelenia Góra. 533  Other older Polish or Slavic 
allonyms outside of Silesia, but still within the ZO, have received the same 
treatment. The pre-war Mapa Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (1934), for example, 
provides two Slavic names for a small town in German Western Pomerania. The 
first, reflecting contemporary German usage, is Belgard, a toponym adopted into 
modern German despite its Slavic etymology. The second is Białogród, as the 
town was known to Poles of the Second Republic.534 By the time it appears in 
Atlas Polski in 1953, both of these Slavic allonyms have been modernised to 
Białogard.535  
What this close reading of the Atlas Polski’s version of the status quo 
along the Oder-Neisse Line in 1953 reveals is that the TRJN’s toponymic re-
inscription of the ZO was not only designed to expunge traces of the region’s 
German legacy, but also that it was aimed at other non-Polish Slavic heritage. 
                                                 
530 Ahonen, P., After the Expulsion: West Germany and Eastern Europe 1945-1990 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2003), pp. 110-15. 
531 Anon., Breslau (Wrocław) in Mapa Taktyczna Polski (Warsaw: Wojskowy Instytut Geograficzny, 1933); Anon., Görlitz 
i Cernousy in Mapa Taktyczna Polski (Warsaw: Wojskowy Instytut Geograficzny, 1936); Anon., Western Poland in Mapa 
Przeglądowa in Atlas Polski (Warsaw: Centralny Urząd Geodezji i Kartografii, 1953). 
532 Prussia, C. b. F. I. o., 'Polish Names for Places in German Silesia in 1750'; Anon., Western Poland 1953. 
533 As noted above, this change was made in spite of the decision taken at the first onomastic conference in Szczecin in 
September 1945 not to transliterate existing German toponyms. 
534 Anon., Mapa Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (Warsaw: Wojskowy Instytut Geograficzny, 1934). 
535 Anon., Western Poland 1953. 
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This strategy contributed towards a collective memory narrative which 
emphasised the ur-Polishness of the region. The Atlas Polski supports this 
narrative by omitting important information at the ontological level, i.e., the actual 
historical allonyms used by pre-war Poles to refer to German places now claimed 
by Poland. Looking beyond Poland to those areas of Germany, Austria and 
Czechoslovakia visible on the plate that depicts the Oder-Neisse region, one 
notices that the cartographers have not used double allonyms anywhere. Instead 
they have consistently shown a single name for each location, always in the 
current official language of the state in question and always spelt with the correct 
diacriticals.536 On the one hand this supports the notion that the plate was simply 
designed to respect and reflect the current geo-political status quo: 
Czechoslovakian places have Czechoslovakian place names; German places have 
German place names.537 The onus is on Polish users of the atlas to accept these as 
they are and to acquire the necessary knowledge to decipher the foreign 
orthography and diacriticals. However, the implicit logical corollary is that Polish 
places have Polish names and, therefore, that all those areas in which Polish 
names predominate must be part of Poland. Thus, the toponymic strategy adopted 
by the cartographers actually serves as propaganda for the official Polish geo-
political outlook in which the ZO was already a permanent, de jure, part of 
Poland. In this respect, the Atlas Polski presents a narrative based on the omission 
of crucial data about the contemporary ontological status of the ZO in favour of an 
aspirational status, that was not realised for another 17 years (Treaty of Warsaw).  
Considered together, a selection of contemporary maps of the region 
produced outside Poland more accurately reflect the undecided status of the 
annexed territories and the Oder-Neisse Line, and the resulting confusion at the 
explanatory and ontological levels. Two atlases published in the USA in 1948 and 
1951 exemplify this trend. The map of Poland included in Hammond’s World 
Atlas (1948), for example, includes the disclaimer: 
 
Post-war territorial changes shown on this map do not 
necessarily represent the final status of such boundaries. Only 
                                                 
536 Interestingly, this is not the case for the map’s hydrographical content. All rivers and minor waterways bear modern 
Polish names regardless of location and regardless of whether or not they originate in or traverse Polish territory. 
537 The only exception to this practice is in the Kresy, particularly in East Galicia where the former Polish names are still 
shown. See: Anon., Eastern Poland in Mapa Przeglądowa in Atlas Polski (Warsaw: Centralny Urząd Geodezji i 
Kartografii, 1953). 
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after the signing of Peace Treaties can changes be considered 
official and definite.538 
 
However, the relevant plate includes several features that appear to 
question this clear and accurate statement. In one example, an insert on the same 
map, which shows ‘Polish Boundaries 1938 / 1945’, promotes a perception of 
these changes as permanent.539 In addition, toponyms on the map of Poland are 
treated differently to those on all other maps in the atlas. For example, all 
toponyms in the ZO are shown in their Polish forms only (e.g. Wrocław, 
Wałbrzych, and Gorzów). However, uniquely in this atlas, the map of Poland is 
overlaid with a glossary of ‘Present Polish’ and ‘Former German’ allonyms, once 
again suggesting permanence of the situation depicted. Indeed, no double 
toponyms are provided for any place in Poland, even outside of the ZO. By 
contrast, the atlas includes double allonyms for large towns and cities throughout 
Europe outside of Poland (e.g., Munich/München, Cleves/Kleve, 
Florence/Firenze, Torino/Turin, Beograd/Belgrade).540 All such pairings include 
the current Anglophone allonym for the locations in question. However, as noted 
above, the current Anglophone allonym for ‘Wrocław’ is ‘Breslau’, which is 
omitted from the relevant map, as is ‘Warsaw’, the Anglophone allonym for 
‘Warszawa’. That such differences do reflect a quasi-political paradigm, rather 
than simply the house style of the publisher, is suggested by the fact that Poland is 
the only country in which Anglophone allonyms are completely absent.541  
Thus, in the Hammond’s World Atlas, one finds on the same page a clear 
disclaimer as to the provisional nature of the geo-political situation depicted on 
the map of Poland in conjunction with several editorial inclusions that tend to 
weaken the statement. For example, the insertion of a glossary, especially one that 
includes the words ‘Present’ and ‘Former’, in conjunction with the fact that the 
German-Polish frontier is marked as an international boundary with no indication 
of its provisional status on the map plate itself, detracts from the reader’s 
                                                 
538 Hammond, C. S., Poland in Hammond's World Atlas (Garden City: Garden City Publishing Company, Inc., 1948), p. 
60. 
539 Ibid. 
540 Interestingly, the editors do not seem to have a consistent approach to the order in the which the allonyms appear, 
sometimes favouring an ‘English (foreign)’ format and sometimes ‘Foreign (English)’. See: Hammond, C. S., Germany in 
Hammond's World Atlas (Garden City: Garden City Publishing Company, Inc., 1948), pp. 48-49; Hammond, C. S., Italy in 
Hammond's World Atlas (Garden City: Garden City Publishing Company, Inc., 1948), p. 57. 
541 Hammond, C. S., Poland 1948, p. 61. 
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awareness of the lack of permanence of the depicted status quo, in spite of the 
disclaimer to that effect. To summarise these observations, Poland is treated 
differently from all other maps in the atlas. However, it is not easy to deconstruct 
the contradictory features included on the Polish plate such as to demonstrate any 
overt political support or preference for the permanence or otherwise of the 
postwar status quo with respect to Poland and Germany at this time. 
The attitudes of Anglophone cartographers towards the situation arguably 
changed in the five years following the GDR’s recognition of the Oder-Neisse 
Line as a permanent boundary between Germany and Poland in 1950.542 After this 
point, complete neutrality on the issue was impossible because there were now 
two realities to choose between. One could agree with the Adenauer government 
of West Germany, who were still steadfastly refusing to acknowledge the 
permanence and irreversibility both of the territorial shifts in Poland’s favour and 
of the Oder-Neisse Line as a permanent frontier between the two states. 
Moreover, the FRG did not recognise the GDR, and consequently refused to be 
bound by any international treaties entered into by the GDR, and, furthermore, 
claimed the sole right to represent all Germans.543 On the other hand, one could 
accept the GDR-Polish consensus to the effect that the originally de facto postwar 
geo-political configuration of the region had become a de jure reality with the 
signing of the Görlitzer Vertrag. The ramifications of these two alternative 
worldviews became increasingly difficult to ignore as the so-called Cold War 
worsened and Europe, and indeed the world, polarised into two politically 
opposed blocs, each with its distinct economic, socio-political, and ideological 
axioms.  
And yet, these divisions are not immediately apparent or reflected in the 
maps and atlases produced soon after the signing of the Görlitzer Vertrag, such as 
another American atlas published by the National Geographic Society just one 
                                                 
542 The crucial statement is made in Article 1 which states unequivocally that: 'Die Hohen Vertragschließenden Parteien 
stellen übereinstimmend fest, dass die festgelegte und bestehende Grenze, die von der Ostsee entlang der Linie westlich 
von der Ortschaft Swinoujscie und von dort entlang dem Fluss Oder bis zur Einmündung der Lausitzer Neiße und die 
Lausitzer Neiße entlang bis zur tschechoslowakischen Grenze verläuft, die Staatsgrenze zwischen Deutschland und Polen 
bildet'. See: Anon., Görlitzer Abkommen (Auswärtiges Amt, 1959), International Treaty, p. 2. 
543 This attitude towards the GDR and the FRG's claim to represent all Germans was expressed in a number of Adenauer's 
official statements and eventually came to be known as the 'Hallstein Doctrine' after Walter Hallstein (1901-1982), who 
was one of its chief exponents. See: Görtemaker, M., Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: von der Gründung bis 
zur Gegenwart (Munich: Beck, 1999), pp. 337-38; Ahonen, P., After the Expulsion, pp. 122-23. 
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year later (1951).544 The relevant plate includes the German/Anglophone allonyms 
for all places within the ZO, but not for other places in Poland (such as Kraków / 
Krakau / Cracow). German/Anglophone allonyms within the ZO are provided in 
brackets after the Polish allonyms as in ‘Wrocław (Breslau)’, ‘Wałbrzych 
(Waldenburg)’, and ‘Gorzów (Landsberg)’.545 This decision certainly indicates an 
awareness of the special status of the ZO but, interestingly in light of the 
subsequent development of the Cold War, does not reflect any western-centric 
ambiguity about the GDR’s recognition of the border. If anything, one could 
argue that placing the German allonym in brackets suggests the incidental nature 
of these, which would indicate the cartographer’s acceptance of the situation as 
presented by the GDR and Poland. Arguably, favouring the German allonyms and 
placing their Polish counterparts in brackets after or below them could be taken as 
an endorsement of the Adenauer position in which the long-term future of the 
region was still undecided. By contrast, the cartographers/publishers at the NGS 
had, consciously or unconsciously, espoused the GDR-Polish-Soviet paradigm 
pertaining to the current ontological status of the ZO. The subtitle of the map –
 ‘Russian and Polish boundaries according to treaties and claims as of July 1, 
1951’ – is significant as it suggests that any outstanding claims would be 
indicated on the map. However, the FRG’s outstanding claim to the ZO and 
northern East Prussia is not registered on the map, which limits its explanatory 
power by omitting significant information at the ontological level. 
The situation appears to have been similarly vague in Great Britain during 
the same period. In 1952, for example, the editors of The Citizen's Atlas of the 
World appear to be ‘hedging their bets’ in terms of the permanence of Poland’s 
postwar frontiers. These are depicted and duly labelled as international 
boundaries, which corresponds to the GDR’s worldview, not that of the FRG. 
However, the map of Western and Central Europe is overlayed with a thick 
yellow line labelled ‘1938 Boundary of Germany’.546 Whilst one could regard this 
as a convenient way of including some illuminating information about the recent 
history of the area, it is not a method that was repeated on any other plate in the 
                                                 
544 Grosvenor, G., Central Europe including the Balkan States (Russian and Polish boundaries according to treaties and 
claims as of July 1, 1951) (Washington, USA: National Geographic Society, 1951). 
545  Grosvenor, G., Western Poland in Central Europe including the Balkan States (Russian and Polish boundaries 
according to treaties and claims as of July 1, 1951) (Washington, USA: National Geographic Society, 1951). 
546 Bartholomew, J. G., et al., The Citizen's Atlas of the World, pp. 66-67. 
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atlas. This is despite the fact that many of these plates depict other states which 
had also undergone significant boundary changes in the wake of WWII. It does 
not, for example, show the ‘1938 Boundary of Poland’, which had been modified 
to a far greater extent than that of Germany.  
The The Times Atlas of the World, Volume IIII, Northern Europe (1955), 
by contrast, does show an additional ‘Boundary of Poland 1939’.547 On the other 
hand, it includes no separate map of Poland which, arguably, suggests a relative 
lack of interest in the relevant geo-political issues. Instead, there is a single two-
page map entitled ‘Germany Poland and Czechoslovakia’. This plate does, 
however, show all de facto postwar borders without comments or caveats, all of 
which are labelled ‘International Boundary’. This suggests support for the GDR-
Polish-Soviet position in which all of Poland’s postwar borders have acquired de 
jure status. In addition, it shows Poland’s internal administrative boundaries 
including those that encompass areas within the ZO. This detail also supports a 
narrative in which there was no ontological difference between the ZO and the 
rest of Poland at the time of publication, which was contrary to West German 
claims at that date. Further support for this ‘narrative of no difference’ is 
suggested by the consistent use of double allonyms wherever they exist around 
Europe, always favouring the language deemed to be dominant in any region at 
the time of printing, and by treating former German cities in the ZO in the same 
way.548 
Such an apparently unproblematic acceptance of the Eastern Bloc view 
among British cartography houses at this time is rather surprising. After all, the 
FRG, which rejected this paradigm, was a full member of NATO by then, and was 
therefore an ally of Britain and the USA.549 The implied lack of solidarity among 
Anglophone cartographers suggests a lack of interest in the region, and possibly a 
widely held assumption that Poland’s de facto frontier changes did, to all intents 
and purposes, have de jure character.550 By contrast, opinion as to the permanence 
                                                 
547 Bartholomew, J., The Times atlas of the world. Plates 62-63. 
548 Gdańsk (Danzig) and Wrocław (Breslau) within the ZO, and Kraków (Krakau), Warszawa (Warsaw) elsewhere in 
Poland. See: Bartholomew, J. G., et al., The Citizen's Atlas of the World; Bartholomew, J., The Times atlas of the world. 
549 The Federal Republic of Germany joined NATO on May 06, 1955. See: Thränhardt, D., Geschichte der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland, Edition Suhrkamp (Frankfurt a.M: Suhrkamp, 1996), p. 97; Görtemaker, M., Geschichte der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland, p. 328. 
550 Incidentally, it also suggests a general lack of support, or perhaps of awareness, of the FRG’s claim to represent all 
Germans and consequent lack of recognition of the GDR. 
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and/or the legitimacy of the postwar frontiers appears to have been split in France, 
traditionally a staunch supporter of a sovereign Polish state.  
Éditions Larousse’s Atlas général, published in Paris in 1959 follows the 
Russian and Polish approach in showing the postwar border situation with no 
additional commentary (see below), thus ignoring their actual political status at 
the time. Like contemporary Soviet-authored maps of the region, it completely 
ignores historical German place names in the ZO. It includes a detailed map of 
Poland in its de facto form, suggesting a recognition of the current territorial 
configuration of the area. In short, there is no overtly western paradigm evident in 
this atlas, which may reflect the fact that France had withdrawn from NATO in 
1959, thereby signalling neutrality in the emerging Cold War. On the other hand, 
it may reflect a lack of willingness on the part of the cartographers/publishers to 
espouse the FRG’s worldview, possibly based on lingering enmity in the wake of 
WWII and previous Franco-German conflicts. However, the editors have also 
provided a section entitled Histoire de la Pologne, which includes two plates 
showing Silesia outside of historical Poland: ‘La Pologne sous Casimir III le 
Grand (1333-1370)’ and ‘La Pologne au XVIIe Siècle’, with separate maps for 
1772, 1793, 1795 (Partitions).551  This suggests an interest in the region, and, 
moreover, one that takes full account of its longer-term history whilst not 
challenging the current status quo.  
Another French atlas, published in Paris just four years later, in 1963, by 
the Société européenne d'études et d'informations, presents a very different 
worldview. In the Atlas of Western Europe (1963), Poland’s current borders are 
drawn in a line-type labelled in the legend as ‘de facto boundaries in Central and 
Eastern Europe’. Both Germany (green) and Poland (blue) are still shown in their 
pre-war configurations with de facto borders superimposed to show the territorial 
extent of postwar Poland. This does not suggest any recognition of the likely 
permanence of the situation or of the Görlitzer Vertrag. In addition, the Baltic 
States are shown as separate states but the remainder of the Soviet Union is 
depicted as an undifferentiated bloc. For example, the Ukrainian SSR is not 
identified in any way.552 This special treatment of the Baltic States also, arguably, 
suggests an attitude of not fully recognising the de facto status quo in Central and 
                                                 
551 Anon., Atlas général Larousse (Paris: Larousse, 1959), pp. 95-97. 
552 Dollfus, J., Atlas of Western Europe (Paris: Société européenne d'études et d'informations, 1963), p. 31. 
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Northern Europe. Of all of the maps studied for this chapter, this one is most 
glaringly at odds with the ontological situation of the region it purports to depict. 
In Cold War parlance, the first of these French atlases (1959) appears to 
support, or at least not to seriously contradict, the Soviet Bloc paradigm, whilst 
the second (1963) reflects a NATO worldview in which the Soviet Union’s 
territorial advances in Central and Northern Europe are questionable and the 
German-Polish frontier is still awaiting final ratification. The French example 
suggests that, both Poland’s annexation of the ZO and the Polish government’s 
explanatory narrative were sometimes challenged even outside of the two nations 
directly affected. Thus, the collective memory discourse was exported beyond the 
immediate vicinity and, to some extent, this is evident in the choices made by 
geographers and cartographers around the world. 
Such differences in the way the German-Polish border region was depicted 
become easier to identify as the Cold War intensified in the late 1960s, especially 
when one considers maps produced within the main stakeholder polities. Soviet 
atlases depicted Eastern and Western Europe in simple terms at that time. The 
1967 The World Atlas (published in Moscow), for example, shows all de facto 
postwar borders with no comments or caveats to indicate their provisional nature. 
Similarly, it shows only Polish names for all towns and cities in postwar Poland, 
neither including recent German nor historical Russian alternatives.553 At least 
one contemporaneous East German map, the Übersichtskarte Deutsche 
Demokratische Republik und Westdeutschland published in Potsdam in 1966, is 
staunchly in line with the Soviet worldview. The few Silesian places shown on the 
map all bear Polish toponyms only, and place names in other countries are shown 
strictly in the relevant national language including diacritical marks. Similarly, it 
presents no historical alternative to Karl-Marx-Stadt (as Chemnitz was called in 
the GDR) and does not cater to non-German speakers with regard to any other 
place names throughout the German-speaking regions.554 This is a clear statement 
of a paradigm in which every state has a right to its own particularities, despite 
overriding political allegiances, and which respects national boundaries as they 
currently stand, from the perspective of Moscow. The only challenge to this 
                                                 
553 Anon., The World Atlas (Moscow: Chief Administration of Geodesy and Cartography Under the Council of Ministers of 
the USSR, 1967), pp. 87-88. 
554 Anon., Übersichtskarte DDR und Westdeutschland. 
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pacifistic, inclusive worldview is the reference to the Bundesrepublik Deutschland 
(FRG) as simply Westdeutschland, whereas Ostdeutschland is given its full 
official name (Deutsche Demokratische Republik).  
Contemporary Polish maps, such as the Pergamon World Atlas (1968), 
present a similarly confident view of the region, with nothing to indicate or 
acknowledge West Germany’s outstanding territorial aspirations and claims.555 
Published in Warsaw by British publishers Pergamon Press, this atlas included 
maps of Central Europe first prepared by the Polish Army Topographical Service 
in 1963, which the English editors and advisers, Stanley Knight et al., adopt 
without change.556 The fact that it depicts the Soviet Union as an undifferentiated 
bloc, with no visible Baltic states and no delineation of the individual SSRs, 
suggests some level of ideological or political intervention during the production 
and/or publication process. Like its Soviet counterpart, the Pergamon World Atlas 
shows the postwar Oder-Neisse Line as Poland’s western border, with no 
comments or caveats and depicts all towns and cities in postwar Poland (including 
the ‘recovered territories’, which are not marked in any way) with Polish 
toponyms only. German allonyms are completely absent from the relevant plate. 
This Polish atlas betrays its political bias in other ways too. For example, it 
includes a linguistic map in which postwar Poland is represented as a 
homogenous and contiguous Polish-speaking bloc. In fact there is significant 
linguistic diversity within Poland to this day (see above).557 On the other hand, 
this omission of detail may be a matter of scale: minority languages in other 
regions, outside Poland, are also ignored.558 In summary, this Polish atlas presents 
a geo-political vision of Poland in general, and the ZO in particular, which 
completely ignores the, as yet, still contested nature of the postwar geo-political 
configuration in Central Europe.  
By contrast, the West German Deutscher General Atlas (1968) labels the 
Oder-Neisse Line as a ‘Verwaltungsgrenze’ which, from a West German 
perspective, properly reflects its de jure status at this time. The overall status of 
                                                 
555 Naumienko, T., Pergamon World Atlas (Warsaw: Pergamon Press, Polish Scientific Publishers, 1968), pp. 76, 80-82. 
556 Anon., Information on the Pergamon World Atlas at Open Library Online, <http://openlibrary.org>, Accessed on: 
15.04.2013. 
557 Wolnicz-Pawłowska, E., et al., Toponymic Guidelines of Poland, pp. 25, 33. 
558 One illuminating example of this trend is Sorbian in Germany. As the only member of the West-Slavic language family 
spoken outside of the Soviet Bloc, this minor language ought to have been of interest to the atlas’ target readership. See: 
Crystal, D., The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Language (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 300, 02. 
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the ZO was similarly contested in the Deutscher General Atlas which labels the 
contested region as ‘z. Zt. unter polnischer Verwaltung’. All place names in 
formerly German territories are given in German with no Polish or Russian 
allonyms.559  Thus, the Deutscher General Atlas and the Polish edition of the 
Pergamon World Atlas, both published in exactly the same year, represent the two 
most divergent interpretations possible of the contempory geo-political situation 
along the German-Polish border region.560  
Other features in both maps, in addition to those mentioned above, 
demonstrate that both were at least partially intended as political instruments and 
not merely as educational tools designed to reflect the world as it currently 
stood.561 In the Polish atlas, for example, all towns in rump Germany are named in 
German with no alternatives offered, even where the alternatives have a wider 
currency throughout Europe; thus München is not ‘explained’ to the non-German-
speaking reader by the inclusion of ‘Munich’ (English, French) or ‘Monachium’ 
(Polish) in a smaller typeface. In the German atlas, place names in the area 
covered by pre-war Poland are generally written in Polish except where traditional 
German names exist, e.g. Warschau instead of Warszawa. Therefore, the only 
territories in which the cartographers’ respective national language is used 
exclusively in these two works are precisely those areas contested by the FRG and 
Poland, the ZO. The German map also challenges the status of East Prussia by 
labelling its northern and southern divisions as ‘z. Zt. unter sowjetischer 
Verwaltung’ and ‘z. Zt. unter polnischer Verwaltung’ respectively. In addition, 
the entire former German province is demarcated by a line-type decoded in the 
legend as a ‘Staatsgrenze’ indicating its continued status as part of an intact 
                                                 
559 Anon., Deutscher General Atlas. 
560 As explained in more detail in Chapter 6, 1968 was a crucial year in both the FRG and Poland and beyond. Both the 
NATO and Warsaw Pact countries suffered crises of legitimacy that set a chain of political events in motion that would 
eventually culminate in the so-called Wende, a complete collapse and reordering of the existing order in 1989/90. See: 
Meinhof, U. M., 'Vom Protest zum Widerstand', Konkret, 1968; Anon., 'Das Zentralkomitee der SED, der Staatsrat und der 
Ministerrat zur Intervention in der ČSSR', Neues Deutschland, 21.08.1968 1968; Anon., 'Quittung vorhanden', in Der 
Spiegel, (Hamburg: SPIEGEL-Verlag, 1969), p. 36; Pollmann, B., Lesebuch zur Deutschen Geschichte: Vom deutschen 
Reich bis zur Gegenwart (Dortmund: Harenberg Kommunikation, 1984), 3, pp. 247-49; Otto, K. A., Die APO. Die 
Außerparlamentarische Opposition in Quellen und Dokumenten 1960-1970 (Cologne: Pahl-Rugenstein, 1989), pp. 174-75; 
Thränhardt, D., Geschichte der BRD, pp. 167-85; Kraushaar, W., Frankfurter Schule und Studentenbewegung: Von der 
Flaschenpost zum Molotowcocktail; 1946 - 1995 (Hamburg: Rogner & Bernhard, 1998), 2, p. 363; Görtemaker, M., 
Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, pp. 453-91, 584-88; Banchoff, T. F., The German Problem Transformed, pp. 
61-96; Gassert, P., Kurt Georg Kiesinger - 1904-1988: Kanzler zwischen den Zeiten (Munich: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 
2006), p. 69; Gassert, P., et al., Coping with the Nazi Past: West German Debates on Nazism and Generational Conflict, 
1955-1975, Studies in German History (New York; Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2006); Stromer, A., Die 
Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands - eine Partei mit rechtsextremistischer Ausrichtung? (Norderstedt: Grin 
Verlag, 2013), p. 7; Fehr, H., Legitimitätskonflikte in Ostmitteleuropa, pp. 33-36, 39-42. 
561  Interestingly, British cartographers were still avoiding the extremes of the controversy at this time by diligently 
including German/Anglophone allonyms for all Polish towns and cities in the ZO. See: Philip, The International Atlas. 
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German state.562 That this state was envisaged as being coextensive with pre-War 
Germany is demonstrated by the fact that both the inner-German and Berlin 
borders are labelled as ‘Verwaltungsgrenze’, not ‘Staatsgrenze’. These internal 
dividing lines were represented as being impermanent whereas the inclusion of a 
‘Staatsgrenze’ around the whole of East Prussia suggests continuity between the 
Third Reich and the current geo-political situation at the de jure level. 563 
Interestingly, the above applies only to the introductory overview map at a scale 
of 1:300,000. The rest of the atlas is dedicated almost entirely to West Germany 
as it stood in 1968. Most of the GDR is absent from the map, which obviated the 
need for the mapmakers to take a stance on places that had been renamed for 
ideological reasons, such as Karl-Marx-Stadt (Chemnitz), and pre-war German 
territories, such as Posen and Silesia. Thus, having made a political statement in 
the smaller scale map, the cartographers/publishers avoid labouring the point in 
the larger scale plates that follow. Certainly, this was mainly because the GDR 
and Poland were ‘off-topic’ in an atlas of West Germany. Nevertheless, it 
fortuitously avoids contentious issues at a point in time when the frozen fronts of 
the Cold War were beginning to show some movement as a result of Egon Bahr’s 
(1922-) and Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik.564  
In summary, one can argue that Anglophone and French cartography 
between 1945 and 1970 reflected an ambivalent attitude and/or lack of emotional 
or political concern for the precise situation in the ZO and regarding the Oder-
Neisse Line. Nevertheless, by depicting the de facto boundaries as if they already 
had de jure status, cartographic products such as The International Atlas, 
published in 1969 by London-based publishers George Philip & Son, presented a 
view of the geo-political situation that reflected Polish, not West German, 
aspirations.565 Cartographers from stakeholder communities more closely linked 
to the events in question, particularly those working in the two German states, 
Poland and the USSR, expressed more polarised worldviews in their cartographic 
products. Postwar Polish and German maps and atlases therefore served a well-
                                                 
562 Otherwise there would have to be two Staatsgrenzen to indicate the fact that the northern part of East Prussia had been 
annexed by the USSR and the southern part by Poland. 
563 It is worth noting that, within the international legal frameworks recognised by their respective countries, both the West 
German, the Polish, and the Soviet cartographers were all depicting the de jure situation. The fact that their cartographic 
representations differ so markedly from one another is simply a function of the arbitrary, quasi anarchic nature of 
international law. 
564 Knopp, G., et al., Die deutsche Einheit: Traum und Wirklichkeit (Erlangen: Straube, 1990), pp. 193-97. 
565 Philip, The International Atlas, p. 31. 
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defined socio-political purpose. Rather than mapping the world as they found it, 
Polish cartographers helped to project an image of postwar Poland as their 
political masters, initially the TRJN, wished it to be and to anchor this in the 
collective consciousness of both their countrymen and the world at large. This 
‘aspirational cartography’ (to coin a phrase) has a long tradition in Poland. Polish 
cartographers in the immediate postwar period were following in the footsteps of 
previous generations of Polish cartographers, who, ever since the First Partition in 
1772, have been instrumental in keeping alive an idea of an aspirational Polish 
state among a subjugated Polish nation.566  
To explore the extent to which this situation changed in line with the 
period of détente in German-Polish relations that began in 1970, the following 
section includes a direct comparison between a Polish atlas, Narodowy Atlas 
Polski, produced between 1973 and 1978 and intended for an international 
readership (it was accompanied by a separate, extremely detailed book of texts 
and map keys in English), an East German atlas from 1981, the Atlas Deutsche 
Demokratische Republik, the West German Diercke Weltatlas (1974), and the 
Historischer Weltatlas (1974), produced in West Berlin.567 
 
5.4.3 Détente (1970-Wende) 
As noted elsewhere in this thesis, a period of détente between the FRG and Poland 
set in following the signing of the Treaties of Moscow and Warsaw in 1970 (12th 
of August and 7th of December respectively). In Article 1 of the Treaty of Warsaw 
both parties (the FRG and Poland) promised to respect 
 
die Unverletzlichkeit ihrer bestehenden Grenzen jetzt und in der 
Zukunft und verpflichte[ten] sich gegenseitig zur 
uneingeschränkten Achtung ihrer territorialen Integrität. Sie 
erklär[ten], daß sie gegeneinander keinerlei Gebietsansprüche 
haben und solche auch in Zukunft nicht erheben werden568  
                                                 
566 One way in which they have striven to achieve this was through a close collaboration with the educational authorities, 
and the ‘Flying University’ a tradition that continued in the newly reconstituted Poland after World War One as well as 
after 1945. See: Joerg, W. L. G., 'The Development of Polish Cartography since the World War', Geographical Review, 23 
(1933), 122-29, p. 122; Kostrowicki, J., 'Geography in Poland Since the War', pp. 441-42; Davies, N., Heart of Europe, p. 
235; Großbongardt, A., et al., Die Deutschen im Osten Europas, p. 41. 
567 Polska Akademia Nauk. Instytut, G., Narodowy Atlas Polski: National Atlas of Poland: Texts and Map Keys in English 
(Breslau: Zakład Narodowy Imienia Ossolinskich Wydawnictwo Polskiej Akademii Nauk, 1978 [1973]). Plates 3, 10, 4; 
Polska Akademia Nauk. Instytut, G., et al., Narodowy Atlas Polski (Breslau: Zakład Narodowy Imienia Ossolinskich 
Wydawnictwo Polskiej Akademii Nauk, 1978 [1973]); Diercke, C., et al., Diercke Weltatlas (Braunschweig: Georg 
Westermann, 1974); Putzger, F. W., et al., Historischer Weltatlas (Bielefeld: Cornelsen-Velhagen & Klasing, 1974); 
Akademie der Wissenschaften der DDR (Berlin Ost) Kommission zur Herausgabe des Atlas DDR, Atlas Deutsche 
Demokratische Republik (Gotha: Haack, 1981). Blatt I 
568 Artikel I in: Brandt, W., et al., Warschauer Vertrag, 1970, pp. 1-2. 
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Article 3 in the Treaty of Moscow states unequivocally that both parties 
(the FRG and the USSR) 
 
betrachten heute und künftig die Grenzen aller Staaten in 
Europa als unverletzlich, wie sie am Tage der Unterzeichnung 
dieses Vertrages verlaufen, einschließlich der Oder-Neiße-
Linie, die die Westgrenze der Volksrepublik Polen bildet, und 
der Grenze zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der 
Deutschen Demokratischen Republik569  
 
Thus, for all practical purposes, there was no longer any ideological 
difference between the key stakeholders with respect to the German-Polish border 
and the permanent integration of former German regions into Poland. At the same 
time, social forces were at work in Poland during the 1970s that would eventually 
culminate in the Solidarność movement in 1980 leading to a political crisis in 
Poland and, arguably, to the collapse of the entire postwar geo-political system by 
1990.570 It is interesting to see the extent to which these political changes together 
with the simple progress of time and the changing outlook of the postwar 
generation found their pendants in the cartographic practice of the period. 
Turning first to the West German Historischer Weltatlas (1974), one is 
struck by the fact that no Polish allonyms are included anywhere within the ZO.571 
This is a remarkable editorial decision for a historical atlas, which one might 
reasonably expect to provide contrasting relevant information about current and 
historical situations. For example, some indication of the toponymic transition 
within the ZO would have been entirely relevant on the map plate entitled 
‘Mitteleuropa nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg 1945 – 1960’. The omission is 
particularly striking given the fact that the same map does include a border line 
labelled in the legend as ‘Deutschland und Danzig in den Grenzen von 1937’ and 
text superimposed on both the western part of the ZO and the northern part stating 
‘1945 unter poln. Verwaltung’ and ‘1945 unter poln. bzw. sowjetischer Verw.’ 
respectively. In addition, the map includes the ‘Oder-Neisse-Linie’ shown in its 
own dedicated line type, which differs from that used for other internationally 
                                                 
569 Artikel 3 in: Brandt, W., et al., Deutsch-sowjetischer Vertrag, 12 August 1970 (Bonn: Das Auswärtige Amt, 1970), p. 2. 
570 Fehr, H., Legitimitätskonflikte in Ostmitteleuropa, pp. 49-59. 
571 Putzger, F. W., et al., Historischer Weltatlas, pp. 138-41. 
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ratified frontiers.572 However, the omission of Polish allonyms within the ZO on 
the same map is even more problematic. Whilst it is true that, wherever German 
allonyms exist for any place in the world, they are used exclusively throughout 
the atlas, the decision not to include Polish allonyms in the contested region 
reduces the historical accuracy of the map as this is relevant information for the 
period covered. One is therefore tempted to interpret the map in a political light, 
especially given the publication date, four years after the Treaty of Warsaw came 
into force. At this time, 1974, it was more accurate to regard German allonyms in 
the region as historic and one might have expected the editors to include the 
modern Polish names with a note explaining the historical situation obtaining 
during the period covered by the map. That the cartographers/publishers were 
politically aware is demonstrated by the fact that the only place on the same map 
for which modern and historic allonyms are included is ‘Chemnitz (Karl-Marx-
Stadt)’ in the GDR. Placing the postwar allonym in brackets in this way arguably 
questions the legitimacy of the modern allonym. At the very least, it indicates that 
the two allonyms exist side-by-side, which is precisely the same situation that 
pertained to German and Polish toponyms within the ZO at that time. A direct 
comparison with the relevant plates in the Diercke Weltatlas, published in the 
same state in the same year, reveals the extent to which cartographers were free to 
represent the world in an alternative way at that time and place. 
In the West German Diercke Weltatlas (1974), ‘Karl-Marx-Stadt’ is the 
only allonym included for the city in question. For all other places for which both 
German and local allonyms exist, the cartography team has chosen to include 
both. In every case, the modern German allonym appears first followed by the 
local allonym in brackets, for example, Lüttich (Liège), Warschau (Warszawa), 
Mailand (Milano).573 The only exception to this practice is Breslau which appears 
in conjunction with its Polish allonym Wrocław without the use of brackets.574 It 
is difficult to deconstruct this decision in terms of the historical German-Polish 
conflict in the region. As the historical capital of Silesia Breslau is one of the most 
important cities in the ZO. Its Polish allonym is well attested in the historical 
                                                 
572 This differentiation does properly represent the de jure situation, from a West German perspective, during the period 
covered by the map. See: ibid. p. 141. 
573 Not every allonym pairing accurately reflects the contemporary geo-political status quo. The by then Ukrainian city of 
L’viv, for example is designating by its German and Polish allonyms in the following format: Lemberg (Lwów). 
574 Diercke, C., et al., Diercke Weltatlas, pp. 48-49. 
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record. Its status as either a predominantly German or Polish city or both is 
important within the deflected collective memory discourse with which this thesis 
is concerned. However, this exceptional juxtapositioning of the two allonyms in 
exactly the same typeface and without prefering one over the other (as would have 
been suggested by the use of brackets) is open to multiple interpretations. It could 
suggest that both Germans and Poles have equal historical claims on the city, 
which would be inaccurate. Alternatively, it might mean that the cartographers 
and/or publishers are still asserting a German claim at the time of publication, 
which would be equally inaccurate. This ambiguity is exacerbated by the 
inclusion of a dotted line which delineates the ZO but is not explained either in an 
accompanying legend or on the map itself. There is no corresponding line 
showing the extent of pre-war Poland. On the other hand, the Rivers Oder and 
Neisse are both depicted and are named in both German and Polish (in that order 
and with the Polish version in brackets), but the German-Polish border is not 
specifically referred to as the Oder-Neisse-Linie as it is in the Historischer 
Weltatlas. Thus, whilst the inclusion of the pre-war German border suggests some 
ontological difference between the ZO and the rest of Poland, and perhaps some 
lingering resentment on the part of the cartography team, nothing on the map 
questions the current status of Poland’s western frontier. In summary, this atlas 
appears to reflect the de jure geo-political situation in Central Europe, but the 
inclusion of two unique features on the map of Poland (the unique treatment of 
the two allonyms ‘Breslau’ and ‘Wrocław’ and the unexplained inclusion of the 
pre-Treaty-of-Warsaw frontier as asserted by the FRG) disrupt the implied 
narrative. These features beg an explanation that is not forthcoming either on the 
map plate in question or elsewhere in the atlas. 
This level of ambiguity is completely absent from the Polish atlas 
produced during the same period. The Narodowy Atlas Polski (1978) is surprising 
in its rejection of any spirit of German-Polish détente. It is frank about the fact 
that part of its current territory was annexed from Germany in an act of war and 
that part of its pre-war territory had been lost to the Soviet Union. Plate 47 is 
entitled ‘Population shifts as a result of the recovery of the western and northern 
territories’. 575  Among other things, it shows the territorial origins of the 
                                                 
575 All plate titles and other text quoted in this section is taken from the accompanying English volume: Polska Akademia 
Nauk. Instytut, G., National Atlas of Poland: Texts and Map Keys in English. 
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population inhabiting the western and northern territories in 1950, by 
Voivodeship. The wording here and the fact that Polish cartographers have the 
confidence to openly criticise Soviet actions at this time are both significant. The 
decision to refer to the ‘recovery of the western and northern territories’ can be 
interpreted as a conscious rejection of German attempts to normalise the postwar 
situation. By the time the cartography team began working on the atlas in 1973, 
both the GDR and the FRG had fully recognised Poland’s western border and had 
renounced all territorial claims against Poland. The cartographers’ ‘hard-line 
attitude’ is, therefore, surprising, particularly when compared directly with the 
East German atlas referred to above.576 It supports my argument, presented in 
Chapter 4, about the Polish government’s instrumentalisation of historic German-
Polish conflicts in the interest of legitimising their own undemocratic hold on 
power and the continued presence of the Red Army on Polish soil. Moreover, it 
suggests that Cold War rhetoric was slow to react to geo-political changes aimed 
at a lowering of tensions between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, especially along 
the German-Polish border. This is a significant observation in the current context: 
the collective memory discourse with which this thesis is concerned was, until 
1990, performed against a broader background discourse in which the main 
stakeholders (the expellees, the settlers and the Polish government) were located 
inside two ideologically opposed blocs. That this wider Cold War discourse left a 
clearly identifiable trace within the collective memory discourse concerning flight 
and expulsion is amply demonstrated by the examples I present in Chapter 6. 
Support for the notion that Cold War rhetoric was slow to react to geo-
political changes along the German-Polish border and, therefore, interfered with 
the progress of the collective memory discourse concerning Poland’s postwar 
frontier changes and the concomitant sociocide can be found in the Atlas Deutsche 
Demokratische Republik, which is also still firmly mired in Cold War rhetoric.577 
A colour-coded insert in Blatt 1 shows an irreconcilably divided Europe. The 
whole of Western Europe and Scandinavia (green) is labelled ‘Kapitalistische 
Staaten’, whilst the whole of Central and Eastern Europe, including the GDR 
                                                 
576 The fact that the mapmakers dare to refer to territorial losses to the Soviet Union and the concomitant population 
transfers is also interesting, if slightly off topic. It arguably reflects the growing confidence amongst Poles during the 1970s 
that would eventually culminate in the showdown with the Communist, and therefore ultimately Soviet-backed, authorities 
during the Solidarność era. 
577 Akademie der Wissenschaften der DDR (Berlin Ost) Kommission zur Herausgabe des Atlas DDR, Atlas DDR. 
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(pink) is labelled ‘Sozialistische Staaten’. However, although the insert divides 
Europe on the basis of the prevalent economic systems, the individual state 
boundaries are still dotted in. 578  The fact that all information in the atlas is 
presented in five languages (German, English, Russian, French, and Spanish) 
demonstrates the aspirational reach of the publishers. The narrative of an 
irreconcilably divided Europe presented in the maps and accompanying texts was 
intended for global consumption. However, this uncompromising, confrontational 
stance is tempered slightly by the fact that all place names are shown in postwar 
local languages with no additions in brackets. Thus, despite the multilingual 
accompanying text, no effort is made to assist the international reader with the 
recognition of unfamiliar sounding places (e.g. Köln) by including more familiar 
versions (Cologne in English and French). Enforcing this rule across the board has 
the benefit of ostensibly depicting the world as is, or as it would be if one were 
standing on location in front of a signpost saying ‘Willkommen in Köln’ for 
instance.579  
A far greater benefit from the point of view of East-West détente is that it 
obviates the need for the authors and/or publishers to take a stance on naming 
conventions within the ZO. The Oder-Neisse Line is shown as an abstract, ideal 
line based on specific coordinates. It does not follow the current course of the 
rivers after which it is commonly named. Both the Oder and the Neisse are shown 
crossing back and forth across the political border. The considerable effort that 
has gone into plotting the two river courses against the intangible border can be 
understood as a measure of the GDR’s political commitment to it as a specific, 
inviolable border based on carefully established and ratified coordinates. Thus, 
whilst the overall atlas does embody a Cold War outlook, the naming convention 
adopted throughout and the specific attention paid to delineating, and thereby 
honouring, Poland’s western frontier can arguably be interpreted as signs of 
political détente between Germany and Poland. 
                                                 
578 Although strictly speaking outside of the purview of this thesis it may be worth noting that in British maps and atlases 
pink is usually reserved for the British Empire, the British Commonwealth and/or Britain and its dominions. Cartographers 
in other parts of the world have adopted the same tradition. Even pre-World War One Germans maps, such as the Andrees 
Allgemeiner Handatlas of 1899 followed the same convention. The colour pink is therefore associated with world 
domination and it may be significant that the East German cartography team selected the same colour for the ‘Socialist 
Empire’, which arguably aspired to replace all previous empires. See, for example: Scobel, A., et al., Andrees Allgemeiner 
Handatlas in 126 Haupt- und 137 Nebenkarten nebst vollständigem alphabetischen Namenverzeichnis (Bielefeld; Leipzig: 
Velhagen & Klasing, 1899). Plates 21-22, Europa, Politische Übersicht, map dated ‘Juni 1898’ 
579 It is worth noting that the archaic spelling ‘Cöln’ can still be frequently encountered within Köln and its environs, a 
good example of the limits faced by mapmakers when trying to depict reality.  
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A contemporary British atlas shows that the ambiguity about the 
prevailing geo-political and toponymic situation in Central Europe was also in 
evidence outside of the region during the final decade of the Cold War. Philips’ 
New Practical Atlas (1981) is highly inconsistent in its use of allonyms 
throughout Europe. 580  Some German cities, for which English allonyms are 
commonly used, such as Nürnberg and Braunschweig (Nuremberg and Brunswick 
respectively) are only shown in their German forms. Others like Munich and 
Vienna are shown in both the local German and (in brackets) the English variants. 
The situation in the ZO and Russian East Prussia is equally mixed. Kaliningrad, 
Śląsk, and Wrocław are all included in both their local and English/German 
versions (Königsberg, Silesia, and Breslau respectively). However, for other 
former German towns, such as Waldenburg, only the Polish allonym is shown 
(Wałbrzych). 
In the following section I compare a selection of cartographic works 
produced during the post-Wende period to trace the development of the collective 
memory discourse connected with the German-Polish border region into the 
modern era. 
 
5.4.4 The Transition: 1990 to Present 
British cartographers in the post-Wende period consistently treat Poland and, 
sometimes, the Kresy significantly differently to other European countries. The 
Dorling Kindersley World Atlas (1997), for example, implements a general policy 
of using local allonyms as the main toponymic identifier followed by the English 
allonym in brackets, if such exists. For instance, one finds toponymic pairings 
such as München (Munich), Wien (Vienna), and Firenze (Florence) on the 
relevant plates. However, only the Polish allonyms are used throughout the ZO. 
Similarly, Kaliningrad is labelled using only its Russian allonym whilst the 
common English allonym of ‘Königsberg’ is omitted. The same omission of 
English allonyms is evident in the Kresy, where the Ukrainian L’viv is not paired 
with its common English allonym ‘Lemberg’.581 A consistent application of the 
general policy would have substantially increased the historical content of the 
                                                 
580 Philip George, et al., Philips' New Practical Atlas. 
581 Kindersley, P., Dorling Kindersley World Atlas. 
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map of Poland. For example, the general policy would have required Wrocław 
(Breslau), Kaliningrad (Königsberg). 
The Reader's Digest Illustrated Atlas of the World (1997) takes a very 
similar approach, whereby the general practice is to include the local allonym 
followed by the English name in brackets. In this case, the cartographers 
differentiate between former German territory annexed by Poland and by Russia. 
For example, the general policy would have required Wrocław (Breslau), whereas 
the Polish allonym alone is used. By contrast, Russian allonyms are used in 
conjunction with English allonyms in the northern part of East Prussia: e.g., 
Kaliningrad (Königsberg). Only local allonyms are used throughout the Kresy.582 
Fifteen years later the cartographers and editors of the Times Desktop 
Atlas (2012) also diverge from their general naming policy for all areas annexed 
and lost by Poland in 1945. Their general policy stipulates the use of the English 
allonym first followed by the local variant in brackets. However, only the local 
allonym (Polish or Russian) is used in historically German areas, whereas the 
general pattern is reversed in the Kresy where the local allonym is followed by the 
English equivalent in brackets as in L’viv (L’vov).583 
Post-1990 German atlases take differing approaches to toponymic 
labelling in formerly German territories. The Diercke Weltatlas (2006), for 
example, implements a consistent toponymic strategy for all areas around the 
world. Wherever a German allonym exists it is used as the principal identifier 
with local allonyms following in brackets. There are no exceptions. 584  This 
implies that, whereas British cartographers during the same period continued to 
regard Poland and former Polish territories as toponymically unique areas, their 
German colleagues no longer did so. The specific date of publication, 2006, is 
interesting in this context. According to Hans-Jürgen Bömelburg and Robert 
Traba, writing in 2006, public discourse on the Vertreibungen was characterised 
by a confrontational approach at that time. They contrast this negative 
development with a high point in Polish-German reconciliation between 1993 and 
                                                 
582 This is the part of East Prussia annexed by the USSR. See: Reader's Digest, A., Reader's Digest illustrated Atlas of the 
World. 
583 Anon., Desktop Atlas of the World. 
584 Sang, P., et al., Diercke Weltatlas (Braunschweig: Georg Westermann, 2006). 
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2000.585 Yet, the Diercke Weltatlas’ undifferentiated treatment of Poland does not 
suggest a commensurate level of anti-Polish or pro-German revisionism on the 
part of the cartography team involved in its production. Moreover, changes to the 
toponymic policy implemented in the Diercke series of atlases between 1974 and 
2006 were very minor. ‘Karl-Marx-Stadt’ (1974) has been replaced with 
‘Chemnitz’ (2006), and L’viv which had been labelled ‘Lemberg (Lwow)’ in 
1974, has been updated to ‘Lemberg (Lwiw)’ by 2006.586 There are no changes to 
Polish toponyms.587  
The differences between the Putzger Historischer Weltatlas (2011) and its 
1974 counterpart are, by contrast, more pronounced. In the 1974 version, the 
cartography team favoured the consistent use of German allonyms on all historical 
maps, only using local allonyms where no German ones were available. This 
policy even extended to the inclusion of the rarely encountered ‘Lodsch’ for 
Polish Łódź.588 However, whereas this policy had been applied throughout Poland 
and the rest of Europe in the 1974 version, the 2011 version implements a 
significantly different toponymic policy for the ZO and Kresy. Polish allonyms 
are now included in brackets after the German allonyms throughout the ZO. Place 
names in the Kresy are rendered in Polish but without diacriticals. Kaliningrad, 
which had been labelled only ‘Königsberg’ in 1974, is shown as ‘Kaliningrad 
(Königsberg)’ in 2011. 589  Overall, this atlas adopts a toponymic policy with 
respect to former German territories that is more similar to contemporary British 
atlases than to the 2006 version of the German Diercke Weltatlas. This suggests 
that the toponymic decisions evident in cartographic representations of 
historically contested regions, such as the ZO, can no longer be taken as a proxy 
for shared national narratives. Instead, they reflect the more specific worldview of 
the publishing house and the cartography team.  
Irrespective of its historical aspirations, the Atlas historii Polski (2011) 
uses modern Polish allonyms wherever these exist, and completely omits all 
                                                 
585 Bömelburg, H.-J., et al., Vertreibung aus dem Osten: Deutsche und Polen erinnern sich, trans. Marta Faas, et al., 
Zeitzeugnisse (Olsztyn: Stowarzyszenie Wspólnota Kulturowa "Borussia", 2006), p. 8. 
586 Both Lwow and Lwiw are modified versions of Lwów (Polish) and L’viv (Ukrainian) respectively. The toponymic 
decision in 1974 appears to have memorialised the city’s recent Polish past, whereas the policy in 2006 was to respect the 
current ontological situation in which the city was Ukrainian. 
587 Diercke, C., et al., Diercke Weltatlas; Sang, P., et al., Diercke Weltatlas. 
588 Lodz / Lods in: Scobel, A., et al., Andrees Allgemeiner Handatlas; Łódź in: Diercke, C., et al., Diercke Weltatlas; Łódź 
in: Akademie der Wissenschaften der DDR (Berlin Ost) Kommission zur Herausgabe des Atlas DDR, Atlas DDR; Łódź in: 
Sang, P., et al., Diercke Weltatlas; Łódź in: Bruckmüller, E., et al., Putzger Historischer Weltatlas. 
589 Diercke, C., et al., Diercke Weltatlas, pp. 138-41; Bruckmüller, E., et al., Putzger Historischer Weltatlas, pp. 208-09. 
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historical toponyms, including older versions of Polish toponyms.590 Whilst the 
general policy appears to be non-political, it actually distorts the historical record 
in some interesting ways. For example, a map showing the defensive positions of 
the Polish forces during the September Campaign (1939) includes a vast swathe 
of what was then still Germany in which Polish toponyms are used for all places 
and waterways as per the general policy. However, rather than using ‘Białogród’, 
which was the contemporary Polish allonym for the German ‘Belgard’, the 
cartographers have chosen to use the modern ‘Białogard’, a toponym invented 
after the end of WWII (see above). 591  This practice of ahistorical naming is 
applied throughout the atlas, regardless of the time period represented on any 
given map. German ‘Bunzlau’, for example, is consistently referred to by its 
modern Polish allonym ‘Bolesławiec’ even on a map that shows information 
about the national economy in the Commonwealth during the sixteenth century.592 
At that time, the only Polish allonym for this place was ‘Bolesłiec’.593 
 
5.5 Concluding Remarks 
The most important strategies employed in the postwar toponymic re-inscription 
of Schlesien as Śląsk involved the cataloguing of existing etymologically Slavic or 
Polish toponyms in the ZO, the extension of these to nearby places for which no 
such Slavic allonyms existed, and transferring the names of the places of origin of 
the majority of settlers to their new homes in German Silesia. The first of these 
strategies had already begun in the pre-war era and was carried on by the IZ, 
primarily for ideological reasons, and by the RABNR for more pragmatic reasons 
to do with train scheduling. The decision was taken at the First Onomastic 
Conference in Szczecin to use the Dictionary of Geographical Names of the 
Kingdom of Poland and Other Slavic Lands (1880-1902) and the Atlas of 
Geographical Names of Western Slavs (1934-1937) as the main sources for 
historical Slavic toponyms. The IZ published its toponymic decisions in gazetteers 
such as The Pocket Dictionary of Place Names (1945). Another decision, taken 
                                                 
590 Jankowiak-Konik, B., et al., Atlas historii Polski. 
591 Anon., Mapa Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej; Anon., Western Poland 1953; Jankowiak-Konik, B., et al., Atlas historii Polski, 
pp. 128-29. 
592 Jankowiak-Konik, B., et al., Atlas historii Polski, p. 34. 
593 Prussia, C. b. F. I. o., 'Polish Names for Places in German Silesia in 1750'. 
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during the same onomastic conference, to avoid the translation or transliteration of 
German names into Polish remained largely aspirational. 
The extent to which the postwar toponymic situation in the ZO took 
account of the linguistic, cultural and political needs and aspirations of minority 
groups was minimal. On the contrary, the conference delegates aspired to 
linguistic and cultural homogenisation throughout Poland. This objective was 
easiest to achieve in the ZO, which the delegates treated as a blank canvas in 
terms of cultural inscription. One of the most controversial decisions taken in the 
course of the First Onomastic Conference was to expunge traces of non-standard 
dialects in Polish toponyms. Wherever several historic Slavic allonyms were 
attested for a given place, the delegates agreed to adopt whichever one was closest 
to modern Polish as the official place name. 
The toponymic situation in the ZO has influenced the overall discourse 
concerning the Flucht und Vertreibung of Germans from the ZO and its 
resettlement by Poles relocated from the Kresy in some interesting ways. The 
TRJN’s toponymic practice in the region supported a historical narrative in which 
the majority of the native population were categorised as non natives and only a 
minority (the autochthones) were classed as Poles, although, as explained above, 
even these were subject to certain restrictions in terms of their linguistic practice. 
This narrative, which I have called the ‘Piast Formula’, enabled the framing of the 
annexation of German territory and the expulsion of the German natives as a post-
colonial endeavour. The TRJN’s toponymic reinscription of the area, especially 
the elevation of existing Polish allonyms to the only officially permitted place 
names at the same time as prohibiting the use of German allonyms anywhere in 
the region, lent credence to this narrative. Essentially, this narrative of a post-
colonial re-conquest worked at the ontological level: either Germany had 
originally occupied the territories included in the ZO as part of a colonial 
enterprise – the infamous Drang nach Osten – or they had not. Important 
stakeholder collectives, such as the BdV, spent much the postwar era publishing 
historical texts that countered this version of history. Others, notably the Deutsch-
polnische Schulbuchkommission (1972-ongoing) sought to work within the 
constraints of the general narrative. Following the Görlitzer Vertrag (1950) and 
more so after the Treaty of Warsaw (1970), it became increasingly anachronistic 
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for Germans to use German allonyms in relation to the ZO in a post-1945 context. 
This introduced the concept of ‘political correctness’ into the relevant collective 
memory discourse, whereby the use of German allonyms in relation to places 
within the ZO was taken to indicate a right-wing revanchist mentality. 
There are a number of discernible differences between the prevailing 
toponymic situations in Poland, and the ZO in particular, during the postwar and 
post-Wende periods, particularly following Poland’s accession to the EU in 2004. 
For example, the impact of the decision taken at First Onomastic Conference in 
Szczecin in 1945 to expunge traces of non-standard dialects in Polish place names 
has been lessened by certain provisions set out in the Act on National and Ethnic 
Minorities and on the Regional Language (2005). By contrast with the TRJN’s 
aspiration for linguistic and cultural homogeneity, this act allows for the use of 
traditional toponyms, etymologically rooted in minority languages, in addition to 
Polish toponyms. Moreover, the Polish authorities currently recognise seven 
different dialect groups including Silesian (sometimes known as Wasserpolnisch), 
with its German substrate, and nine national minorities, including Germans.594  
Thus, the current linguistic and toponymic situation in Poland is 
considerably more pluralistic, tolerant, and inclusive than it had been in the 
postwar period, the effect of which within the collective memory discourse under 
discussion has been to lessen the political implications of toponymic choice. This 
development is most evident in the way it has been reflected in the relevant 
literature. Until recently, most authors interested in supporting the status quo, or at 
least not openly challenging it, habitually used German allonyms up to and 
including 1945 and Polish allonyms after that, thereby conforming to the 
strictures of ‘political correctness’. At the same time, however, as the example I 
quoted from Leonie Ossowski demonstrates, this chronological toponymic usage 
was often problematized within the narrative of a given piece of literature. This 
practice has changed since the Wende. German authors, such as Sabrina Janesch, 
are currently flouting this convention and, whilst this change has not gone 
unnoticed in the German press, it is generally being greeted as a sign of 
normalisation as the article in Der Spiegel: Geschichte quoted above 
                                                 
594 Within the current discourse the term ‘Wasserpolnisch’ can be considered to have pejorative connotations although 
these bear no relation to the characteristics of this dialect from a purely linguistic perspective and often obscure its socio-
historic origins. In the current context I use the term, with caveats, in order to differentiate between this Polish-Czech 
dialect, and the German Silesian dialect spoken throughout the region until 1945.  
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demonstrates.595 Some Polish authors, such as Olga Tokarczuk, appear to accept 
the use of German toponyms for minor towns and cities in the ZO but to insist on 
the Polish toponym for important metropolises like Wrocław. Others, for 
example, Joanna Bator, take the opposite approach and prefer German ‘Breslau’ 
even in modern settings, but the official Polish toponyms for less important places 
in the ZO. Other authors, German and Polish, have used allonyms from a third 
language, often Latin, in order to avoid naming a place either by its German or 
Polish allonym. 
As a rule, translators have tended to adopt precisely the same naming 
strategy as their authors. This has, on occasion, introduced an inadvertent 
foreignising effect into the texts in question. By following Tokarczuk’s use of the 
– for her Polish readers – familiar ‘Wrocław’, Antonia Lloyd-Jones, for example, 
has actually introduced an unfamiliar, foreignising element in her translation of 
Dom dzienny, dom nocny, from the perspective of Anglophone readers. At the 
same time, her decision implies the untranslatability of ‘Wrocław’, whereas it is 
eminently translatable as ‘Breslau’. However, Esther Kinsky’s decision to follow 
Joanna Bator in her use of ‘Breslau’ but Polish toponyms for all other places in 
the ZO is equally problematic, if not more so, as it foreignises all toponyms in the 
former German territories except ‘Breslau’. By attempting to avoid the potential 
political ramifications of making specific place-name choices appropriate for an 
Anglophone readership, both translators have treated the relevant text sections as 
non-translatable insertions. Rather than playing down the importance of allonymic 
choice in relation to this region, this strategy has highlighted it as an unresolved 
issue. To this extent, the toponymic reinscription of the ZO continues to leave 
traces in literature despite the fact that it is no longer considered a prominent or 
emotive issue within the relevant collective memory / historical discourse. 
The reaction of Polish, German and other cartographers to Poland’s 
annexation and resettlement of parts of Germany in 1945 and to the TRJN’s 
toponymic re-inscription of the ZO has been complex. On the whole, is true to say 
that political developments in relation to the Polish frontiers and other postwar 
geo-political configurations, such as the establishment of two ideologically 
                                                 
595 Sabrina Janesch is half-German, half-Polish. Her mother grew up on a farm in (Polish) Lower Silesia where her 
maternal grandfather was forced to resettle after being driven out of East Galicia by Ukrainian nationalists. See: Janesch, 
S., 03.02.2013, Autobiographical Content in the Novel 'Katzenberge' (Email). 
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opposing blocs during the Cold War, have been reflected in the mapping of the 
ZO by cartographers around the world. However, the cartographic products 
analysed above demonstrate that the reaction of cartographers and publishing 
houses to political developments within the region have been slow and uneven. 
Whilst the majority of these maps and atlases do treat the ZO differently to other 
parts of the world, in many cases, certainly outside of the immediate stakeholder 
nations (Germany, Poland, and the USSR), it is difficult to reconcile these 
differences with the overt political alignments one expects to see in the context of 
the Cold War.  
In the immediate postwar era, Polish cartographers played a leading role in 
establishing the Piast Formula as a rationale for the annexation of parts of 
Germany. They attended peace conferences to defend Poland’s western frontier 
and were involved in the resettlement and regional planning of the ZO. This 
ideological orientation is reflected in the their cartographic output. The Atlas 
Polski (1953), for example, presents an overtly politicised view of the region, 
omitting any reference to the de jure status of the ZO and depicting the situation 
as if the annexation had been accepted and ratified when in fact it was still 
challenged by the FRG. It also expunges non-Polish Slavic allonyms attested in 
earlier documents, such as Polskie-nazwy śląskich miejscowosci z patentu 
Fryderyka II (1750) and maps such as Mapa Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (1934). 
The (Polish) Pergamon World Atlas (1968), presents a similarly confident view of 
the region, with nothing to indicate or acknowledge West German territorial 
aspirations and claims. It continues to refer to the annexed territories as the 
‘recovered territories’ and refers to the Oder-Neisse Line as Poland’s western 
border, with no comments or caveats. In addition, it shows only Polish toponyms 
for the – from a de jure perspective at the date of publication – still German towns 
in the ZO. A decade later, and in an apparent rejection of the spirit of détente 
taking hold within the wider collective memory discourse following the signing of 
the Treaty of Warsaw in 1970, the Narodowy Atlas Polski (1978) is aggressively 
assertive about Poland’s annexation of the ZO. The editors’ decision to refer to 
the ‘recovery of the western and northern territories’ (my italics) can be 
interpreted as a conscious rejection of German attempts to normalise the postwar 
situation. More recently, the Atlas historii Polski (2011) uses modern Polish 
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allonyms wherever these exist. This approach distorts the historical record in 
some interesting ways, for example by failing to reinstate those non-Polish 
toponyms expunged during the most zealous phase of the TRJN’s toponymic 
reinscription of the ZO.  
Soviet atlases, such as the The World Atlas (1967) depicted Eastern and 
Western Europe in simple terms throughout the Cold War era. This volume shows 
all de facto postwar borders as if they already had de jure status, despite 
outstanding claims on the part of the FRG. Similarly, it shows only Polish names 
for all towns and cities in postwar Poland, neither including historically attested 
German nor Russian alternatives. The East German Übersichtskarte Deutsche 
Demokratische Republik und Westdeutschland (1966) is staunchly in line with the 
Soviet worldview. The few Silesian places shown on the map, for example, all 
bear Polish toponyms only despite the fact that the map was produced for the 
German market. Another East German example, the Atlas Deutsche 
Demokratische Republik (1981) is similarly rooted in Cold War rhetoric. 
However, this uncompromising stance is tempered slightly by the fact that all 
place names are shown in (postwar) local languages only, suggesting a non-
confrontational aspiration (but see my analysis above). 
West German cartographers were slow to react to the new de jure situation 
following the signing of the Treaty of Warsaw in 1970. Two years earlier, the 
Deutscher General Atlas (1968) had labelled the Oder-Neisse Line as a 
‘Verwaltungsgrenze’ and the ZO as ‘z. Zt. unter polnischer Verwaltung’. From a 
West German perspective, these explanatory notes correctly reflect the de jure 
situation at the time of publication. However, the decision to use only the German 
allonyms for all places and topographic features in formerly German territories 
strikes one as provocative given the developing political rapprochement taking 
place at the time (the Treaty of Warsaw was the culmination of several years’ of 
highly publicised Ostpolitik led by Willy Brandt and Egon Bahr, inter alia). The 
Historischer Weltatlas, published in West Berlin in 1974, is even more striking in 
its omission of Polish allonyms anywhere within the ZO. The editors also include 
text about the recent historical situation in relation to Poland’s frontiers, which 
they do not include for other regions similarly affected by recent territorial 
changes. Whilst this may simply reflect the difficulty and expense involved in 
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obtaining updated plates, the idea is unconvincing as such plates were readily 
available at the time. The West German Diercke Weltatlas (1974), for example, 
already includes updated plates. In every case, the modern German allonym 
appears first followed by the local allonym in brackets, and the atlas generally 
appears to reflect the de jure geo-political situation in Central Europe. However, 
the cartography team’s unique treatment of the two allonyms ‘Breslau’ and 
‘Wrocław’ (see above) and the unexplained inclusion of the pre-Treaty-of-
Warsaw frontier as asserted by the FRG disrupt the implied narrative of 
acceptance of the status quo. Thus, until the mid 1970s, traces of the ongoing 
collective memory discourse pertaining to Poland’s annexation of parts of 
Germany in 1945 and the concomittant expulsions and toponymic reinscription of 
the region, can be discerned in West German maps. This is no longer the case in 
more recent German atlases such as the Diercke Weltatlas (2006), which 
implements a consistent toponymic strategy for all areas around the world 
including Poland and the ZO. Wherever a German allonym exists it is used as the 
principal identifier with local allonyms following in brackets. There are no 
exceptions. 
Cartographic artefacts produced beyond the region immediately affected 
by Poland’s postwar frontier changes do not reflect any consistent national bias. 
Were these products consistently aligned, for example, with the Cold War fronts, 
then one would expect to observe a preference for the de jure situation as 
understood by the FRG at the time of publication. Instead, one gets the impression 
that a certain amount of confusion existed among the Western Allies about the 
current status of Poland’s frontiers at any given time. In France, the Atlas général 
(1959) follows the Russian and Polish approach in showing the postwar border 
situation with no additional commentary, thus suggesting an acceptance of the 
Görlitzer Vertrag and a de jure permance of the situation that would not actually 
obtain until 1970. Another French atlas published just four years later presents an 
entirely different worldview. In the French Atlas of Western Europe (1963), 
Poland’s current borders are drawn in a line-type labelled in the legend as ‘de 
facto boundaries in Central and Eastern Europe’. Germany and Poland are still 
depicted in their pre-war configurations with de facto borders superimposed to 
show the territorial extent of postwar Poland. This does not suggest any 
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recognition of the likely permanence of the situation or of the Görlitzer Vertrag. 
The situation is similarly contradictory among Anglophone cartographers. 
Hammond’s World Atlas (1948) includes relevant information about the 
difference between the de facto and de jure status of the ZO, but also some 
potentially misleading information that seems to indicate the permanence of the 
situation. Poland is the only country in which Anglophone allonyms are 
completely absent, suggesting its special status in the minds of the cartographers. 
A map of Central Europe including the Balkan States (1951) by National 
Geographic Society includes German/Anglophone allonyms for all places within 
the ZO, but not for other places in Poland, indicating that the ZO is, in fact, 
different to the rest of Poland (the FRG view). The Citizen's Atlas of the World 
(1952), by contrast depicts Poland’s postwar frontiers as international boundaries, 
which corresponds to the GDR’s worldview, not that of the FRG. However, the 
map of Western and Central Europe is overlayed with a thick yellow line labelled 
‘1938 Boundary of Germany’, suggesting the continuing importance of this fact. 
Thirty years later the Philips’ New Practical Atlas (1981) is highly inconsistent in 
its use of allonyms. For example, Kaliningrad, Śląsk, and Wrocław are all 
included in both their local and English/German versions. However, only the 
modern Polish allonyms are given for minor former German towns, such as 
Waldenburg (Wałbrzych). Moving forward a decade and a half, the Dorling 
Kindersley World Atlas (1997) implements a general policy of using local 
allonyms as the main toponymic identifier followed by the relevant English 
allonym in brackets throughout the world except for the ZO, where only the 
Polish allonyms are used. The Reader's Digest Illustrated Atlas of the World 
(1997) takes a very similar approach, but differentiates between former German 
territory annexed by Poland and by Russia. For example, the general policy would 
have required Wrocław (Breslau), whereas the Polish allonym alone is used. By 
contrast, Russian allonyms are used in conjunction with English allonyms in 
northern East Prussia: e.g., Kaliningrad (Königsberg). Only local allonyms are 
used throughout the Kresy. Another fifteen years later, the Times Desktop Atlas 
(2012) also diverges from its general naming policy for all areas annexed and lost 
by Poland in 1945. Their general policy stipulates the use of the English allonym 
first followed by the local variant in brackets. However, only the local allonym 
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(Polish or Russian) is used in historically German areas, whilst the pattern is 
reversed in the Kresy.  
What this analysis reveals is that, even recent cartographic products 
created far away from the region in question and, in the final example, published a 
full 67 years after the annexation of, expulsions from, resettlement in and 
toponymic reinscription of the ZO, the concomitant collective memory discourse 
has left its trace, however faint. There remains a broad potential for future 
research in this area as it is by no means obvious in which specific cases 
seemingly politically-motivated decisions, or those which are amenable to 
interpretation within the discourse in question, are taken in response to political 
pressures to conform to a certain narrative or are the result of an unconscious 
acceptance of dominant cultural paradigms or, alternatively, reflect economic 
concerns. It is highly likely that at least a subset of all cases examined will be the 
result of a combination of several or all of these factors.  
In the next two chapters, I turn to Polish and German literature to track the 
relevant discourse in one of its more explicit modes. 
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6: Festung Breslau in German Literature 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter addresses the contribution of literature and the study of literature to 
specific collective memory discourses and analyses. The novels I analyse in this 
chapter are representative of a genre to which I shall refer in the following 
discussion as ‘quasi-autobiographical novels’, which I define and justify below 
(Section 6.3). In addition, they were produced by authors who were eye-witnesses 
to the events they describe in the novels, but who, at the time of writing, lived in 
separate German states (the FRG and GDR respectively) and were therefore 
exposed to divergent official narratives concerning wartime events and questions 
concerning German guilt and victimhood, particularly in relation to the Flucht 
und Vertreibung of Germans from Poland. As such, I argue, they are illuminating 
from the point of view of assessing literary reflections of these events in different 
stakeholder communities.596 In particular, I seek to explore the ways in which 
different socio-political conditions constrain and influence the production of 
literary contributions to collective memory discourses on Flucht und Vertreibung, 
and how and to what extent literature contributes to collective memory discourses 
and the establishment of hegemonic historical narratives.597 Before moving on to 
these questions, however, I shall briefly examine some of the ways in which 
German armed forces directly contributed towards the acute symmetric trauma in 
Lower Silesia that triggered the collective memory discourse with which this 
thesis is concerned. The events in question occurred in Breslau in 1945 and, 
unlike the majority of German narratives of Flucht und Vertreibung, whether 
presented as literature or historiography, involved German victims of German 
perpetrators. 
 
  
                                                 
596 In the following chapter I broaden my analysis to take in relevant examples of Polish literature pertaining to the same 
events, but in the current chapter I am solely concerned with the pre-Wende German-German discourse on Flucht und 
Vertreibung. 
597 For a definition of the term ‘hegemonic historical narrative’, see the Introduction, Section 1.1. 
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6.2 Acute Symmetric Trauma 
 
6.2.1 Breslau 1944 
Compared with other German cities, Breslau in Lower Silesia had been relatively 
safe until late 1944. Military discipline had been lax and the atmosphere calm.598 
The city had been considered so secure that, when author Hugo Hartung 
evacuated his family from Silesia prior to the Soviet invasion, his comrades teased 
him mercilessly for his seemingly unnecessary caution.599 But around the same 
time Gauleiter Karl August Hanke, who had been in possession of far more 
detailed information about the military situation, had secretly moved his valuables 
to his chalet near Rosenheim in Upper Bavaria.600 Indeed, the security situation 
changed dramatically when Hitler designated Breslau as one of a number of future 
Festungen in the Autumn of 1944 (Unternehmen Bartold).601 Each of these was to 
be defended ‘to the last man’ against the expected onslaught of the Red Army. 
Accordingly, Breslau was prepared for a lengthy siege. Regular troops who 
happened to be in the city, either on convalescent leave or as members of the rear 
echelons, were formed into a defensive garrison. This was augmented by the 
Volkssturm, a people’s militia made up of adolescents and old men. 602  The 
Volkssturm was officially launched on the 18th of October in line with a ‘Führer 
Erlass’ issued on the 25th of September. The Lower Silesian Volkssturm was 
sworn in by Hanke in Breslau two days later.603 
Due to the fact that up to 73% of Breslauers lived in the densely built-up 
town centre, they were particularly vulnerable to attack from the air or by ballistic 
armaments and airborne ordnance. Its precarious situation became apparent to all 
when it suffered its first significant air attacks on the 13th of September and the 7th 
of October (by the US Air Force).604  
  
                                                 
598 Hartung, H., Schlesien 1944/45: Aufzeichnungen und Tagebücher (Munich: DTV, 1976 [1956]), p. 1; Kriwat, K., Der 
andere Holocaust, p. 33. 
599 Hartung, H., Schlesien 1944/45, pp. 40-41. 
600 Siebel-Achenbach, S., Lower Silesia from Nazi Germany to Communist Poland, p. 30. 
601 Hartung, H., Schlesien 1944/45, p. 13. 
602 Thum, G., Uprooted, p. xxi. 
603 Hitler, A., Der Führer Erlass über die Bildung des Deutschen Volkssturmes, (Wels: Joh. Haas, 1944); Hartung, H., 
Schlesien 1944/45, p. 26; Siebel-Achenbach, S., Lower Silesia from Nazi Germany to Communist Poland, pp. 27-29. 
604 Hartung, H., Schlesien 1944/45, p. 20; Siebel-Achenbach, S., Lower Silesia from Nazi Germany to Communist Poland, 
pp. 23, 29. 
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6.2.2 Breslau 1945 
The Red Army offensive against Germany began on the 12th of January 1945. 
Soviet forces crossed into Silesia on the 19th of January, reaching the Oder to the 
north and south of Breslau on the 22nd of January.605 At that time, the population 
of Lower Silesia was 4,700,000 which included some 450,000 ethnic German 
refugees from the Warthegau and the General Government. A recent influx of 
refugees into Breslau had swelled the city’s population from 626,000 to around 
1,000,000 people.606  
The Red Army bombed Breslau for the first time on the 18th of January.607 
The resident population immediately began to flee westwards and south towards 
the Sudeten Mountains. Officially, only those living on the eastern bank of the 
Oder were permitted to leave their homes, of whom some 700,000 succeeded in 
crossing over to the western bank between the 19th and 25th of January.608 It was 
during this period, on the 22nd of January, that Breslau was officially declared a 
Festung.609 By an unfortunate twist of fate, thousands of Silesian refugees who 
had fled across the Lausitzer Neiße into Saxony, were subsequently killed during 
the Allied bombing of Dresden on the 13th and 14th of February, just one day 
before the Red Army succeeded in fully isolating Breslau.610  
The Red Army had fully encircled the city by the 15th of February.611 At 
that time, there were still some 150,000 to 250,000 German civilians left in the 
city, as well as non-Germans including prisoners of war (PoWs), forced labourers 
and concentration camp inmates. In addition, the city was home to between 
45,000 to 50,000 soldiers (i.e., trained adult soldiers and members of the 
Volkssturm).612 
                                                 
605 Peikert, P., "Festung Breslau" in den Berichten eines Pfarrers, pp. 23-24, 28-32; Hartung, H., Schlesien 1944/45, p. 38; 
Bahlcke, J., et al., Schlesien und die Schlesier, p. 164; Thum, G., Uprooted, p. xxi. 
606 Bahlcke, J., et al., Schlesien und die Schlesier, p. 163. 
607 Peikert, P., "Festung Breslau" in den Berichten eines Pfarrers, p. 24. 
608 Bahlcke, J., et al., Schlesien und die Schlesier, p. 164. 
609 Hartung, H., Schlesien 1944/45, p. 44. 
610 Peikert, P., "Festung Breslau" in den Berichten eines Pfarrers, p. 30; Bahlcke, J., et al., Schlesien und die Schlesier, p. 
165; Irving, D. J. C., Apocalypse 1945: The Destruction of Dresden (London: Focal Point Publications, 1995 [1963]). 
611 Peikert, P., "Festung Breslau" in den Berichten eines Pfarrers, pp. 51-52; Bahlcke, J., et al., Schlesien und die Schlesier, 
p. 165; Thum, G., Uprooted, p. xxii. 
612 Thum, G., Uprooted, p. xxii. 
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On the 1st of April, the Red Army Air Force began regular blanket 
bombing runs on the city centre. 613  Nevertheless, terrorised by their NSDAP 
masters and terrified of the treatment they expected at the hands of the Red Army, 
the besieged population continued to defend Breslau even after Hitler’s suicide on 
the 30th of April and the surrender of Berlin on the 2nd of May.614 Breslau finally 
capitulated on the 6th of May, following talks with the attackers initiated under the 
aegis of some of the city’s leading Protestant and Catholic clerics.615 Wehrmacht 
General Hermann Niehoff signed the articles of surrender, in his capacity as 
Festungskommandant of Breslau, whilst Gauleiter Hanke had fled the city by 
light aircraft earlier that day, and the Red Army took formal control of the city.616  
Of those who remained in, or had been forced to return to, Breslau 
following failed attempts to break through the Soviet lines, 400,000 had been 
killed in the fighting by the time the town surrendered on the 6th of May. At this 
point, around 70% of the city’s infrastructure had been destroyed as the result of 
Soviet bombardments and measures taken by the German authorities to clear their 
field of fire. Most of the regular military personnel caught within the city were 
transported to the USSR as PoWs. The Soviet and Polish authorities had expelled 
about 27,000 of the remaining civilians by the 5th of December 1945.617  
 
6.2.3 NSDAP Actions Against German Civilians 
A review of actions carried out against German civilians during the Siege of 
Breslau by Gauleiter Hanke (Wehrmacht Oberleutnant a.D., and SS 
Obergruppenführer) is particularly illuminating in relation to perpetrator-victim 
discourses and notions of ‘good Germans’ versus ‘bad Germans’.618 Hanke had 
been appointed Oberpräsident and Gauleiter of Lower Silesia on the 14th of 
January 1941.619  Hanke’s behaviour prior to and during the Siege of Breslau 
confounds simplistic narratives propounded by some stakeholders during the 
                                                 
613 Peikert, P., "Festung Breslau" in den Berichten eines Pfarrers, pp. 111-12; Hartung, H., Schlesien 1944/45, p. 77; 
Thum, G., Uprooted, p. xxviii. 
614 Thum, G., Uprooted, p. xxviii. 
615 Gleiss, H., Breslauer Apokalypse 1945. Dokumentarchronik vom Todeskampf und Untergang einer deutschen Stadt und 
Festung am Ende des Zweiten Weltkrieges (Rosenheim Obb: Natura et Patria, 1986).Vols. 1-7 & Hartung, H., Schlesien 
1944/45, pp. 89-90. 
616 Thum, G., Uprooted, p. xxix. 
617 Bahlcke, J., et al., Schlesien und die Schlesier, pp. 165-66. 
618 ‘a.D.’ = außer Dienst = ‘ex’, ‘former’ or ‘retired’. 
619 Bahlcke, J., et al., Schlesien und die Schlesier, p. 161. 
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subsequent collective memory discourse, in which Germans and ethnic Germans 
have invariably been presented either as the victims of retaliations by Slavic 
forces, usually Soviet and Polish, or, equally problematically, as members of a 
‘perpetrator collective’.620  
The first of Hanke’s commands to directly affect the city’s civilian 
population was his order to construct the so-called Ostwall on the 10th of August 
1944.621 This enormous civil engineering project, consisting of a series of ditches 
intended to halt Soviet tanks, was undertaken by tens of thousands of German 
Lower Silesians whom he forced to work without remuneration, on pain of 
death.622 Five months later, he ordered the evacuation of non-combatants from 
Breslau on the 19th of January 1945, driving them out into ‘[den] verharschten 
Schnee [und den] scharfen, schneidenden Wind’. 623  This order was further 
clarified on the 20th of January 1945 with the amendment that ‘[alle] Frauen und 
Kinder verlassen sofort die Stadt Breslau zu Fuß’.624  Under the harsh winter 
conditions prevailing at the time, ‘[tens] of thousands [of Breslau’s women and 
children] either froze to death or died of exhaustion’ en route.625 Apparently, 
unmoved by their fate, Hanke (now promoted to Reichsverteidigungskommissar) 
issued another order on the 26th of January 1945 stating that:  
 
Frauen jeden Alters sowie männliche Jugendliche unter 16 
Jahren und Männer über 60 Jahre haben das Stadtgebiet von 
Breslau zu verlassen!626 
 
Again, he demanded that they leave Breslau on foot, regardless of the 
inclement weather conditions. The next day, he ordered women and children to 
evacuate all populated areas on the left-bank of the Oder but decreed that men 
were to remain at their homes.627 
Around 3-400,000 civilians, mostly elderly citizens, women and children 
left Breslau during this period. Men of fighting age (16-60) were forbidden, on 
                                                 
620 Niven, W. J., et al., Germans as Victims, p. 15. 
621 Siebel-Achenbach, S., Lower Silesia from Nazi Germany to Communist Poland, p. 27. 
622 Ibid. 
623 Peikert, P., "Festung Breslau" in den Berichten eines Pfarrers, p. 26; Hartung, H., Schlesien 1944/45, p. 41; Thum, G., 
Uprooted, p. xxii. 
624 Peikert, P., "Festung Breslau" in den Berichten eines Pfarrers, p. 26; Kriwat, K., Der andere Holocaust, p. 33. 
625 Thum, G., Uprooted, p. xxii. 
626 Hanke, K. A., Breslau, Anordnung zur Evakuierung (Poster). 
627  Hanke in the Schlesische Tageszeitung, January 27, 1945. Reproduced in: Peikert, P., "Festung Breslau" in den 
Berichten eines Pfarrers, p. 30. 
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pain of death, from deserting the town. Those who did, even if only to see their 
families to safety, were summarily and publically executed by firing squad in the 
market square, and on Hanke’s express orders. This was the fate of Wolfgang 
Spielhagen Mayor of Breslau. Hanke announced such executions on officially 
printed posters placed at prominent points around the city.628  
Another decree issued by the Special Plenipotentiary of the Army Group, 
(Wehrmacht) General Koch-Erpach, stated that as of the 2nd of February 1945, 
everybody over the age of ten years old still remaining in Breslau and not being a 
member of either the Wehrmacht or the Volksturm would require a proof of 
authority to remain in the town, which would only be issued by the NSDAP 
authorities.629 On the 7th of March 1945 the authorities decreed that everyone in 
the city, starting with boys aged ten and over, and girls over the age of twelve, 
would be obliged to carry out work ‘regardless of the dangers involved. Anyone 
who refused to work was shot on the spot’.630 Those who deserted their posts were 
dealt with severely by the NSDAP.631  
Thus, decisions taken by the NSDAP (Hitler, Hanke) and implemented 
with the aid of the Wehrmacht (Niehoff, Koch-Erpach) resulted directly in the 
death and injury of German civilians. However, it is precisely this type of 
complex detail, which is often omitted from black-and-white accounts of WWII 
and/or the Vertreibungen, in which ‘Germans’ are represented as an 
undifferentiated collective, either of perpetrators or of victims. Moreover, this 
episode in German history represents an example of the kind of acute symmetric 
trauma that often triggers long-term collective memory discourses. Accordingly, it 
has spawned a rich literature comprising life writing and historical fiction to 
which I now turn. 
 
  
                                                 
628 See announcement concerning the execution by firing squad of Dr. Spielhagen on on January 28, 1945. Published in the 
Schlesische Tageszeitung on January 29, 1945. Reproduced in: ibid. p. 37; See announcement concerning the execution by 
firing squad of Dr. Sommers in the Schlesische Tageszeitung on February 01, 1945. Reproduced in: ibid. p. 38. 
629 Koch-Erpach in the Schlesische Tageszeitung, January 31, 1945. Reproduced in: ibid. p. 30. 
630  See decree signed by Gauleiter Hanke and Festungskommandant Niehoff on March 07, 1945, stipulating the 
introduction of forced labour for all male residents of Breslau over the age of ten years and females over the age of twelve 
years. reproduced in: ibid. p. 147; Thum, G., Uprooted, p. xxv. 
631 See appeal to the population of Breslau to denounce deserters to the authorities, published by Festungskommandant 
Niehoff on March 21, 1945 in the Schlesische Tageszeitung and Frontzeitung der Festung Breslau. Reproduced in: Peikert, 
P., "Festung Breslau" in den Berichten eines Pfarrers, p. 167. 
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6.3 Key Texts and Authors 
This chapter is centred on a comparison between two key texts by eyewitnesses to 
the siege and fall of Breslau: Der Himmel war unten (1951) by Hugo Andreas 
Hartung, and Schlesisches Himmelreich (1968) by Hildegard Maria Rauchfuss.632 
These novels were published in completely different socio-political conditions, as 
the authors lived and wrote in the Federal Republic of Germany (Hartung) and 
German Democratic Republic (Rauchfuss), and were therefore subject to 
divergent official narratives about the fall of Breslau and the loss of German 
Silesia to Poland. In addition, the two authors were each working under a different 
set of socio-political constraints (see below). Nevertheless, both novels directly 
address the German-German expulsions in the lead up to the Siege of Breslau and 
can be productively compared and contrasted in this context.633 The results of 
such a close comparative reading are particularly informative in relation to 
postwar collective memory discourse in the two German states. Moreover, such a 
German-German (i.e., FRG v. GDR) comparison directly addresses the 
particularities of literature-based discourse. By focusing on the similarities and 
differences between shared topoi in the works of East and West German authors, 
my analysis specifically illuminates the contribution literature can make to the 
creation of hegemonic historical narratives, as accepted within a specific socio-
cultural space, toward which, as I contend, collective memory discourse is 
ultimately directed. 
Hugo Hartung’s oeuvre bridges the gap between academic History, life 
writing, and the short story. In this chapter, I am primarily concerned with his 
novel Der Himmel war unten, which has been described as a ‘Roman zwischen 
Dichtung und Reportage’.634 This text is a literary reworking of Hartung’s own 
experiences during the siege of Breslau. He documented these in a set of diaries, 
which he later published under the title Schlesien 1944/45: Aufzeichnungen und 
Tagebücher (1956). These diaries represent an important historical source for the 
                                                 
632 Hartung, H., Der Himmel war unten; Rauchfuss, H. M., Schlesisches Himmelreich (Leipzig: Paul List, 1968). An 
alternative spelling of 'Rauchfuss' that one frequently encounters is 'Rauchfuß'. Throughout this thesis I adhere to the 
former, simply because that is the spelling reproduced in the specific edition of the novel in question to which I refer. 
633 Further reasons for my selection of these two specific texts are provided in the relevant sections below. 
634  Grözinger, W., Panorama des internationalen Gegenwartsromans: Gesammelte "Hochland"-Kritiken 1952-1965 
(Paderborn: Schoeningh, 2004), p. 51. 
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Siege of Breslau, and have been used as such by historians.635 As a glance at my 
footnotes will reveal, along with the diaries of the Reverend Paul Peikert, 
Hartung’s diaries are one of my main sources for the specific events in 
question.636 They are particularly informative in relation to the experiences of 
military personnel during the siege.  
Having earned a PhD in literary studies at the Ludwig-Maximilians-
Universität in Munich in 1928, Hartung embarked on a career encompassing the 
performing arts and literature.637 As of 1929 he wrote satirical pieces for the 
magazines Simplicissimus, Jugend, Stachelschwein, Querschnitt, and other satirist 
publications, under the Pseudonym ‘N. Dymion’. 638  He also worked as a 
dramatist, storyteller, author of radio dramas, novels, short stories and historical 
reference works.639 These activities brought him to the attention of the NSDAP 
censor who had begun to interfere in the freedom of artists and theatre directors as 
early as the 30th of January 1933 demanding, for example, that the latter adhere to 
a ‘zeitgenössischen Spielplan’.640 The result was falling visitor numbers which 
caused many producers to concentrate on those classics which were both 
ideologically sound (from an NSDAP perspective) and entertaining to the 
public.641 Hartung resisted this trend and his career as an author was temporarily 
halted in 1936 when the NSDAP forbade him to write.642 This act of censorship 
was the result of an accumulation of minor infringements against NSDAP 
                                                 
635 Kempowski, for example quotes three of Hartung's diary entries in: Kempowski, W., Das Echolot: Abgesang '45: ein 
kollektives Tagebuch (Munich: Random House, 2005), pp. 85-87.These entries cover April 20, 25, and 28, 1945 
respectively. Kempowski mistakenly reproduces Hartung's diary entry from April 28, 1945 under the date April 30, 1945. 
636 Peikert’s diaries were published in 2004 by, and with introductory comments by, Karol Jonca and Alfred Konieczny 
under the title "Festung Breslau" in den Berichten eines Pfarrers: 22. Januar bis 6. Mai 1945. 
637 Stein, C., 03.02.2013, Hugo Hartung at LMU Munich (Email). 
638 Anon., Deutsche National Bibliothek [Online], <http://www.dnb.de/DE/Home/home_node.html>, Accessed on: 
02.02.2013; Dymion, N., 'Münchner Bakeriana, Frühling über München, Princes go to Germany!, Verbrecher in München, 
Schollensport, Faschings-Season, Warum Zangerls nicht mehr "Husch-Husch" sagen, & Segen der Rationalisierung', in 
Simplicissimus, (Stuttgart: Albert Langen und Th. Heine, 1931).Volumes and editions: 33 [49, 52], 34 [12, 39, 44, 46], 35 
[39], 36 [19] at pp. 634, 678, 137-138, 477-478, 534-535, 561-563, 464, 223-224 respectively; Stein, C., Hugo Hartung at 
LMU Munich; Munzinger, E., Munizinger: Wissen, das zählt, 
<http://www.munzinger.de/search/portrait/Hugo+Hartung/0/8232.html>, Accessed on: 31.01.2014. 
639 Hartung was employed as a dramatic advisor to the Bayerischen Landesbühne (1928-1931), a radio editor in Munich 
(1931-1936) and principle dramatist at the Oldenburg State Theatre (1936-1940), before taking on the same role at the 
Städtischen Bühnen in Breslau in 1940. See: Hartung, H., Schlesien 1944/45, p. 1; Neumann, K.-H., Theater in Oldenburg: 
Wesen und Werden einer nordwestdeutschen Bühne (Oldenburg: Holzberg, 1982), pp. 141-43; Kempowski, W., Das 
Echolot: Abgesang '45, p. 464. 
640 Neumann, K.-H., Theater in Oldenburg: Wesen und Werden einer nordwestdeutschen Bühne, p. 135. 
641 Ibid. pp. 138-39. 
642 Steps, P., Hugo Hartung: Ein gebürtiger Netzschkauer wird 100 Jahre alt, <http://www.schloss-
netzschkau.de/Veranstaltungen/Popups/Hartung.htm>, Accessed on: 18.02.2013. 
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sensibilities, including ridiculing the future Führer in a 1929 edition of 
Simplicissimus.643  
At the age of 42, Hartung was drafted into the German forces in Breslau in 
1944, and was later thrown into the defence of the town with no military 
training.644 He was injured in the fighting and captured by the Red Army. During 
his time as a PoW, part of his diary was lost and never recovered.645 
The foregoing short biography contains three points of particular relevance 
for the current chapter. First, Hartung’s anti-NSDAP stance is important in the 
context of the ‘good Germans versus bad German’ topos (see below). Second, he 
witnessed the events in question as an active, adult participant and mature writer, 
and recorded them as they unfolded. His Aufzeichnungen und Tagebücher can, 
therefore, be considered a primary document for the relevant history (and are in 
fact used as such by historians). This fact is significant in respect of one of my 
research questions pertaining to the contribution of literature to collective memory 
discourses and the establishment of hegemonic historical narratives. The fact that 
Hartung based part of his literary oeuvre, including Der Himmel war unten, on a 
non-literary text he produced himself, to which historians refer for first-hand 
evidence, is a potent illustration of the multi-directionality of collective memory 
discourse. Viewed in this light, it is more appropriate to talk in terms of interstices 
and interfaces between literature and historiography rather than seeking to identify 
unambiguous differences. The third point of interest in Hartung’s biography is the 
gap in his contemporary record of events due to the loss of parts of his diary 
during his time in Soviet captivity. The missing diary entries cover the period 
from the 13th of December 1944 to the 19th of January 1945.646 This, together with 
differences between Hartung and the protagonist of Der Himmel war unten, which 
the author signals throughout the text (see below), demonstrates that, regardless of 
how convincing a given novel may be in terms of historical verisimilitude, it 
ought never to be treated as simply history disguised under a veneer of 
literariness. Moreover, it reveals the epigraph to Der Himmel war unten – ‘Mögen 
                                                 
643 In the article in question, Hartung described a ‘Hitolf Adler’ presenting the American exotic dancer Josephine Baker 
with a swastika-shaped cookie cutter after an appearance scheduled to take place the following year (February 15-19, 1930) 
at the Bürgerbräukeller in Munich. See: Dymion, N., 'Münchner Bakeriana', in Simplicissimus, (Stuttgart: Albert Langen 
und Th. Th. Heine, 1929), p. 634. 
644 Hartung, H., Schlesien 1944/45, p. 1. 
645 Ibid. pp. 1, 37-41; Kempowski, W., Das Echolot: Abgesang '45, p. 464. 
646 Hartung, H., Schlesien 1944/45, pp. 37-41. 
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andere es anders gesehen haben – ich sah es so ...’ – as, at least in part, a literary 
device, rather than an unambiguous statement by the author to the effect that the 
novel is based entirely on actual events.647 
The second author considered in this Chapter is Hildegard Maria 
Rauchfuss, who was born in Breslau and died in Leipzig.648 Her father had been 
an officer in the Imperial Guard and her mother was French. Rauchfuss was 
expelled from the Lyzeum in Breslau for taking sides with her Jewish friend 
against the school authorities (an episode repeated by her alter ego in Schlesisches 
Himmelreich). Rauchfuss fled Breslau in 1945 and spent over a year in Cieplice 
near Jelenia Góra (formerly Hirschberg) working at a Polish garden nursery 
before moving to Leipzig. There she worked in an accounting department and 
then in radio, during which time two of her short stories were broadcast. She 
became a freelance author in 1952. 649  During her writing career, Rauchfuss 
produced cabaret texts, chansons, and television plays as well as seventeen 
volumes containing novels, short stories, and poems. 650  Her career profile, 
therefore, overlaps with that of Hartung although it began a quarter of a century 
later. Between 1967 and 1976, Rauchfuss was an inoffizielle Mitarbeiterin for the 
GDR’s Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (Stasi). It is not currently known to what 
extent this arrangement was voluntary.651  
Several aspects of the foregoing short biography are relevant in the current 
context, particularly in terms of points of contrast and similarity with Hartung. 
First, like Hartung much of Rauchfuss’ writing career took place at a time and 
place in which a de facto state censor strongly influenced the content of all 
published texts.652 As I demonstrate below, Schlesisches Himmelreich contains 
clear allusions to the class struggle and makes fairly blunt propaganda for a 
                                                 
647 Epigraph on first unnumbered page in: Hartung, H., Der Himmel war unten. 
648 Rauchfussweg in Leipzig is named after Hildegard Maria Rauchfuss. See: Kruse, C., Wer lebte wo in Leipzig (Stürtz, 
2011), p. 69. 
649Jung, U., Frauenpersönlichkeiten in Leipzig: Hildegard Maria Rauchfuß, <http://www.uni-
leipzig.de/~agintern/frauen/rauch.htm>, Accessed on: 19.07.2013. 
650 Kuhlmann, W., Killy Literaturlexikon: Os-Roq (Berlin; New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2010), 9, pp. 443-44; Anon., 
Deutsche National Bibliothek: Hildegard Maria Rauchfuss [Online], 
<https://portal.dnb.de/opac.htm?method=simpleSearch&reset=true&cqlMode=true&query=auRef%3D1025667069&select
edCategory=any>, Accessed on: 27.03.2013. 
651 Kruse, C., Wer lebte wo in Leipzig, p. 69; Frach, F., Schloss Wiepersdorf: Das »Künstlerheim« unter dem Einfluss der 
Kulturpolitik in der DDR (Berlin: Links Christoph, 2012), pp. 126, 215. 
652 Although, as Konrad Franke explains, censorship was implemented 'durch eine Hauptabteilung in einem Ministerium, 
durch die Lektorate der Verlage, mit Hilfe des Schriftstellerverbandes, des Büros für Urheberrechte [und] des 
Staatssicherheitsdienstes'. See: Wichner, E., et al., "Literaturentwicklungsprozesse": die Zensur der Literatur in der DDR 
(Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1993), p. 103. 
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Marxist worldview. This ideological slant satisfied the censor in the Communist 
GDR (or else the novel would not have been published), but it is difficult to 
determine the extent to which it was also an expression of her own convictions. 
To my knowledge, Rauchfuss neither publically disavowed East German 
Communism nor demonstratively endorsed Western Capitalism after the Wende. 
The second point of interest is that, by defying the authorities and defending her 
Jewish school friend to her own detriment, Rauchfuss, like Hartung, demonstrated 
an anti-NSDAP stance at a time when the party controlled all aspects of German 
life. Conversely, her complicity with the GDR regime is problematic in the 
context of the ‘good Germans versus bad German’ topos (see below). Third, 
Rauchfuss witnessed the siege of Breslau as an active, adult participant, but did 
not, to our knowledge, record them as they unfolded. Therefore, her contribution 
to the relevant discourse has been made exclusively through fictional literature, an 
interesting point of difference between Rauchfuss and Hartung.  
Both Der Himmel war unten and Schlesisches Himmelreich can be 
interpreted as ‘quasi-autobiographical novels’, which is to say that they are 
centred on a main protagonist (Werner Rönnig and Carlotta Fähndrich 
respectively) who, as is evident from biographical and autobiographical sources, 
strongly resemble the authors. 653  This resemblance is physical, ideological, 
familial, and professional (i.e., they are described working in the same or similar 
professions to those pursued by the authors). In addition, the authors in question 
are known to have lived through events very similar to those in which the main 
protagonists are portrayed.654 Therefore, both main protagonists can, arguably, be 
considered to represent the authors’ respective alter egos, by which I mean that 
the actions, personalities, and apparent attitudes of the fictional characters are 
informed, to a considerable extent, by those of the authors.655 
                                                 
653 For biographical details for Rauchfuss see the relevant entries in: Kuhlmann, W., Killy Literaturlexikon; Kruse, C., Wer 
lebte wo in Leipzig; Anon., DNB Hildegard Maria Rauchfuss [Online], Accessed on: 27.03.2013; Jung, U., 
Frauenpersönlichkeiten: Hildegard Maria Rauchfuß, Accessed on: 19.07.2013; In addition to Hartung's own biographical 
work cited in this thesis, see: Steps, P., Hugo Hartung 100 Jahre Gendenkveranstaltung, Accessed on: 18.02.2013; 
Gerstmann, G., 'Hugo Hartung - im Thüringischen Neustadt unvergessen', Schlesischer Kulturspiegel, 39 (2004), 20. 
654 Specific examples of such congruencies are provided in context during the following analysis. 
655 The reader is reminded of my comments in the Introduction (Section 1.4) on the cautious use of autobiographical 
literary fiction as an adjunct to historiography under certain conditions. In addition, however, I would also remind the 
reader that my purpose in this chapter is not to search for historical detail in these novels but rather, as stated above (5.1) 
‘to explore the ways in which different socio-political conditions constrain and influence the production of literary 
contributions to collective memory discourses on Flucht und Vertreibung, and how and to what extent literature contributes 
to collective memory discourses and the establishment of ‘hegemonic historical narratives’. 
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All of the action in Der Himmel war unten takes place in the period 
immediately before and during the siege. Rauchfuss’ Schlesisches Himmelreich is 
set in Breslau but encompasses a much longer period. It begins just before the 
Kapp Putsch (1920) and concludes with a lengthy section on the Siege of Breslau 
and its immediate aftermath.656  
In terms of the analytical framework set out in the Introduction to this 
thesis, both novels display a high degree of verisimilitude at the ontological level. 
Rauchfuss achieves a sense of historical realism in Schlesisches Himmelreich by 
using the names of real streets, shops, churches and other institutions as well as by 
including well-known historical events in the story. These are presented either as 
major historical backdrops to the protagonists’ individual lives (Kapp Putsch, 
WWII, the Siege of Breslau), or as incidental, datable incidents such as the 
execution of Dr. Spielhagen on the 29th of January 1945 (see above).657 Yet, her 
dates are not always accurate. For example, she immediately follows the 
Spielhagen episode with another event that actually took place nine days earlier 
when Hanke ordered women and children out of the city (20th of January 1945). 
This combination of a high-degree of verisimilitude with a lack of accuracy in 
relation to easily verifiable dated events can be interpreted in at least two ways. 
On the one hand, it supports the notion that the author is writing from episodic 
(i.e. inherently fallible) memory rather than having carefully researched the 
background material to her novel. This is likely, as we know from her biography 
that Rauchfuss did live in Breslau at that time.658 On the other hand, the lack of 
accuracy in relation to easily-verifiable dated events signposts the ‘literariness’ of 
the text, which may have been the author’s intent, specifically to emphasise the 
separation between herself and her protagonist.  
Similarly, although the protagonists in Der Himmel war unten are 
fictional, the novel is also replete with references to historical characters such as 
Gauleiter Hanke. 659  To add to the apparent ontological authenticity 
(verisimilitude) of the novel, Hartung also mentions important places and 
                                                 
656 Rauchfuss, H. M., Schlesisches Himmelreich, pp. 28-64, 531-696; For details of the Kapp Putsch see: Erger, J., Der 
Kapp-Lüttwitz-Putsch. Ein Beitrag zur deutschen Innenpolitik 1920-21 (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1967), pp. 324-26. 
657 Announcement concerning the execution by firing squad of Dr. Spielhagen on on January 28, 1945. Published in the 
Schlesische Tageszeitung on January 29, 1945. Reproduced in: Peikert, P., "Festung Breslau" in den Berichten eines 
Pfarrers, p. 37. 
658 Kuhlmann, W., Killy Literaturlexikon, pp. 443-44. 
659 Hartung, H., Der Himmel war unten, pp. 18, 37. 
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buildings in Breslau such as the ‘Rathaus, Staupsäule, Matthiaskirche; [und auch] 
Straßen (Schmiedebrücke oder Albrechtstraße)’.660 Nevertheless, although based 
on Hartung’s own direct experiences during the Siege of Breslau, one must 
exercise caution in terms of the novel’s alleged autobiographical content. 661 
Whilst the main protagonist, Rönnig, does resemble the author in many ways, 
Hartung uses subtle narrative devices to create distance between himself and this 
character. For example he specifically refers to Rönnig as ‘[ein] Nullnuller’, i.e. 
someone born in 1900, whereas Hartung himself was born 1902.662 This subtle 
differentiation between the main protagonist and the author, more pronounced in 
Hartung’s novel than in Rauchfuss’, is what justifies the use of the term ‘quasi-
autobiographical’.663As a narrative strategy it clearly signposts the ‘literariness’ of 
the work as opposed to the historical verisimilitude of the setting and context. 
Indeed, one contemporary reviewer finds the literary sophistication of Der 
Himmel war unten problematic, stating that ‘[diese] Darstellungsart mutet bei der 
ungewöhnlich massierten Dramatik des Themas fast schon zu schriftstellerisch 
geschickt an.664 A different reviewer, however, praises its masterful composition 
but predicts that it ‘will not survive for its artistic qualities but for its documentary 
value’.665 Over half a century later, a third critic sees no value at all in any of 
Hartung’s oeuvre opining that: 
 
[wer] Hartungs Prosa liest, wird wahrscheinlich enttäuscht [...] 
aufgrund einer stark autobiographisch gefärbten Erzählhaltung 
[... der] es nicht gelingt sich [...] ins Künstlerische zu 
erheben.666 
 
Schlesisches Himmelreich is unabashedly programmatic and, as such, is 
reminiscent of novels written in the Nachmärz tradition of programmatic realism, 
the purpose and effect of which was to convey an unambiguous socio-political 
                                                 
660 Białek, E., et al., SILESIA IN LITTERIS SERVATA, p. 161. 
661 Alleged, for example, by Jutta Radczewski-Helbig in: ibid. p. 147. 
662 Hartung, H., Der Himmel war unten, p. 141. 
663 That is to say, the similarities are so striking that one has to conclude that there is a pronounced autobiographical thread 
running through the work in question. However the overlap between the author and protagonist is not total. In fact one 
could argue, as Mikhail Bakhtin does, that it is impossible to achieve a total conflation of identity of author and protagonist 
even when the author sets out to do so. Indeed, in the Bakhtinian paradigm ‘[authors] are somehow both inside and outside 
their work. In literary texts, interactions between author and heroes is what constructs the relation that gives the deepest 
coherence to the other meanings of relation, not least relation understood as a telling’. See: Holquist, M., Dialogism, p. 30. 
664 Anon., 'Review: Der Himmel war unten', in Der Spiegel, (Hamburg: SPIEGEL-Verlag, 1952), p. 32. 
665 Meyer, H., 'Review of Der Himmel war Unten', Books Abroad, 26 (1952), 356. 
666 Jutta Radczewski-Helbig in: Białek, E., et al., SILESIA IN LITTERIS SERVATA, p. 147. 
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message.667 Rauchfuss explains the actions and decisions of her protagonists in 
terms of a longer-term struggle between the forces of Fascism and Capitalism and 
Marxist modernisers.668 In a single sentence, for example, Henriette Fähndrich, 
the mother of the main protagonist, Carlotta, identifies the class enemy and sets 
out a basic left-wing manifesto when she says:  
 
Im Grunde geht es gegen alle, die ... immer nur raffen und 
raffen und das Geraffte mit Zähnen und Klauen verteidigen [...] 
Meinem Gefühl nach sollte jeder Geld für Milch haben, genug 
zu essen, ein anständiges Bett.669  
 
Such socialist propaganda is inserted throughout the text. Joachim Fichte, 
a friend of the Fähndrich family and early influence on Carlotta, for example, 
suggests to her father that ‘[ein] gewisser Marx wäre eigentlich eine ganz 
interessante Lektüre für einen abwartenden Zivilisten’.670  At other places, the 
author places words into the mouths of her protagonists that amount to a 
manifesto for a new Communist or Socialist postwar Germany strikingly 
reminiscent of the GDR. For example, Matzel, the hunchback son of a shoemaker 
who lives in the basement flat in the same residential block as Carlotta, explains 
that postwar Germany will be ruled by a: 
 
Regierung die nicht ausbeutet. Eine ohne Gutsbesitzer und 
Schlotbarone. Eine Regierung, zu der du auch gehören 
könntest, Fräulein Fähndrich. Sender ‚Freies Deutschland’, 
Empfänger freies Deutschland! [...] denke nach dem Krieg an 
mich. An mich den du kennst, an den Begriff der Demokratie, 
den du nicht kennst [...] Und dann tu was!671 
 
It is also very apparent throughout the novel that Carlotta’s sympathies are 
with working-class people rather than with representatives of her own class (the 
Upper Bourgeoisie or ‘heruntergekommener Adel’). For example, her main 
confidants at the banks she works at in Breslau and, following her Flucht, in 
Hirschberg, are the two janitors Bomaschke and Hinke.672 
                                                 
667 This instrumentalisation of literature for political ends is best exemplified in the oeuvre of another Silesian author, 
Gustav Freytag (1816-1895). For a brief exposition of programmatic realism in German writing in the Nachmärz period 
see: Becker, S., Bürgerlicher Realismus (Tübingen: A.Franke, 2003), p. 179. 
668 Kuhlmann, W., Killy Literaturlexikon, pp. 443-44. 
669 Rauchfuss, H. M., Schlesisches Himmelreich, p. 62. 
670 Ibid. p. 102. 
671 For example Matzel at: ibid. pp. 546-47. 
672 Ibid. p. 582. 
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Thus, notwithstanding its apparent verisimilitude at the ontological level, 
Schlesisches Himmelreich can best be analysed at the explanatory level. Rather 
than simply narrating the events as they unfold, Rauchfuss attempts to explain 
them within a Marxist framework. The calamity of war and the fall of Breslau are 
presented as the inevitable result of the ultimately unsustainable ascendancy of the 
Capitalist Bourgeoisie and landed gentry. In this narrative, the Red Army has 
arrived to liberate Germany and reinstate it on a new, inherently fairer political 
footing. The working class will hold sway in this new democratic state, but there 
will also be room for members of the former elite, as long as they are prepared to 
participate (‘Und dann tu was!’). 
This programmatic content needs to be read in the context of the socio-
political upheavals that took place in the year of publication. The year 1968 was a 
critical period in postwar Europe during which the legitimacy of both German 
states was called into question. Students and left-wing activists in the FRG were 
anxious about the re-emergence of Fascism in German politics. The 
Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD), a neo-Nazi organisation, had 
been founded on the 28th of November 1964. 673  Both the Chancellor Kurt 
Kiesinger and his Minister of Defence Gerhard Schröder were former members of 
the NSDAP.674 The killing of student Benno Ohnesorg by the police during a 
demonstration on the 2nd of July 1967 had increased fears that the FRG was 
becoming a police state.675 The attempted assassination of student leader Rudi 
Dutschke less than a year later (11th of April 1968) by the neo-Nazi Josef 
Bachmann caused outrage throughout German society.676 The state’s handling of 
the student protests during 1967 and 1968, together with its continued allegiance 
to the USA and NATO (and, therefore, its tacit support for the US-led war in 
Vietnam), and the continued presence of former NSDAP personnel in positions of 
                                                 
673 Brown, T. S., West Germany and the Global Sixties: the Anti-Authoritarian Revolt, 1962-1978 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2015), p. 93. 
674 For Gerhard Schröder see: Anon., 'Quittung vorhanden'; Gassert, P., Kurt Georg Kiesinger, p. 69; For a more general 
understanding of the continued presence of former NSDAP members in German politicis and society see: Gassert, P., et al., 
West German Debates on Nazism and Generational Conflict, 1955-1975. 
675 See flyer "Student erschlagen" in: Otto, K. A., Die APO in Quellen und Dokumenten, pp. 174-75. 
676 See "Die Erklärung der Vierzehn", first published in Die Zeit, (April 19, 1969) and reproduced in: Kraushaar, W., Von 
der Flaschenpost zum Molotowcocktail, p. 363; For a general overview of the crisis of legitmacy in the FRG between 1966 
and 1969 see: Thränhardt, D., Geschichte der BRD, pp. 167-85; Görtemaker, M., Geschichte der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland, pp. 453-91. 
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authority prompted some FRG citizens to call for armed ‘counter violence’.677 At 
the same time, however, a process of so-called Ostpolitik or East-West détente 
was underway in the FRG, which seemed to legitimise the SED’s totalitarian hold 
over the GDR. The notion of a specific, largely pacifistic and reconciliatory 
Ostpolitik was first mooted in a 1963 speech by journalist Egon Bahr. In the 
course of this speech Bahr called for ‘Wandel durch Annäherung’. This policy 
was vigorously promoted by Chancellor Willy Brandt in his campaign speeches 
throughout 1968 in the lead up to the 1969 federal German elections.678  
However, the Bahr/Brandt policy of ‘Wandel durch Annäherung’ 
coincided with a series of crises of legitimisation in Central and Eastern Europe. 
These crises culminated in the so-called ‘Prague Spring’ when Warsaw Pact 
forces invaded the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (ČSSR) to put down a 
popular uprising against the Communist regime.679 Although this event did not 
represent the same kind of fundamental caesura in the political consciousness of 
East Germans as it did in the minds of many Czechoslovakians and Poles, a 
disproportionate number of the young adults arrested in the GDR during the 
ensuing unrest were members of families counted among the political elite.680 
Partially to distance themselves from the actions of their wayward offspring, the 
SED regime publically expressed its support and approval for the brutal 
suppression of dissent in the ČSSR. 681  Thus, just as the FRG was being 
challenged by protesters with a predominantly left-wing Weltanschauung, which, 
in combination with Bahr-Brandt’s Ostpolitik may have led to closer cultural ties 
with the Communist Bloc, the latter was also undergoing a crisis of legitimacy. As 
an ‘inoffizielle Mitarbeiterin’ for the Stasi and prominent public figure, Rauchfuss 
was compelled to support the party line and promote a vision of history in which 
the political status quo in Eastern and Central Europe was basically sound, 
legitimate and historically justified.682 Thus, although a programmatic element is 
                                                 
677 Among those calling for the overthrow of the state was Ulrike Meinhof, one of the leaders of the Rote Armee Fraktion. 
See: Meinhof, U. M., 'Vom Protest zum Widerstand'; For a general overview of the genesis and actions of the RAF see: 
Görtemaker, M., Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, pp. 584-88. 
678 See "Wandel durch Annäherung" speech by Egon Bahr (July 15, 1963). Reproduced in: Pollmann, B., Vom deutschen 
Reich bis zur Gegenwart, pp. 247-49; Banchoff, T. F., The German Problem Transformed, pp. 61-96. 
679 Fehr, H., Legitimitätskonflikte in Ostmitteleuropa, pp. 33-36. 
680 Ibid. pp. 39-42. 
681 Anon., 'SED zur Intervention in der ČSSR 1968'. 
682  On censorship in the GDR during the 1960s, see Konrad Franke in: Wichner, E., et al., 
"Literaturentwicklungsprozesse": die Zensur der Literatur in der DDR (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1993), pp. 101-27. 
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clearly present throughout the novel, this element is just as likely to represent the 
author’s contemporary concerns as to reflect her feelings regarding the siege, fall 
and annexation of Breslau. 
Hartung, by contrast, resists presenting a well-developed explanatory level 
in Der Himmel war unten. The protagonist is Werner Rönnig, a musician, who, 
like Hartung, is drafted into the Luftwaffe shortly before Christmas 1944 and 
deployed as a guard at a military airbase (HoKo-Mann).683 Rönnig’s wife flees 
Breslau by train whilst he is on duty and unaware of her decision. She and their 
two children reach Dresden and are still there when it is firebombed, although it is 
never explicitly stated that they die in the resulting inferno. 684  This lack of 
resolution is characteristic of the novel as a whole. Rönnig’s ensuing struggle for 
survival during the siege of Breslau is narrated in the form of a set of free-
standing, uncommented episodes. There is no overarching storyline or plot that 
attempts to explain the facts. This resistance to plot is succinctly expressed in the 
novel’s epigraph ‘Mögen andere es anders gesehen haben – ich sah es so ...’.685 
People witness events, whereas explanatory narratives (plots and stories) are 
developed after the fact. Hartung’s collage-like presentation of a number of 
intricately developed scenes with no accompanying explanation contrasts 
markedly with the works of historians, which are often characterised by the 
narration of a simplified subset of events within an overriding explanatory 
framework (see Chapter 3).  
Hartung’s staunch resistance to adding to or embellishing the facts as he 
observed them also stands in marked contrast with much of the German 
Vertriebenenliteratur published around the same time. Many examples of this 
genre are characterised by overt attempts to explain the Vertreibungen with 
reference to some overarching framework that goes beyond WWII as a 
historically circumscribed event.686  
Conversely, notwithstanding Hartung’s omission of a well-developed 
explanatory model, like Schlesisches Himmelreich, Der Himmel war unten does 
                                                 
683 HoKo = Horst Kompanie 
684 Hartung, H., Der Himmel war unten, pp. 32, 48, 50, 72. 
685 Ibid. [n.p] 
686 I discuss one of these below in connection with the Biblical topos. In Chapters 3, 4 and 5, I have already noted the fact 
that the postwar Polish government (TRJN) also made recourse to an explanatory framework rooted in Poland’s ‘deep’ 
history and the narrative of a long-term German-Polish conflict to justify their annexation of the ZO and the Vertreibung of 
the native German population. 
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convey a well-defined socio-political message. Although less obviously 
programmatic, its inherent potential as an anti-war tract has been noted by one 
contemporary reviewer who opines that ‘[if] the substance of this book were part 
of everyone’s consciousness the danger of future wars might be somewhat 
reduced.’687 Over and above this pacifistic or anti-war content, the novel conveys 
a message of social optimism, which is one of the main hallmarks of Hartung’s 
entire oeuvre. Even in the midst of the siege of Breslau ‘dringen grüne Spitzen aus 
der Erde, die der Soldat mit seinem Stiefelhacken auflockert, um das junge 
Wachstum zu erleichtern’. 688  Time and again the author expresses this basic 
attitude both through ‘stage-ready’ humour and consciously artistic excurses. 
Indeed, Hartung’s reflections upon life often approach the mystical or numinous: 
‘[nichts] geschieht. Aber im Nichts ist alles …’.689  
This optimism is remarkable when one considers the period during which 
the novel was written and published. The Reich for which Hartung had reluctantly 
fought had already begun to disintegrate with Austria’s declaration of 
independence in 1945.690 The foundation of the FRG and GDR in 1949 had then 
signalled a potentially permanent partition, not only of Germany but of Europe as 
a whole.691 One of the ramifications of this split was that the legal status of the 
place in which the novel was set, Breslau/Wrocław, was now interpreted in two 
different ways between East and West. A year before publication, the GDR had 
formally recognised the Oder-Neisse Line, and therefore the irrevocable secession 
of Lower Silesia and the remainder of the ZO, in the Treaty of Görlitz (1950).692 
However, the FRG did not recognise the GDR (even de facto) until 1972 and was 
not bound by the treaty.693 Recognition of the German-Polish border by the FRG 
was still 19 years in the future (Treaty of Warsaw, 1970).694 For West Germans, 
                                                 
687 Meyer, H., 'Review of Der Himmel war Unten'. 
688 Hartung, H., Der Himmel war unten, p. 136. 
689 Ibid. p. 150. 
690 Grunwald, A., et al., Chronik der Weltgeschichte, p. 296. 
691 Ibid. pp. 299-300. 
692 Theisen, A., Die Vertreibung der Deutschen, p. 3; Ther, P., Deutsche und polnische Vertriebene, pp. 345-46; Neubach, 
H., Geschichte Schlesiens, p. 32. 
693  See Grundlagenvertrag (December 21, 1972) reproduced in: Nawrocki, J., Die Beziehungen zwischen den beiden 
Staaten in Deutschland: Entwicklungen, Möglichkeiten und Grenzen (Berlin: Holzapfel, 1986), p. 113; Before 1972 
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694 Brandt, W., et al., Warschauer Vertrag, 1970; The FRG had already agreed to recognise the Oder-Neisse Line some 4 
months earlier in Article 3 of: Brandt, W., et al., Deutsch-sowjetischer Vertrag, 1970. 
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therefore, Breslau was still an occupied German city and, with the backing of the 
Western Allies, Chancellor of the FRG Konrad Adenauer was still refusing to 
accept the Oder-Neisse Line as a permanent frontier between Germany and 
Poland.695 Thus, whilst the Allies had formally declared the end of the War on the 
9th of July 1951, it was by no means certain that a state of peace would endure.696 
 
6.4 Literary Reflections: East-West Topoi  
In this section, I turn to two of the most common topoi found in German literary 
reflections of WWII and Flucht und Vertreibung: the Biblical topos and the 
notion of ‘good Germans’ versus ‘bad Germans’.  
 
6.4.1 Biblical Topos 
The Biblical topos primarily functions at the narrative level, and has the potential 
to inflate explanatory frameworks by linking localised events to culturally 
embedded mythical narratives. In the following paragraphs I mention several 
works of literature that employ various aspects of this topos, but several historical 
works, such as those alluding to the ‘Breslauer Apokalypse’, demonstrate that this 
topos is also relevant outside literature.697 
In her doctoral thesis Karina Berger posits that ‘in the early postwar years 
the focus on German suffering was a central feature both of private and public 
memory’.698 She also points out that novels with a Biblical and/or eschatological 
motive were common in the early 1950s. As examples she cites Ernst Wiechert’s 
Missa sine nomine (1950), Menschen und Dämonen (1951) by Hanna Stephan, 
Wintergewitter (1951) by Kurt Ihlenfeld, Ruth Storm’s Das vorletzte Gericht 
(1953), and Jenseits der Schleuse (1953) by Werner Klose.699 This preoccupation 
with faith-based narratives is reflected in the wording of the Charta der deutschen 
Heimatvertriebenen published on the 5th of August 1950. Statements such as ‘Gott 
hat die Menschen in ihre Heimat hineingestellt. Den Menschen mit Zwang von 
seiner Heimat trennen bedeutet ihn im Geiste töten’ and ‘Die Völker sollen 
                                                 
695 Banchoff, T. F., The German Problem Transformed, pp. 34, 38, 58. 
696 Grunwald, A., et al., Chronik der Weltgeschichte, p. 300. 
697  Gleiss, H., Breslauer Apokalypse 1945; Klußmann, U., 'Breslauer Apokalypse', in Der Spiegel Geschichte. Die 
Deutschen im Osten Europas: Eroberer, Siedler, Vertriebe, (Hamburg: SPIEGEL-Verlag, 2011), pp. 98-99. 
698 Berger, K. L., 'The Representation of the Expulsion of Ethnic Germans in German Literature from the 1950s to the 
Present', p. 18. 
699 Ibid. pp. 61-103. 
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handeln, wie es ihren christlichen Pflichten und ihrem Gewissen entspricht’ reveal 
a degree of religious conviction not often encountered in European politics 
today.700 
Published at precisely this time (1951), Hartung’s Der Himmel war unten, 
supports Berger’s analysis. One of the most interesting moments in the novel, and 
the most overt use of a specifically Biblical concept, is when Hartung penetrates 
the third-person narrative voice to declare, in the only instance of first person 
narration other than in the epigraph: 
 
Nein, ich wäre auch nicht in Breslau, wenn ich der liebe Gott 
sein müßte. Ich möchte es nicht mit ansehen, was ich da 
angerichtet habe, als ich den Menschen schuf und ihm als 
einzigem Lebewesen die Vernunft mitgab. Großartig, wozu er 
die benutzt!701 
 
The novel also includes a winter-birth scene which invokes the Nativity. 
The inter-textual reference is reinforced by the presence of ‘the Three Wise Men’ 
in the shape of three officers.702 The Biblical topos is also reflected in the title, 
which relates to the narrator’s explanation that ‘[in] Breslau ist der Himmel unten’ 
because all Hell has broken loose above ground and in the skies and the only 
relatively safe (i.e. heavenly) places are cellars and catacombs.703 Conversely, 
Hartung chooses to finish the novel just at the point when, for the first time in 85 
days, everything is back as it should be: ‘unter ihren Füßen ist die Erde. Und der 
Himmel ist oben’.704  
Similarly, the title of Schlesisches Himmelreich appears, at first sight, to 
allude directly to the same Biblical topos, and, just as in Der Himmel war unten, 
certain passages in the novel appear to invoke it explicitly. In one example, 
Joachim Fichte, an old school friend of Carlotta’s father and an important mentor 
in Carlotta’s life, muses that ‘[genaugenommen], versuchte Christus 
sozialdemokratische Ideen unter die Menschheit zu bringen’.705 Fichte is even 
described as looking like Jesus. However, Rauchfuss does not develop the idea, 
least of all as part of an overarching explanatory concept. The Himmelreich of the 
                                                 
700 Czaja, H., et al., Charta der deutschen Heimatvertriebenen, p. 15. 
701 Hartung, H., Der Himmel war unten, p. 172. 
702 Ibid. p. 41. 
703 Ibid. p. 152. 
704 Ibid. p. 233. 
705 Rauchfuss, H. M., Schlesisches Himmelreich, p. 101. 
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title may also allude to the Biblical topos, although other potential explanations 
for the book title are more mundane. One of the protagonists, Henrietta, actually 
visits a village called Himmelreich, which represents a place of relative safety, 
during her search for food in the mountains.706 In addition, there is a Silesian 
culinary speciality called Schlesisches Himmelreich.707 The title could have been 
inspired by either or both of these circumstances. However, it is equally likely that 
it was intended to be ironic in that Silesia, at that time of the Soviet counter 
offensive, was anything but heavenly, in the sense of idyllic.708 Nevertheless, 
Rauchfuss’ use of Biblical terminology and her overt conflation of Jesus with 
Marxism as redeeming forces invoke the Biblical topos. 
More recent literature by Polish authors on the subject of Polish 
expulsions from the Kresy and the Polish resettlement in the ZO also make use of 
the Biblical topos. Marek Krajewski, for example, employs an overtly 
eschatological framework in his Festung Breslau (2006).709 More recently still, 
the focal character in Sandberg (2009) by Joanna Bator is born on Christmas day 
following a difficult journey during which nobody offers to help the struggling 
parents thus invoking the Biblical ‘no room at the inn’ motif.710 The observation 
that Polish authors use elements of the same Biblical topos in relation to the same 
events is interesting, and usefully extends Berger’s analysis of German 
Vertriebenenliteratur to take in a larger corpus.  
In terms of my three-level analytical model, the Biblical topos in Der 
Himmel war unten and Schlesisches Himmelreich functions at the narrative level 
rather than at the explanatory level. That is, it works through inter-textual 
references to evoke culturally embedded notions of wholesomeness (Marxism as a 
Messianic force for good), easily comprehensible metaphors for the state of chaos 
to which Breslau had been reduced (the spatial inversion of Heaven and Hell), and 
a sense of pathos (Nativity scenes and the associated narrative of society and 
fate’s cold indifference to essentially good people). At another level, the Biblical 
topos also provides the moral framework for another frequently encountered 
                                                 
706 Ibid. p. 575. NB: There are over 20 places of that name spread throughout Germany and Austria, but none in Silesia. 
707 Saul, H., Unvergessliche Küche Schlesien: Traditionelle Familienrezepte und ihre Geschichten (Leipzig: Bassermann, 
2009), p. 39. 
708 At least one other author has used the same name for a novel based on her childhood in Görlitz, a town now split 
between Poland (Zgorzelec) and Saxony in Germany. See: Schöne, R., Schlesisches Himmelreich (Munich: Herbig, 1991). 
709 Krajewski, M., Festung Breslau, trans. Paulina Schulz (Munich: DTV, 2011 [2006]). 
710 Bator, J., Sandberg, p. 121. 
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staple within this corpus, the notion of ‘good Germans’ versus ‘bad Germans’. It 
is to this topos that I now turn. 
 
6.4.2 Good Germans: Bad Germans 
A common topos in postwar German thought and literature involves the attempt 
to distinguish between ‘good’ and ‘bad Germans’. In her discussion of the main 
characteristics of so-called Vertriebenenliteratur, for example, Karina Berger 
points out that: 
 
‘the main characters are portrayed as unpolitical, yet it seems to 
be implied that in their disposition as honest and righteous 
people [i.e. “good Germans”], they would naturally be at odds 
with National Socialist ideology. Genuine pro-Nazi sentiment is 
generally limited to just one or two characters who, in their 
overzealousness, serve as a contrast for the rest of the 
population [“bad Germans”].’711 
 
In terms of the three-level analytical model set out in the Introduction to 
this thesis, the ‘good versus bad Germans’ topos operates at the ontological level. 
It pertains to the nature or behaviour of specific human beings, who, in this 
specific discourse, are deemed either morally bad or good, or else their specific 
actions can be described in these terms with reference to a specific cultural 
framework.712 
This topos has played a role in terms of Vergangenheitsbewältigung in 
relation to the Holocaust as well as in the discourse surrounding German 
victimhood per se, and as a result of Flucht und Vertreibung in particular. In 
general terms, since 1945 in both East and West Germany, people are considered 
to be ‘good Germans’ if they opposed the NSDAP and either had no involvement 
in the Holocaust or else actively defended and/or befriended Jews in Germany and 
in the occupied areas. In the GDR, this definition was augmented to include 
                                                 
711 Berger, K. L., 'The Representation of the Expulsion of Ethnic Germans in German Literature from the 1950s to the 
Present', p. 44. 
712 The 'good German v. bad German' concept is often explored in relation to the so-called 'clean Wehrmacht' or 'two-wars' 
hypothesis, which conjectures that the Holocaust and WWII were two entirely separate, but overlapping, events. In this 
version of history, the former was perpetrated exclusively by agents of the NSDAP, including the SS, whilst the later was 
prosecuted by the Wehrmacht, whose members fought an 'honourable', 'clean' war and can, therefore, be considered 'good' 
Germans. This understanding of events was challenged by the so-called Wehrmachtsausstellung (subtitled: 
‘Vernichtungskrieg. Verbrechen der Wehrmacht 1941 bis 1944’) organised by the Hamburg Institut für Sozialforschung, 
which toured Germany between 1995 and 1999 and then again from 2001 to 2004. The exhibition focused on war crimes 
committed by members of the Wehrmacht. See: Lentin, A., et al., Retrospect: War and Change in Europe 1914-1955, 
Total War and Social Change in Europe 1914-1955 (Milton Keynes: Open University, 2007), pp. 48-49; Stone, D., 
Histories of the Holocaust (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 16; for a useful overview of literary approaches to 
the theme see: Cooke, M., et al., Representing the "Good German" in Literature and Culture after 1945: Altruism and 
Moral Ambiguity (2013); and for a good specific example of how the subject has been treated in recent German literature 
see: Hahn, U., Unscharfe Bilder (Munich: DTV, 2003). 
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Socialists, Communists and others whose ideas or actions were broadly in line 
with Marxist thought. At times the relevant discourse has revolved around the 
proper classification of entire groups or organisations such as the Wehrmacht. For 
example, until the so-called Wehrmachtsaustellung (March 1995 - July 1999 and 
November 2001 – March 2004) presented unambiguous evidence of the 
Wehrmacht’s active complicity in the Holocaust and other war atrocities, there 
had been a tendency, particularly in the FRG, to regard all members of the 
Wehrmacht as ‘good Germans’ unless specifically proven otherwise. 713  More 
frequently though, ‘good Germans’ are identified on an individual basis.714 In 
both the FRG and the GDR, victims of the NSDAP automatically ‘qualified’ as 
‘good Germans’. Both Hartung and Rauchfuss fall into the category of NSDAP 
victims, Hartung for having been banned from writing and Rauchfuss for having 
been expelled from school for defending her Jewish school friend.715 
Traces of the ‘good versus bad German’ topos are present in both Der 
Himmel war unten and Schlesisches Himmelreich. An analysis of how the two 
authors use it can partially illuminate the formation of East and West German 
hegemonic historical narratives in relation to Flucht und Vertreibung. However, 
in undertaking such an analysis it is necessary to bear in mind the different socio-
political constraints to which Hartung and Rauchfuss were subject at the time of 
writing (see above).  
On the whole, key scenes in Der Himmel war unten combine to give the 
unmistakable impression that this book is primarily about ‘good Germans’. 
Hartung presents his heroes (Rönnig and those with whom he chooses to spend 
time) as non-Nazis who stand apart from any perpetrator collective. They 
mentally resist the destruction of Poles, Jews and German culture at the hands of 
the NSDAP through a kind of ‘internal migration’, albeit whilst bearing arms 
externally.716  Rönnig’s commanding officers, for example, sing the traditional 
words to Stille Nacht rather than those prescribed by the NSDAP (i.e. sans 
                                                 
713 Wette, W., The Wehrmacht: History, Myth, Reality (Cambridge, Mass.; London: Harvard University Press, 2006); 
Niven, W. J., et al., Memorialization in Germany since 1945, p. 142. 
714 One well-known example is Willy Brandt. See: Moeller, R. G., 'War Stories: The Search for a Usable Past in the Federal 
Republic of Germany', The American Historical Review, 101 (1996), 1008-48, p. 1035. 
715 See my comments above on the impact of Rauchfuss’ active involvement in the Stasi on the basic categorisation of her 
as a ‘good German’ in this sense. 
716 A detailed discussion of the concept of 'internal migration' is outwith the scope of this thesis. For insights into the issues 
it involves see Grimm and Reinhold "Im Dickicht der inneren Emigration" in: Denkler, H., Die deutsche Literatur im 
Dritten Reich: Themen, Traditionen, Wirkungen (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1976), pp. 406-26; Schnell, R., Literarische innere 
Emigration: 1933 - 1945, Metzler Studienausgabe (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1976). 
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references to the Jewish homelands). In another example, Rönnig, a professional 
musician, gives a public rendition of Tochter Zion freue dich at a military 
hospital, the very title of which challenges Nazi anti-Semitism.717 Rönnig also 
spends time in the company of a Lieutenant Colonel in the Luftwaffe who 
demands a performance of something by Gustav Mahler, a composer shunned by 
committed Nazis and other anti-Semites for his Jewish ethnicity. 718  Later, 
Gruppenleiter Michalke reveals a similar low-level opposition to the NSDAP, 
despite his forced membership of the party, by stubbornly greeting everyone ‘zu 
jeder Tageszeit mit “Morjen!”’, instead of the required ‘Heil Hitler!’.719  
One common way of delineating ‘good and bad Germans’ in both East and 
West-German literature throughout the postwar period was to reveal a given 
protagonist’s (or the narrator’s) attitude towards the NSDAP via the symbol of the 
Führerbild. The narrator in Christa Wolf’s Kindheitsmuster (1976), for example, 
expresses her delight when a picture of Hitler is incinerated. 720  Rönnig’s 
Lieutenant Colonel makes a point of putting him at his ease by pointing out that 
‘[nein], ein “Führerbild” ist nicht im Raum’.721 And whilst the Hitler portrait in 
Kindheitsmuster was deliberately burned, one old Breslau resident in Der Himmel 
war unten – a ‘bad German’ – goes out of his way to save an expensively framed 
picture of the Führer from a fire. This painted image then goes on to watch ‘das 
neronische Schauspiel’ of Breslau in flames through ‘starr aufgerissene […] 
Augen, die nicht einmal der Flammenglanz belebt’.722 What Hartung effectively 
draws attention to in this short scene is that a significant section of German 
society did in fact support the Führer and remained defiantly committed to his 
agenda even in the face of defeat and in the full knowledge of its humanitarian 
consequences. 
Interestingly in the current context, Hartung also refers to other ‘bad 
Germans’ but not in connection with the Vertreibungen. For example, he excuses 
the Hitler Jugend (HJ) on the grounds that ‘ein Verbrechen geschieht, nicht durch 
                                                 
717 Hartung, H., Der Himmel war unten, pp. 15, 25. 
718 Ibid. p. 21. 
719 Ibid. pp. 116-17. 
720 Wolf, C., Kindheitsmuster, p. 29. 
721 Hartung, H., Der Himmel war unten, p. 19. 
722 Ibid. p. 179. 
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sie, aber an ihnen’ (my italics).723 Thus, the organisers and leaders of the HJ are 
criminals and therefore not just ‘bad Germans’ but bad people per se. However, 
his comments on Flucht und Vertreibung are more reserved in terms of the ‘good 
Germans versus bad Germans’ topos.  
The first mention of Flucht in Der Himmel war unten is in the context of 
Germans (represented by Regina Schirmer and her young child) fleeing into 
Lower Silesia from the General Government in Poland just before Christmas in 
1944.724 The narrator notes that, at the time, things are still so peaceful in Breslau 
that it is rather difficult for the residents to understand ‘daß sich nicht nur im 
Osten Menschen auf die Flucht machen, sondern, daß sogar im Westen welche 
ans Fliehen denken’.725 However, he does not comment on the refugees’ status in 
terms of ‘good and bad Germans’. It is important to note, however, that in terms 
of their victim status, Germans driven out of the General Government are in a 
fundamentally different category to those driven out of historical German 
territories such as Lower Silesia. 726  Yet Hartung is just as reserved in his 
description of people fleeing from Breslau. In the first such scene, a mother is 
separated from four of her children when the train in which she has placed them 
leaves without her. Once again, Hartung merely recounts the circumstances 
without pathos, pointing out that, at that time, nobody was yet aware that the 
unexpected and involuntary separation of family members was to become a 
frequent and pervasive feature of Germany’s collapse after which ‘wochen-, 
monate-, jahrelang Mütter ihre Kinder, Kinder ihre Mütter suchen werden’.727 
Later in the novel, the narrator describes a refugee trek in detail (the historical 
accuracy of which can be verified on the basis of thousands of photographs and 
eyewitness reports), but again chooses not to problematise it in terms of ‘good 
Germans versus bad Germans’: 
 
Da wandern endlos die Frauen und Kinder. Nur ganz wenige 
Männer sind im Zug. Da sind die Kinderwagen, die 
Rollwägelchen, die Schlitten. Da schleppen welche Bündel in 
Hand und auf dem Rücken. Da mühen sie sich mit Koffern, 
                                                 
723 Ibid. p. 197. 
724 Ibid. pp. 10, 116. See also Joachim Rogall in Bahlcke, J., et al., Schlesien und die Schlesier, p. 164. 
725 Hartung, H., Der Himmel war unten, p. 11. Bombs had fallen Breslau on November 13, 1944 but 'only' 61 people were 
killed. For details see: Siebel-Achenbach, S., Lower Silesia from Nazi Germany to Communist Poland, p. 23. 
726 See Introduction, Section 1.6 
727 Hartung, H., Der Himmel war unten, p. 19. 
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Kisten, Körben. Es ist ein Stöhnen, Schnaufen, Husten, 
Keuchen – kaum einmal fällt ein halblautes Wort.728  
 
Whilst Rönnig is clearly to be reckoned among the ‘good Germans’, any 
unambiguous characterisation of Carlotta in these terms, is problematic. 
Rauchfuss portrays some of her German characters as being ‘good’ or ‘bad’, 
depending upon the extent to which they sympathise with the plight of Jews and 
Poles. In one scene, for example, Arnold Fähndrich (Carlotta’s brother) and his 
father argue over the NSDAP’s treatment of the Jews which Arnold finds 
repugnant. He refers to Adolf Hitler as the ‘Anstreicher aus Braunau’ (an idea 
probably inspired by Bertold Brecht’s habitual public references to the Führer as 
‘the house painter’).729 Carlotta Fähndrich too is portrayed as being a friend and 
supporter of Jews. She refuses, for example, to join the Bund Deutscher Mädels 
(BDM), explaining that ‘sie es Betty [her Jewish friend] nicht antun [konnte]’.730 
Later, when a Polish forced labourer, identifiable by the large ‘P’ sown to her 
garments, tries to run away and is shot dead in one of the main streets of Breslau, 
the narrator expresses disgust at the mind-set of the perpetrators by referring to 
her with bitter irony as ’[ein] Untermensch weniger’, thus invoking and 
subverting a familiar NSDAP trope to accuse the murderers. 731  These scenes 
would suggest that Rauchfuss conceived of her main protagonist, Carlotta, as a 
‘good German’. 
However, other aspects of Carlotta’s behaviour are less easy to categorise 
in such binary oppositions as ‘good Germans versus bad Germans’. For example, 
as soon as the Red Army appears in Lower Silesia she volunteers to work for 
them, despite the Soviet Union’s record of recent atrocities such as the Katyń 
Massacre.732 She also seizes upon the opportunity to work for Polish settlers in 
Lower Silesia, and welcomes a Polish couple into her aunt’s house, even helping 
them to steal her own parents’ money. She then revels in the spectacle of her 
Aunt, an elderly, non-NSDAP-affiliated civilian, being dispossessed of her house 
by this aggressive young couple, and expelled by the (Soviet-Polish) authorities at 
                                                 
728 Ibid. p. 37; Cf., for example: Gleiss, H., Breslauer Apokalypse 1945, pp. 357-58; Bahlcke, J., et al., Schlesien und die 
Schlesier, pp. 164, Fig. 43. 
729 Thomson, P., et al., The Cambridge Companion to Brecht (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 31. 
730 Rauchfuss, H. M., Schlesisches Himmelreich, pp. 191-92, 96; Thomson, P., et al., Cambridge Companion to Brecht, p. 
31. 
731 Rauchfuss, H. M., Schlesisches Himmelreich, p. 541. 
732 Anon., Amtliches Material zum Massenmord von Katyn; Madden, R. J., The Katyn Forest Massacre: Final Report. 
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extremely short notice. Later in the story, she betrays her father in two highly 
problematic scenes. In the first, she fails to come to his aid when she sees him 
being robbed of his boots in the street by Red Army soldiers. Later, she denies 
any relationship with him when he falls foul of Polish militiamen whilst trying to 
smuggle out more of his possessions, during the expulsion event, than the 
occupying forces had permitted. Most abjectly of all, she turns her back on her 
mother, when she (the mother) half jumps, half falls from a moving train, in her 
desperation to remain with her husband, Carlotta’s father.733 By any ‘normal’ 
standards of morality this is reprehensible behaviour. However it is clear from the 
novel’s programmatic objective that the author intends it to be read as 
commendable.734  
It is clear how overt condemnation of the ‘Rolle […der] sowjetischen 
Freunde und Genossen’ during the War may have been regarded as being 
‘wesensfremd’ in SED circles during the 1960s (see above).735 In light of the 
socio-political constraints acting upon GDR authors in the 1960s, one can also 
understand why many of them chose not to question the USSR’s role in the War. 
However, to satisfy the censor, Rauchfuss could simply have omitted all 
references to the Red Army. It is, therefore, far from obvious why she portrays 
Carlotta as actively collaborating with the Red Army during the War, especially 
given the USSR’s invasion of Poland on the 17th of September 1939 in 
collaboration with Nazi Germany. The fact that Rauchfuss was a known Stasi 
informant makes it difficult to read Carlotta’s readiness to serve the interests of 
the Red Army, Polish Militias and incoming Poles as anything other than a 
questionable betrayal of her friends and family, on a par with the actions of many 
other Stasi operatives. Thus, just as Hartung’s problematization of the role of 
German youth in the HJ moves the focus from ‘good or bad’ Germans to ‘good or 
bad’ people per se, Rauchfuss’ portrayal of her protagonist’s active involvement 
in morally dubious activities expands the thrust of the moral question beyond the 
immediate context of the Siege of Breslau and WWII more generally.  
                                                 
733 Rauchfuss, H. M., Schlesisches Himmelreich, pp. 615, 17, 24, 32, 77, 87. 
734 It is, of course, impossible to know what a given author intended at any point in time. However there has been enough 
research carried out on human cognition in the recent past to justify the statement that people have a well-developed ability 
to gauge thoughts of others based on their actions and utterances. See, for example: Gallese, V., 'The 'Shared Manifold' 
Hypothesis: From Mirror Neurons to Empathy', Journal of Consciousness Studies, 5 (2001), 33-50. 
735 Wichner, E., et al., "Literaturentwicklungsprozesse", p. 118. 
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Moreover, it calls into question the epistemological and ontological basis 
of notions of ‘good versus bad’ Germans. Rauchfuss’ inclusion of, from my 
perspective, morally reprehensible actions on the part of Carlotta suggests that, in 
late 1960s GDR culture, a ‘good German’ was deemed to be someone who had 
not only resisted the NSDAP but also actively welcomed and supported the Red 
Army and Poland’s annexation of the ZO.736 Moreover, it was also someone who 
would betray his or her own family as the Stasi required of its informelle 
Mitarbeiter from time to time. This was by no means the case in the FRG in the 
early 1950s when Hartung published Der Himmel war unten. 
To further complicate matters, despite her well-documented defence of 
specific Jews during the NSDAP period, which might usually ‘qualify’ her as a 
‘good German’, Rauchfuss characterises the heruntergekommene Adel, to which 
class the Fähndrichs belong, in essentialist terms more traditionally applied to 
Jews in European literature (i.e., as money-grabbing misers).737 For example, for 
her grandfather, Wilhelm Fähndrich, the safe in his study is a treasure store that 
overshadows all other interests and ‘glich für ihn einem lebendigen Wesen in dem 
ein Herz schlug’. He stores in it the only thing that still interests him, ‘die 
Golddollars‘.738  Similarly, when the announcement is made that Breslau is to 
become a Festung, the bank in which Carlotta works is besieged by people for 
whom ‘Geld, Schmuck, Wertpapiere, Hypothekenbriefe [und] Aktien’ are 
apparently more important than ‘die Rettung des eigenen Lebens.’ 739  Clearly 
Rauchfuss’/the narrator’s sympathies are with the Jewish and Polish victims of the 
NSDAP. However, her strategy of inverting NSDAP rhetoric, whilst retaining its 
essentialist, underpinnings (i.e., all Jews are …, all Poles are …, all 
heruntergekommener [deutsche] Adel are…) is highly problematic.  
The foregoing analysis reveals several instances of the ‘good versus bad 
Germans’ topos in both Der Himmel war unten and Schlesisches Himmelreich. 
                                                 
736 I am fully aware of the fact that ‘my perspective’ entails a culturally inculcated sense of morality, which cannot be 
placed on a sound philosophical footing. Nevertheless, the same can be said of every moral perspective, and my own is the 
only one of which I can speak with authority and upon which I can form moral judgements. 
737 Some of the better known examples are Shylock in The Merchant of Venice, Fagin in Oliver Twist, Veitel Itzig in Soll 
und Haben. 
738 Wilhelm Fähndrich specifically thinks of the safe in his study as an Aladdin’s cave, and this Middle Eastern reference is 
interesting in this context. By the time of publication at the latest (1968), the Middle East was a region firmly established in 
the minds of many Europeans, and indeed Zionists, as the Jewish homeland. The State of Israel had been established and 
formerly recognised (by the United Nations) by 1949. The new state had already fought several wars in the intervening 
period (1948 and 1956) and most recently, in relation to the year in which the novel was published, in 1967.  
739 Rauchfuss, H. M., Schlesisches Himmelreich, pp. 191-92, 510-11, 34-35. 
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However, the differences are striking. Hartung regards members of the HJ as 
victims of a crime perpetrated by the NSDAP, and therefore as ‘good Germans’ 
based on the ‘qualification criteria’ alluded to above. Conversely, by saying that 
Carlotta would have been betraying her Jewish friend by joining the BDM, 
Rauchfuss is implying criminal agency (or at least active immorality) on the part 
of the child members of such NSDAP youth groups. This would make them ‘bad 
Germans’ in the terms set out in this chapter. The two authors also differ in 
relation to the subject of Flucht und Vertreibung. Hartung merely presents the 
facts in the form of a verifiably accurate reportage.  
By contrast, Rauchfuss presents as commendable the fact that her alter ego 
Carlotta actively sides with and collaborates with those carrying out the 
expulsions and concomitant expropriations, and turns her back on members of her 
own family caught up in these events. Carlotta expresses her contempt for her 
parents as ‘bad Germans’ by denying her father when he is arrested for trying to 
take more of his property with him than is permitted by the expelling authorities, 
and ignoring her mother’s plight when she falls from the train in which she is 
being expelled. 
What the foregoing analysis demonstrates is that notions of ‘good and bad 
Germans’ reflect culturally informed rather than absolute categories. As such, 
they are too simplistic to be useful in historic or epistemological analyses. 
However, they are relevant to the analysis of discourses concerning the Flucht 
und Vertreibung of Germans from the ZO as expressed in the 
Vertriebenenliteratur of the FRG and GDR because they represent one of the 
ways in which the discourse was framed differently in the two German states. One 
way in which the study of literature can contribute to analyses of specific 
collective memory discourses is by revealing culturally-informed differences in 
relation to concepts expressed at the ontological level. 
 
6.5 Concluding Remarks 
In the course of the foregoing analysis, I have provided some preliminary answers 
to some of the research questions set out in the introduction to this chapter. 
Section 6.1 details some of the ways in which German armed forces, including 
NSDAP agents and Wehrmacht soldiers, directly contributed towards the acute 
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symmetric trauma in Lower Silesia that triggered the collective memory discourse 
with which this thesis is concerned. Decisions taken by both the NSDAP and the 
Wehrmacht resulted directly in the death and injury of German civilians, and 
account for a significant proportion of German victims of Flucht und Vertreibung.  
As demonstrated in Sections 6.3 and 6.4, works of literature contribute to 
collective memory discourses and the creation of hegemonic historical narratives 
by providing cultural space for the development of topoi at three levels (narrative, 
explanatory, ontological). Topoi that work at the ontological level (e.g. ‘good 
versus bad Germans’) have the potential to ossify into generally accepted ‘facts’. 
As such, they could influence the thrust of grand explanatory narratives that 
compete for inclusion in hegemonic historical narratives, which embody the 
prevailing explanation of a set of purported facts. Those topoi that work at the 
explanatory level (e.g. a Marxist explanatory framework) can compete directly for 
a place within a given hegemonic historical narrative.  
Sections 6.3 and 6.4 also shed light on how different socio-political 
conditions constrain and influence the production of literary contributions to 
collective memory discourses on Flucht und Vertreibung. A close reading of the 
similarities and differences between shared topoi in the works of East and West 
German authors demonstrates that, far from generating their own frameworks of 
reference based on specific traumatic events, collective memory discourses are 
exquisitely sensitive to broader socio-political narratives. In the next chapter, I 
turn to Polish and Polish-Jewish literature to follow the collective memory 
discourse engendered by the forced resettlement of Poles (and others) in the 
annexed areas in non-German contexts. This aspect of Poland’s postwar frontier 
changes and the concomitant sociocide has not, to my knowledge, received 
serious attention in the relevant Anglophone corpus. 
 216 
7: Lived Complexity 
 
7.1 Introduction 
Despite the many differences between the ways in which the subject of Flucht und 
Vertreibung from the ZO is treated in the works of East and West German 
authors, there are similarities. One of the most noticeable of these, not 
unexpectedly, is the consistent focus on the fate of the outgoing German 
population rather than on that of the (in the case of Silesia) mostly Polish 
incomers. In this chapter, I focus instead on literary representations of the plight 
of Poles expelled from the Kresy and obliged to begin their lives anew within the 
ZO.740 
The literary corpus explored below, contributes to collective memory 
narratives of Poland’s resettlement programme within the ZO and hints at some of 
the inter-personal complexities involved. 741  The authors, whose texts I have 
chosen to analyse in relation to the research questions set out in Section 7.1.1 
below, represent a broad cross section of the stakeholders directly affected by the 
transfer of the ZO to Poland and the loss of the Kresy to the USSR.742 Moreover, I 
have selected the authors and texts such that birth and publication dates align 
chronologically in exactly the same order. In combination with ethno-cultural and 
locational differences (i.e. place of birth, upbringing and subsequent residence), 
this strategy of dual-chronological alignment is useful for comparative purposes.  
For example, Józef Hen and Leonie Ossowski were both born in the 
interbellum period. Their respective works under review below, on the other hand, 
were published during the Cold War. Hen published his novel just prior to, and 
Ossowski hers shortly after, the recognition of the Oder-Neisse Line by the FRG, 
which cleared the way for the era of Heimattourismus (with which Ossowski’s 
                                                 
740 In particular I focus on Poles from East Galicia although, as pointed out in the Introduction to this thesis, Polish settlers 
in Lower Silesia came from all over Poland as well as the Kresy, in addition to which other ethnic groups, including the 
Lemkos and Ukrainians as well as Greek refugees, were settled in the region. 
741 Due to its relative scarcity in English translation, I refer to the Dutch translation throughout this thesis: Hen, J., De Wet 
en de Vuist; Zagajewski, A., Two Cities, trans. Lillian Vallee (Athens, Georgia: University Georgia Press, 1991); Chwin, 
S., Death in Danzig, trans. Philip Boehm (London: Secker & Warburg, 2004 [1995]); Tokarczuk, O., House of Day, House 
of Night; Bator, J., Sandberg; Janesch, S., Katzenberge; Ossowski, L., Weichselkirschen. 
742 The authors of the corpus discussed below include a Polish Jew, Józef Hen (born in Warszawa in 1923), one member of 
the German landed gentry, Leonie Ossowski (born in Röhrsdorf in Lower Silesia in 1925), four Poles, born and raised 
within the ZO, Adam Zagajewski (born in Gliwice in Upper Silesia 1945), Stefan Chwin (born in Gdańsk in 1949), Olga 
Tokarczuk (born in Sulechów in Lower Silesia in 1962), and Joanna Bator (born in Wałbrzych in Lower Silesia in 1968), 
and a third-generation author, Sabrina Janesch (born in Gifthorn in Germany in 1985), of more complex parentage, being 
the daughter of a Polish mother of Polish-Galician extraction and a German father. NB: References here to Lower and 
Upper Silesia refer to historic German divisions, which do not map directly onto modern Polish voivodships. 
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novel is concerned). In another example, both Adam Zagajewski and Stefan 
Chwin were born in the immediate postwar era whilst their texts, which I analyse 
in this chapter, were published post-Wende. Olga Tokarczuk and Joanna Bator 
were also born during the Cold War but towards the period of peak tensions 
shortly before the era of détente ushered in by Brandt’s Ostpolitik. Like those of 
Zagajewski and Chwin, Tokarczuk’s novel was published in the immediate post-
Wende era, whilst Bator’s was published, like that of Sabrina Janesch, around the 
cusp of the transition to the second decade of the twenty-first century.  
In many ways, Janesch, the youngest of this selection of authors, both in 
terms of her date of birth (immediate pre-Wende) and the publication date of the 
novel under consideration (at the time of writing, still describable as ‘the 
present’), could form the centre of an imaginary star diagram connecting the rest 
of my chosen authors and the corpus under discussion. At a biographical level, for 
example, her mixed heritage (German-Polish) is not dissimilar from that of Hen 
(Polish-Jewish), and Chwin (Polish-Lithuanian). More obviously, she shares the 
central location of her novel, Lower Silesia, with Bator, Ossowski, and 
Tokarczuk. In addition, like Sandberg, House of Day, House of Night, and 
Weichselkirschen, Janesch’s Katzenberge touches upon the topos of the treasure 
hunt (see below). In common with Weichselkirschen, Katzenberge addresses the 
notion of Polish ‘stewardship’ of German heritage in Lower Silesia, and, although 
written in two different genres, both Zagajewski and Janesch problematize inter-
generational differences of perspective with respect to the lost Heimat (Lwów in 
both cases), and the area of resettlement (Upper and Lower Silesia respectively). 
Interestingly, Janesch, whose mixed German-Polish (Galician) parentage and 
familial ties and third-generation perspective provide her with an inter-cultural 
vantage point not easily obtainable through study alone, can also be productively 
compared with Ossowski (German) and Tokarczuk (Polish) on the basis of their 
use of magical realism in the novels under consideration. And finally, at a more 
tentative level, Chwin’s novel, the only one not set in some part of Silesia (which 
I have included for comparative purposes), is focused on Danzig/Gdańsk, whilst 
Janesch has been Gdańsk’s first ‘writer in residence’ since 2009.  
As the following analysis will show, other, equally interesting parallels 
can be discerned between the other authors and texts under consideration. In 
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addition, whilst I do not pursue them in the current thesis, useful connections and 
comparisons can be made between the two texts set outside of Lower Silesia, 
included in this chapter for comparative purposes, – Two Cities and Death in 
Danzig – and the oeuvre of Horst Bienek (1930-1980) and Günter Grass (1927-
2015), respectively. 
My decision to approach collective memories of the transfer of the ZO 
from Germany to Poland and the loss of the Kresy to the USSR through the 
medium of literature was primarily motivated by a pronounced dearth of official 
sources relating specifically to the Polish expellees as a separate collective within 
the broader category of Polish settlers in the ZO. According to Philipp Ther, very 
little research was carried out in Poland into the Polish expellees as a distinct 
group prior to the 1990s.743 This was partially due to the censor who watched over 
the officially propagated version of events. This propaganda asserted that the 
population exchanges between Poland and the USSR, and the subsequent 
integration within the ZO of Poles relocated from the Kresy, had been successful 
and voluntary, and underplayed the role of anti-Polish pogroms in encouraging 
the mass migration of Poles out of the Kresy. The following words from a 
member of the Polish government exemplify this optimistic narrative: 
 
[Even] the peasants from the other side of the River Bug who 
were probably the most hostile to us [the PPR], saw a better life 
opening up before them when they entered the Recovered 
Territories.744  
 
The government’s insistence on the success of these actions is 
understandable given the TRJN’s active collaboration with the Soviet authorities 
in the bi-directional transfer of various ethnic groups out of and into the Kresy.745 
Any hint of failure associated with these territorial and population exchanges 
would have seriously undermined the TRJN’s position. 746  It was, therefore, 
politically expedient to insist upon the rapid success of the measure and to 
                                                 
743 Ther, P., Deutsche und polnische Vertriebene, p. 14. 
744 Jakub Barman, Undersecretary of the State in the Presidium of the Council of Ministers, quoted in: Siebel-Achenbach, 
S., Lower Silesia from Nazi Germany to Communist Poland, p. 149. 
745 Brandes, D., et al., Lexikon der Vertreibungen, pp. 517, 673-75. 
746 See Chapters 3 and 4 for a reminder of the challenges to the TRJN’s legitimacy that existed in the early postwar period. 
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underplay the difficulties involved. 747  As a result, the latter are not well 
documented in the official record.748  
Initially, the Polish expellees had been euphemistically referred to as the 
‘Repatriates’. But soon after the War they start to appear more frequently in 
official reports under the collective label ‘Settlers’, a term that also applied to 
internal immigrants from Central Poland. This made sense, in terms of social 
planning, as the legal status of both groups had been equalised by the end of 1946. 
However, it also means that the Kresy expellees, as a separately identifiable 
group, virtually vanished from the official record and therefore from historical 
accounts.749 
It is largely due to this circumstance that many aspects of the subject of 
the Polish resettlement in, and appropriation of, the ZO remain virtually untreated 
in Anglophone and German historiography.750 Historians wishing to carry out 
research in this field have had to turn to less common sources of information. 
Much of the information about the immediate postwar situation within the ZO 
which Ther includes in his monograph Deutsche und polnische Vertriebene 
(1998), for example, comes from archived entries to writing competitions held 
under the auspices of government-backed research institutes within the ZO. The 
purpose of these contests was to obtain publishable accounts from the ‘Settlers’ 
that would support the officially propagated story of success. Yet, as Ther 
recounts,  
[viele] Autoren nahmen […] kein Blatt vor den Mund, deshalb 
sind vor allem die Einsendungen von Interesse, die nicht oder 
[nur] zensiert veröffentlicht wurden751 
  
Thus, the current historic record on the events in question is informed, to a 
considerable extent, by literary texts specifically produced to create a collective 
narrative and support the TRJN’s Piast Formula. However, as Ther’s account 
                                                 
747 It is not my intention here to suggest that the TRJN did not achieve some remarkably rapid progress within the ZO, 
which was entirely in line with their propaganda of success. In some areas the situation was quickly stabilised following the 
cessation of hostilities. In Breslau, for example, the electrical supply, telephones and gasworks had all been partially 
restored to a serviceable condition by the 22nd of August 1945. In addition, schools for the children of Polish incomers 
were already operating throughout Lower Silesia by the 1st of September 1945. See: Thum, G., Uprooted, pp. 66-67; 
Siebel-Achenbach, S., Lower Silesia from Nazi Germany to Communist Poland, p. 153. 
748 Ther, P., Deutsche und polnische Vertriebene, pp. 13-15, 21. 
749 Ibid. p. 26. 
750 A number of focused case studies have been published since the Wende, the most interesting examples of which directly 
compare German and Polish experiences in the same small town or village. For an example of this genre see: Halicka, B., 
et al., Aurith - Urad: Zwei Dörfer an der Oder/Dwie wioski nad Odra (Potsdam: Deutsches Kulturforum, 2009). 
751 Ther, P., Deutsche und polnische Vertriebene, p. 22. 
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indicates, some of these early sources already evince a considerable degree of 
resistance to the TRJN’s positive narrative on the part of the ‘Settlers’, which, as I 
demonstrate below, continues to find an echo in modern Polish literature 
produced by authors with a personal connection to the ZO. 
Other Anglophone and German studies of the transition period, such as 
Sebastian Siebel-Achenbach’s Lower Silesia from Nazi Germany to Communist 
Poland, 1942-1949 (1994), Zwischen Stettin und Szczecin: Metamorphosen einer 
Stadt von 1945 bis 2005 (2010) by Jan Musekamp, and Gregor Thum’s Fremde 
Stadt (2011), focus on socio-political issues rather than engaging with less easily 
studied human factors at the personal, emotional and subjective levels.752 They, 
therefore, contribute towards the construction of a depersonalised historical 
framework within which the relevant collective memory discourse is conducted. 
Moreover, like other historical accounts, these texts tend slightly to favour 
narrative homogenisation over lived complexity. 753  By contrast, one of my 
overriding objectives in this chapter is to draw attention to the fundamental 
difference between the heterogeneous character of individual lived experience and 
the emotionally impoverished narratives that often become enshrined in 
hegemonic historical narratives. In order to do so, I analyse some of the ways in 
which such lived experience has been reimagined in a selection of Polish and 
German literature relating to the Polish resettlement of the ZO and loss of Heimat 
in the Kresy, and the concomitant sociocide.754 
To be clear, it is emphatically not my intention here to treat these works of 
literature as historical sources. Instead, I contend that, given the dearth of 
historical sources about the arrival of Polish expellees in the ZO, it is interesting 
to analyse the literary oeuvre of authors with a personal involvement in the events 
                                                 
752 Siebel-Achenbach, S., Lower Silesia from Nazi Germany to Communist Poland; Musekamp, J., Zwischen Stettin und 
Szczecin: Metamorphosen einer Stadt von 1945 bis 2005 (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2010); Thum, G., Uprooted. 
753 Whilst it may be contested that historical simplification is necessary in the pursuit of comprehensible narratives, it is my 
contention that the loss of complexity that this process entails results in a product – historical texts – which bears little 
resemblance or relevance to the events it purports to narrate. The academic subject of Cultural Studies differs from History 
in that it attempts to preserve and live with the inherent complexity of lived experience. Viewed in this light, the pursuit of 
Cultural Studies addresses a clear problem within, and usefully augments, existing historical scholarship. In fairness, 
however, I do not wish to overstate the differences between History and Cultural Studies, as the boundaries between these 
two disciplines are often extremely flexible. 
754 A key finding of my research into the subject of collective memory is that historical accounts tend to simplify, for 
example, through the imposition of a periodic subdivision of the event chronology, and by focusing on the collective at the 
expense of the individual. In such narratives, entire nations are often sublimated under titular states, which are, in turn, 
treated like sentient organisms guided by a single will. Thus, ‘Germany’ invaded Poland rather than certain specific 
Germans participated in the invasion of Poland. Literature, as I show in the following analysis, resists such simplification 
and preserves complexity. Indeed, I have already discussed Hugo Hartung’s rejection of any overriding explanatory 
narrative in Der Himmel war unten, which offers a good example of one of the possible strategies available to authors 
interested in the preservation of complexity. 
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in question in terms of its contribution to collective memory discourses and the 
establishment of hegemonic historical narratives. This is particularly true of works 
of literature that exemplify two peculiarly Polish genres, ‘the literature of small 
homelands’ and ‘the literature of lost homelands’. Both of these genres are based 
on personal memories of actual places, whereby the former deals with those that 
are still accessible at the time of writing (i.e. they are located in the Polish 
People's Republic) whilst the latter refers to areas in the Kresy to which access 
was restricted after 1945.755 Moreover, rather than merely reflecting the relevant 
collective memory discourse, this body of work forms an integral part of it, often 
juxtaposing shifting cultural narratives and, to a greater or lesser degree from 
case-to-case, providing insights into the authors’ own understanding of the issues 
involved at the time of writing. 
 
7.1.1 Research Questions 
In order to productively interrogate the literary corpus I have selected for this 
chapter, I analyse it in relation to four specific research questions: to what extent 
does the Polish literature analysed in this chapter support the TRJN’s portrayal of 
the ZO as a regained Polish homeland, and of its annexation and the concomitant 
Vertreibung of the German population as a matter of historical expediency rather 
than as simple revenge for recent German atrocities in Poland (Piast Formula)? 
Are there any examples of shared topoi between German and Polish literature 
relating to sociocide, the ZO and/or Kresy, and, if so, how do they function within 
the relevant collective memory discourse? What are some of the ways in which 
Polish literature about life in the ZO characterises Germans and the German 
heritage within the region? What can one learn by comparing literary texts from 
different eras by authors of different backgrounds in relation to intergenerational 
perspectives on the impact of Flucht und Vertreibung? 
 
7.2 The Corpus: the Authors 
Before moving on to address these questions I shall briefly introduce the authors 
and texts upon which I base my analysis. The texts are introduced in 
chronological order based on their publication dates, and I include more 
                                                 
755 Stańczyk, E., 'Polish Contact Zones', pp. 51-52. 
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information about Józef Hen than about the other authors to reflect both his longer 
personal involvement in the historic events in question and his more complex 
social position as a Polish Jew under German and Soviet occupation and in the 
People’s Republic. 
 
7.2.1 Józef Hen: Toast (1964) 
Born into a Jewish family in Warsaw in 1923, Józef Henryk Cukier permanently 
changed his name to Józef Hen in 1945 and no longer answers to what he refers to 
as his ‘prewar name’ (sic).756 His wartime diaries have met with critical acclaim, 
and, since the War, he has worked as a journalist, author, and film producer. He is 
an eyewitness to, and a recognised authority on, the Polish and Soviet military re-
conquest of Poland and annexation of the part of the ZO that runs adjacent to the 
Oder and Neisse rivers.757  
As a Jew, Hen and his family suffered decades of unrelenting persecution 
both under the German and Soviet occupiers of his native Poland and later under 
postwar Polish governments. His mother survived the Holocaust but was 
incarcerated in the Warsaw Ghetto before being sent to work in a German 
ammunition factory in Skarżysko-Kamienna. 758  His father was initially 
incarcerated in a concentration camp at Majdanek before spending some time at 
the same munitions factory where his mother had worked. However, he never 
returned after the war and Hen presumes that he may have been one of many men 
massacred near Częstochowa just before the end of the War, or else that he was 
murdered in Buchenwald.759 His mother’s mother ‘died soon after the Germans 
entered Warsaw’ and her father was deported to Treblinka and was never seen or 
heard of again.760 His sister Mirka was gassed in a death camp (Hen has not said 
where this was). 761  All of these close family members were victims of the 
NSDAP, but his brother Hipek was arrested by the Soviet People's Commissariat 
for Internal Affairs or Narodnyy Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del (NKVD) and 
‘disappeared somewhere in Russia after a stay in a Soviet prison camp in 
                                                 
756 Hen, J., 06.08.2014, Questions for Józef Henryk Cukier on the novel Toast (Email). 
757 Hen, J., De Wet en de Vuist.See back cover; Prażmowska, A., Civil war in Poland, 1942-1948, pp. xiii-xiv. 
758 Hen, J., Nowolipie Street, trans. Krystyna Boron (Bethesda, USA: DL Books LLC, 2012 [1991]), pp. 4, 55-56. 
759 Ibid. pp. 55-56. 
760 Ibid. p. 22. 
761 Hen, J., De Wet en de Vuist. Biographical information on the back cover; Hen, J., Questions for Józef Henryk Cukier on 
the novel Toast. 
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Rybińsk’. 762  Hen never discovered what happened to him. The NKVD also 
arrested his other sister Stella and deported her to Yakutia (in the eastern USSR), 
which saved her from the Holocaust. 763  After the war, Hen himself faced 
censorship and persecution at the hands of the Polish authorities.764 According to 
Hen, this was an era of rampant anti-Semitism in Poland during which many 
Holocaust survivors were encouraged to leave the country so that ‘[in] 1968, the 
last remaining Jews appeared again at the Gdańsk station, from which the trains 
departed to Israel via Vienna.’765 Although officially denied for many decades, the 
Polish government now fully acknowledges the existence of an anti-Jewish socio-
political climate in the Polish People’s Republic.766  
As a boy, Hen attended the ‘military training school for kids’ (cadets) and 
later became an ‘attentive and disciplined soldier’ when the war forced him to join 
the army.767 Cadet training for boys began in the final year of the gimnazjum (i.e. 
at the age of 15-16) and was welcomed by many simply for the increased respect 
one gained among other young people by appearing in a smart uniform. 768 
However, things became more serious following the German and Soviet invasions 
in 1939. Not yet sixteen years of age, Hen’s first quasi-military post was as the 
building commander’s liaison assistant in the opening days of the September 
campaign.769 This position came to entail a high level of responsibility during the 
subsequent bombing of Warsaw. Shortly afterwards, having died his hair blonde 
in a successful attempt to disguise his Jewish appearance, Hen crossed into 
Soviet-held territory the day before his sixteenth birthday (7th of November 
1939).770 His movements after this are difficult to reconstruct in detail as his own 
recollection is fading and the relevant events are reflected piecemeal throughout 
                                                 
762 Hen, J., Nowolipie Street, p. 4. 
763 Ibid. p. 290. 
764 Hen, J., Nowolipie: Eine jüdische Straße, Reclam-Bibliothek (Leipzig: Reclam, 1996), p. 290; Hen, J., Questions for 
Józef Henryk Cukier on the novel Toast; Hen, J., 04.11.2014, Visit to London (Email); Krzoska, M., Ein Land unterwegs: 
Kulturgeschichte Polens seit 1945 (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schönigh, 2015), pp. 106-08. 
765 Hen, J., Nowolipie Street, p. 88. 
766 Of the 300,000 Polish Jews who survived the Holocaust (out of a population of 3.5 million) and were living in Poland in 
1945, only 1055 remained by the time of the 2002 census. The rest left Poland in three waves in 1945-1948, 1957-1959 and 
finally 1968-1970 ‘as a result of anti-Zionist, anti-Semitic … battue)’. See: Wolnicz-Pawłowska, E., et al., Toponymic 
Guidelines of Poland, p. 42. 
767 Hen, J., Nowolipie Street, pp. 11, 187. 
768 It would be interesting, but beyond the scope of this thesis, to look into the extent to which German boys were motivated 
to join the HJ by similar, non-ideological considerations. See: ibid. p. 237. 
769 Ibid. p. 249. 
770 Notwithstanding the scientific merits of this situation, it appears that, all other things being equal, racists (German and 
Polish) were less likely to suspect a blonde-haired individual of being a Jew. See: ibid. p. 279. 
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his, largely autobiographical oeuvre. In his partial autobiography Nowolipie Street 
(2012 [1991]), for example, Hen describes a minor incident that took place in 
1942 whilst patrolling near to the Don River in the USSR (in a town called 
Millerovo), but does not say with which force he was serving nor what rank he 
held at the time.771 What we do know for certain is that his wartime Odyssey took 
him to Samarkand and Tashkent in Uzbekistan, as well as to Russia, Sumy in the 
Ukraine, and other regions within the USSR. In Tashkent, he was refused entry 
into the so-called Anders Army for his Jewish ethnicity.772 As this Polish army, 
which was originally established in the USSR following the German incursion 
into Soviet occupied Poland in 1941, was dispatched to the Middle East in 1942, 
we know that he must have been in Tashkent between these two dates.773 He had 
more luck in joining the so-called Berling Army, a ‘leftist’ Polish army 
established in the USSR in 1943 that merged with the underground People's Army 
or Armia Ludowa (AL) in 1944 to form the Polish People's Army or Ludowe 
Wojsko Polskie (LWP).774 It was as a member of this force that Hen ‘took part in 
the last offensive to cross the Neisse River in April 1945’.775 
Hen’s oeuvre is considered so realistic, that at least one of his books – 
Skromny Chłopiec w Haremie (1957) – was translated by the Pentagon for the 
insights it provided into life behind the Iron Curtain. 776  As noted in the 
Introduction to this thesis, Hen specifically states that much of his oeuvre is based 
on barely fictionalised historical events and that his novels and short stories ‘show 
the atmosphere […] in Poland just after the end of WWII’.777 It is, therefore, with 
a reasonable degree of confidence that I turn to his 1964 novel Toast to gain an 
impression of one of the ways in which Poland’s annexation of the ZO was 
accomplished, and how it has been remembered in Polish literature. 
                                                 
771 Ibid. p. 191. 
772 For a brief introduction to the so-called Anders Army see: Kuczyński, S. K., et al., A Panorama of Polish History, p. 
136. 
773 Davies, N., Heart of Europe, p. 82. 
774 Hen, J., De Wet en de Vuist. Biographical information on the back cover; Hen, J., Questions for Józef Henryk Cukier on 
the novel Toast; For the so-called Berling Army see: Davies, N., Heart of Europe, p. 83. 
775 Hen, J., Questions for Józef Henryk Cukier on the novel Toast; Hen, J., 12.08.2014, Questions on Nowolipie Street 
(1991) (Email); Hen, J., 20.11.2014, The Family of Józef Hen (Email).  
776 Hen translates the title as 'A Modest Boy In Harem'. The book is about a visit he made in 1957 as a correspondent for 
the Świat weekly newspaper to Tashkent and Samarkand to see some of his wartime comrades. See: Hen, J., Visit to 
London. 
777 Hen, J., Questions on Nowolipie Street; Hen, J., 12.10.2014, Response to "Compliment on your short stories" (Email); 
Hen, J., Visit to London; Hen, J., 02.11.2014, Cider with Rosie (Email). 
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Toast, also released in film under the name Prawo i pięść (The Law and 
the Fist) describes the violent, planned military takeover of a fictional town in 
German Silesia in the immediate postwar period. 778  The protagonist, whose 
appearance, character and role in the plot Hen modelled on the sheriff played by 
Gary Cooper in the film High Noon (1952), is Henryk König (Polish despite his 
German surname).779 König, we learn, had been picked up in a general raid by the 
German authorities during the War and given the opportunity to be entered in the 
Volksliste as an ethnic German. Having declined ‘that particular pleasure’ (a piece 
of information, which, in the context of the novel, indicates a high level of 
personal courage and integrity) he was arrested and sent to Buchenwald 
concentration camp.780 Immediately after the War, König is deployed to the ZO as 
a member of a government paramilitary task force, whose job it is to seize the 
German town of Graustadt, the majority of whose German residents had already 
left.781 König’s group, under the command of a petty criminal named Mielecki, is 
ordered to secure the town and everything in it and make it habitable for Polish 
evacuees from the Kresy, who are bivouacking at a nearby railway station.782 
Mielecki is determined take the opportunity to enrich himself instead of guarding 
the real estate and infrastructure for the Polish people but clashes with König, 
who reveals himself to be staunch supporter of the new state and the TRJN, and 
believes in a rapid return to normality.783  
At the ontological level, Hen’s decision to set the novel in a plausible, but 
fictional location within a broader real-world region serves to remove the events 
described in the novel from the stream of historical reality, thus potentiating its 
symbolic significance. One way in which this symbolic potential is then realised 
is the inclusion a large statue of Frederick the Great II (der große Fritz) on 
horseback, which dominates the market square in Graustadt. In fact, the only such 
statue extant in 1945 was located in Berlin. At the narrative level, Hen’s inclusion 
                                                 
778 It is interesting to note that, although Hen has chosen to set his narrative in the fictional town of Graustadt, he has has 
also invented a Polish toponymn ‘Siwowo’ for the town. This reflects the contemporary toponymic situation in the ZO (see 
Chapter 5) and, arguably, supports a reading of the novel as aspiring to a high degree of verisimilitude. 
779 Hen, J., Questions for Józef Henryk Cukier on the novel Toast; for an interesting use of the same character in a more 
recent Polish cultural product, see: Sarnecki, T., Political poster featuring Gary Cooper to encourage votes for the 
Solidarity Party (Solidarność) in the 1989 elections, ed. plakat_wyborczy_1989-w_samo_poludnie.jpg (1989). 
780 Hen, J., De Wet en de Vuist, pp. 19-20. 
781 Ibid. p. 19. 
782 Ibid. pp. 19, 21. 
783 Ibid. p. 68; Theisen, A., Die Vertreibung der Deutschen, p. 9; Brandes, D., et al., Lexikon der Vertreibungen, pp. 144-
49. 
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of a statue known only to exist in Berlin in a fictional location in the ZO 
symbolises Poland’s victory over German militarism per se.  
 
7.2.2 Adam Zagajewski: Two Cities (1991) 
Whilst not an eyewitness to the expulsion of Poles from the Kresy, Adam 
Zagajewski, who was born in Gliwice in 1945, certainly lived through the period 
of adjustment and settling in, during which he was in intimate contact with the 
victim community (i.e. Polish expellees from the Kresy).784 When Zagajewski’s 
family arrived in Gliwice it was still occupied by the Red Army which, as Siebel-
Achenbach has made clear, was no guarantee of law and order or civil 
obedience. 785  Nevertheless, many members of Zagajewski’s extended family 
managed to locate each other in and around Gliwice, and, together with other 
expellees from East Galicia, succeeded in establishing a Polish community among 
the ruins of the former German city.786  
In Two Cities (1991), Zagajewski narrates the events surrounding the 
forced eviction of his own parents and sister from Lwów in October 1945, just 
four months before his own birth, and their subsequent resettlement in Gliwice, 
where he grew up. Two Cities is an autobiographical essay, and therefore makes 
an explicit claim to historical authenticity. In terms of my analytical framework 
outlined in Chapter 2 (Section 2.2), this text is of most interest at the ontological 
level, where its claim to historical authenticity differs markedly from Hen’s novel 
with its conscious fictionalisation of the location of the action. Nevertheless, 
although it is presented as an autobiography, the book reads like a novel because 
of the author’s poetic turn of phrase and the imagery he employs to conjure up the 
scenes and feelings of his childhood. It is very reminiscent of the ‘small 
homelands literature’ described above, focussing on local specifics as well as the 
topoi of settling in and alienation.787 It is highly illuminating to contrast this non-
fictional text with fictional works that engage with the same subject matter, which 
I do in the course of the following analysis. 
 
                                                 
784 Zagajewski, A., Two Cities, pp. 3-68. 
785 Siebel-Achenbach, S., Lower Silesia from Nazi Germany to Communist Poland, p. 158. 
786 Zagajewski, A., Two Cities, p. 12. 
787 Stańczyk, E., 'Polish Contact Zones', pp. 50-51. 
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7.2.3 Stefan Chwin: Death in Danzig (1995) 
Stefan Chwin was born in Gdańsk in 1949, where he continues to live. He makes 
his living as a novelist and essayist, whereby his portrayal of life in the ZO during 
the transition period has been particularly well received. In 1997, he was awarded 
the Danziger Erich-Brost Preis specifically ‘für seine herausragende literarische 
Bearbeitung des Verhältnisses von Deutschen und Polen nach dem Zweiten 
Weltkrieg in Danzig und Umgebung’.788  
Although not set in Lower Silesia, Death in Danzig (1995) provides useful 
and interesting insights into comparable experiences of the arrival of Polish 
refugees in other previously predominantly German populated areas within the 
ZO.789 Moreover, the narrative is set in a place and period with which the author 
is demonstrably very familiar from personal experience and addresses subject 
matter in relation to which he is an acknowledged expert. The novel recounts the 
transition of German Danzig to Polish Gdańsk and the integration of one German, 
Doctor Hanemann, in the Polish People’s Republic after 1945. Interestingly, 
Chwin (or rather the narrator) differentiates between Danziger Poles, whom he 
portrays as having much in common with Danziger Germans, and Polish 
immigrants from other regions, whom the native Poles treat with a certain degree 
of scepticism.790 
Chwin’s narrative approach is rather complex. The story is narrated by 
two distinct voices. A third-person omniscient narrator recounts the story until the 
appearance of the another narrative voice on page 69, which does represent an 
active character within the story. From then on, the narrative voice speaks in the 
first-person but remains omniscient (i.e. the narrator retains an insight into the 
minds and hidden actions of third persons).791 Yet, even this already complex 
narrative structure is disrupted by the second narrator, who appears from time to 
time during the first part of the narrative before taking on his role as an active 
character in the novel and its main narrator.792 In addition, for a whole chapter, the 
                                                 
788 Kostyrko, W., Stefan Chwin, 
<http://www.culture.pl/web/english/search?p_p_id=3&p_p_lifecycle=0&p_p_state=normal&p_p_mode=view&p_p_col_id
=column-1&p_p_col_count=1&_3_struts_action=%2Fsearch%2Fsearch>, Accessed on: 19.03.2013; Bünz, H., Die Erich-
Brost-Stiftung in der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung: Aktivitäten in Polen (2003). 
789 Chwin, S., Death in Danzig. 
790 Ibid. p. 131. 
791 Ibid. p. 93. 
792 Ibid. p. 63. 
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narrator speaks as a first-person observer at a time when he is still growing in his 
mother’s womb. 
The central character in the novel is the German Doctor Hanemann, a 
well-respected anatomist, who loses interest in his profession and becomes 
depressed when he enters the dissecting room to give a lecture to a group of 
medical students and unexpectedly finds his girlfriend, Louisa Berger, lying dead 
on the table. Having lost interest in his work he subsequently falls foul of the 
authorities and is dismissed from his position. When the Red Army enters Danzig 
on the 30th of March 1945 he attempts to flee to Hamburg but returns to his home 
after the family he was travelling with is killed by Soviet artillery whilst boarding 
a tug boat in the port of Danzig. He remains in Danzig following its incorporation 
into the Polish People’s Republic, and becomes an object of interest, first to the 
(first-person) narrator, who had been evacuated from Warsaw following the failed 
uprising, and later to a woman who had come to Gdańsk from the Carpathian 
Mountains where she had suffered badly during the War.793 Beyond this basic 
plot, the novel takes the form of a rather loose assemblage of episodes, suffused 
with thought-provoking ideas and given unity by Chwin’s treatment of recurrent 
themes such as death, suicide, transformation, and transition.794 
 
7.2.4 Olga Tokarczuk: House of Day, House of Night, (1998) 
Born in Sulechów in 1962, but now living in Wałbrzych, Olga Tokarczuk, who 
originally trained as a psychologist, is another award winning Polish author. Her 
oeuvre encompasses literature and literary criticism.795 According to Joanna Bator 
(see below) Tokarczuk’s texts ‘undermine the boundary between nature and 
culture, between woman and man, as well as the truth of life and the truth of a 
story.’796 
Her book, House of Day, House of Night (1998) is a ‘hybrid of diverse and 
more or less advanced plots, quasi-essay observations, private notes and the like’ 
                                                 
793 Brandes, D., et al., Lexikon der Vertreibungen, pp. 532-34. 
794 For example, Chwin devotes lengthy sections of the novel to musings on the final days and hours of Heinrich von Kleist 
and to his suicide. See: Chwin, S., Death in Danzig, pp. 118-23, 25-29; and for more on the subject of suicide in Death in 
Danzig see: Lempp, E., Stefan Chwin: Biography, <http://culture.pl/en/artist/stefan-chwin>, Accessed on: 09.08.2014; 
Hofmann, M., Review of Death in Danzig, 
<http://www.theguardian.com/books/2005/mar/05/featuresreviews.guardianreview10>, Accessed on: 11.02.2011. 
795 Klejnocki, J., Olga Tokarczuk Biography, <http://www.polishwriting.net/?s=author&c=tokarczuk>, Accessed on: 
20.09.2012. 
796 Kozioł, P., et al., Olga Tokarczuk, <http://culture.pl/en/artist/olga-tokarczuk>, Accessed on: 26.03.2013. 
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rather than a novel in the accepted sense of the word.797 It is set in Nowa Ruda 
(Neurode), in a part of the ZO close to the Czech border, and addresses ‘the theme 
of the Regained Territories and the impact of the redrawing of state borders.’798 
Predominantly unfolding in the present, the region’s German past is ‘explored 
through flashbacks or “documented” materials’ presented in the form of ‘an oft-
dreamy chronicle woven out of multifariously structured short prose texts’.799 
Several of these chronicle entries involve Germans returning to the town from 
which they had been evicted in 1945, and accounts of Polish-German interactions 
that took place during the immediate postwar period. The book includes elements 
of magical realism and ‘leads us deeper into the mythology of the author’s native 
region’, a complex composite of native Polish and German histories and legends 
with an admixture of folklore from regions such as East Galicia whence the new 
Polish settlers came in 1945.800 
 
7.2.5 Joanna Bator: Sandberg (2009) 
Like the other authors reviewed in this chapter, with the exception of Janesch, 
feminist author Joanna Bator was born (in 1968) and lives in the place in which 
her novel is set.801 In her case, this is Wałbrzych, formerly Waldenburg in Lower 
Silesia, although she also spends lengthy periods living in Japan. According to her 
German publisher, Joanna Bator is ‘die stärkste neue Stimme der polnischen 
Literatur’, an opinion shared by the Association of Polish Publishers from whom 
she received a prize for her novel Sandberg, which I analyse below.802 
According to Paweł Kozioł, Sandberg ‘can be regarded as a history of 
[Wałbrzych], narrated from the perspective of one family and covering about 
thirty years’. 803  Translator Esther Kinsky, a German-born Slavic Studies 
specialist, herself a prize-winning author and translator, has usefully augmented 
the German version of the novel with detailed notes together with a short analysis 
of the plot and the historical context.804  
                                                 
797 Ibid. 
798 Nazarenko, T., 'House of Day, House of Night', p. 324. 
799 Ibid; Taylor, J., 'A Rather Late Letter from Wrocław', The Iowa Review, 38 (2008), 27-41, p. 35. 
800 Jarzębski, J., et al., 'The Decade in Prose', Chicago Review, 46 (2000), 344-56, p. 351. 
801 Kozioł, P., Joanna Bator: Biography, <http://culture.pl/en/artist/joanna-bator>, Accessed on: 09.08.2014. 
802 See publisher's comment in: Bator, J., Sandberg, p. 2. 
803 Kozioł, P., Joanna Bator: Biography, Accessed on: 09.08.2014. 
804 Esther Kinsky in: Bator, J., Sandberg, pp. 483-92. 
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7.2.6 Sabrina Janesch: Katzenberge (2011) 
Sabrina Janesch was born in Gifthorn, Germany in 1985 to a German father and a 
Polish mother, the daughter of East Galician settlers in Lower Silesia.805 Janesch, 
who is fluent in both German and Polish, is currently regarded as an author of 
note in Germany and, among other things, received ‘much media attention as the 
first writer in residence in Danzig, Günter Grass’s city of birth’.806 
According to Janesch, her novel Katzenberge represents a ‘Versatzstück 
der deutschen Gegenwartsliteratur’ and was inspired by several Polish novels 
including ‘Das Tal der Issa, von Czesław Milosz, Tod in Danzig von Stefan 
Chwin, und vielleicht ebenfalls Taghaus, Nachthaus, von Olga Tokarczuk’.807 
The novel is based on the fortunes of Janesch’s own grandparents who fled East 
Galicia to escape one of several Ukrainian-led pogroms in the province.808 Her 
grandparents’ journey ended in the village of Osola (Ritschedorf) near Oborniki 
Śląskie (Obernigk) in Lower Silesia. According to Janesch, some 95% of her 
protagonist Nele’s adventures, on a visit to Lower Silesia and East Galicia, are 
autobiographical, and the remainder of the novel is also biographically 
accurate.809 Katzenberge is set at a point along the collective memory timeline 
that Jan Assmann has called the ‘Epochenschwelle’, a time of transition between 
eyewitnesses to the trigger event, with their own episodic memories of it, and 
those for whom the relevant trauma can only ever be known in the form of 
semantic memories.810 In Katzenberge this transition moment is marked by ‘ein 
Abschiednehmen von der alten Zeit’ when Nele’s grandfather dies and she travels, 
first to Polish Silesia for the funeral, and then to East Galicia in search of clues 
about certain aspects of her grandfather’s past, such as the unexplained 
disappearance of his brother during the post-pogrom migration trek.811 In addition 
to Nele’s own personal investigation of her family’s roots, her mother asks her to 
                                                 
805 Janesch, S., Autobiographical Content in the Novel 'Katzenberge'. 
806Ihmels, I., ‘Who do you think you are?’ Katzenberge (Cat Hills), <http://www.new-books-in-
german.com/english/719/272/272/129002/design1.html>, Accessed on: 24.07.2012; Platthaus, A., Zu Besuch bei Sabrina 
Janesch: Hinter den Fassaden von Danzig, <http://www.faz.net/aktuell/feuilleton/buecher/zu-besuch-bei-sabrina-janesch-
hinter-den-fassaden-von-danzig-11855682.html>, Accessed on: 19.08.2012. 
807 Janesch, S., Autobiographical Content in the Novel 'Katzenberge'. 
808 Sword, K., Poles in the Soviet Union, 1939-48, p. 175; Brandes, D., et al., Lexikon der Vertreibungen, pp. 530, 676-77. 
809 Janesch, S., Autobiographical Content in the Novel 'Katzenberge'. 
810 Jan Assmann in: Berger, K. L., 'The Representation of the Expulsion of Ethnic Germans in German Literature from the 
1950s to the Present', p. 24. 
811 Janesch, S., Katzenberge, p. 17. 
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travel back to her (Nele’s) grandfather’s home village near Lemberg in what is 
now the Ukraine, in order ‘zu sehen, wo wir eigentlich herkommen’, a mildly 
essentialist notion, which Nele roundly rejects: ‘Man brauche keine drei 
Sekunden, um im Internet festzustellen, wo Nele Leibert herkommt. Aus Berlin. 
Basta.’812 
 
7.3 The Piast Formula in Polish Literature 
One way to assess the degree of acceptance of the Piast Formula on the part of 
Polish authors is to analyse the ways in which they narrate the act of taking 
possession of German territory, infrastructure, and property in the ZO.813 As a 
rough proxy I shall posit that narratives in which overt triumphalism and/or 
aggression, on the part of incoming Poles, is foregrounded without being 
problematized, can be interpreted as being supportive of the notion that the Polish 
resettlement of the ZO represented a justifiable regaining of historically Polish 
territory. In addition, I argue that novels that portray the settlement process in 
highly positive terms can be interpreted as supporting the narrative of success in 
relation to the annexation and resettlement of the ZO. Novels that combine these 
features, I suggest, are broadly in line with the TRJN’s Piast Formula.814 
An in-depth reading of the available quasi-autobiographical Polish 
literature on the subject of annexation and settlement of the ZO reveals very few 
examples of overt triumphalism or even Schadenfreude on the part of characters 
and protagonists taking part in these events, or an the part of the narrators. Indeed, 
many of these literary accounts present a differentiated, psychologically complex 
history of the transition, highlighting a sense of alienation, unhappiness, and 
varying levels of cross-cultural tolerance and/or conflict. Explicit inter-ethnic 
violence is largely absent from Polish accounts of the immediate postwar situation 
within the ZO, but Hen’s Toast is an interesting exception to this trend.815  
                                                 
812 Nele’s mother’s suggestion is based in an essentialist paradigm as it suggests that Nele and her mother essentially come 
from the place where their ancestors used to live although neither of them had ever been there. This is not different from 
ascribing the attributes, actions or putative guilt of any one specific member of an ethnic or nationalist group (e.g. Jews or 
Germans) to others on the assumption that they share some essential, inherited quality. See: ibid. pp. 41-42. 
813 My use of the word ‘acceptance’ in this context does not necessarily imply a conscious espousal of the TRJN’s narrative 
on the part of the author. I simply mean to suggest that some texts appear to question the relevant paradigm whilst others 
do not and, therefore, can be thought of as accepting it to some extent.  
814  The reader will recall that certain non-Polish authors, such as Hildegard Maria Rauchfuss, describe the Polish 
appropriation of German homes in just such triumphalist, aggressive terms, apparently with approval. See: Rauchfuss, H. 
M., Schlesisches Himmelreich, pp. 630-36. 
815 Hen, J., De Wet en de Vuist. 
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By contrast with the Polish incomers described in more recent Polish 
fiction (see below), those in Hen’s novel are not hesitant about entering 
abandoned German homes and searching through the former owners’ private 
possessions. On the contrary, they are aggressively assertive about their right to 
do so and cynical in their approach, which suggests support for the TRJN’s 
actions.816 Moreover, Hen’s use of symbolic narrative devices that relate to Piast 
Poland suggests some degree of acceptance of the Piast Formula as an explanation 
for the TRJN’s actions. For example, on the face of it Hen’s choice of a German 
surname, König, for his protagonist is remarkable as it implies an ethnically 
ambiguous character for what was, in effect, a nationalistic role within the plot. In 
postwar Poland a ‘Henryk König’ would have continuously had to explain away 
his German name, as indeed the protagonist in the book has to do on several 
occasions. Moreover, this authorial choice serves no obvious function within the 
plot, and the theme of König’s paternal ancestry is never developed in the course 
of the novel. At the symbolic level, however, the name can be interpreted as 
subverting a specific important episode in the region’s German-Polish history, 
which relates directly to its Piast past. It was the Piast King Henryk I who actively 
encouraged large numbers of German migrants to settle in Lower Silesia, long 
before it reverted to the Holy Roman Empire in 1335.817 Thus, whereas König 
Henryk had helped secure Lower Silesia for German settlers, in the novel, Henryk 
König reversed the process and helped secure it for Polish settlers. 
However, another interesting difference between Hen’s narrative and more 
modern Polish Vertriebenenliteratur is that the former is replete with essentialist 
references designed to represent all Germans as part of an NSDAP perpetrator 
collective, irrespective of their own actions during the War.818 König sums up this 
general paradigm when he says, with reference to an old German man whose 
house he and a comrade had forcibly entered in search of lodgings for the night: 
‘His son gave me a kick in the guts – even if he doesn’t have a son – and he 
                                                 
816 Ibid. p. 39. 
817 It should be noted that Henryk I was actually one of the High Dukes (Supreme Princes) of Poland during the Period of 
Feudal Disintegration. These senior princes aspired to the status of King of Poland but their effective power was severely 
circumscribed. They did, however, carry the succession or 'germline' of the Polish kings during this turbulent period and, 
within the region of Małopolska, ruled as de facto Kings from their centre of power in Cracow. See: Neubach, H., 
Geschichte Schlesiens, p. 6; Wolnicz-Pawłowska, E., et al., Toponymic Guidelines of Poland, p. 30. 
818 See for example: Hen, J., De Wet en de Vuist, p. 42. 
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kicked me and kicked me’.819 This runs counter to the Piast Formula as it suggests 
that the Polish presence and anti-German violence in the ZO is justified as a 
response to atrocities committed by agents of the German Reich during the recent 
occupation of Poland, rather than by rights derived from ancient Polish ownership 
of the region during the Piast period. Indeed, the author further emphasises the 
motive of revenge for recent atrocities by having his protagonist speculate about 
what the expelled Germans might have been thinking in relation to the current 
state of affairs. He wonders whether they might have drawn parallels in their 
minds between their own situations, as they were forced to flee their homes ahead 
of the Red Army, and that of the Poles some five to six years earlier as NSDAP 
agents deported hundreds of thousands of Poles to make room for Baltic Germans 
evacuated under the Hitler-Stalin Pact.820 On balance, whilst certain elements in 
Toast can be interpreted as being broadly in line with the Piast Formula, the action 
is also adequately explainable within a framework of revenge for recent German 
war crimes against Poles. 
By contrast with Hen’s portrayal of an assertive, centrally directed 
annexation of German territory in Toast, the demeanour of the Galician Poles 
arriving in Lower Silesia in Janesch’s Katzenberge is timid and non-assertive. The 
protagonist, Nele’s grandfather Janeczko (a young man at the time), and his 
countrymen, are simply released into the German countryside to fend for 
themselves.821 The only possible way for them to survive is to take possession of 
the vacant German properties in the vicinity, which they do with extreme 
reluctance. To this extent, Katzenberge does not reflect the TRJN’s 
propagandistic portrayal of the population transfers as a triumphant retaking of 
Ur-Polish territory which was achieved rapidly and with a minimum of trauma on 
the part of the incoming Poles. 
On the other hand, Janesch employs various narrative devices to 
emphasise the justifiable nature of Nele’s family’s occupation of German property 
in Lower Silesia, which go beyond the contingencies of immediate survival. In 
one example, Nele’s grandfather finds a copper swastika above the door of the 
house into which he moves, and in which he grudgingly lives right up until his 
                                                 
819 My italics. See: ibid. p. 23. 
820 Brandes, D., et al., Lexikon der Vertreibungen, p. 612. 
821 Janesch, S., Katzenberge, pp. 28-30. 
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death.822 The narrative effect of this is to suggest that German Silesians deserved 
their fate, their Vertreibung and the loss of their property, because they had 
actively supported Hitler.823 However, just as in Toast, this scene works at the 
explanatory level to justify the Polish presence in the ZO on the grounds of recent 
NSDAP atrocities, which does not support the Piast Formula.  
Opportunities for social mobility and well-paid work were objectively 
better for settlers in the ZO during the wave of postwar Stalinist industrialisation 
in the region than they had been in their home regions in the Kresy.824 Yet, far 
from celebrating their newfound prosperity, many of the incomers appear to have 
felt guilty vis-à-vis the displaced Germans. In Katzenberge, Nele’s grandmother 
compares her family’s situation in Lower Silesia to that of the cuckoo ‘indem sie 
sich in ein fremdes Nest setzten und von fremder Arbeit zehrten.’825 As a narrative 
device, Janesch’s inclusion of this scene increases the reader’s sympathy for, and 
empathy with, the Galicians. Janesch shows them to have been cognisant of how 
their German predecessors might have viewed them, and in so doing she 
demonstrates that they were in fact anything but cuckoos, which notoriously treat 
their host families with callous indifference. Janesch portrays the Galician Poles 
as having been mindful of those Germans from whose labour they were so 
unexpectedly benefiting, and represents them as unwilling victims rather than 
perpetrators. Such feelings of guilt and empathy toward the displaced native 
Germans do not support the TRJN’s propaganda of triumph and legitimacy 
derived from ancient rights rooted in the Piast Formula. 
Other scenes in Katzenberge serve to emphasise the complexity of the 
relevant collective memory discourse in Germany at the time of writing, which 
was strongly influenced by historical misconceptions and a lack of understanding 
of the legal situation pertaining to the territorial transfers. Such misconceptions 
transcend the discourse surrounding the Piast Formula and are also not directly 
related to notions of collective or corporate guilt on the part of the German 
Vertriebenen. In one example, the protagonist expresses bemusement at her 
                                                 
822 Ibid. p. 55. 
823 Indeed, throughout Silesia the NSDAP had received a particularly high share of the votes cast in the final election prior 
to the establishment of the Nazi dictatorship. See: Bahlcke, J., et al., Schlesien und die Schlesier, pp. 134-35, 37; Thum, G., 
Uprooted, p. xviii. 
824 Ther, P., Deutsche und polnische Vertriebene, p. 17. 
825 Janesch, S., Katzenberge, p. 103. 
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grandfather’s reluctance to trample through the planted fields he encounters upon 
his arrival in Oborniki. However, her statement ‘[natürlich] gehörten diese Felder 
zu jenem Zeitpunkt schon niemandem mehr’ is rooted in a teleological view of 
history which is both anachronistic as well as historically and legally incorrect.826 
Certainly it was the de facto case that few, if any, of the former proprietors of the 
land in question were ever able to reclaim it. Nevertheless, de jure, it remained 
their property until both German governments formally assented to the secession 
of Lower Silesia to Poland (1950 in the case of the GDR and 1970 in the case of 
the FRG).827 However, of more immediate concern to Polish settlers in the ZO 
was the fact that, as early as the 6th of May 1945, the new Polish government had 
claimed all German movable and immovable property for the Polish state.828 
Thus, it was anything but the case that these fields no longer belonged to anybody 
at the time of her grandfather’s arrival. From the perspective of both the Polish 
and German judiciaries, occupying property and real estate within the ZO did not 
constitute, imply, confer or usually involve, any legal transfer of property rights to 
the new residents, nor was the property deemed to be ownerless. In this example, 
Janesch inadvertently perpetuates a falsehood, which favours one strand of the 
relevant discourse over another. This alerts us to the fact that authors of literature 
are apt to become the unwitting carriers of disinformation or false information if 
their primary historical research happens to be superficial. 829  Moreover, even 
when historical fiction is based on episodic memories, there is no reason to 
assume a priori that the author’s understanding of the historical geopolitical 
situation is any deeper than that of the uninformed layman. 
In House of Day, House of Night, Olga Tokarczuk describes the Poles’ 
arrival, in Neurode and other nearby villages, in very different terms. Whereas 
Hen’s protagonist enters and occupies German territory in the course of an 
aggressive, government-backed paramilitary mission, and Janesch’s protagonists 
are simply abandoned to their own devices to make whatever use they can of 
                                                 
826 Ibid. p. 33. 
827 Neubach, H., Geschichte Schlesiens, p. 32; Theisen, A., Die Vertreibung der Deutschen, p. 3; Großbongardt, A., et al., 
Die Deutschen im Osten Europas, p. 42. 
828 Bahlcke, J., et al., Schlesien und die Schlesier, p. 347. 
829 There is no more reason to assume or demand that authors of historical fiction carry out in-depth research into the 
historical events that form that backdrop to their plots that one would expect a painter to thoroughly acquaint himself or 
herself with the natural or social history of a scene they choose to paint. Indeed, even in paintings by artists renowned for 
the verisimilitude of their oeuvre, such as the Russian Itinerants, compositional considerations take precedence over 
realism. See: Aigner, C., et al., Russland: Repin und die Realisten, trans. Roswitha Fraller (St. Petersburg: Palace Editions, 
2002). 
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deserted German property, the immigrants in House of Day, House of Night are 
forced to share small houses with Germans still awaiting deportation. They are 
met by newly appointed Polish officials, who impatiently urge them to unload 
their belongings before allocating them to homes that are still occupied by the 
owners.830 Tokarczuk describes a significant period of overlap during which the 
newly arrived Poles are forced to share kitchens and bathrooms as well as cooking 
utensils and, to some extent, chores with people they still think of as the enemy.831  
However, despite their uncomfortable situation, the Polish incomers to 
Neurode, in Tokarczuk’s novel, are still confident about their right to be there. 
Just as in Katzenberge, the incoming Poles in House of Day, House of Night erect 
crosses to claim the land for God and the Poles.832 The planting of a Catholic 
cross on newly acquired land was by no means a trivial act in this context: it 
symbolised nothing less than the full integration of the territory into Poland. As in 
many aspects of Polish life, the Church played an important role in the 
Polonisation of the ZO, by providing new settlers with a familiar cultural 
environment in the midst of their strange new surroundings.833 One is reminded of 
Roman Dmowski’s simplistic, but not altogether inaccurate, ethno-cultural 
identifier ‘Polak-Katolik’.834 The sense of continuity represented by the Church 
was reinforced when priests relocated alongside their congregations as they often 
did. The encroachment of Polish Catholicism in these formerly predominantly 
Protestant regions was symbolised by the appearance of roadside crosses and 
chapels. Protestant churches were re-consecrated as places of Catholic worship 
and German inscriptions were painted over. In some cases, German Protestant 
churches were demolished to provide building materials for Catholic clergy 
                                                 
830 Tokarczuk, O., House of Day, House of Night, p. 234. 
831 In this part of the novel, Tokarczuk's characterisation of the situation suggests a high level of complexity in the context 
of population and land exchanges in Lower Silesia that stands in stark contrast to the official Polish propaganda on the 
subject. Nor is it reflected in other Polish works on the subject. Neither Sabrina Janesch in Katzenberge nor Stefan Chwin 
in Death in Danzig nor Joanna Bator in Sandberg mention anything approaching this difficult, and potentially incendiary, 
situation. Certainly Chwin’s German protagonist Doctor Hanemann continues to live in his own apartment, whilst 
incoming Poles take possession of other flats within the same apartment block. However, that is an issue of a completely 
different order of magnitude than having to share crowded quarters, limited utilities and few resources with strangers still 
regarded as belonging to an enemy collective. See: ibid. pp. 234-38; for a historical account of the transition period that 
suggests a high degree of verisimilitude in Tokarczuk's novel, see: Siebel-Achenbach, S., Lower Silesia from Nazi 
Germany to Communist Poland, p. 159. 
832 Tokarczuk, O., House of Day, House of Night, p. 237; Janesch, S., Katzenberge, pp. 109-10. 
833  For a more in-depth discussion of the direct role played by members of the Polish Catholic clergy in the de-
Germanisation of the ZO see: Zemella, G., Deutschland im Fadenkreuz, pp. 443-50; For an example of the prominent role 
played by individual Catholic priests in shaping ideas about Polish expansionism, see J.A. Łukasiewicz in: Fuchs, W., Der 
neue Polenspiegel, pp. 82-85. 
834 Wilson, A., Unexpected Nation, p. 103. 
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houses.835 However, despite the fact that the Piast period was undoubtedly the era 
when Catholicism was consolidated throughout the western ZO, this 
foregrounding of the advancement of Catholic institutions in the vanguard of the 
postwar Polish settlement of the ZO has little to do with the TRJN’s Piast 
Formula. Instead, it is rooted in more recent German-Polish conflicts, notably the 
Prussian Kulturkampf during which everything German ‘von vielen Polen mit 
aggressivem Protestantismus gleichgesetzt [wurde]‘.836 
Of the novels analysed in this Chapter, the one which most clearly 
contradicts the TRJN’s narrative of success, in terms of human happiness and 
social equality, is Bator’s Sandberg. In this novel, it is clear from the start that the 
Polish refugees will not be finding a paradise in their new homeland, at least not 
one in which social equality is likely to be a salient feature. Indeed, Bator 
highlights the continuities of social disparities between the pre and post-
annexation societies, interestingly focusing on the function of the built 
environment in perpetuating such divisions. Immediately after the arrival of 
Polish settlers in Waldenburg, the narrator notes: 
 
[man] fängt erst an einzuteilen: wer Gold hat und wer keines, 
wer mit Gott ist und wer gegen ihn’.837 […] In Szczawno Zdrój 
wohnten früher die Reichen und in Szczawienko die Armen 
[Deutschen], und nach dem Krieg war es genauso [bei den 
neuen polnischen Bewohnern].838 
  
Thus, assuming that Bator’s novel reflects the reality of the situation in this 
respect, the visible gulf between rich and poor, an ontological feature of German 
Waldenburg, survived the transition to impress itself upon the new community of 
Polish Wałbrzych. This flatly contradicts the government’s assertion that settlers 
‘saw a better life opening up before them when they entered the Recovered 
Territories’.839 
                                                 
835 One example of a German Protestant church that was demolished and used as a source of building materials for a Polish 
Catholic clergy house was the St.-Anna-Kirche in Broniszów (Brunzelwaldau). See: Frackowiak, J., et al., Deutsche und 
Polen von 1871 bis zur Gegenwart, p. 251. 
836 Ibid. pp. 44-45; for more on so-called Kulturkampf and the importance of Protestantism in Prussia see: Lawaty, A., Das 
Ende Preussens in polnischer Sicht: Zur Kontinuität negativer Wirkungen der preussischen Geschichte auf die deutsch-
polnischen Beziehungen (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1986), pp. 43, 47-50, 243; Trzeciakowski, L., The Kulturkampf in 
Prussian Poland, trans. Katarzyna Kretkowska, East European Monographs (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1990); Bahlcke, J., et al., Schlesien und die Schlesier, pp. 102-06; Clark, C. M., Iron Kingdom, pp. 419-35; Prażmowska, 
A., Poland: a Modern History, pp. 22-23. 
837 Bator, J., Sandberg, p. 15. 
838 Ibid. p. 84. 
839 Jakub Barman Undersecretary of the State in the Presidium of the Council of Ministers, quoted in: Siebel-Achenbach, 
S., Lower Silesia from Nazi Germany to Communist Poland, p. 149. 
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Similarly, right from the start of her novel Bator is extremely frank in her 
acknowledgement that the mining town of Wałbrzych (Waldenburg) had until 
recently been populated by Germans.840 Yet, she is careful to avoid depicting the 
Polish takeover as an unambiguous triumph over the Germans. Whilst the 
younger generation of Poles enjoy taunting the last few remaining Germans with 
the truism ‘Hitler kaputt’, older settlers are concerned with covering over all 
traces of the former German residents in order to quickly forget their situation as 
the beneficiaries of other people’s labour. 841  To this extent, Bator does not 
represent the transition period in Lower Silesia in terms that suggest support for 
the Piast Formula. 
On the whole, Bator’s implicit contradiction of the TRJN’s propaganda is 
reflected throughout the literary corpus analysed above. Hen’s Toast comes 
closest to supporting the TRJN’s portrayal of the ZO as a regained Polish 
homeland, and of its annexation as matter of historical expediency and triumph. 
However, as with Katzenberge and House of Day, House of Night, key scenes in 
the novel suggest that the author preferred to portray the annexation of the ZO and 
the concomitant Vertreibung of the German population as simple revenge for 
recent German atrocities in Poland. This does not indicate a high level of support 
for the Piast Formula in postwar Polish fiction by authors with intimate personal 
connections to the area and the historical events in question. Together with 
Philipp Ther’s analysis of early texts produced by ZO settlers in the context of 
early postwar writing contests, the above analysis suggests that the Piast Formula 
failed to convince a significant section of Polish society, and that resistance to the 
‘formula’ as an adequate explanation for the events in question emerged almost 
immediately after the War and continued to grow into the modern era. 
 
7.4 Topoi and the Formation of Hegemonic Historical Narratives 
Despite the heterogeneous nature of the incoming Poles’ early experiences in the 
ZO, a number of interesting topoi are evident in the relevant literature. Like the 
tropes and topoi that have arisen in the course of the historians’ discourse 
(Chapter 4), these ‘cultural memes’ reveal the force of the underlying trend 
                                                 
840 Bator, J., Sandberg, p. 15. 
841 Ibid. pp. 15, 100. 
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towards homogenisation in the course of the collective memory process. In this 
section, I analyse two of the more prominent of these, the first of which pertains 
to the notion of hidden German treasure and the hope, among incoming Poles, of 
discovering it, whilst the second involves the use of magical realism in several of 
these novels. 
 
7.4.1 German Treasure 
To many of the Polish incomers into formerly German territories in Western 
Poland, the hope of unearthing buried German treasure represented a kind of 
‘silver lining’. It, arguably, furnished the immigrants with the psychological 
wherewithal to come to terms with their, otherwise bleak, situation. This shared 
dream, a topos in much of the relevant Polish literature on the subject, is, 
interestingly, reflected, and often subverted, in German Vertriebenenliteratur.842 
According to the narrator in Bator’s Sandberg, for example, the search for 
buried treasure was a major preoccupation for Polish incomers in Wałbrzych in 
the decades following the Germans’ exodus.843  Their efforts usually ended in 
disappointment, leaving them jaded and bitter. This, however, did not deter them 
from trying again and again. Unlike the unlucky incomers to Wałbrzych in 
Sandberg, many of the new Polish residents in Tokarczuk’s literary reimagining 
of Nowa Ruda considerably improved their material circumstances through 
chance discoveries of buried German ‘treasure’.844 Intriguingly, Tokarczuk also 
writes of Germans who, returning to their earlier homes decades after the 
Vertreibungen, undertook their own clandestine searches for valuables they had 
buried before fleeing or being forcibly evicted.845 Whilst this idea may well be 
based more on urban legend than verified historical fact, it would certainly be an 
interesting avenue for future study. Indeed, Rauchfuss’ Schlesisches Himmelreich 
includes a scene in which the German protagonists are actually preparing to bury 
their most valuable possessions in case they are forced to leave their temporary 
refuge, in the hills outside of Breslau, with a view to retrieving them after the end 
                                                 
842 In addition to the texts analysed below, this topos is present in other recent examples of Polish literature in which the 
setting within the ZO is of a more incidental nature and has no bearing on the plot. The presence of the treasure hunt topos 
in novels of this type suggests that it is a common and culturally relevant aspect of Polish postwar collective memory and 
does, perhaps, contain an element of non fiction. See, for example: Huelle, P., The Last Supper, trans. Antonia Lloyd-Jones 
(London: Serpent's Tail, 2008 [2007 ]), p. 39. 
843 Bator, J., Sandberg, pp. 37, 81. 
844 Tokarczuk, O., House of Day, House of Night, pp. 242-46. 
845 Ibid. p. 245. 
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of the War.846 Given Rauchfuss’s credentials as an eyewitness to the events in 
question, this suggests that there may have been more than just a grain of truth in 
such stories, although my interest here is not the veracity or otherwise of the 
topos, but rather its role in the relevant collective memory discourse.  
One of the things that their potential enrichment at the expense of the 
Germans represented for the protagonists in Sandberg, was a form of belated 
Gerechtigkeit.847 Indeed, notwithstanding the reluctance with which most Poles 
moved into deserted German homes, this yearning for justice, if indeed Bator 
presents an accurate picture of the postwar situation in Wałbrzych, demonstrates 
that the incomers understood their current predicament within a wider perpetrator-
victim narrative. To these involuntary ‘cuckoos’, the expelled German collective 
belonged firmly within the perpetrator category and they, the new residents, were 
clearly victims.848 Within the essentialist paradigm that prevailed in the Polish 
People’s Republic it seemed outrageous that  
 
die Deutschen, die doch den Krieg angeblich verloren und so 
viele Menschen ermordet hatten, jetzt Supermärkte, Otto-
Kataloge und Getränkedosen hatten, während die Sieger 
Frikadellen aus Paniermehl und gehackter Mortadella 
machten.849  
 
Yet, at least for the residents of Bator’s reimagined Wałbrzych, the vague 
chance of stumbling across something valuable that Germans had left behind 
represented hope and a sense of justice in their otherwise humdrum existence in 
this dreary industrial town. 
In Katzenberge, Janesch also weaves the treasure-trove topos into her 
narrative in a number of interesting ways. At its most basic it simply involves the 
villagers taking items the Germans had left behind, and for which they had no 
immediate use, to a market at Oborniki to turn them into cash. 850  More 
interestingly, however, another version of the topos underpins the scene in which 
Czesław is showing Nele around a local mansion where he is carrying out some 
restoration work. His main task involves digging through layers of paint to 
                                                 
846 Rauchfuss, H. M., Schlesisches Himmelreich, pp. 576, 608. 
847 Bator, J., Sandberg, pp. 37, 81. 
848 For more on the notion of the incomers as 'cuckoos' in somebody else's nest see: Janesch, S., Katzenberge, p. 103; Bator, 
J., Sandberg, p. 81. 
849 My italics. See: Bator, J., Sandberg, p. 212. 
850 Janesch, S., Katzenberge, p. 117. 
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discover, or rather, uncover, traces of German heritage. He explains to Nele that 
people are currently doing this all over Śląsk, and that ‘[in] jeder Bar, jedem Kino 
sucht man nach diesen Zeichen.’851 Thus, in this scene, it is the German heritage 
of Lower Silesia itself that represents ‘treasure’.852 
This attitude of stewardship towards the treasures of German culture still 
extant within the built environment in the ZO suggests an interesting change to 
the prevailing situation in 1978 when Ossowski’s (quasi-autobiographical) 
protagonist in Weichselkirschen expressed her indignation about the fact that 
Poles were neglecting the German heritage of the buildings they had made their 
homes. In one kitchen she visited, the wall tiles were ‘voll Fliegendreck [und] 
lassen den deutschen Sinnspruch über dem Herd kaum noch erkennen.’ 853 
However, far from simply alluding to the Poles’ lack of respect for traces of 
German heritage, Ossowski also subverts the otherwise harmless, rather optimistic 
treasure-hunt topos by setting a macabre version it in a deserted German 
graveyard. There, local Poles and Russians smash their way into old German 
crypts and dig down to buried coffins containing the remains of the village’s 
former German residents. They then break open their skulls to tear out gold teeth, 
as well as filching any jewellery that had been buried along with the bodies.854 
Ossowski’s inclusion of representatives of two Slavic nations, Poles and 
Russians, in this disturbing episode, reflects NSDAP propaganda in which ‘the 
Slav’ is depicted as the Untermensch, a charge to which her portrayal of grave-
robbing Slavs responds with a resounding quod erat demonstrandum!855 For who 
but Untermenschen would allow their German-built infrastructure to fall into 
dilapidation and disrepair, and defile the dead in their unsavoury lust for the 
trinkets of German civilisation?  
Thus, whilst the same basic topos can be shown to be present in both 
German and Polish literature, the way in which it is used at the narrative level is 
very different in each case. Whereas Polish authors overwhelmingly use the 
treasure hunt topos to communicate a sense of hope for justice and recompense, 
                                                 
851 Ibid. p. 133. 
852 For more on the rediscovery and preservation of German heritage in the ZO in recent years see: "Wir leben unserem 
Traum" by Christian Neef in: Jansen, H., et al., Die Deutschen im Osten: Auf den Spuren einer verlorenen Zeit, pp. 48-53. 
853 Ossowski, L., Weichselkirschen, p. 31. 
854 Ibid. pp. 61-63. 
855 Cf. Anon., Der Untermensch, ed. Der Untermensch.jpg (Berlin: Nordland-Verlag, 1942). 
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Ossowski employs it to reveal her personal bitterness and loathing towards the 
incomers. Leonie Ossowski is one of several noms de plume used by German 
author Jolanthe von Brandenstein who was forced to flee her home in Röhrsdorf 
(now Osowa Sień) in Lower Silesia. Since the War, she has constructed a well-
known pro-Polish public persona, based on the principles of forgiveness and 
conciliation. However, her inclusion in Weichselkirschen of such accounts of 
Polenwirtschaft, in the case of the kitchen scene, and her implication of Poles, in 
the graveyard scene, is difficult to reconcile with this image.856  
Turning again to more recent literature relating to the Polish annexation of 
the ZO, Janesch gives the treasure hunt topos another intriguing twist when Nele 
goes in search of ‘treasure’ for her host, Mr. Adamczyk’s, elderly mother, Babuś. 
What she finally unearths turns out to be a small horde of Tirschenreuth porcelain, 
apparently given to old Babuś by her German lover during her, initially 
involuntary, sojourn in Germany during the War. In this case, the discovery of 
this ‘treasure’ was anything but good for Mr. Adamczyk. The fact that one of the 
expensive cups had been inscribed with the words ‘Meiner geliebten Terezia’ 
suggested that his Polish mother had actually come to treasure her exile in 
Germany. But, more importantly for Adamczyk’s sense of identity, the fact that 
his mother had returned to Poland pregnant with him and carrying this gift of 
personalised porcelain meant there was a good chance that his father had been a, 
from Adamczyk’s point of view, hated German.857 In this scene, Janesch draws 
attention to the complexity inherent in Polish-German relations, a complexity, 
which is increasingly reflected in the public collective memory discourse 
triggered by the Flucht und Vertreibung of Germans from the ZO and its 
resettlement by Polish victims of sociocide in Eastern Poland.  
 
                                                 
856 Indeed, the removal of the gold teeth of murdered victims is well attested in the context of the Holocaust whereas there 
are, to my knowledge, no historical sources for such activity on the part of Poles or Russians after the War. Ossowski’s 
arbitrary insertion of this imagined, non-plot-related, scene seriously undermines her credibility as a person who has come 
to terms with the loss of her childhood home in the spirit of reconciliation with the new residents. At the same time though 
it arguably reveals something interesting about the process of Vergangenheitsbewältigung, which involves both an 
intellectual and a visceral processes of coming to terms with the past. The fact that certain scenes in Ossowski’s literature 
appear to contradict, and subvert her carefully cultivated and consciously projected public stance on the loss of the ZO and 
her own expulsion as a young woman reveals the power of the subconscious. For it is at this basic, inaccessible level that 
suppressed resentments can continue to fester despite one’s best intentions at the intellectual level. For details of 
Ossowski's public recognition as an outspoken champion of the Polish occupation of the ZO see: Anon., Niemiecka pisarka 
otrzyma polskie odznaczenie, Accessed on: 16.02.2013; ‘Weichselkirschen und Emanzen. Leonie Ossowski und ihre 
anspruchsvolle Unterhaltungsliteratur,’ Neue Zeit 4 September 1992, quoted in: Berger, K. L., 'The Representation of the 
Expulsion of Ethnic Germans in German Literature from the 1950s to the Present', p. 141; Anon., Kulturpreis Schlesien 
des Landes Niedersachsen [online], Accessed on: 16.02.2013. 
857 Janesch, S., Katzenberge, pp. 204-07, 18-21. 
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7.4.2 The Magic of Silesia 
Still operating at the ontological level, but of a fundamentally different order to 
the inclusion of plausible detail, such as the treasure-hunt topos, are those texts 
that shade into the genre of magical realism. Both Katzenberge and House of Day, 
House of Night fall into this category. In Janesch’s Katzenberge, magical realism 
is focused on das Biest which finds employment throughout the narrative as a 
device whose effect is to undermine the reader’s understanding of the ontological 
status of the world being described. However, one of the most interesting aspects 
of das Biest is that it appears to have taken on a life of its own and works in a way 
completely unintended by the author. In response to a question I put to her by 
email, Sabrina Janesch took the time to explain what das Biest was intended to 
represent: 
 
Das Biest, der Teufel, der für die Angst und ein möglicherweise 
schlechtes Gewissen der Polen steht, existiert in seiner 
metaphysischen Bedeutung nur in den Köpfen der Bauern. Aber 
es hat seine Entsprechung, seine ganz konkrete Spiegelung in 
der Realität (und da haben Sie mit ihrer Deutung ganz recht): 
Es handelt sich (das habe ich nie auf irgendeiner Lesung 
verraten!) um einen schwarzen Kater, der, anders als die 
anderen Tiere der Deutschen, weder verhungert noch 
fortgerannt ist. Katzen binden sich an einen Ort und verlassen 
ihn nicht einfach. Als die Polen angekommen sind, ist er auf 
Abstand gegangen und hat den Hof umkreist ... die Bauern 
haben das sehr wohl bemerkt, und für sie war diese 
Hinterlassenschaft der Deutschen ein dunkles ‘Mal’, dass sie zu 
verfolgen schien und sie nie vergessen ließ.858 
 
In the novel, however, das Biest actually defies this explanation. Despite 
the many indications that it is a living entity, perhaps a cat as Janesch suggests, 
there are several scenes in which its behaviour is supernatural. For example, it 
comes into Janeczko’s (Nele’s grandfather’s) house and attacks his new-born son 
leaving a sulphurous smell in its wake, an odour often associated with the Devil in 
folklore, but never associated with cats.859 Das Biest finally dematerialises on the 
day on which Janeczko’s second son is born – the first of the Galicians to be born 
in their new homeland. When the baby cries for the first time, the creature sinks 
into the ground and vanishes. Janeczko who watches it happen, ‘war sich sicher, 
                                                 
858  Tokarczuk, O., House of Day, House of Night, pp. 139-42; Janesch, S., Autobiographical Content in the Novel 
'Katzenberge'. 
859 Janesch, S., Katzenberge, p. 104. 
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nicht geträumt zu haben’.860 It is highly symbolic that das Biest – the ‘dunkles 
Mal’ left behind by the Germans – vanishes at the very moment when the first 
modern Polish Silesian is born.861  
The fact that, although all of the scenes alluded to above take place in 
1945 and 1946, but that das Biest reappears to haunt the place in the 1980s and 
1990s, is further evidence of the creature’s supernatural nature. Looking through 
the train window as a young child, Nele spots a large dark animal moving about 
among the beech trees. Her grandfather immediately concludes that she has seen 
das Biest and that it ‘[sich] ausgerechnet mir [Nele] gezeigt hätte, weil ich beide 
Teile vereine, von drüben, von jenseits der Oder [Germany], und von hier 
[Poland]’.862  Then, over a decade later, when Nele returns to Poland for her 
grandfather’s funeral, she is convinced ‘einen Schatten gesehen zu haben, den 
Einen, Unerhörten, der aufmerksam jede meiner Bewegungen verfolgt’.863 This is 
the very same creature her grandfather had seen over half a century earlier on his 
first day at his new Hof in Lower Silesia when he notices a ‘Paar gelber Augen, 
das ihn die ganze Zeit aufmerksam beobachtet hatte’, the eyes of the 
‘Unaussprechlichen, dem Körpergewordenen, dem dreimal Vermaledeiten’.864  
Thus, whilst, according to her own account, the author clearly intended 
das Biest to work as a psychological device through which she could indicate 
certain aspects of her protagonists’ mental life, its longevity, manifestations of 
devilry, in the form of sulphurous smells, and the fact that it magically vanishes 
into the ground in plain sight, questions its ontological status. This circumstance 
gives the novel a veneer of magical realism which – as the author’s email 
demonstrates – was entirely unintended. Moreover, it places the novel at a further 
remove from the historical events that form the backdrop to the plot than those of 
older authors such as Hartung, Rauchfuss, and Hen, all of whom lived through the 
traumatic events described in their novels. 
House of Day, House of Night also incorporates elements of the 
supernatural, which blur the ontological distinctions between consensus reality, 
magic, and liminal psychological states. Tokarczuk writes of the ghost of Marek, 
                                                 
860 Ibid. pp. 145-48. 
861 Ibid. p. 148; Janesch, S., Autobiographical Content in the Novel 'Katzenberge'. 
862 Janesch, S., Katzenberge, p. 27. 
863 Ibid. p. 8. 
864 Ibid. pp. 56, 63. 
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the Doppelgänger of Franz Frost’s son, and Frost’s dream premonition of his 
son’s death by mushroom poisoning, as if they were everyday events requiring no 
particular explanation.865 Like Janesch, she also makes use of a magical, or out-
of-place, beast to signpost the otherworldliness of her narrative. Just as das Biest 
in Katzenberge occupies an ontological superposition – the devil in the minds of 
the Polish incomers as well as a manifestation of their fear and feelings of guilt, 
and, in reality, a black cat left behind by the former German residents – so the 
monster in House of Day, House of Night can be interpreted in different ways. 
Described as being crocodile-like, it could well have been a crocodile: it is 
certainly not unthinkable that animals could have escaped from zoos during the 
Allied bombing of Germany. The zoo in Breslau, some 80 kilometres from 
Neurode, where the novel is set, was bombed on the 7th of October 1944. 
Although most large predators were shot for safety reasons during the siege of 
Breslau in 1945, some may have escaped and continued to survive in the 
surrounding area for a while.866 Tokarczuk’s creature, which spent most of its time 
in a pond, could also have been a Wels Catfish, which can grow up to 4m long. 
Janesch also mentions these creatures, which are not uncommon in that region, in 
Katzenberge, describing them as ‘mannsgroß’.867 Equally, the monster could be 
intended as a metaphor for the dangers left behind by the retreating Germans – 
land mines, poisons, unexploded bombs – or for the existential threat to the ZO 
posed by the FRG until 1970. This interpretation works well within the collective 
memory discourse relating to the Polish settlement of the ZO, as many years 
passed before the settlers could feel really safe from German revanchism (see 
Chapter 4). However, given the characteristics of the storyteller, Whatsisname 
(sic), ‘a shaggy, ugly little gnome, [like] the sort that spring up […] under the 
amanita each summer’, the creature could also represent nothing more than a 
manifestation of the narrator’s alarming focus on entheogenic mushrooms and the 
psychological states they engender.868 
Interestingly, the use of magical realism in Vertriebenenliteratur is not 
restricted to Polish authors of a generation that had not personally experienced the 
                                                 
865 Tokarczuk, O., House of Day, House of Night, pp. 8, 126-31. 
866 Scheuermann, G., Das Breslau Lexikon (Dülman: Laumann-Verlag, 1994), 2, p. 2018. 
867 Janesch, S., Katzenberge, p. 126. 
868 Tokarczuk, O., House of Day, House of Night, pp. 31, 74, 249, 139-40.  
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transfers. Examples of magical realism are also included in Leonie Ossowski’s 
quasi-autobiographical novel Weichselkirschen, written during the early period of 
Heimattourismus.869 Intriguingly, for a novel that is usually read as being largely 
autobiographical, the ontological status of the world and events described in 
Weichselkirschen is called into question by startling interpolations of episodes of 
magical realism. These are usually centred on Jula, an old Polish ‘witch’ who had 
already lived in the village prior to the Polish takeover. In one scene, Jula bestows 
the gift of second sight on Jurek who (supernaturally) sees his girlfriend Sabina in 
mortal danger when her mother attempts to set fire to their farm in order to be able 
to make a fraudulent insurance claim.870 In another episode, Anna (the novel’s 
protagonist who shares so many biographical details with Ossowski that she can, 
arguably, be regarded as the author’s alter ego), in the presence of Jula, becomes 
aware of, and enters into a conscious exchange with, the ghost of one of her 
famous ancestors, communicating with him through mime and facial gestures.871 
But, even when Jula is not present, Anna is able to demonstrate the 
presence of a supernatural influence permanently attached to the spot where her 
ancestor had been stabbed to death.872  
The use of magical realism in relation to what were, after all, a series of 
brutal, life-changing events, is striking, as are the continuities between the 
relevant German and Polish literature. Perhaps it is symptomatic of a profound, 
cross-generational ontological disjuncture caused by the type of acute symmetric 
trauma that tends to trigger the collective memory process. The fact that Gabriel 
García Márquez (1927-2014), often regarded as the ‘father’ of the genre, wrote 
some of his major relevant works during a time of intensive conflict in Colombia, 
would tend to support this suggestion.873 These parallels suggest that the use of 
magical realism in trauma-related literature is a narrative device that enables the 
eyewitness author to deal with the trauma in question at a psychologically safe 
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remove.874 However, this explanation is less convincing when applied to younger 
authors such as Tokarczuk and Janesch, whose exposure to the traumatic events in 
question has always been mediated, albeit through close family members and 
neighbours who had been directly involved. This is certainly an area that would 
benefit from further comparative study. 
 
7.5 Post-German Germans: Living with the Enemy 
Poles arriving in Lower Silesia in the aftermath of WWII encountered Germans in 
various ways, some of which have had a lasting effect on the relevant collective 
memory discourse. In addition to taking possession of previously German homes, 
land, moveable property, and livestock, they also encountered dead Germans and, 
in many cases, entire families of Germans who were very much alive and not 
always inclined to leave their homes and property to the newcomers. However, 
the ontological situation regarding supposed Germans was often extremely 
ambiguous, with many being officially identified as autochthones, i.e. Germanised 
or German-speaking Poles. Rather than being forcibly expelled, members of this 
group were forced to remain in what was now Poland.875  From Zagajewski’s 
autobiography we learn that, upon their arrival in ‘post-German Gliwice’ the 
Polish Galicians found themselves in the company not only of autochthonous 
Silesians, but also of other ‘post-German Germans’. 876  Indeed, it is a well-
documented fact that key German workers, such as railway engineers and miners, 
were prevented from leaving Upper and Lower Silesia and were obliged to work 
for the Polish authorities during the postwar period.877 All of the novels reviewed 
for this chapter refer to such ‘post-German Germans’, and it is interesting to note 
the shifting attitudes towards Germans and the cultural artefacts they left behind 
in the relevant Polish literature with increasing temporal distance from the events 
in question.  
I have already alluded to scenes in Toast in which ‘post-German Germans’ 
encountered in the course of appropriating and securing the fictional town of 
                                                 
874 Although it cannot be accommodated within the scope of the current thesis, this is an area that would reward a broader 
research project carried out on a comparative basis. 
875 Bundesamt, S., Die deutschen Vertreibungsverluste, pp. 195-98. 
876 Zagajewski, A., Two Cities, p. 26; Siebel-Achenbach, S., Lower Silesia from Nazi Germany to Communist Poland, pp. 
194-95. 
877 Hen, J., De Wet en de Vuist, pp. 10, 90; Siebel-Achenbach, S., Lower Silesia from Nazi Germany to Communist Poland, 
p. 161. 
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Graustadt were dealt with severely as representatives of a perpetrator collective 
conceived of in essentialist terms. 878  In Katzenberge too the initial meeting 
between the East Galicians and Germans (the deceased Herr Dietrich found 
hanging in the attic of the house into which Janeczko moves) are framed in 
hostile, essentialist terms.879 By contrast with these accounts, Tokarczuk describes 
an uncomplicated and unemotional attitude towards the previous German 
residents of Nowa Ruda (Neurode). Yet even in this account there are hints of 
animosity towards Germans immediately after the arrival of the Poles who ‘would 
not look those leftover Germans in the face, because it was all their fault – they 
were the ones who had sparked off the war’.880 However, by the time the German 
expellees return as Heimattouristen decades later, the Polish residents of Nowa 
Ruda receive them with bemused civility and uncomplicated hospitality.881 ‘Every 
year Germans come pouring out of coaches […] walk about in small groups […] 
take photos of empty spaces [where their houses used to stand]’ and embarrass the 
local Polish residents by trying to offer them a handful of Deutschmark in return 
for the hospitality shown them.882 Thus, in Tokarczuk’s narrative, contemporary 
Germans are an interesting, but non-threatening feature of modern life in Nowa 
Ruda. 
In an interesting illustration of the fact that ontological reality is purely a 
construct of subjective consciousness, rather than something that can be proven to 
exist objectively, many incoming Poles openly resented the fact that they were 
forced to live in German houses which they found to be foreign and 
uncomfortable Bruchbuden. Bator makes this clear in Sandberg: ‘[ein] Haus 
hatten sie drüben gehabt, mit Matthiolen an der Wand, mit Dach und Fußboden, 
und neben der Scheune wuchs der Reineclaudenbaum, den Władeks Großvater 
gepflanzt hatte’.883 Władek not only ‘meinte, drüben wäre alles besser gewesen’, 
he even begins to think that his wife, Halina, had been different at home than she 
was in Wałbrzych (i.e. ontologically different rather than just behaviourally 
                                                 
878 Hen, J., De Wet en de Vuist, p. 23. 
879 Janesch, S., Katzenberge, pp. 55, 74-79. 
880 Tokarczuk, O., House of Day, House of Night, p. 236. 
881 Ibid. pp. 91-92. 
882 Ibid. p. 91. 
883 Bator, J., Sandberg, pp. 32, 80. 
 249 
different).884 This lack of enthusiasm for the new home and nostalgic longing for 
the home from which they had been forcibly evicted is also characteristic of the 
Poles in Janesch’s Katzenberge (2011). The first-person narrator’s grandfather, 
for instance, picks up a handful of Silesian soil to compare it with that of his 
native home, Galicia, and finds ‘[es] sei nichts in ihr gewesen: kein Wurm, kein 
Käfer, kein Engerling, nichts ... als hätten die Deutschen sie nicht bestellt, sondern 
gesiebt’.885 Like the protagonists in Katzenberge, the Polish incomers in House of 
Day, House of Night also detest the look of their new homeland upon arriving in 
Neurode and its surrounding villages: ‘[the] whole place was so empty and alien 
… [and] memories of those gold-green plains they had left behind went through 
their heads.’ 886  And yet, objectively, much of the German property and 
infrastructure that the incoming Poles inherited within the ZO was of a quality far 
higher than that to which they had been used in East Galicia and elsewhere within 
the Kresy. The built infrastructure and agriculture in their home regions had not 
kept pace with modern developments elsewhere in Europe. 887  In addition, 
particularly in East Galicia in the interbellum period, the Poles had not enjoyed 
unopposed ownership of their own homes and landholdings.888 Yet, the Polish 
literature analysed in this section suggests that those Poles forced to relocate from 
their insecure homes in East Galicia did not feel any more secure in their new 
homes, surrounded, as they were, by constant reminders of the shortly departed 
owners. 
House of Day, House of Night, for example, is replete with references to 
the German presence in the region, and the objects and infrastructure they left 
behind, much of which is described in neutral terms, whereas some examples of 
the German heritage is represented as being ominous, threatening or even lethal. 
This nexus of issues is exemplified in the interactions of ‘Marek Marek’ (sic) with 
objects left behind by the German natives.889 In one scene, Marek’s sisters are 
                                                 
884 Ibid. pp. 88-89. 
885 Janesch, S., Katzenberge, pp. 39-40. 
886 Tokarczuk, O., House of Day, House of Night, p. 233. 
887 Prażmowska, A., Poland: a Modern History, pp. 16, 24, 28, 34, 39, 48. 
888 Although many of the worst anti-Polish pograms took place in Volhynia, the status of Poles in East Galicia had also 
been challenged by Ukrainians who claimed the overlordship of the region, a claim that would finally be made brutally 
manifest in the anti-Polish pogroms conducted by the OUN/UPA in the latter stages of WWII. See Appendix C, Section 
C.2 and: Wilson, A., Unexpected Nation, pp. 129-33; Urban, T., Der Verlust, pp. 146-52; Brandes, D., et al., Lexikon der 
Vertreibungen, pp. 529-32. 
889 Marek Marek is the name of the character, i.e. the repetition is deliberate. 
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pushing him along the mountain paths in an old German pram, but later one of 
their younger siblings is killed by an unexploded German bomb left over from 
WWII. Later, as an adult, Marek, an alcoholic by then, ‘went wandering about the 
ruins of the houses that had been abandoned by the Germans’ looking for things 
to sell to raise money for vodka.890 Thus, in the life of a single character German 
artefacts are associated with innocuous childhood fun, a horrific family trauma, 
and hope for a man who has fallen through the social net. 
However, Tokarczuk also suggests that members of the younger 
generation are often quite unaware of the recent German history of their current 
homeland. In one example the narrator asks long-term resident Marta: ‘Why 
should any [German] be interested in our house?’ Marta’s response is 
straightforward: ‘Because they built it’.891 This is interesting given the fact that 
the narrator had been brought up by a German nanny, who had been forced to 
remain in the region after the War. Clearly, the nanny had not seen the need to 
explain her presence in a Polish community nor to ensure that her ward was 
appraised of the region’s recent history.892  This suggests a kind of collective 
forgetting, on both the Polish and the German side, during the decades that 
followed the end of the War. There is, of course, no way of assessing the degree 
to which Tokarczuk’s representation of this situation coincides with actual Polish-
German interactions in the region. However, the book is itself part of the 
collective memory discourse and it is interesting to note Tokarczuk’s inclusion of 
scenes that emphasise the non-confrontational nature of Polish-German relations 
in the region at the time of writing. 
Other Polish-German encounters were of a more psychological nature. 
Bator evokes scenes in which objectively useful German facilities prompted 
feelings of revulsion among the incoming Poles. The ‘German’ water from the 
taps, for example, has to be boiled before it is felt to be Polish woda fit to drink.893 
German symbols evoked different psychological responses, depending on their 
referent. For example, not only was German lettering and signage on buildings 
and various artefacts illegible to the majority of the new arrivals and, therefore, 
                                                 
890 Tokarczuk, O., House of Day, House of Night, pp. 12, 13, 18. 
891 Ibid. p. 92. 
892 Ibid. pp. 239-41. 
893 Bator, J., Sandberg, pp. 15, 36. 
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foreign and vaguely menacing, but it also served as a potent reminder of their 
immediate predecessors’ cultural and legal claims to the land. In Sandberg, 
German books ‘mit Frakturschrift’ that resembled ‘Haare auf einer Warze’ are 
used as fuel in domestic ovens.894 By contrast, NSDAP symbols served to remind 
people of the recent brutality of German occupation in Poland, and helped shore 
up an explanatory framework in which the current occupation of the ZO could be 
understood as just retribution for recent crimes committed against Poles.895 
German housing and infrastructure looked and felt noticeably different to 
their Polish counterparts and were experienced as being irreconcilably foreign.896 
This subjective experience of foreignness on the part of relocated Poles represents 
an interesting difference between these expellees and the German Vertriebenen. 
Poles arriving in Lower Silesia from rural Galicia found themselves in a very 
alien built environment, whereas Germans expelled from the ZO to western and 
central Germany at least arrived in towns and cities that looked familiar. 897 
Indeed, both from a legal perspective and from the point of view of the perception 
of the built environment and infrastructure, the Polish expellees from the Kresy 
were deported to a foreign environment, whereas the German Silesians were 
relocated within Germany, and remained within a familiar cultural space.  
The fact that the effect of this perception of foreignness could only be felt 
by the first generation of immigrants and not by those Poles born within the ZO, 
must inevitably have driven a psychological wedge between the generations. As 
Zagajewski points out in this context, there is an unbridgeable gulf between any 
migrant generation and their descendants. In Two Cities he describes the 
bewilderment of the older Galicians who, having arrived in Gliwice, look ‘in 
amazement at the Prussian bricks of the tenements … taken aback by the place in 
                                                 
894 Whilst it is tempting to link the burning of German books as fuel to the book burning events staged by the NSDAP, such 
a connection is extremely tenuous. It was NSDAP themselves, who demanded the change from Fraktur to Latin type face 
in books and newspapers in 1941. In addition, book burning in the Third Reich was a purely symbolic act, whereas, having 
no other use for them, the Poles in Bator’s novel utilise German books as a convenient source of fuel. This does not suggest 
that the Poles were trying to make any symbolic statement about the authors or contents of the books in question. See: ibid; 
Berbenni, D., Schrift und Herrschaft: Das Verbot der Frakturschrift durch die Nationalsozialisten im Jahre 1941 
(Norderstedt: Gin Verlag, 2013), pp. 5-17. 
895 As noted above (see Chapters 3 and 4, and Section 7.4 above), this ‘folk explanation’ of the annexation as just 
retribution for recent NSDAP atrocities differs fundamentally from the Polish government’s Piast Formula. 
896 Urban, T., Der Verlust, pp. 157-58. 
897 For many centuries, towns throughout Germany, including Silesia, had been built in accordance with specific ancient 
city rights which included rules on acceptable layouts and building types. This resulted in a high degree of uniformity of 
street layout and shared architectural styles across widely dispersed German regions. See: Bahlcke, J., et al., Schlesien und 
die Schlesier, pp. 28-34; Neubach, H., Geschichte Schlesiens, p. 5; Leuschner, M., Heimat und Schickal, pp. 20, 34; Gaupp, 
E. T., Ueber Deutsche Städtegründung, Stadtverfassung Und Weichbild in Mittelalter: Besonders Über Die Verfassung 
Von Freiburg Im Breisgau Verglichen Mit Der Verfassung Von Cöln (Ulan Press, 2012 [1923]); Groten, M., Die deutsche 
Stadt im Mittelalter, Reclams Universal-Bibliothek (Stuttgart: Reclam, 2013), pp. 109-26. 
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which they were to die’.898 Zagajewski goes on to develop this point, arguing that 
first-generation immigrants have experienced life at both ends of the journey, and, 
depending upon the circumstances of the relocation (e.g., as a result of sociocide, 
or other overwhelming pressures), often tend to disparage their new home and 
idolise their place of origin, but that those born after the migration event can only 
experience the destination as their natural Heimat. Whilst one can readily agree 
with this, his assertion that second-generation immigrants have no reason to hate 
their birthplace and nothing to compare it with is not necessarily true.899 They can 
certainly compare it with an imagined, and quite possibly idealised version of 
their parents’ lost Heimat based on the stories they hear from them and from the 
wider expatriate community. They may also be familiar with their family’s place 
of origin through personal visits. And finally, their social status within the land of 
their birth may well be such that they come to hate it. This notwithstanding, 
Zagajewski draws attention here to an interesting aspect of sociocide, which often 
manifests itself as a major caesura in diasporic collective memory narratives.900 In 
the context of this section, i.e. Polish encounters with ‘post-German Germans’, 
Zagajewski’s generation of Polish Galicians must have had a fundamentally 
different experience of such encounters to that of their parents and grandparents 
whose memories of the lost Heimat and of the traumatic event itself are concrete 
and unmediated (episodic memory). Those of the second generation, on the other 
hand, are constructed, mediated, impersonal, and require a conscious research 
effort to prevent them from slipping into the category of legend rather than 
History (semantic memory). With his usual wry humour Zagajewski neatly 
encapsulates the situation for second-generation immigrants when he points out 
that to the older generation who had suffered Soviet, then German, then a repeated 
Soviet occupation before and during WWII, ‘the fact that someone [Zagajewski] 
was born a month after the end of the war bordered on a joke … like arriving at 
the Philharmonic ten minutes after the end of the concert’.901  
 
  
                                                 
898 Zagajewski, A., Two Cities, pp. 15-16, 29. 
899 Ibid. p. 31. 
900 This subject has been treated quite extensively in relation to the Holocaust. See, for example: Hirsch, M., Family 
Frames: Photography, Narrative, and Postmemory, p. e.g. 241ff. 
901 Zagajewski, A., Two Cities, p. 31. 
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7.6 Concluding Remarks 
One can draw several key findings from the above analysis, all of which apply to 
the specifically Polish discourse strand within the collective memory process 
triggered by the acute symmetric trauma outlined in the Introduction to this thesis 
and Chapter 3 above. Addressing the explanatory level of the corpus analysed in 
this chapter, I asked to what extent the Polish literature analysed in this chapter 
supports the TRJN’s Piast Formula. It is noteworthy that the overwhelming 
majority of Polish protagonists in the corpus analysed above reject the Piast 
Formula and its justification of the annexation of the ZO and the concomitant 
Vertreibung of the German population as a matter of historical expediency based 
on ancient Polish claims to the territory rather than as simple revenge for recent 
German atrocities in Poland. Instead they, or rather, the authors, insist upon a 
‘folk explanation’ of the annexation and Vertreibung precisely in terms of just 
retribution for crimes committed by agents of the German Reich.  
One of the main ways in which we see this expressed is in the ‘treasure 
trove’ topos in which Polish settlers in the ZO conceived of their potential 
enrichment at the expense of the Germans in terms of Gerechtigkeit. This also 
pertains to another of my research questions about shared topoi between German 
and Polish literature relating to sociocide, the ZO and/or Kresy, as the ‘treasure 
trove’ topos is indeed found in examples of the relevant Polish and German 
corpus. Paradoxically, in the Polish context these hopes for enrichment tend to be 
centred on buried treasure, rather than on that which was freely accessible to 
incomers in the form of leftover German property. The resolution to this seeming 
paradox is that, because the new Polish government had claimed all German 
movable and immovable property for the Polish state, nothing that was visible on 
the surface and readily available really held out any hope of personal enrichment 
and therefore compensation and Gerechtigkeit.902  Ultimately this yearning for 
justice also suggests that the incomers did, in fact, understand their current 
predicament as that of victims, not as victors triumphantly reclaiming land to 
which they felt they had a historical right, as the TRJN had tried to portray them. 
More precisely, the consistency with which the Polish authors whose texts I 
analysed above portray their protagonists as rejecting the Piast Formula in favour 
                                                 
902 Bahlcke, J., et al., Schlesien und die Schlesier, p. 347. 
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of a ‘folk explanation’ based on retribution for recent war crimes, suggests this 
interpretation enjoyed a wide currency during the period in which these texts were 
produced. In the example I provided of this topos being used in German 
Vertriebenen literature, in Ossowski’s Weichselkirschen, the topos functioned 
very differently. Rather than symbolising hope and justice, as it does in the minds 
of the immigrant Poles, Ossowski’s version inverts the historical record by 
showing Poles and Russians engaging in activities known to have been practiced 
by members of the NSDAP organs but not otherwise recorded. As stated above, 
the most remarkable aspect of Ossowski’s use of this version of the topos is the 
way it apparently reveals her subconscious feelings about the territorial and 
population transfer, which contrast markedly with her carefully cultivated public 
persona. Thus, whereas in the Polish context the authors’ use of the topos serves 
an explanatory function in relation to the immigrants understanding of their own 
situation – they understand themselves as victims, not victors, and seek 
Gerechtigkeit in the form of treasure taken from the perceived perpetrator 
collective – in the German context the author’s use of the topos, arguably, works 
at the unintentional subconscious level.  
In terms of my three-level analytical model, such topoi can be analysed at 
all three levels. They all entail an ontological component in that they pertain to 
things with a concrete existence such as actions, and aspirations. Yet these actions 
and aspirations are embedded within a wider explanatory framework, in this case 
pertaining to the immigrants reason for being in previously German territory and 
having to make use of artefacts produced and, for a certain period, still owned by 
an enemy collective. At the same time, the use of such topoi can serve a narrative 
function. In Ossowski’s case, for example, to cast the Slavic incomers in a 
negative light, in contradiction to both the author’s and the narrator’s avowed 
acceptance of their right to be there. 
Another of my research questions in this chapter pertains to the ways in 
which Germans and the German heritage have been characterised in Polish 
literature about life in the ZO. My findings in respect to this question are mixed. 
On the one hand, one can detect traces of an essentialist paradigm in which, not 
individual Germans but rather Germans as a nation or ethnic group are held to be 
responsible for recent anti-Polish atrocities and, more specifically, for the Poles’ 
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current plight as involuntary immigrants in the ZO. Hen’s protagonist holds one 
particular German responsible for the actions of his son ‘even if he doesn’t have a 
son’. At the narrative level, Janesch uses NSDAP symbolism in association with 
deserted German property to suggest that the Lower Silesian Germans deserved 
their fate. And the topos of the ‘treasure trove’ in its Polish version, turns on the 
essentialist notion that finding the buried belongings of any specific German 
represents a degree of Gerechtigkeit vis-à-vis Germans as a perpetrator collective. 
On the other hand, all of the texts analysed above evince a willingness to engage 
with the complexity of the situation. Janesch exemplifies this trend beginning 
with her own and her protagonist’s mixed Polish-German parentage, a personal 
identity theme which she develops later in the novel in relation to Mr. 
Adamczyk’s sudden discovery of his own probable German heritage resulting 
from his mother’s relationship with a German during her enforced stay in the 
country as a forced labourer.  
And finally, I asked what one can learn by comparing literary texts from 
different eras by authors of different backgrounds in relation to intergenerational 
perspectives on the impact of Flucht und Vertreibung. Whilst this question is 
rather broad and would certainly benefit from further comparative analysis, the 
foregoing analysis has shown that both Tokarczuk and Zagajewski allude to the 
complexities of intergenerational memory. Whilst Tokarczuk refers to a lack of 
knowledge about the region’s German heritage on the part of members of the 
younger generation resulting from a simple lack of communication, Zagajewski 
goes further in pointing out the fundamental unknowability of the victim 
generation’s trauma by subsequent generations. The ontological gap between 
episodic and semantic memories, as Zagajewski reminds us, is unbridgeable. 
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8: Final Thoughts 
 
8.1 Introduction 
As I have already summarised my specific arguments and the answers to my 
research questions at the end of Chapters 3 to 7, I do not intend to repeat myself 
here. Instead, I wish to turn to the broader conceptual and philosophical 
implications of my research before briefly outlining the potential for further 
research in this field. First, in Section 2.1, I went to considerable lengths to define 
the concept of collective memory as I use it throughout this thesis. One thing I did 
not do, however, was to question the fundamental usefulness of the term 
‘collective memory’ as a metaphor. Yet, this question is entirely legitimate and I 
would like to address this subject in Section 8.2 below. Second, in defining the 
term ‘hegemonic historical narrative’ for the purposes of this thesis, I explained 
that, as a result of the conflict of interest between different stakeholder collectives 
vis-à-vis a given event in combination with economic disparities and unequal 
opportunities to participate in the relevant discourse, there is no guarantee that 
hegemonic historical narratives, as one may encounter them at any particular time 
or within a given socio-political situation, will represent the ‘truth’ in any 
epistemologically meaningful sense. In Section 8.3, I would like to return briefly 
to this statement to assess its validity and ramifications in light of the discussion 
presented in the foregoing chapters. 
 
8.2 Collective Memory: a Useful Metaphor? 
Having discussed some of the ways in which other researchers use the term 
‘collective memory’ as well as a selection of suggested alternatives, I defined 
collective memory, for the purposes of this thesis, as a contested narrative 
discourse directed towards the establishment of a specific stakeholder narrative of 
a given traumatic event as historical fact. I also posited the notion of a transition 
period after which collective memories relating to a given episode of acute 
symmetric trauma give way to, or can better be conceived of as a matter of, 
‘History’. However, both my broader discussion and my specific working 
definition of the concept were based on the tacit assumption that it is useful to use 
the term ‘collective memory’ as a metaphor in the study of historic events. Yet, it 
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is by no means immediately obvious that this is the case. In other words, one may 
legitimately ask whether one could not simply replace the term ‘collective 
memory’ with the word ‘history’ in any given text. Would this result in a loss of 
analytic productivity or, to turn the question around, does the concept of 
‘collective memory’ add anything specific to the traditional concept of History as 
an academic pursuit?  
Even if one does accept the validity of the concept of collective memory, 
one can also ask whether or not it ought to be used in relation to a specifically 
German trauma. This question arises due to the fact that that the majority of books 
dealing with the phenomena of collective memory, however defined, focus on the 
Holocaust as the central trauma. This raises the question of whether it is somehow 
provocative to use a concept developed within the field of Holocaust Studies to 
explore other collective traumas, especially one which affected Germans? In my 
view, this is a legitimate, and somewhat troubling, question even if one rejects the 
notion of collective, rather than individual, German guilt for the Holocaust.  
The notion of collective guilt notwithstanding, Germany has, and has 
accepted, a corporate responsibility for the Holocaust, and at one level it does 
seem distasteful to use the same terminology to describe the suffering of Jews at 
the hands of the NSDAP and that of (ethnic) Germans at the hands of various 
enemy collectives. Book titles such as Karsten Kriwat’s Der Andere Holocaust: 
Die Vertreibung der Deutschen 1944-1949 strike one as unnecessarily 
provocative and disrespectful.903  
In the case of collective memory, however, there is an implicit claim, 
certainly in the working definition I present above, that the term objectively 
describes something other than History. This is not the case with the word 
‘Holocaust’ which, regardless of any broader dictionary definition, is generally 
thought of as describing a specific historical event, and, moreover, one in which 
one of several extant German collectives was implicated beyond doubt. Thus, 
whereas Kriwat’s choice of title was almost certainly intended to provoke a 
reaction, an examination of the term ‘collective memory’ in relation to cases other 
than the Holocaust is a necessary prerequisite for assessing its general validity and 
usefulness as an academic concept. To this extent, my thesis represents a test case 
                                                 
903 Kriwat, K., Der andere Holocaust. 
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for the concept of collective memory in general in addition to being an analysis of 
a specific collective memory discourse. 
To address the question as to the validity and usefulness of the concept of 
collective memory, I find, on balance, that yes, it is useful to delineate a period 
and discursive process that bridges the gap between any specific episode of acute 
symmetric trauma and the general convergence on hegemonic historical narratives 
of the event. The period in question is characterised by the active, interested 
participation of several competing stakeholder collectives whose ultimate 
objective (conscious or unconscious) is the inclusion of their specific, subjective, 
understanding of the events in question in the relevant hegemonic historical 
narrative. This differs from the pursuit of History as an academic discipline in that 
History is generally dominated by professional historians striving for a 
disinterested, objective understanding of specific events rather than the interested 
portrayal of a specific version of the events in question. The extent to which a 
given historian manages to achieve this ideal in the real world is irrelevant in the 
current context, as the defining factor is the starting point of any individual’s 
engagement with the topic in question. Historians begin with an objective quest 
for the epistemological ‘truth’ about a specific subject (see below). Participants in 
collective memory processes, by contrast, begin their engagement in the relevant 
discourse with a belief that they already know the truth about the events in 
question.  
Thus, there are two objectively different periods involved in the 
production of hegemonic historical narratives of acute symmetric traumas. The 
first period is ostensibly open to people from every walk of life and tends to be 
dominated by eyewitnesses; the second is dominated by professional historians. 
Having worked through the above case study, I have found the term ‘collective 
memory’ to be a useful metaphor for the process of narrating, commemorating, 
and explaining the events in question, that takes place during the first of these 
periods.  
 
8.3 Epistemological Relevance 
In the Introduction to this thesis I stated that this study relates, among other 
things, to philosophical questions concerning the field of epistemology. 
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Epistemology is concerned with the acquisition of ‘true’ knowledge and the 
question of how one can, in principle, be confident that one’s beliefs about a 
given subject are valid and accurate. Philosophers interested in this nexus of 
problems often consider it from an extremely abstract position, challenging 
themselves with idealised examples and thought experiments that have little direct 
bearing on our everyday lives. My usage of the word in this context differs 
slightly from such lofty concepts, but only by degree. I am more interested in 
what one might refer to as ‘folk epistemology’, which turns on the matter of how 
we can, in principle, discriminate between information and disinformation about 
past events as well as developments in the contemporary world to which we have 
no direct personal access.  
As my analysis of cartographic representations of the ZO amply illustrates, 
it has been, and still is, possible for two equally well-educated people, each with 
access to a similar range of scholarly texts and reference materials, to form 
completely different views on the region in question. Depending upon which set 
of atlases one happens to consult, one may come to believe that the ZO is in some 
way different to the rest of Poland, for example, because dual allonyms are shown 
for most of the towns and cities within the region, but not for the rest of Poland. A 
different selection of atlases could leave one with the impression that this area is 
not historically different from the rest of Poland, for example, if only the modern 
Polish toponyms are provided and no additional historical notes are included. 
Another interested individual could be left with the impression that the region is 
still contested between Germany and Poland, for example, if different atlases 
among those selected should happen to take radically different approaches to the 
toponymy of the region and/or include contrasting pieces of additional historical 
information in relation to the frontiers.  
Because many households, schools, and even public libraries have only a 
limited selection of atlases available for consultation at any given time, one can 
readily understand that the view a given individual ultimately develops in relation 
to the current and historical status quo of a specific region is subject to a certain 
degree of arbitrariness or coincidence. The situation will not necessarily become 
any clearer in the mind of the casual reader should he or she choose to investigate 
it in more detail, for example, by consulting an equally arbitrary subset of all the 
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scholarly texts that have ever been written about the region. This is because, in the 
case of the ZO, there is no complete agreement between scholars concerning 
various details of the region’s history. This situation can only be exacerbated if 
one or more of the texts in question have been produced by scholars with strong 
links to a specific stakeholder collective or group, such as the BdV, the Deutsch-
polnische Schulbuchkommission or any of the Polish historians writing on behalf 
of the TRJN in the immediate postwar era. 
Nor is it possible to refer to some external source for an impartial 
understanding of the region’s history, because – and this is my point – all 
information is generated by human beings operating within specific cultural 
paradigms. There is no neutral position on history in general and of the ZO in this 
particular case. No one group of historians, including, as I argued in Section 1.6, 
those working in predominantly Anglophone centres, can transcend their own 
cultural paradigms to produce an unbiased, ‘true’ history of the region. To be 
more precise, it is possible to transcend whichever cultural paradigm happens to 
dominate the environment in which one lives and works, but only to exchange it 
for some other paradigm, even if the newly won perspective is unique to oneself. 
All such cultural paradigms (including unique personal world views) are limiting 
to some extent as they, by definition, exclude certain viewpoints and purported 
facts in favour of others. 
Yet, to argue that no specific hegemonic historical narratives of the Flucht 
und Vertreibung of Germans from the ZO and the repopulation of the area with, 
inter alia, Poles transferred from regions within the Kresy, such as East Galicia, 
must necessarily represent the ‘truth’ in any epistemologically meaningful sense 
is not the same as arguing that all versions of the relevant history are equally 
valid. Nor does the fundamental impossibility of producing a history of any given 
region that is one hundred per cent accurate and comprehensive preclude the 
possibility of identifying and discarding disinformation and/or fabricated 
histories.  
Within this thesis I have alluded to four different historic narratives of the 
ZO, the Kresy, Flucht und Vertreibung, population transfer and Polonization, each 
of which needs to be treated with circumspection for a number of reasons. In 
Chapter 3, I discussed the TRJN’s ‘Piast Formula’ and explained how this 
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narrative served their immediate political agenda. In Section 3.5.2, I also argued 
that the TRJN were fully conscious of the fact that they were creating an 
ahistorical myth and that this mythical narrative was intended purely for domestic 
‘consumption’. Since 1989, Polish historians have led the way in deconstructing 
this version of events and I am not aware of any scholar anywhere in the world 
still currently promoting the Piast Formula as historical fact. Similarly, the 
Deutsch-polnische Schulbuchkommission has, albeit with laudable intent, 
produced a highly selective history of the region (see Sections 2.1, 4.2, and 4.6). 
Both of these histories have had an influence on the relevant collective memory 
discourse and, whilst neither can be said to be wholly falsified, both employ 
various narrative strategies, including conflation and omission, to present a subset 
of the known facts such as to create a narrative that supports a specific, highly 
biased, world view (see Section 4.5). 
The German Bund der Vertriebenen has also produced a history of the ZO 
and of other former German communities in Central and Eastern Europe (see 
Section 1.6). As the central representative umbrella organisation of Germans and 
ethnic Germans expelled from these regions in the wake of WWII, however, it is 
clear that the BdV also constitutes an interested stakeholder collective. 
Consequently, one ought to exercise caution in relation to this corpus. On the 
other hand, to independently verify or refute every statement of purported fact 
presented within this vast body of work is beyond the capacities of a single 
researcher. For, whereas the work of the Deutsch-polnische 
Schulbuchkommission and that of historians working in the service of the TRJN 
involves a certain amount of omission, and therefore simplification, that of the 
BdV is almost overwhelmingly comprehensive, including such a wealth of arcane 
data that much of it resembles an archive of statistics or a catalogue of ‘facts’. 
Nevertheless, one must remain cognisant of the fact that this corpus has been 
produced in the service of a well-defined agenda. 
Whilst this focus on facts – collecting and cataloguing them in the case of 
the BdV, or sieving and/or omitting them in the case of the TRJN and the 
Deutsch-polnische Schulbuchkommission – invites analysis at the ontological 
level, the explanatory level is more interesting in the current context. For, even 
when there is widespread agreement on the basic facts (and compendious tomes, 
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produced by multi-national collectives, such as the Lexikon der Vertreibungen, 
suggest that the basic facts relating to the Polish and German postwar population 
and territorial transfers have been established on a broad, consensual basis), these 
are still open to different interpretations or explanations. 
It is in this context that the fourth stakeholder collective to which I have 
alluded in this thesis, which consists of Anglophone historians, is interesting. As I 
argued and demonstrated in Section 1.6, certain Anglophone authors have chosen 
to interpret the events in question from within an essentialist paradigm. In this 
view of the world, the notion of German victimhood per se is suspect on the basis 
that all Germans (and, in the crassest examples, ethnic Germans) can be held 
accountable for the horrors of WWII in general and the Holocaust in particular. 
The conscious or unconscious acceptance of this essentialist paradigm can result 
in accounts of the events in question which, at one extreme, tend to be narrated 
with a severe degree of scholarly disinterest that can verge on the accusatory or 
even reveal a certain amount of Schadenfreude and lack of empathy. Depending 
on the degree to which one subscribes to or rejects the underlying paradigm, such 
narratives can be distressing to read, but more importantly from an analytical 
perspective, they can also result in an unhelpful conflation of separate historical 
events. For if one accepts the implicit notion that ‘the Germans’ deserved their 
fate (i.e., Vertreibung and loss of Heimat), then one must necessarily explain why. 
If the answer to this question is ‘because of what they did to the Jews’, as some of 
the examples I provided above demonstrate is often the case, then this implies a 
process of cause and effect, which, as I argued in Section 1.6, and reemphasised in 
Section 7.2.1, is wholly untenable on the basis of the historical record and 
eyewitness testimony. 
Thus, from a ‘folk epistemological’ perspective, what we currently believe 
we know about the central trauma complex with which this thesis is concerned 
can, at best, be regarded as a work in progress. However, one of the insights I 
have gained in the course of my research for this thesis is that it is fundamentally 
impossible to change the epistemological status in relation to this geographic 
region and this period of history: it will continue to be a work in progress. In the 
following, final, section, I would like to take the opportunity to point out some of 
the directions in which this work might productively progress. 
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8.4 Further Research Potential 
In the Introduction to this thesis, I briefly alluded to the fact that Lower Silesia not 
only became a permanent home to Polish transferees from the Kresy and other 
Polish immigrants from elsewhere in Poland, but also to Ukrainians and members 
of smaller nations such as the Łemkowie. It would be interesting to look into 
interactions between these different collectives, both in relation to each other and 
to the ‘post-German Germans’, during the resettlement era. In addition, one can 
imagine a number of productive projects involving studies of the subsequent 
linguistic and cultural legacy of these disparate groups within the region. Were 
they all Polonized, i.e., did they lose their cultural and linguistic identities, during 
the postwar period, or did they leave discernible traces in the current linguistic 
and cultural practice within the region? According to the 2010 version of the 
GUGiK’s Toponymic Guidelines of Poland for Map Editors and Other Users, the 
ZO is home to ‘new mixed dialects’ (nowy dialekty mieszane).904  
Some relevant questions of interest are, for example: to what extent is a 
convergence on an emergent regional dialect, as opposed to, for example, a 
standardised Polish dialect, discernible in this region? To what extent is it possible 
to discern a Ukrainian and/or Łemki substrate within the dialect(s) developing 
within this region? Similar questions, relating to an implicit or ‘background’ 
influence of these immigrants could be asked in relation to other forms of cultural 
production in the ZO. Within this context, it would also be useful to investigate 
the cultural and linguistic impact of the ‘post-German Germans’ within this 
region.  
On a related issue, I noted in Chapter 5 that, in addition to expunging all 
traces of the region’s recent German presence throughout the ZO, the Polonization 
of the region also involved the suppression of minority Slavic interests and 
aspirations in the area. The scope of the current thesis has not allowed for an 
investigation into the extent to which this was the result of a conscious policy on 
the part of the TRJN as well as the degree of, and official reaction to, resistance to 
this development on the part of the affected communities. 
Focusing on the specific experience of individuals during, and in the wake 
of, the various episodes of sociocide with which this thesis is concerned, there are 
                                                 
904 Wolnicz-Pawłowska, E., et al., Toponymic Guidelines of Poland, p. 25. 
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several lines of investigation that could prove fruitful for researchers with the 
requisite background knowledge. One of these involves the economic impact of 
immigrants, refugees, repatriates, transferees etc., within their respective 
destination communities. How great a role, for example, did the influx of rootless, 
mobile, refugees in the American, British and French zones play in the subsequent 
Wirtschaftswunder? One imagines that the presence of a highly mobile workforce 
with no vested interest in any given region would prove beneficial in the 
reconstruction of each of the regions in question. To what extent can such an 
influence be verified and quantified for each of the regions concerned, and to what 
extent can any measurable differences be attributed to differences between the 
prevailing economic-political systems and/or the immigrant communities 
themselves?  
A related question concerns the demographic makeup of the various 
expellee/transferee collectives. Within the immediate postwar context, for 
example, it made a difference whether a given family was headed by a father, a 
mother, or some other adult relation. One, often overlooked aspect of Flucht und 
Vertreibung in the German context, for example, is the fact that the majority of 
refugee families consisted of a mother with young children and older dependents. 
This situation is not always adequately reflected in commemorative images of the 
events in question. In some cases, such images appear to ignore the actual 
situation in the interests of a ‘sanitised’ version of history designed to present the 
flight and expulsion of Germans from Central and Eastern Europe as a simple, not 
particularly dramatic, movement of people from one region to another.  
One particularly interesting example of such a reimagining of the relevant 
historic situation concerned images of the Vertreibungen in stamps issued by the 
West German Bundespost in 1965. 905  Because these images did not reflect 
popular ideas about the war’s end and the resettlement of (ethnic) Germans 
promulgated, and no doubt widely believed, within the Soviet Bloc, many postal 
services in countries to the east of the Iron Curtain refused to forward letters 
bearing the stamps in question.906 This reaction is the more surprising given the 
fairly innocuous imagery used on the offending stamps. One stamp, for example, 
depicts a healthy-looking family, consisting of three generations, all walking 
                                                 
905 Fendl, E., Zur Ästhetik des Verlusts, pp. 48-53. 
906 Ibid. pp. 50-51. 
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briskly against a light to moderate wind, seemingly well dressed and only lightly 
burdened by rucksacks.907 This imagery is far removed from the reality of the 
situation. In general, the men of the middle generation, i.e. those of ‘fighting age’ 
(see Chapter 6), were not present during the Vertreibungen. Moreover, those old 
men not drafted into the army or the Volkssturm by that time would certainly not 
have cut such a sprightly figure as that of the old grandfather bringing up the rear 
of the group on the stamp in question. The reality for women and children 
contrasted sharply with the hale and homely security suggested in this design.908 
In addition, there is also no sign, within the image, of material destruction or loss 
and, significantly, perpetrators too are conspicuous by their absence (unless of 
course one accepts the essentialist view of the German nation as a ‘perpetrator 
collective’).909 
This example illustrates the discrepancy between ‘official’ or ‘sanitised’ 
versions of sociocide and eyewitness accounts. Without necessarily assuming that 
the ‘official’ version is any less accurate than eyewitness accounts, the mere fact 
that such a discrepancy exists raises a number of research questions such as: what 
accounts for the discrepancy? Who controls the production of narratives and 
images of Flucht und Vertreibung? Are similar differences between official and 
private narratives evident in Polish, German (West and East), Ukrainian and 
Łemki accounts of the various episodes of sociocide with which this thesis is 
concerned? And, in instances in which private and public narratives of the events 
in question differ significantly, cui bono? 
In terms of those aspects of the relevant discourse to which I have alluded 
in the foregoing chapters, there remains a broad potential for future research in the 
field of cartography. For example, it is by no means obvious in which specific 
cases seemingly politically-motivated cartographic decisions, or those which are 
amenable to interpretation as such within the discourse in question, were taken in 
response to overt political pressures to conform to a certain narrative or are the 
result of an unconscious acceptance of dominant cultural paradigms or, 
alternatively, reflect more mundane economic concerns. It is highly likely that at 
                                                 
907 Ibid. p. 48. Abb. 3 
908 See 9th image in: Rees, L., The Nazis, pp. 144-45; Autze, R., Treibgut des Krieges, pp. 172, 80; Rees, L., Their Darkest 
Hour: People Tested to the Extreme in WWII (Random House, 2008), pp. 103, 259-64; Bard, R., 'Historical Memory and 
the Expulsion of Ethnic Germans in Europe, 1944- 1947' (unpublished thesis, University of Hertfordshire, Hatfield 2009), 
p. 116. 
909 Niven, W. J., et al., Germans as Victims, p. 15. 
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least a subset of all cases examined are the result of a combination of several or all 
of these factors. It has not been possible, within the narrow scope of the current 
study, to do more than draw attention to the different ways in which the relevant 
situation is capable of being portrayed and to reflect upon the potential impact of 
contrasting cartographic representations of the region and associated events on the 
associated collective memory discourse. My inclusion of a large selection of the 
relevant cartography has necessarily precluded any detailed investigation into the 
production history of any one specific text. 
And finally, there remains ample scope for research in relation to the 
relevant literature. It would, for example, be interesting to compare Polish texts 
relating to the loss of the Kresy with those of Germans that turn on loss of Heimat 
in the ZO. In addition to chronological and thematic approaches, it would be 
highly interesting to compare and contrast these corpuses on the basis of author 
biographies. Are there, for example, discernible differences between literature 
produced by eyewitnesses to the events in question and that produced by later 
generations or contemporary authors who had no direct involvement? And what 
of women authors? I have already pointed out that, in the majority of cases, 
women were the dominant adults among expellee groups: this is very much a 
women’s history and that is an angle which I have not felt able to adequately 
address in the current thesis. 
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Appendix A: Historic Polish Nation Building 
 
A.1 Piast Poland (1025-1370) 
The Piast Dynasty is generally regarded as having begun with Mieszko I (c. 960-
992) and ended with King Kazimierz III Wielki (1333-1370).910 The historical 
dynasty took its name from a legendary leader thought to have started life as a 
peasant boy but who later became the tribal chief of the Polanians at around the 
time of Alfred the Great of Wessex (849-899).911 The Polane (also referred to 
variously as the Polanians or, less frequently, the Polians) were a people 
inhabiting the region later known as Great Poland (Latin: polonia maior; Polish: 
Wielkopolska) after whom the Poles and Poland were named.912 The first leader 
within the region that was to become Poland, for whose existence historical 
sources exist, was Mieszko I. He is known to have been baptised into the Catholic 
faith in 965, and to have married a Czech princess in the same year.913 Mieszko I 
continued to expand the area under his rule by conquest and treaty until his death 
in 992, by which time he ruled over Great Poland, Kuyawy and the central Polish 
regions of Łęczyca and Sieradz, and the entire area between the Rivers Oder and 
Bug, and from the Sudeten and Carpathian Mountains to the Baltic. Towards the 
end of his reign Mieszko I was able to annex the region around modern 
Kraków.914 It was during this period (981) that the first recorded contact between 
Poles (known as the Liakhs in Ruthenian historiography) and Ruthenians (the 
forebears of today’s Byelorussians and Ukrainians) took place as a result of an 
expedition into Mieszko I’s lands under the Ruthenian Prince Volodymyr the 
Great (c. 958-1015).915  
                                                 
910 Zamoyski, A., The Polish Way, pp. 10-20, 80. 
911 Halecki, O., History of Poland, p. 8. 
912 Ibid. pp. 6-7. 
913 Ibid. p. 9; Zamoyski, A., The Polish Way, p. 10; Großbongardt, A., et al., Die Deutschen im Osten Europas, p. 40; 
Whaley, J., Holy Roman Empire: 1493-1648, pp. 22-23; Pohanka, R., Die Herrscher und Gestalten des Mittelalters 
(Wiesbaden: Marixverlag, 2012), p. 191. 
914 Halecki, O., History of Poland, p. 8; Barraclough, G., Atlas of World History, p. 117; Jankowiak-Konik, B., et al., Atlas 
historii Polski, p. 9; Bruckmüller, E., et al., Putzger Historischer Weltatlas, pp. 70-71. 
915  Both Byelorussians and Ukrainians are often referred to as Ruthenians in the relevant sources (White and Red 
Ruthenians respectively). For an overview of the terminological and geographic complexity involved in the use of this term 
as well as for a general understanding of Ukrainohphile nationalism as a geo-political movement see: Potichnyj, P. J., 
Poland and Ukraine, Past and Present, pp. 3-7, 39, 73; Rudnytsky, I. L., et al., Rethinking Ukrainian History (Edmonton: 
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(Montreal; London: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1999); Wilson, A., Unexpected Nation, pp. 2-3, 15-19, 164-65, 
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However, despite the considerable extent of Mieszko I’s dominion, he 
failed to convert his landholdings into a formal kingdom in the European sense 
(i.e., as recognised by the Papacy). This was left to his son Bolesław I Chrobry 
(ruled 992-1025), who presided over the formal integration of the region into the 
Catholic Church hierarchy through the founding of the See of Gniezno in AD1000 
(effectively the ecclesiastical province of Poland).916 His efforts in consolidating 
and further expanding the territories of his father’s dominion and success in 
bringing the region into the sphere of the Roman Catholic Church were rewarded 
with a crown in 1025 (the year of his death).917 His son Mieszko II Lambert (c. 
990-1034) was crowned in the same year, and ruled, as King of Poland, from 
1025 to 1034.918  
At the height of Piast power, a period of 42 years straddling the reigns of 
Bolesław I Chrobry and Mieszko II Lambert, this family ruled a core area, which 
encompassed most of modern Silesia, Kraków, Sandomierz, Wyszegrod, and 
Poznań. During and overlapping with this period they had also held temporary 
control of Pomerania (966-1001), Bohemia (1003-1004) and Moravia (1003-
1029) and their hegemony had extended briefly as far to the North West as 
Lübeck, to Pressburg in the South and Brest in the East.919 
However, this rapid expansion had not been accompanied by the 
establishment of sufficiently robust state structures to provide for the effective 
control and administration of so vast a territory. Immediately following the death 
of Mieszko II Lambert, in 1034, the Kingdom collapsed under a combination of 
external and internal pressures.920 The chief external competitors were dukes of 
the Holy Roman Empire as well as the Kaiser (who demanded fealty from the 
Polish Kings for parts of their territory); the Kievan Rus; Ruthenians, Lithuanians, 
Prussians (i.e., the Slavic, pre-German Prussians); Czechs, Slovaks, and 
                                                                                                                                     
313,46-52; Pittaway, M., et al., Maps: Europe 1914-1955, p. 5; Soanes, C., et al., eds., Concise OED, pp. 563, 1261; 
Bruckmüller, E., et al., Putzger Historischer Weltatlas, p. 115. 
916 Halecki, O., History of Poland, pp. 11-14; Zamoyski, A., The Polish Way, pp. 12, 18, 35; Warner, D., et al., Ottonian 
Germany: the Chronicon of Thietmar of Merseburg, Manchester Medieval Sources Series (Manchester; New York: 
Manchester University Press, 2000), pp. 22-33. 
917 Some sources cite 1024 as the date in which Bolesław I was crowned. Cf. Prażmowska, A. J., A History of Poland, pp. 
11-12; Other sources cite 1025 as the correct year. Cf. Kuczyński, S. K., et al., A Panorama of Polish History, p. 22. 
918 Halecki, O., History of Poland, pp. 14-18; Zamoyski, A., The Polish Way, p. 15. 
919  I define ‘the height of Piast power’ as the period during which the Polish Crown enjoyed formal international 
recognition coupled with the maximum contiguous territorial expanse centrally controlled by the dynasty for a decade or 
more. For a detailed graphic overview of this area, with notes on the permenancy and/or duration of Piast control in the 
relevant areas, see: Bruckmüller, E., et al., Putzger Historischer Weltatlas, pp. 70-71; Barraclough, G., Atlas of World 
History, pp. 117-19; Jankowiak-Konik, B., et al., Atlas historii Polski, pp. 9-10. 
920 Prażmowska, A. J., A History of Poland, pp. 13-30. 
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Hungarians.921 Internally the dominance of the Polanians met with resistance from 
other related tribes such as the Sorbs, Kashubians, Slovincians, and Polabians.922 
Apart from the brief reign of Bolesław II Szczodry (1076-1079), none of the 
Polish dukes was able to claim the Polish crown between 1034 and 1295 at which 
time Przemysł II became King of Poland for a year until his death in 1296.923 
The intervening 261-year period was so chaotic, in terms of failed state 
formation, that it is known as the ‘Period of Feudal Disintegration’ in Polish 
historiography. 924  During this time the senior princes attempted to rule from 
Kraków. However, the entire area, once united under the Kings of Poland, had 
splintered into an ever-changing set of duchies and smaller polities incapable of 
implementing a concerted foreign policy.925 
It was during this time that many of the events took place that would re-
emerge as topoi in the collective memory discourse following the postwar 
movement of Poland’s borders, and concomitant population expulsions. In 1157 
Kaiser Friedrich I Barbarossa (1122-1190) forced Bolesław IV Kędzierzawy 
(1146-1173) to pay homage for Silesia.926 Shortly afterwards, with the backing of 
the Holy Roman Empire, Silesia became an independent polity under Mieszko I 
Plątonogi (c. 1130-1211) and his descendants.927  One of the Polish Dukes of 
Silesia, Henryk I Brodaty (1232-1238), invited German settlers to populate the 
duchy during his reign. This was the start of an influx of non-Poles into various 
Polish-ruled territories including Wielkopolska and Małopolska, most of 
Pomerania, the Neumark and Lower Silesia.928 In 1264, the Statute of Kalisz 
provided ‘a general charter of Jewish liberties in Poland.’929 In 1226 Konrad I 
Mazowiecki (Duke of Mazovia 1194-1247 and High Duke of Poland 1229-1232 
and 1241-1243) invited the Order of the Teutonic Knights into the Piast 
                                                 
921 For details into the meaning of feudal ties and notions of fealty see: Bloch, M., Feudal Society: The Growth of Ties of 
Dependence, trans. L. A. Manyon, 2 vols (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978 [1939]), 1, pp. 166-67, 71-75, 80. 
922  Zamoyski, A., The Polish Way, pp. 8-20; For information on the current status of these peoples see: Wolnicz-
Pawłowska, E., et al., Toponymic Guidelines of Poland, p. 25. 
923 Halecki, O., History of Poland, pp. 18-21, 45; Kuczyński, S. K., et al., A Panorama of Polish History, pp. 22-23. 
924 Kuczyński, S. K., et al., A Panorama of Polish History, pp. 22, 33-37. 
925 Halecki, O., History of Poland, pp. 21-30. 
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territories, as vassals of the Polish princes, to help defend against the Slavic 
Prussians. The Order completed the conquest of (Slavic) Prussia in 1283.930 Two 
Mongol invasions in 1241 and 1259, which reached as far as Silesia, almost put 
an end to the Piasts’ control over any part of Poland; the fact that the Ruthenians 
actively supported the second of these has never been forgotten in Polish 
tradition.931 After these Mongol incursions had destroyed the unity of the Kievan 
Rus, several Piast dukes took advantage of the situation, and of various dynastic 
squabbles that ensued, to begin an eastward expansion. This movement reached a 
high point in 1340 when King Kazimierz III Wielki (1310-1370) invaded Red 
Ruthenia and annexed the Ruthenian principality of Halych (roughly coextensive 
with Galicia with which it shares an etymological origin), which was fully under 
Polish dominion by 1366.932 
The end of Kazimierz’ reign and life (1370) also marked the end of Piast 
Poland as well as the start of Poland’s long-term, collaborative association with 
Lithuania.933 
 
A.2 The Commonwealth of Poland-Lithuania (1569-1795) 
Given Lithuania’s current relative lack of significance in international diplomacy, 
it might appear a little odd that its association and eventual union with the small, 
landlocked Kingdom of Poland would result in one of the most powerful polities 
in the world. It is stranger still that cultural memories of this, now completely 
dissolved (since 1795) power would still be influencing the actions of Ukrainians 
and Poles in the mid-twentieth century, a full 150 years after its dissolution. It is 
yet more surprising that such a powerful state has been all but forgotten, over the 
past half century, outside of the core territories it encompassed. Nevertheless, as I 
explain in more detail below, it was cultural memories of the differential socio-
political positions of Poles and Ukrainians, both within the Commonwealth and 
within its various successor states, that fuelled the ethnic antagonisms in East 
Galicia during WWII which resulted in the Ukrainian-led sociocide/genocide 
carried out against the province’s Polish population. Moreover, it was the 
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traditional east-facing outlook engendered by cultural memories of this polity that 
caused the London Poles to oppose Stalin’s postwar offer of a west-shifted Poland 
circumscribed by the Oder and Bug Rivers, the Carpathian Mountains and a 
sphere of Soviet interest that encompassed Lithuania, Byelorussia and the 
Ukraine, as well as the northern part of East Prussia.  
My use of the term ‘cultural memory’ in this context is deliberate and is 
specifically intended to express a clear distinction between the socio-political 
forces at work in this context, which are based on a popular knowledge of 
hegemonic historical narratives, and the process to which I refer as ‘collective 
memory’ throughout this thesis, which involves a contested discourse that takes 
place prior to the establishment of hegemonic historical narratives. Because these 
modern events were informed by cultural memories of the Commonwealth, it is 
necessary to briefly survey the history of this, largely forgotten, polity and the 
aftermath of its demise.  
Following the death of Kazimierz III Wielki in 1370, the Polish crown 
passed to King Louis d’Anjou of Hungary and Croatia (1342-1382), who then 
ruled as King of Poland from 1370 to 1382.934 This legal transfer of Poland to a 
foreign potentate was the result of the Angevin Agreement concluded between 
Kazimierz and the then King of Hungary during the second Congress of Višegrad 
in 1339. 935  At that time, Lithuania, the last pagan country in Europe, was 
struggling against the Knights of the Teutonic Order (Deutscher Orden), whose 
mission was the Christianisation of the Northern European pagans. Since Konrad 
I Mazowiecki invited the Order into North-East Europe in 1226, successive Polish 
Dukes and Kings had lost effective control over the Teutonic Knights. Their 
crusader state was blocking Polish expansion to the North. It also barred the way 
to the lucrative Baltic Sea trade, the majority of which was in the hands of North 
German merchants united in the Hanseatic League.936 It therefore made political 
sense for the Lithuanians and Poles to join forces against the Teutonic Order.  
                                                 
934 King of Hungary and Croatia (1342-1382) and King of Poland (1370-1382) 
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Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 282. 
936 Zimmerling, D., Handelsmacht im Zeichen der Kogge, pp. 105-17, 323-39. 97-98; Stoob, H., Die Hanse, pp. 18-115; 
Bruckmüller, E., et al., Putzger Historischer Weltatlas, p. 97. 
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An opportunity to bring about just such an arrangement arose upon the 
death of Louis of Hungary and the ascendancy to the throne of his daughter 
Jadwiga d’Anjou (c.1383-1399). By marrying her in 1385 (Union of Krevo), and 
accepting the Christian religion, Jagiełło, the Grand Duke of Lithuania (c. 1351-
1434) solved several problems at a stroke. He had removed the ideological 
justification for the Order’s crusade against the Lithuanians, whilst extending his 
influence into Central and Eastern Europe through a dynastic match with the 
powerful Angevin dynasty. Calling himself Władysław II, Jagiełło of Lithuania 
then ruled Poland, firstly as King jure uxoris (1386-1399) and later as king in his 
own right (1399-1434), and Lithuania as Grand Duke, in personal union until his 
death in 1434.937  With minor interruptions (1440, 1447 and 1492) successive 
members of the Jagiellon Dynasty continued to rule Poland, as King, and 
Lithuania, as Grand Duke, until the last of the dynasty, Sigismund II, died in 
1572.938  
The first attempt to convert this union of crowns to a formal merger 
between the two polities, the Union of Mielnik (1501), failed due to a lack of 
support among the Polish and Lithuanian nobility.939 However, a second attempt 
in 1569 (Union of Lublin) succeeded and the Commonwealth of Poland-Lithuania 
was formally inaugurated. The new state encompassed a vast area from Danzig in 
the North-West to Porogen on the border of the Crimean Khanate in the South-
East, and included Poles, Lithuanians, Byelorussians and Ukrainians (White and 
Red Ruthenians).940 Between 1468 and 1493, Poland-Lithuania had already been 
informally organised as a rzeczpospolita, which is usually translated as 
‘commonwealth’ but is actually etymologically identical with Latin res publica.941 
This organisational model was formalised in 1569, as of which time all Polish 
Crown-lands and lands within the Grand Duchy of Lithuania owed allegiance to a 
                                                 
937  Potichnyj, P. J., Poland and Ukraine, Past and Present, p. 7; Barraclough, G., Atlas of World History, p. 139; 
Kotljarchuk, A., In the Shadows of Poland and Russia: The Grand Duchy of Lithuania and Sweden in the European Crisis 
of the mid-17th Century (Huddinge: Södertörns högskola, 2006), p. 229. 
938 Halecki, O., History of Poland, pp. 65-131; Zamoyski, A., The Polish Way, pp. 46-74. 
939 Potichnyj, P. J., Poland and Ukraine, Past and Present, p. 37; Kotljarchuk, A., In the Shadows of Poland and Russia, p. 
134. 
940 Potichnyj, P. J., Poland and Ukraine, Past and Present, pp. 7, 39; See map in: Bruckmüller, E., et al., Putzger 
Historischer Weltatlas, p. 115. 
941 According to Reddaway, ‘source material on this point is not quite reliable’: Reddaway, W. F., et al., Cambridge 
History of Poland: (to 1696), p. 423. 
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single ruler, who, as of 1573, was a jointly elected King. Representatives from 
every region of this vast area met periodically in a central Diet, or Sejm.942  
As was the case in the Holy Roman Empire (HRE), the election of the 
King was not subject to ethno-national restrictions, which made it the focus of 
European attention. The Commonwealth became a den of intrigue every time a 
new election took place or was imminent. A further similarity between the 
Commonwealth and the HRE was that the history of both polities was largely 
characterised by an on-going antagonism between the centralising efforts and 
aspirations of the Crown, and the particularistic tendencies of powerful magnates 
and the nobility. In the case of Poland-Lithuania, the latter had a vested interest in 
their own latifundia and none whatsoever in the fate of the Commonwealth.943  
In other ways the Commonwealth resembled the United States of America 
(USA). The elected King ruled the polity in conjunction with a General Assembly 
consisting of a Senate and a Chamber of Deputies. Thus the King’s power was 
circumscribed in a manner similar to that of the President of the USA, albeit there 
was no restriction on the length of time he could hold office.944 According to 
Davies, ‘[in] their slogan of Nic o nas bez nas [derived from the Latin nihil novi 
sine communi consensus] … the Polish nobles … had anticipated the ideas of the 
Glorious Revolution of 1688 in England, and the American Revolution of 
1776’.945  
However, despite this ostensibly progressive model of government and the 
immense size of the Commonwealth, the state had ceased to exist by 1795 
following three events generally referred to as the Partitions. Each of these 
involved the annexation of territory by Prussia and Russia (1772, 1793 and 1795) 
and Austria (1772, 1795).946  
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A.3 The Partition Era (1772-1918) 
Tadeusz Lalik and Henryk Rutkowski identify a ‘crisis of sovereignty’ between 
1648 and 1763, followed by the ‘downfall of the Commonwealth’ between 1764 
and 1795.947 Norman Davies on the other hand descries a ‘Noble Republic’ (1569-
1795), during whose existence the ‘Partitions of Poland’ took place, the inaugural 
events of which happened as early 1764, followed by several distinct acts of 
partition ending in 1795.948 Davies' uncritical use of the word 'Poland' in this 
context for the multi-ethnic Commonwealth of Poland-Lithuania is a problematic 
but common conflation, to which I have already alluded in Chapter 4.  
In fact one could argue that the Commonwealth contained the seeds of its 
own eventual destruction right from its inception. There were several inherent 
structural problems within the polity. Uppermost among them were a deficiency 
of central authority and military power. This situation was exacerbated by the fact 
that its nobles jealously guarded their libertas against the demands of the state.949 
As Davies explains, ‘[the] principle of liberum veto in conjunction with the 
requirement for unanimity [in the decision-making process of the Sejm] provided 
a tool with which ill-disposed individuals could effectively halt the exercise of 
government.’950 During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries both the territorial 
integrity of the Commonwealth and the ability of the Crown to wield its nominal 
resources effectively were weakened by the establishment of extensive latifundia 
by self-interested magnates (the Szlachta). Some of the most powerful, the so-
called ‘little kings’ of the Ukrainian marchlands, maintained their own armies and 
effectively pursued their own foreign policy.951  
In addition to external pressures exerted whenever it was necessary to 
elect a new monarch, the Commonwealth Kings involved themselves in foreign 
wars and continuously pursued policies of territorial expansion, rather than 
consolidation.952 This resulted in a number of serious foreign interventions and 
episodes of long-term occupation, which any state would have found difficult to 
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withstand intact. Invasions by Cossacks, Swedes, Muscovites, Transylvanians, 
Tartars, and Brandenburgers during the twenty-year reign of John Casimir Vasa 
(1648-1668) left a quarter of the population dead.953 In 1654, Ruthenian magnates 
accepted the protectorate of the Russian Tsar against the King of the 
Commonwealth (Treaty of Pereiaslav). 954  Russian forces occupied most of 
Lithuania from 1654 to 1656. 1655 was the year of the ‘Swedish Deluge’ during 
which Swedish troops occupied most of the Commonwealth not already occupied 
by Russians or Cossack forces.955 Plans to partition the Commonwealth between 
Sweden, Brandenburg, Transylvania, and the Cossack states (a number of short-
lived independent Ukrainian polities - see Appendix C below) were put forward 
as early as 1656 (Swedish-Brandenburgish Treaty). 956  Transylvanian forces 
invaded the Commonwealth in 1657, and a full-scale Turkish invasion of the 
Commonwealth under Sultan Mohammed IV (1642-1693) in 1672 resulted in the 
capture of Podolia and the southern Kiev region.957 Thus the polity was politically 
divided and, in fact, barely viable, long before the Partitions. These problems 
were exacerbated by rising nationalist aspirations among some of the subject 
peoples, notably the Red (or Southern) Ruthenians (see below). 
In Church matters too the ecumenical constitution of the Commonwealth 
eventually resulted in a push-and-pull between Rome and Moscow, which 
coincided with ethnic divisions between Catholic Poles and Lithuanians on the 
one hand, and Orthodox Ruthenians on the other. These extra-territorial or supra-
national religious antagonisms had a negative impact on the internal integrity of 
the polity and stifled the formation of a shared identity. This situation was only 
made worse by the establishment of the Ukrainian Uniate Church in 1596 (Union 
of Brest). 958  As early as 1624 Iov Boretskyi, Metropolitan of the restored 
Orthodox Church in Kiev, appealed to the Russian Tsar for protection against 
Polish (Catholic) persecution, presaging the kind of invited foreign intervention in 
Commonwealth affairs that would eventually result in the Partitions.959  
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As we have seen, the first plan to partition the Commonwealth was 
mooted at the time of the Swedish-Brandenburgish Treaty in 1656.960 This was 
reiterated in the Compact of Radnoth (December 06, 1696), which envisaged a 
partition between ‘Sweden, Brandenburg, Transylvania, the Cossack Ukraine, and 
the Lithuanian magnate Bogusław Radziwiłł’.961 However, more concrete plans 
emerged during the early part of the reign of Augustus II the Strong (1697-1706 
and 1709-1733), a member of the Saxon Wettin dynasty and King of Poland-
Lithuania. The King himself even entertained such plans with a view to 
consolidating his position and ensuring the succession of his son by jettisoning 
troublesome areas of the Commonwealth, which were difficult to govern or prone 
to war.962 Ironically, the so-called Alliance of the Black Eagles, encompassing 
Russia, Austria and Prussia (1732), which was directed against the interests of 
Poland-Lithuania, was based on the preservation of the legitimate, constitutionally 
guaranteed system of government in Poland to ‘ensure her [continued] political 
weakness.’ 963  This was superseded by the Löwenwolde Treaty (1733), which 
pursued the same objectives.964  
During the reign of King Frederick II the Great of Prussia (1740-1786), 
and following unilateral annexations of parts of Commonwealth territory by 
Austria in 1769-1770, specific plans were conceived and implemented resulting in 
the First Partition of the Commonwealth (Convention of Partition: August 05, 
1772).965 Inasmuch as the Sejm ratified it, nolens volens, the First Partition was 
legalised on September 18, 1773.966  
Despite this, widespread resistance both within what remained of the 
Commonwealth and in the areas annexed by the partitioning powers, resulted in a 
two-decade long period of insurrection. This period was characterised by severe 
military reprisals and occupation on the part of Russia, Austria and Prussia.967 
However, the partitioning powers rarely collaborated to their mutual advantage. 
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Working in secret collusion with Prussia, for example, the ‘Four-Year’ Diet, 
which convened on October 06, 1788 and remained in session until 1792, 
instituted major constitutional reforms that ran counter to Russian interests. It 
abolished the Permanent Council, approved the expansion of the armed forces to 
100,000 men and entered into a defensive treaty with Prussia (March 29, 1790).968 
A new constitution introduced on May 03, 1791, represented 'a sort of peaceful, 
parliamentary coup d’état. It instituted hereditary monarchy and abrogated the 
liberum veto.’969 The result was a concentration of power in the centre and a, for 
Russia and Austria, intolerable enmeshment of Prussia in Commonwealth affairs. 
Disaffected nobles, whose own interests were, as they always had been, best 
served by a weak monarch and ineffective democratic institutions, conspired with 
the Russian Empress and united in the Confederation of Targowica (1792).970  
Pledging to restore the 1775 constitution, the confederates and Russia 
declared war on the Commonwealth. Catherine II of Russia dispatched 100,000 
soldiers into the Kingdom (May 18, 1792).971 The Crown forces were quickly 
subdued between May and July 1792, and plans were drawn up for a Second 
Partition.972 Having hastily dropped their Polish-Lithuanian allies, the Prussians 
entered into an alliance with Russia on January 23, 1793 (Treaty of St Petersburg) 
and agreed to the Second Partition, in which the Commonwealth lost another third 
of its former territory.973 All that remained of the former polity after this was ‘a 
thin band of territory running from Kurland south through Warsaw to Cracow, 
and southeast to western Volhynia.’974 Much to her ‘collective chagrin’ Austria 
was not involved in the Second Partition, which had been completed by the end of 
1793.975 The Sejm assembled for the final time at Grodno on November 24, 1793 
at which time it annulled the constitution and proclaimed the Second Partition.976 
Thus this Partition too had been legalised within the very polity that had been 
partitioned, once again demonstrating its inherent structural weaknesses.  
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Crucially however, the greatest fracture between the constituent parts of 
the Commonwealth took place along ethnic lines this time. This was the start of 
an era of specifically Polish resistance. The first concrete acts of rebellion against 
the partitioning powers were the march of the Madaliński Brigade on Kraków 
(March 12, 1794) and the Act of Insurrection, proclaimed by Tadeusz Kościuszko 
(1746-1817). There were minor Polish victories at Racławice and Warsaw in 
April 1794, the latter won under the leadership of Jan Kiliński (1760-1819). 
Another Polish force led by Jakub Jasiński (1761-1794) managed to disarm 
Russian soldiers garrisoned in Vilna.977 In an attempt to overcome the traditional 
antagonism between peasants and the (mostly Polish) nobility in the hope of 
recruiting more peasant ‘scythe-men’ to fight the oppressors, Kościuszko ‘issued 
the Połaniec Manifesto (May 07, 1794). This constitutional programme abolished 
serfdom and lowered labour dues’ but came too late to provide the means of any 
effective defence against the partitioning powers.978 By November 1794, Russian 
forces had recaptured Warsaw and slaughtered thousands of civilians.979  
Once again the movement of Russian troops towards their borders caused 
discomfort in Prussia and Austria, and triggered military interventions by both 
these great powers. 980  Any permanent occupation of the remainder of the 
Commonwealth would inevitably bring the three powers, Austria, Russia and 
Prussia face to face, and none of them wanted to tolerate the de facto annexation 
of the remaining Commonwealth territory by any of the others. The wheels of 
diplomacy ground into action and the Third (and final) Partition was agreed in 
principle.981 The Treaties of Partition were signed on October 24, 1795 but it took 
until November 23, 1796 to complete the annexation and deal with the remaining 
territorial issues.982 
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A.4 Partition Era Polish Polities (1795-1918) 
For historical accuracy, it is worth noting that a number of minor Polish polities 
came into being between 1795 and the founding of the Second Republic in 1918. 
Each had a different constitution, territorial coverage, and varying degrees of 
sovereignty. Briefly, these were the Kingdom of Galicia-Lodomeria (1773-
1867/1918), the Duchy of Warsaw (1807-1815), the (Congress) Kingdom of 
Poland (1815-1864/1918), the Grand Duchy of Posen (1815-1848) and the 
Republic of Cracow (1815-1848).983 As the dates show, several of the other post-
Partition polities existed simultaneously. For example, there were four Polish 
states in existence between 1815 and 1848.984 In November 1916 the Central 
Powers declared the creation of a new Kingdom of Poland before the Russian 
Kingdom of Poland (the Congress Kingdom) had been formally abolished.985 
Thus, between 1916 and 1918 there nominally existed two Kingdoms of Poland, 
both virtually co-extensive but formally and constitutionally separate.  
 
A.5 Concluding Remarks 
The historic developments described above are of paramount importance for a full 
appreciation of postwar Polish state-building and the official discourse relating to 
the two episodes of sociocide, with which this thesis is concerned. Cultural 
memories of Piast Poland contributed to the discourse and explanatory framework 
surrounding the Vertreibung of Germans from Lower Silesia, and are in fact the 
origin of the contentious term ‘the Regained Territories’ or Ziemie Odzyskane 
(ZO) in its modern, postwar meaning.986 The notion of the lost Kresy, an equally 
problematic term for those regions beyond the River Bug annexed by the USSR at 
the end of WWII, is also rooted in memories of the eastward-facing 
Commonwealth.987 
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Appendix B: A Brief History of Silesia 
 
B.1 Introduction 
The historical region of German Silesia consisted of an oak-leaf-shaped strip of 
land running in a north-westerly to south-easterly direction roughly parallel with 
the Sudeten Mountains across the north-eastern edge of the modern Czech 
Republic.988 It was irrigated by the River Oder, which formed the main artery or 
backbone of the ‘oak leaf’ with several of its major tributaries extending out to the 
edges of the ‘leaf’.989 It is this riverine network that characterises the landscape 
and which has shaped settlement patterns over the centuries leading to the 
establishment of frontiers dictated by proximity to water and the related 
commerce rather than other natural barriers like mountain ranges or oceans. This 
underlying geological cohesion accounts for the fact that, despite internal 
divisions resulting from dynastic inheritance issues, Silesia ‘ist immer eine 
geschichtliche Einheit geblieben’.990 
Because of its strategic position, navigable rivers, and extensive system of 
pathways and roads, Silesia has always been seen as a thoroughfare or bridge 
between the surrounding powers and between Germans and Slavs.991 For the same 
reasons, however, it has been subjected to multiple invasions over the centuries 
and has been incorporated into, and occasionally split between, a number of 
historical polities. Nevertheless, as Helmut Neubach rightly points out, however 
often Silesia changed hands, it always remained on the periphery of the states that 
laid claim to it. It was the northernmost possession of the Habsburgs and the 
Hohenzollerns’ southernmost territory. Prior to WWII it marked Germany’s 
eastern frontier. Today it lies on the western edge of Poland.992  
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By the outbreak of WWII, the greater part of Silesia (all of Lower Silesia 
and over half of Upper Silesia) were part of Germany. Some of Upper Silesia had 
been integrated into the Second Republic in the wake of WWI.993 Another part, 
Cieszyn Silesia, formed part of Czechoslovakia.994 However, this complexity is 
often ignored in the relevant historiography, much of which, as detailed in 
Chapter 4, conflates these various Silesian provinces and refer simply to ‘Silesia’ 
with no qualifying adjectives.  
At the end of the WWII, and prior to its incorporation into the people’s 
Republic of Poland, German Silesia covered an area of approximately 48,000 km2 
and had been an integral part of Germany since at least 1335 (Treaty of 
Trentschin).995 This appendix presents a short overview of the main phases and 
events in the development of Silesia up until its annexation by Poland in 1945 and 
the concomitant sociocide. 
 
B.2 Early History: c. 100 BCE to 1335 CE 
The early history of the province is shrouded in the mists of time but it is 
generally accepted that the name ‘Silesia’ is probably derived from a Germanic 
tribe related to the Vandals known as the Silingen, who settled the area around the 
Zobtenberg (Ślęża) between 100 BCE and 400 CE.996 However, the majority of 
this tribe appears to have moved out of the area in a westerly direction leaving the 
area largely empty.997 By about 500-600 the area around the Zobtenberg was 
inhabited by a Slavic tribe known as the Slenzanen, who possibly derived their 
name from the Silingen. Other Slavic tribes took control of most of the 
surrounding area, which later became Silesia. The fact that the name ‘Silesia’ is 
derived from the Silingen probably via the Slenzanen suggests that the entire area 
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gradually fell under the hegemony of some polity or dynasty that grew up around 
the Zobtenberg area.998  
In the tenth century (by around 930), most of what eventually became 
German Silesia had fallen under the hegemony of the Bohemians under the 
leadership of Wratislaus I (894-921). 999  However, the Poles conquered the 
territory under Mieszko I (c. 930-992) and his successor Bolesław Chrobry (992-
1025).1000 Upper Silesia came under Polish rule around 1000 at a time when it was 
only thinly settled by the decedents of the Germanic Vandals and Slavic 
Opolans.1001 Bohemia and Poland continued to fight over possession of Silesia 
until the Glatzer Pfingstfrieden (1137), which fixed the boundaries between 
Silesia, Moravia and Bohemia.1002 Most of Silesia remained under Polish rule at 
that time.1003  
By 1163, however, the Silesian Piasts had renounced all ties with the 
Polish branch of the dynasty and the entire province of Silesia had become 
independent from the Polish Piasts during the reign of Mieszko I Plątonogi (c. 
1130-1211).1004 This was during the Period of Feudal Disintegration (1138-1295) 
during which there was no King of Poland.1005 Thus, although still held by a 
branch of the Piast dynasty, Silesia no longer formed part of the Kingdom of 
Poland when the kingdom was restored under Przemysł II (1257-1296) in 
1295.1006  Upper Silesia became the Herzogtum of Ratibor in 1163 and, after 
annexing Oppeln in 1202, it was renamed the Herzogtum of Oppeln, which had 
splintered into seven smaller duchies by 1281.1007  
The first German settlers had been invited to Silesia as early as 1138 
where they founded towns on the basis of the Magdeburg borough rights 
(Magdeburger Stadtrecht).1008 In Lower Silesia, Germans built some 1500 villages 
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and 63 towns in accordance with the Magdeburger Stadtrecht, including Breslau. 
Similarly, within a hundred and fifty years of the first German colonists settling in 
Upper Silesia (1217-1367) they had already founded twenty towns and 200 
villages ‘nach deutschem Recht’.1009 In addition, the German farmers who settled 
in Silesia under the Piast dynasty between 1138 and 1335 introduced new 
agricultural practices that gave them an early economic advantage over their new 
Slavic neighbours. These included the use of metal plough shears and a system of 
triennial crop rotation.1010  
 
B.3 German Silesia: 1335 to 1763 
Dynastic inheritance settlements, throughout the twelfth century and into the 
1300s, resulted in an on-going splintering of Silesia into ever smaller and 
continuously changing polities. This breakup caused both internal political 
difficulties and undermined the province’s ability to assert its independence 
against the Polish Piasts. Upon his ascent to the throne in 1333, for example, 
Kazimierz III attempted to assert control over the province after 170 years of 
independence. Faced with the loss of autonomy, increasing numbers of Silesian 
princes turned to Bohemia for assistance, eventually accepting King Johann 
(1296-1346) of Bohemia, an Imperial Prince, as their feudal overlord during the 
first Congress of Višegrad (1335). 1011  This arrangement, in turn, led to the 
secession of Silesia from Poland, which Kazimierz III (1310-1370) of Poland 
formally acknowledged in the Treaty of Trentschin (August 24, 1335).1012 In the 
treaty Kazimierz stated under oath that Poland had no current pretentions to 
Silesia and never would have. 1013  Kazimierz reaffirmed this in the Peace of 
Namyslau (1348).1014 The status quo was reconfirmed by Ludwig I of Hungary 
and Poland in 1372.1015  
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Thus, by 1335 the majority of Silesia had become an Imperial province 
and no longer formed part of the Kingdom of Poland. The whole of Silesia 
received a unified political and military organisation following the signing of ‘Die 
Strehlener Einnung’ (February 14, 1427). 1016  The Upper Silesian Duchy of 
Auschwitz was ceded to Poland 1457 followed by the Zator region in 1479, 
during the brief rule of Hungary in the second half of the fifteenth century.1017 The 
remainder of the province reverted to Bohemia following the death of King 
Matthias Corvinus (1469-1490).1018 
According to Markus Leuschner, after 1479 ‘die schlesisch-polnische 
Grenze [war] für beinahe ein halbes Jahrtausend eine der unumstrittensten und 
friedlichsten ganz Europas’.1019 This long period of peace and stability was due in 
part to the fact that the all members of the Piast dynasty, who may potentially 
have laid claim to some parts of Silesia, died out between 1532 and 1625.1020 
From 1526 to 1740 most of Silesia came into the Austrian (Habsburg) 
sphere of influence after Archduke Ferdinand (1503-1564 [Ferdinand I of HRE 
from 1531 to 1564]) inherited Hungary and Bohemia and therefore Silesia in 
1526.1021 However, under the Hohenzollern dynasty Prussia took most of Silesia, 
except for the Duchies of Troppau, Jägerndorf and Teschen, by force of arms in 
the course of the three Silesian Wars between Prussia and Austria. These wars 
were fought between 1740 and 1763 and culminated in the Frieden von 
Hubertusburg (1763). 1022  The incorporation of Silesia into Prussia virtually 
doubled the size of Prussia setting it on the path to becoming one of the major 
European powers.1023 
 
B.4 The Divided Province: 1763 to 1933 
Following the three Silesian Wars, the King of Prussia, Friedrich II (1712-1786), 
reformed the political structure of Silesia by installing a Provinzialminister, ‘a 
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kind of viceroy with wide-ranging powers’, in Breslau and Landräte at the head 
of forty Landkreise.1024 He also reinforced the existing fortifications at several 
cities and had new fortifications built.1025 In addition, the King invited tens of 
thousands of new, mostly German, settlers into the country to replace the 
manpower lost during the wars against Austria.1026 Despite these reforms, until 
Karl Heinrich vom und zum Stein (1757-1831) was able to introduce sweeping 
changes to the Prussian constitution under the protection, and acting on behalf, of 
Napoleon I (1769-1821) in 1807, the whole of Prussia, including Silesia, was 
ruled on a feudal basis.1027  
Politically, Silesia had always been subject to foreign intervention. One 
example of this was when the Swedish king Karl XII forced Kaiser Ferdinand III 
of Austria to permit Silesian Protestants to build several so-called Gnadenkirchen 
over and above the three Friedenskirchen agreed in the Peace of Westphalia 
(1648) in the Altranstädter Konvention of 1707. Another good example of the role 
Silesia has always played as a pawn within the greater scheme of European 
politics can be seen in Napoleon’s response to the Prussian declaration of war on 
March 27, 1813, which was simply to offer the whole of Silesia to Austria in 
return for her support.1028 If nothing else, this demonstrates that Silesia was a 
well-defined province that was never really in control of its own destiny and could 
be traded and bartered to suit the political situation as well as being appended to 
outside polities without necessarily becoming an integral part of them or losing its 
core identity. However, because of its strategic location between Tsarist Russia, 
the Austrian Empire and Prussia, Silesia also became the centre of German 
resistance to Napoleon. In 1813 the King of Prussia moved his operational base to 
Breslau from where he, in alliance with the Russian Tsar, launched the counter 
offensive that resulted in the liberation of all of the German states.1029 
Silesia also played an important role in the formation of the modern 
European political landscape, being the birthplace of many radical often left-wing 
political parties. Peasant revolts shook the province during the revolutionary years 
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of 1848-49, but the best-known example of quasi revolutionary direct action 
against the exploitation of the emerging Working Class in the wake of 
industrialisation was the Silesian Weavers’ Rising in June 1844.1030 This revolt 
was the result of social pressures rooted in the plight of the working poor in and 
around Bielau in Lower Silesia. It exploded in a series of incidents, which helped 
to galvanise early left wing movements throughout Europe and ignited the 
indignation or pioneering figures in the socialist movement. One of these was 
Wilhelm Wolff (1809-1864), a political radical to whom Marx dedicated his first 
volume of Das Kapital.1031 Wolff ensured that news of the revolt reached the 
outside world, thereby putting Silesia at the centre of international affairs once 
again, as it had been so often in the past.1032  
Upper Silesia too was radicalised in the wake of the Industrial Revolution. 
Yet, although this part of the province was rich in natural resources such as coal, 
and other minerals, the development of the relevant industries only really reached 
its full potential after the introduction of railway links between Brieg and Breslau 
(1842) and from Gleiwitz to Brieg (1845). This delayed start to industrialisation in 
the region contrasted sharply with the situation in Germany’s other major 
coalfields in the Ruhrgebiet, which was adequately connected to the rest of the 
world via the major river and canal systems of Western Europe.1033 The rapidly 
expanding industrialisation of Upper Silesia which followed the construction of 
improved rail links between 1842 and 1845 resulted in a pressing demand for a 
much greater workforce than the province could supply. The shortfall was met by 
a period of state-led immigration. The majority of immigrant workers came from 
Russia, Russian-dominated Congress Poland and Galicia, a development that 
introduced nationalist tensions into the already simmering social situation that 
characterised the decades leading up to German unification in 1871.1034  
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These tensions, and Prussia’s heavy-handed approach to enforcing cultural 
homogeneity throughout the state, culminated in the so-called Kulturkampf (1871-
1887). This period was characterised by a struggle for the hearts and minds of all 
sectors of society and was ultimately aimed at the continuance of Prussian culture 
and power throughout Silesia. The main parties were Slavic-oriented, mostly 
Polish, Catholics, who enjoyed Austrian support on the one side, and Lutheran 
Prussians on the other, whereby the former had their powerbase in Upper Silesia 
and the latter were concentrated in Lower Silesia.1035 Whereas the ethno-linguistic 
dominance of the Germans in Lower Silesia never really came under threat as this 
part of the province experienced a lesser degree of industrialisation and, therefore, 
less immigration, the Polish influence in Upper Silesia was significant and 
continued to be consolidated right from the Reichsgründung through to the 
plebiscites of the 1920s.1036 
As a direct result of the political unrest during the so-called Nachmärz 
Period (1848-c.1871) four of the most significant political parties in modern 
German history were founded in Silesia, including: the Allgemeiner Deutscher 
Arbeiter Verein (1863 by Ferdinand Lassalle); the Deutsche Reichspartei (1866 
by Count Eduard von Bethusy-Huc); the Nationalliberale Partei (1866 by Rudolf 
Haym et al.), and the Zentrumspartei (Count Lazy Henckel von Donnersmark et 
al.).1037 All of these went on to inform, and serve as models for, a whole raft of 
political parties that proliferated during the Weimar Republic era. According to 
Neubach, Lower Silesia became a staunch bastion of the SPD during the late 
1800s and remained so right up until 1932. During the same period, however, 
Upper Silesian politics was dominated by the archconservative 
Zentrumspartei.1038 
In addition to these essentially German movements, a Polish nationalist 
movement began to gather momentum in Upper Silesia around 1885 in response 
to Bismarck’s increasingly anti-Polish policies. At the turn of the century, Polish 
nationalists from Posen and West Prussia began agitating for more autonomy 
within Upper Silesia, which resulted in greater political representation for Poles 
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throughout Upper Silesia by the outbreak of war in 1914.1039 This movement 
culminated in the Polish minority’s highest ever showing (14.3%) in the 
Reichstagswahlen in 1907, which gave them five seats in the Reichstag, although 
support for their cause had fallen again to 11.1% in the 1912 elections.1040  
In areas in which German Silesians felt their culture to be most under 
threat from Polish influence, they attempted to boost their sense of German 
identity, largely by peaceful means, by forming associations such as the so-called 
Trachtengruppen which celebrated German costume and customs.1041 However, 
the protracted Kulturkampf in Upper Silesia was not always contested on the 
grounds of such more or less self-conscious ‘performances’ of culture. Following 
WWI, both the newly reconstituted Poland and Czechoslovakia raised territorial 
claims to parts of Upper Silesia, with Polish politicians openly agitating for the 
secession of Upper Silesia from Germany and its incorporation into the recently 
founded Second Republic.1042  
Under the Treaty of Versailles (1919) Germany was forced to cede the 
southern part of the Ratibor administrative district, covering an area of some 
315km2 and home to 48,500 people, to Czechoslovakia. Most of these people 
spoke Moravian, a Czech dialect. Yet, according to German nationalists, they 
were ‘deutsch gesinnt’.1043 Germans in Lower Silesia and beyond protested that 
this territorial arrangement and the concomitant population transfer had been 
imposed upon the population by external powers with no democratic consultation. 
Their protest was successful and the victorious powers granted them a plebiscite 
to decide over their own fate.1044 At the same time, demands for an independent 
Silesia grew louder and the Prussian government responded by once again 
dividing Silesia into two provinces: Lower Silesia, governed from Breslau, and 
Upper Silesia governed from Oppeln.1045  
During the lead up to the plebiscite, Poles and Germans contested 
ownership of Upper Silesia, the former concentrating on the social question 
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(German = Protestant = rich) whilst the latter focused on nationalism.1046 The 
plebiscite took place on the 20th of March 1921 in the shadow of a campaign of 
terrorism by Polish nationals. Prior to the plebiscites, the government of the newly 
founded Poland worked politically and militarily towards the forced annexation of 
the majority of Upper Silesia. Their actions in the area resulted in three ‘Polish 
Revolts’ (1919, 1920 and 1921), in which Polish insurgents attempted to seize de 
facto control of the province, with the support of regular Polish armed forces and 
the more or less open support of the French occupying forces. All three attempted 
annexations were put down by German Selbstschutzverbände.1047  
The result of the plebiscite was 60:40% in favour of a continued 
membership within the German state.1048 This result in favour of Germany was 
achieved despite the fact that entire German populations in various regions were 
prevented from participating in the vote, such as those from the administrative 
districts of Neisse, Grottkau and Falkenberg as well as the western part of the 
Neustadt region.1049 Disregarding the results of this democratic process, Polish 
insurgents under Albert Korfanty (1873-1939) occupied the area claimed by 
Poland in a final attempt to annex the area on the basis of the maxim ‘possession 
is nine tenths of the law’. Korfanty’s forces were finally beaten by German 
volunteers led by General Karl Hoefer (1862-1939).1050  
However, the matter was still far from settled. Once again flouting the 
democratic tradition, the Geneva Arbitral Verdict of October 20, 1921 (which was 
arrived at by ‘a committee of four – a Brazilian, a Chinese, a Belgian and a 
Spaniard’) removed two fifths of the contested area from Germany and placed it 
under Polish control.1051 In a further plebiscite held in 1922 within the two thirds 
of Upper Silesia that had not until then been ceded to Poland, over 90% of the 
population voted against independence within the German Reich in favour of 
remaining part of Prussia.1052 
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In total Germany’s losses to Poland following the First World War dealt a 
serious blow to the German economy. Germany was compelled to cede 3,213 
Km2 of territory; 893,000 residents; 92% of the Upper Silesian coal reserves; 
79.1% of all collieries in Upper Silesia (there were 67 active collieries at the 
time); 59.5% of all blast furnaces in Upper Silesia (total = 37); 66.7% of all zinc 
and lead ore mines (total = 15), and 100% of all zinc and lead ore smelters (total = 
24).1053 
According to censuses taken in the late 1930s, there was a total of around 
490,000 ethnic Germans living in Eastern (Polish) Upper Silesia of which around 
360,000 were bilingual (German and Polish). Based on figures produced in 1925 
for the Western part of the province (German Upper Silesia) there remained over 
830,000 Germans of which c. 390,000 were either bi- or trilingual (speaking 
various combinations of German, Polish and so-called Wasserpolnisch).1054 
However, as Markus Leuschner stresses, the linguistic affinities of specific 
Silesians did not always coincide with their feelings of national and ethnic 
belonging. This was proven in the plebiscite of 1921 when, for example, areas 
such as Groß-Strehlitz and Kreuzburg, with German-speaking populations of only 
17% and 47% respectively, voted, sometimes overwhelmingly, to remain part of 
Prussia (49.3% and 92% respectively). This shows that Polish-speakers in Silesia 
often saw themselves as Germans or else expected a better future for themselves 
under German rule.1055  In fact, the overall linguistic situation in the Prussian 
province of Silesia was never particularly clear-cut and it would be a mistake to 
generically equate linguistic practice with ethnic affinity.1056 
There were, moreover, no rigid linguistic boundaries in Silesia, which is to 
say that there were no sharp delineations between the languages spoken in various 
parts of Silesia and the neighbouring countries. Until 1945, various dialects of 
German, Polish and Moravian were spoken in different regions of Silesia, 
producing a linguistic patchwork not unlike that found in Switzerland today.1057 
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1056 In general, the expectation that linguistic practice and ethnicity will necessarily coincide is naïve. One need only 
consider the case of Irish and Scottish nationalists, the majority of whom speak English rather than the languages of their 
putative ancestors (Gaeilge and Gàidhlig respectively). For a rather whimsical exposition of the linguistic situation in 
Upper Silesia, see: Hartung, H., Deutschland deine Schlesier, pp. 98-103. 
1057 Neubach, H., Geschichte Schlesiens, p. 3. 
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As a result of Hussite incursions into Upper Silesia in the early fifteenth century, 
which curtailed German colonisation in that region and promoted the immigration 
of Slavs, mainly Poles, German was spoken mostly in the larger towns in Upper 
Silesia whilst the rural population spoke a Polish dialect known as 
Wasserpolnisch.1058 Overall, the ethno-linguistic situation throughout Silesia, but 
more so in Upper Silesia, was fluid and not easily definable in modern, 
nationalistic terms. Nevertheless, the choices people made in respect to their 
cultural and ethnic affinities would have serious consequences as the turbulent 
Weimar Republic gave way to the Third Reich, and the NSDAP consolidated their 
power (see my discussion of the Deutsche Volksliste and the Polish weryfikacja 
narodowościowa in Section 1.6 above).1059 
 
B.5 Brown Silesia: 1933 to 1945 
Helmut Brückner, Silesia’s first Gauleiter, founded the Silesian NSDAP in 
1925.1060 During the economic downturn of the 1930s, the NSDAP dramatically 
increased its share of the vote from, for example 1% in Breslau in 1928 to 43.5% 
by July 1932.1061 According to Neubach, the main reason for this notable swing to 
the political right was, in addition to the economic misery that characterised the 
Weimar Republic, Hitler’s promise to denounce, and by implication, reverse the 
Treaty of Versailles and, by implication, rectify the post-WWI transfer of parts of 
Silesia to Poland.1062 Despite the apparently solid right-wing support within the 
Silesian population that these results would seem to indicate, the NSDAP found it 
necessary to import political leaders such as Gauleiter from other parts of 
Germany due to a lack of ‘home-grown’ (right-wing) political ‘talent’.  
 
B.6 Heim ins Reich: 1939 to 1945 
Within days of the outbreak of WWII, German troops had conquered all of the 
territory lost to Poland as a result of the controversial Genfer Schiedsspruch 
                                                 
1058 The term Wasserpolnisch need not, but often is considered to have, perjorative connotations. See: Leuschner, M., 
Heimat und Schickal, p. 21. 
1059 Weryfikacja narodowościowa = national verification 
1060 Neubach, H., Geschichte Schlesiens, p. 18. 
1061 Ibid. pp. 18-19. 
1062 For a more detailed account of the economic situation in Weimar Germany and of the ramifications of the Treaty of 
Versailles in the lead up to WWII see: Taylor, A. J. P., Origins of the Second World War; Neubach, H., Geschichte 
Schlesiens, p. 19; Hürten, H., ed. Weimarer Republik und Drittes Reich, pp. 94-96, 141-42. 
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(1921).1063 In order to improve the economic potential of Upper Silesia, Hitler 
also ordered the annexation of neighbouring, purely Polish, territories, thereby 
augmenting the province of Silesia by some 10,500 km2 and increasing the 
population by 2.7 million ethnic Poles. As a result, Silesia became so large and 
politically unwieldy that the NSDAP once again divided it into two provinces on 
the 1st of April 1941.1064 By contrast with the more westerly parts of Germany, 
Silesia experienced very little aerial bombardment during WWII. The only parts 
of Silesia to suffer significant (although, in the greater scheme of things, relatively 
minor, bombing campaigns) were industrial Upper Silesia around Heyderbreck, 
and Breslau in Lower Silesia. Both of these areas were bombed during 1944 by 
the USA and the USSR respectively.1065 By comparison with the rest of Germany, 
Silesia was considered so safe, that it came to be known as the 
‘Reichsluftschutzkeller’. As the War progressed, the province become a refuge for 
private citizens and officials fleeing from the harder hit areas of Germany.1066 In 
the final days of WWII, Hitler declared the Silesian towns of Breslau and Glogau 
to be Festungen (redoubts) and ordered them to stand firm down to the last man 
and bullet in the service of Germany.1067 
 
B.7 Annexation and Vertreibung: 1945-1952 
As explained in the Introduction to this thesis, the Bund der Vertriebenen (BdV) 
represents all Germans and ethnic Germans forced or encouraged to ‘return’ to 
Germany from ancestral homes beyond the current borders of the FRG. However, 
they reserve the term ‘Vertriebene’ for those expelled from Central and Eastern 
Europe in the wake of WWII and up to December 31, 1952.1068 The years 1945-
1952 therefore constitute a key period in the collective memory discourse 
triggered by Poland’s annexation of German Silesia and the concomitant 
sociocide. 
                                                 
1063 Neubach, H., Geschichte Schlesiens, p. 23. 
1064 Ibid. p. 24. 
1065 Ibid. p. 25. 
1066 Ibid. 
1067 Hartung, H., Deutschland deine Schlesier, pp. 129-34; Neubach, H., Geschichte Schlesiens, p. 25. 
1068 These groups are defined in the German Federal Expellee Act or Bundesvertriebenengesetz (BVFG), which regulates 
the rights and status of those represented by the BDV within the FRG. Specifically the following paragraphs are relevant: 
Vertriebene (§ 1), Aussiedler (§ 1 Section 3), and Spätaussiedler (§ 4). See: Anon., Vertriebene, Aussiedler, Spätaussiedler, 
p. 2. 
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Having been spared much of the misery of the aerial bombardments 
suffered by their fellow Germans elsewhere in Germany, Silesians suddenly found 
themselves on the front line when the Russians launched their major offensive 
against the German Reich in January 1945. 1069 The civilian population 
immediately began a mass exodus which, however, was too late to save them 
from the wrath of the Soviet soldiers, who, according to Neubach, instigated a 
regime of ‘barely imaginable terror’ resulting in the deaths of thousands of 
civilians.1070 Of those who managed to escape the unstoppable ‘eastern hordes’ by 
fleeing to the West, several thousands lost their lives in Dresden in February 
1945, which was full of refugees when it was bombed by the British and 
American air forces.1071 Many thousands of Silesians had fled the province as 
fighting intensified, in the van of the Soviet advance and motivated by reports of 
Russian atrocities, mostly to Saxony and the Sudetenland. Most of those who fled 
expected to be able to be allowed to return to their homes after the cessation of 
hostilities and started to do so as soon as the major battles had finished and the 
remains of the German forces had fallen back beyond the Oder and the (Lausitzer) 
Neisse rivers.1072 However, the Soviet authorities had left the administration of 
occupied Silesia to the Polish militia, who immediately instigated a reign of terror 
aimed not just at known war criminals and members of the NSDAP, but at all 
ethnic Germans within the province. According to German sources, apart from 
random violence and summary justice against individuals, this phase of Soviet-
Polish occupation also involved the torture and murder of tens of thousands of 
Germans in militia-run concentration camps, most of which had been built by the 
NSDAP, such as those at Myslowitz, Lamsdorf, and Schientochlowitz.1073 
In some areas in Lower Silesia, the so-called ‘wilde Vertreibungen’ i.e., 
the unofficial expulsion of the German population from their homes and property 
at the hands of local Poles, had begun as early as June 1945.1074 These pogroms 
were followed by officially sanctioned expulsions in accordance with the Potsdam 
Agreements beginning on August 02, 1945 and lasting until the early winter 
                                                 
1069 Hürten, H., ed. Weimarer Republik und Drittes Reich, p. 452. 
1070 Neubach, H., Geschichte Schlesiens, p. 25. 
1071 Irving, D. J. C., Apocalypse 1945; Neubach, H., Geschichte Schlesiens, p. 25; Zemella, G., Deutschland im Fadenkreuz, 
pp. 307, 33. 
1072 Theisen, A., Die Vertreibung der Deutschen, p. 7. 
1073 Ibid. p. 12; Neubach, H., Geschichte Schlesiens, p. 26. 
1074 Theisen, A., Die Vertreibung der Deutschen, p. 6. 
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months of 1947. 1075  Whilst the majority of the Vertriebenen were driven 
westwards beyond the ‘frontier’ formed by the River Neisse and the River Oder as 
of its confluence with the Neisse near Neuzelle (which still forms the border 
between Germany and Poland today), several tens of thousands were deported to 
Russia as forced labourers.1076 Nevertheless, the Polish authorities also retained 
many thousands of German Silesians to help with the reconstruction of the 
province before finally expelling them to Germany years later.1077 About a million 
bilingual Silesians in Upper Silesia were classified as being autochthonous and 
were permitted/forced to stay but were forbidden to speak German or cultivate 
their tradition: of these people, a small number voluntarily emigrated to Germany 
at a later date, (55,000 to the FRG and 115,000 to the GDR) often taking their 
Polish wives and children with them.1078 According to Neubach, around a half a 
million ethnic Germans were killed during, or died as direct result of, the 
expulsion treks out of Silesia (Leuschner quotes a slightly lower figure of 
466,000).1079 
To summarise the fate of the Silesian Germans in the immediate aftermath 
of the Second World War: about 1.6 million Silesians were able to flee to 
Czechoslovakia; many fled to Saxony and the Sudetenland to avoid the fighting as 
the Soviet forces swept through Silesia in 1945; of these, several thousand were 
killed in Dresden during the firebombing campaign of 1945; many returned to 
Silesia as soon as the fighting had finished; some were murdered in spontaneous 
acts of revenge; of these people, some were guilty of war crimes, some were 
members of the NSDAP, and can therefore be said to have supported the 
foregoing oppression of the Poles, whilst others were indigenous Germans not 
guilty of any specific crime. Some of the expellees were tortured and killed in 
organised acts of revenge in concentration camps, run by the Polish militia, to 
which entire villages were sometimes relocated.1080  
                                                 
1075 Neubach, H., Geschichte Schlesiens, p. 26. 
1076 There are several Neiße rivers in old Silesia; the specific river referred to here is known as the Lausitzer Neiße in 
German and is often called the Western Neisse in English. Ibid. 
1077 Ibid; Leuschner, M., Heimat und Schickal, p. 36. 
1078 Theisen, A., Die Vertreibung der Deutschen, p. 10; Neubach, H., Geschichte Schlesiens, pp. 26-27, 30-31; Brandes, D., 
et al., Lexikon der Vertreibungen, p. 148. 
1079 Neubach, H., Geschichte Schlesiens, p. 26; Leuschner, M., Heimat und Schickal, p. 55. 
1080 Theisen, A., Die Vertreibung der Deutschen, pp. 7, 9; Neubach, H., Geschichte Schlesiens, pp. 26-27. 
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Of the Germans still living in Silesia after the Potsdam Conference, which 
ended on August 02, 1945, most (3,197,000) were driven out of the province and 
into occupied Germany, where they finally settled in all four occupied zones.1081 
According to Theisen, about 1.5 million Silesians managed to reach the western 
part of the German Reich via a direct route.1082 Around 1.6 million Silesians were 
captured by the Red Army either at their homes or whilst fleeing the province. 
Some 350,000 were deported to the Soviet Union as forced labour although it is 
not known how many died en route or in Soviet labour camps, lost within the 
Gulag system.1083 Theisen quotes the figure of 400,000 Germans from the west of 
the Oder-Neisse line who were taken into Russian captivity as forced labourers of 
whom some 200,000 died en route and in Soviet camps.1084 
 
B.8 Concluding Remarks 
Those ethnic Germans, who remained in Silesia after the Vertreibungen fall into 
two broad groups. The first group consisted of skilled workers and their families 
(60-80,000 people) held back by the Soviet/Polish authorities, mainly in the 
vicinity of Waldenburg in Lower Silesia and the industrialised areas of Upper 
Silesia, to carry out specialised work involving the maintenance of infrastructure 
and plant not destroyed in the War, as well as the rebuilding and repair of industry 
and infrastructure necessary to make the region habitable. The second, far more 
numerous, group consisted of indigenous people, who cannot be defined as being 
either Polish or German, most of whom lived to the east of the Oder in Upper 
Silesia. Many of these people either had no time to flee or refused to do so (over 1 
million people); despite their mixed heritage, these people were forcibly made to 
embrace all aspects of Polish culture. Including the language1085 The numbers of 
ethnic Germans remaining in former Silesia declined steadily from 870,000 in 
1950 to 107,000 by 2002.1086 
                                                 
1081 Brandes, D., et al., Lexikon der Vertreibungen, pp. 351-52; Leuschner, M., Heimat und Schickal, p. 55. 
1082 Theisen, A., Die Vertreibung der Deutschen, p. 7. 
1083 Ibid; Brandes, D., et al., Lexikon der Vertreibungen, pp. 163-65; Erika Steinbach in: Leuschner, M., Heimat und 
Schickal, pp. 5, 55. 
1084 Theisen, A., Die Vertreibung der Deutschen, pp. 9, 13-14; Brandes, D., et al., Lexikon der Vertreibungen, pp. 24-26, 
144-49, 725-28. 
1085 Theisen, A., Die Vertreibung der Deutschen, p. 10; Neubach, H., Geschichte Schlesiens, pp. 30-31; Brandes, D., et al., 
Lexikon der Vertreibungen, p. 25. 
1086 Neubach, H., Geschichte Schlesiens, p. 32; Leuschner, M., Heimat und Schickal, p. 55. 
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Two interesting footnotes to the history of Silesia as a centre of German 
life and culture stand out during the period immediately predating its integration 
into Poland. The first is that Silesia was intimately involved in the Second World 
War literally from the first hour on. For it was in response to an attack on a radio 
station in Gleiwitz, Upper Silesia, on the 1st of September 1939, purportedly by 
Polish soldiers, that Hitler ordered the invasion of Poland.1087 And the final action 
by the German military during WWII was the defence of Breslau (see Chapter 6), 
which continued even after Hilter’s suicide. The second is that the most serious 
German plot to assassinate Hitler was hatched at Graf von Moltke’s (1907-1945) 
estates near Groß Rosen in Lower Silesia.1088 Thus, despite its position on the 
geographical outskirts of Germany, Silesia continued to play a central role in 
German politics until its integration into Poland in 1945. 
                                                 
1087 Rees, L., The Nazis, p. 97; Färber, M., Zweiter Weltkrieg: Bilder, p. 9; Neubach, H., Geschichte Schlesiens, p. 23; 
Hürten, H., ed. Weimarer Republik und Drittes Reich, pp. 332-37. 
1088 Neubach, H., Geschichte Schlesiens, p. 24. 
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Appendix C: Anti-Polish Pogroms in East Galicia 
 
C.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 3, I explained how the Lublin Poles benefited by accepting Stalin’s 
offer of a new state based on the Piast Formula. I argued that the logical corollary 
of this was the need to reject the traditional understanding of the Commonwealth 
as the non plus ultra of Polish statehood. I have also explained why it proved 
politic to accept the loss of East Galicia to the Ukrainian SSR. However, this still 
does not explain why Ukrainian nationalists were so adamant about seizing 
control of the province. It is worth looking into this in some detail for two main 
reasons. First, the circumstances under which those Poles who replaced the 
outgoing Germans in Lower Silesia were forced to leave their own homes is 
directly relevant to the concomitant collective memory discourse. Second, one of 
my objectives throughout this thesis has been to situate the postwar Flucht und 
Vertreibung of Germans from the ZO within longer-term geopolitical problems 
centred on accommodating Poland within Central Europe. Considering this 
problem with reference to a frontier other than that shared with Germany will 
provide interesting insights into the relevant issues beyond the pall of the 
Holocaust.1089 In addition, forming a comprehensive understanding of Ukrainian-
Polish border conflicts throughout the twentieth-century will help illuminate some 
of the concepts of Polish statehood and self-stereotyping that have informed 
Polish contributions to the collective memory discourse with which this thesis is 
concerned. 
I have already briefly alluded to the frontier wars fought between Poland 
and neighbouring states between 1918 and 1921, two of which involved 
Ukrainians. In the first, Poland fought against the Western Ukrainian People’s 
Republic (1918-1919). In the second, Poland formed an alliance with the 
Ukrainian People’s Republic (1920-1921) in order to wage war against Soviet 
Russia. From a Ukrainian perspective, the result of these conflicts was a loss of 
                                                 
1089 Whilst the shadow of the Holocaust cannot be said to hang over the Ukrainian SSR itself, its penumbra certainly 
reached into certain elements of Ukrainian society. However, an exposition of the relevant facts is outwith the scope of this 
thesis. For some interesting views on this subject see: Copsey, N., 'Informed Public Opinion in South-Eastern Poland and 
Western Ukraine', pp. 109-17; Marples, D. R., Heroes and Villains: Creating National History in Contemporary Ukraine 
(Budapest; New York: Central European University Press, 2007), p. 1ff; Lehmann, R., 'The Strength of Diversity', pp. 510-
25; Rossoliński-Liebe, G., 'Debating, Obfuscating and Disciplining the Holocaust: Post-Soviet Historical Discourses on the 
OUN–UPA and Other Nationalist Movements', East European Jewish Affairs, 42 (2012), 199-241. 
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independence, the only concession to Ukrainian statehood being some measure of 
autonomy under Russian domination. This development provided the immediate 
incentive for the OUN-UPA anti-Polish pogroms during WWII and I briefly 
review these frontier conflicts in Section C.3 in light of Ukrainian state building 
aspirations. First however, it is necessary to review the longer-term causes of 
Polish-Ukrainian antagonisms in the East Galicia region. 
 
C.2 Galicia as the Ukrainian Piedmont (1772-1918)1090 
As a result of the Partitions (see Appendix A, Section A.3), most Ukrainians from 
the Commonwealth of Poland-Lithuania (around 15 million) became subjects 
either of the Russian Empire (1721-1917) or of Austria (1526-1804). Austria, in 
this context, refers to three distinct polities: the Habsburg ‘Empire’ (1526-1804) 
and the Austrian Empire (1804-1867), both of which overlapped with, and were 
integral to the Holy Roman Empire (962-1806), and Austria-Hungary (1867-
1918).1091 The majority of Ukrainians who had lived in the Commonwealth (12.5 
million) were engulfed by Russia. 1092  Historically, Russians had frequently 
referred to Ukrainians as ‘Little Russians’ and did not recognise their separate 
ethnic identity.1093 Indeed, many Ukrainian nobles who became Russian subjects 
following the Partitions appeared to acquiesce in this view. Many such men were 
rapidly assimilated into the Russian state apparatus and became Russified. 
Ukrainian peasants, by contrast lost their freedom in 1783 when they were 
reduced to a state of serfdom.1094 However, those Ukrainians who fell under the 
Habsburg sceptre in the wake of the Partitions fared considerably better in the 
longer term. 
Small numbers of Ukrainians were spread across a number of minor 
Austrian provinces, with major Ukrainian centres in Volhynia, Transcarpathia, 
                                                 
1090 Since the final phase of the Italian Risorgimento was launched from Piedmont, historians have referred to various 
national strongholds throughout Europe as 'the Piedmont of such-and-such'. The trope highlights the potential of the place 
in question to serve as a centre from which a large-scale unification or re-unification process might be launched. For details 
of the actual Piedmont and the final phase of Italian reunifcation see: Beales, D. E. D., et al., The Risorgimento and the 
Unification of Italy (London: Longman, 2002), pp. 114-33. 
1091 For an overview of Austrian history see: Kann, R. A., History of the Habsburg Empire; Roman, E., Austria-Hungary & 
the Successor States: a Reference Guide from the Renaissance to the Present (New York: Facts On File, 2003); Ackerl, I., 
Geschichte Österreichs in Daten von 1806 bis heute (Wiesbaden: Marix, 2008); Burgdorff, S., et al., Die Habsburger: 
Aufstieg und Fall der mächtigsten Familie Europas, Der Spiegel: Geschichte (Hamburg: SPIEGEL-Verlag, 2009), 6; 
Whaley, J., Holy Roman Empire: 1493-1648. 
1092 Wilson, A., Unexpected Nation, p. 106. 
1093 Davies, N., Heart of Europe, p. 247; Potichnyj, P. J., Poland and Ukraine, Past and Present, p. 4. 
1094 Wilson, A., Unexpected Nation, pp. 72-78, 100; Helbig, A., et al., Culture and Customs of Ukraine (Westport, Conn.; 
London: Greenwood, 2009), p. 20. 
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and Bukovyna.1095 However, the majority were concentrated in the Kingdom of 
Galicia-Lodomeria (1773-1867/1918), a Polish-dominated province in which they 
formed a minority.1096 There too the Nobility chose to merge with their Polish 
counterparts, relegating the Ukrainian peasantry to an inferior social position due 
to a lack of leadership.1097 Education was only offered in Polish or German until 
1893 when the use of Ukrainian was officially sanctioned in Austrian schools. 
However, only the elite benefited from such academic facilities and remained 
correspondingly ambivalent about their sense of identity. The overwhelming 
masses of the common peasantry (serfdom was abolished in the Austrian Empire 
in 1848) remained staunchly Ruthenian/Ukrainian.1098 In fact ‘Galician peasants 
were notorious for sticking pitchforks in the hated Polish landlords whenever they 
got the chance’, an ominous precursor to the pogroms of 1943 to 1946.1099 
In modern times, Poles and Ukrainians first clashed in Galicia during the 
1848 revolutions when Ukrainian nationalists advocated splitting Galicia-
Lodomeria along ethnic lines.1100 This would have left Western Galicia as part of 
Poland whilst East Galicia would have been homogenously Ukrainian. However, 
like the London Poles almost a century later, Polish nationalists considered the 
whole of Galicia to be Polish. Moreover, like the Russians, they ‘did not even 
recognize the existence of a Ukrainian (Ruthenian) nationality’.1101  
The 1848 revolutions increased national awareness throughout Europe. 
About that time, Ukrainian peasants in Galicia-Lodomeria began thinking of 
themselves as ‘part of a great Ruthenian people that speaks the same language and 
numbers 15 million’.1102 However, due to their servile condition in Russia, where 
their identity as a separate ethnic group was largely denied, the 12.5 million 
Russian Ukrainians could not be mobilised in the service of Ukrainian 
independence. The Austrians, on the other hand, had expressly recognised the 
                                                 
1095 Wilson, A., Unexpected Nation, pp. 111-18. 
1096  Anon., Blatt I: General Karte von Galizien in General-Karte des Königreiches Galizien und des Herzogthums 
Bukowina (Vienna: K.K militär-geografischen Institut, 1868); Barraclough, G., Atlas of World History, p. 193; Jeffries, D., 
et al., The Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy (New Holland Publishers (UK) Ltd, 2007); NB: The actual name of this 
polity following its incorporation in Austria in 1772 was Das Königreich Galizien und Lodomerien (the Kingdom of 
Galicia and Lodomeria). However it is frequently referred to by other, shorter names such as Kgr. Galizien, Galizien, 
Galicia. Compare the following: Bruckmüller, E., et al., Putzger Historischer Weltatlas, pp. 130-31, 42-43, 49, 50-53. 
1097 Wilson, A., Unexpected Nation, p. 103. 
1098 Potichnyj, P. J., Poland and Ukraine, Past and Present, p. 15; Wilson, A., Unexpected Nation, pp. 102, 08. 
1099 Wilson, A., Unexpected Nation, p. 102. 
1100 Helbig, A., et al., Culture and Customs of Ukraine, pp. 21-22. 
1101 Potichnyj, P. J., Poland and Ukraine, Past and Present, p. 18. 
1102 Wilson, A., Unexpected Nation, p. 106. 
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existence of a separate Ruthenian nationality in 1848.1103 In addition, state-led 
nationalising projects, aimed at the eradication of minority identities, were largely 
absent in Austria, or were extremely attenuated compared with the situation in 
Russia.1104 Indeed, ‘[the] equality of all the subject nationalities and languages in 
Cisleithania [Austria] was formally recognized in the Basic Law of 1867’.1105 
Moreover, Austrian officials frequently favoured and promoted Ukrainians in the 
state service ‘as a counterweight to the Poles’.1106 Thus, right up to the outbreak 
of war in 1914, Ukrainians enjoyed a large degree of autonomy and many 
opportunities for national development within Austria that were denied to them 
elsewhere. In Galicia-Lodomeria they even succeeded in obtaining a separate 
Ukrainian chamber in the local diet as well as a Ukrainian board of education.1107  
These developments, and the freedoms and opportunities they represented, 
were centred upon the Kingdom of Galicia-Lodomeria. As a result, this area 
became a rallying point for Ukrainians and ‘a conditio sine qua non for national 
independence’.1108 Nevertheless, ‘the Council of Ambassadors in Paris, acting for 
the Allied Powers, awarded sovereignty over eastern Galicia to Poland’ on the 
14th of March 1923 following the post-WWI frontier conflicts outlined above.1109 
Given the central importance of this province in the Ukrainian psyche as a kind of 
‘Ukrainian Piedmont’, this was an ill-informed decision. It would prove disastrous 
two decades later. 
 
C.3 Ukrainian State-building in the Interbellum Era (1918-1939) 
 
C.3.1 Ukrainian People’s Republic (1918-1921) 
During, and in the immediate aftermath of, WWI, Ukrainians, who had been 
living as minority populations in Russia and Austria-Hungary since the time of 
the Partitions, attempted to achieve independence within a nation state of their 
                                                 
1103 For a more detailed understanding of the relatively propitious position of Ruthenians under Habsburg rule see: Kann, R. 
A., History of the Habsburg Empire, pp. 391-94, 526-27; Potichnyj, P. J., Poland and Ukraine, Past and Present, p. 14. 
1104 Wilson, A., Unexpected Nation, p. 105. 
1105 Clark, C. M., The Sleepwalkers, p. 70. 
1106 Wilson, A., Unexpected Nation, pp. 101, 05-06. 
1107 Ibid. p. 108. 
1108 Potichnyj, P. J., Poland and Ukraine, Past and Present, pp. 17-21. 
1109 Magocsi, P. R., The Roots of Ukrainian Nationalism: Galicia as Ukraine's Piedmont (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 2002); Potichnyj, P. J., Poland and Ukraine, Past and Present, p. 26; Ascherson, N., The Struggles for Poland, pp. 
56-58; NB: Others have referred to Galicia as the Polish Piedmont. Cf. Wandycz, P. S., 'Poland', The American Historical 
Review, 97 (1992), 1011-25, p. 1015. 
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own. At first it had seemed as if the Austrian Ukrainians would simply be 
swallowed up by Russia as the Tsarist forces swept westward. The Russian Count 
Gregorii Bobrinskii (dates unknown) was placed in charge of, and attempted to 
Russify, the province of Galicia when it came under Russian occupation between 
September 1914 and June 1915.1110 Further to the east, the Ukrainian People’s 
(Central) Council (Ukrainian: Центральна Рада) was established in Kiev in 
March 1917. Later it was renamed as the Ukrainian People’s Republic or 
Українська Народня Республіка (UNR) and declared autonomy within a 
federated Russia in June 1917. The area of Ukrainian autonomy recognised by the 
Russian authorities, known as the Central Rada, comprised the regions of Kiev, 
Chernihiv, Poltava, Podolia, and Volhynia. Its leaders went on to declare full 
independence on the 25th of January 1918. This ‘virtual republic’ (as Andrew 
Wilson calls it) eventually increased beyond the Central Rada to include Kharkiv, 
Katerynoslav, Kherson, and Taurida. It was expanded by the German High 
Command in March 1918 under the terms of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (9th of 
February 1918) to include Kholm, Minsk, and Grodno. However, the Germans 
then replaced it with a smaller Hetmanate in April 1918, which they placed under 
the command of Pavlo Skoropadskyi (1873-1945). This polity collapsed in 
December 1918 after which the UNR was restored as the ‘Directory’.1111 On the 
22nd of April 1920, the UNR and the Polish Republic joined forces against Soviet 
Russia, but Poland changed sides and signed the Treaty of Riga on the 18th March 
1921, as a result of which the independent Ukrainian territories were partitioned 
between Poland and Russia. 1112  The Allies placed East Galicia under Polish 
suzerainty for a period of 25 years starting on the 21st of the November 1919, 
which they changed to full sovereignty on the 15th of March 1923.1113 
 
C.3.2 The West Ukrainian People’s Republic (1918-1919) 
The West Ukrainian People’s Republic or Західноукраїнська Народна 
Республіка (ZUNR) was established in November 1918 and encompassed East 
Galicia, Transcarpathia, and part of Bukovina.1114 This area, home to some 18 
                                                 
1110 Wilson, A., Unexpected Nation, pp. 120-21. 
1111 Ibid. pp. 122-24, 26-27. 
1112 Potichnyj, P. J., Poland and Ukraine, Past and Present, p. 22. 
1113 Zemella, G., Deutschland im Fadenkreuz, p. 121. 
1114 Wilson, A., Unexpected Nation, p. 127. 
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million Poles and only 3.5 Ukrainians, immediately became a bone of contention 
between the ZUNR and the Second Republic, which was founded at the same 
time and laid claim to most of the same region. War broke out when a Polish army 
led by General Josef Haller de Hallenberg occupied East Galicia prompting 
Ukrainian forces to attempt to take the Lwów (L’viv) region by force.1115 Fighting 
had ceased by the 17th of July 1919 at which time the ZUNR also ceased to 
exist.1116  
 
C.3.3 The Ukrainian SSR (1919-1941 / 1943-1991) 
On the 22nd of January 1919 the UNR and the ZUNR united shortly before the 
establishment of the first Ukrainian SSR on the 10th of March 1919, but only on 
paper.1117 Overlapping this development, a second, more successful, Ukrainian 
SSR grew out of the first Soviet Ukrainian government which had been 
established in December 1917. However, this polity could not be stabilised until 
1921 in the wake of the demise of the UNR following the Treaty of Riga. It 
acceded to the USSR in 1922.1118 
 
C.4 Concluding Remarks 
Thus, at the same time as Polish nationals were fighting to establish the Second 
Republic, they effectively dashed Ukrainians hopes for a fully independent state 
of their own. During the interbellum period (1921-1938) various Polish 
governments implemented a series of repressive measures against ethnic 
Ukrainians in East Galicia.1119 All of this contributed towards decisions taken by 
the UPA and OUN first to expel, then to murder the Polish inhabitants of the 
region during WWII, primarily between the spring of 1943 and the end of 
1944.1120 
The Ukrainian part of the population had already gained the upper hand 
following the Soviet invasion in September 1939 and had continued their 
                                                 
1115 Zemella, G., Deutschland im Fadenkreuz, p. 121. 
1116 Potichnyj, P. J., Poland and Ukraine, Past and Present, pp. 20-21. 
1117 Ibid. p. 21; Wilson, A., Unexpected Nation, p. 127. 
1118 Wilson, A., Unexpected Nation, pp. xvii, 134. 
1119  ‘Interbellum’ in this context refers to the period following the Treaty of Riga and the Polish incursion into 
Czechoslovakia in 1938. 
1120 Ascherson, N., The Struggles for Poland, pp. 59-79. 
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dominance under German occupation between 1941 and September 1944.1121 
Despite occasional episodes of mutual resistance to German occupation, conflict 
between Polish and Ukrainian irregular forces erupted and rapidly worsened in the 
course of 1942. The OUN often collaborated openly with the German occupiers 
during this period. 1122  As explained above, anti-Polish sentiment among 
Ukrainians was partially fed by news of the exile Polish Government’s insistence 
on retaining East Galicia within any postwar Polish state and soon degenerated 
into sociocide/genocide.1123 
                                                 
1121 Piotr Madajczyk in: Frackowiak, J., et al., Deutsche und Polen von 1871 bis zur Gegenwart, p. 226. 
1122 Brandes, D., et al., Lexikon der Vertreibungen, pp. 529, 676. 
1123 Churchill, W., The Second World War, p. 856; Sword, K., Poles in the Soviet Union, 1939-48, p. 175; Brandes, D., et 
al., Lexikon der Vertreibungen, pp. 530, 676-77. 
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Appendix D: The Piast Formula in Anglophone Texts  
 
D.1 Objective 
The objective of this distant reading exercise is to assess the extent to which the 
Piast Formula, as discussed in Chapter 3, has been addressed in the relevant 
Anglophone historiography.1124 
 
D.2 Method 
To asses the extent to which the Piast Formula has been addressed in the relevant 
Anglophone historiography, I carried out a distant reading of Anglophone 
historiography in two parts. In the first part of the exercise I performed an ‘Any 
Field’ search at the British Library and the Library of Congress, using specific 
search terms in conjunction with the term ‘Piast Formula’. The second part of the 
exercise involved a full-text search of the JSTOR database. Prior to beginning the 
exercise, I performed a control check using other search terms in various 
combinations.1125 
 
D.3 Search Tools 
EndNote X6.0.1 (Bld 8432) 
RMIT University 
2091600762 
www.endnote.com 
 
JSTOR 
©2000-2015 ITHAKA 
www.jstor.org 
 
  
                                                 
1124 For an explanation of the 'distant reading' approach as advocated by Franco Moretti see: Tatlock, L., et al., Distant 
Readings: Topologies of German Culture in the Long Nineteenth Century (Rochester, NY: Camden House, 2014). 
1125 The following controls prove that the search engine is producing the desired results (i.e. that it is finding the full phrase 
and not the individual words): ‘hits’ at the British Library for Piast = 103, Poland = 5000, Piast Poland = 77, Piast Poland 
Badger = 0. In the case of JSTOR I used the following test (search term in Title or Abstract): ‘Poland’ (English, post 
01.01.1945) = 3328 pages x 25, ‘Poland’ (French, post 01.01.1945) = 3 pages x 25, ‘Computer’ (English, post 01.01.1945) 
= 418 pages x 25, ‘Computer’ (French, post 01.01.1945) = 4 pages x 25, ‘Computer’ (English, pre 01.01.1945) = 1 page x 
3, ‘Computer’ + ‘Mouse’ (English, post 01.01.1945) = 1 page x 3, Computer Mouse’ (English, post 01.01.1945) = 1 page x 
1. 
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D.4 Search Terms 
A – Piast Poland 
B – Piast Myth 
C – Regained Territories 
D – Recovered Territories 
E – TRJN 
F – German Expulsion 
G – Oder-Neisse Line 
H – Poland’s Eastern Territories 
I – Kresy 
 
D.5 Results Step 1 (single phrase searches) 
 
D.5.1 British Library – ‘Any Field’ (searched on 14.12.2014) 
Search Term Combination Number of ‘Hits’ ‘Hits’ dated Post-1945  
A 11 7 
B 0 0 
C 1 1 
D 3 3 
E 0 0 
F 50 41 
G 10 10 
H 1 1 
I 1 1 
 
 
D.5.2 Library of Congress – ‘Any Field’ (searched on 14.12.2014) 
Search Term Combination Number of ‘Hits’ ‘Hits’ dated Post-1945 
A 2 2 
B 0 0 
C 0 0 
D 4 4 
E 0 0 
F 0 0 
G 20 20 
H 0 0 
I 3 3 
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D.5.3 JSTOR – ‘Full Text’ (searched on 14.12.2014) 
Search Term Combination Title or Abstract Full Text 
A 1 11 
B 0 0 
C 1 10 
D 1 45 
E 0 14 
F 0 8 
G 2 252 
H 0 11 
I 0 17 
 
 
D.6 Step 2 (multiple phrase searches) 
 
D.6.1 British Library – (searched on 14.12.2014) 
Search Term 
Combination 
Any Field  
A + F 0  
A + G 0  
F + G 0  
F + D 0  
G + D 0  
F + I 0  
 
 
D.6.2 Library of Congress – ‘Any Field’ (searched on 14.12.2014) 
Search Term Combination Any Field  
G + A 0  
G + D 0  
G + I 0  
D + I 0  
D + A 0  
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D.6.3 JSTOR – ‘Full Text’ (searched on 14.12.2014) 
Search Term Combination Abstract Full Text 
A + C 0 0 
A + D 0 0 
A + G 0 0 
D + E 0 0 
D + G 0 6 
G + C 0 0 
G + E 0 1 
G + H 0 2 
G + I 1 2 
D + G + E 0 0 
D + G + H 0 6 
D + G + I 0 0 
 
D.7 Results 
The results of this distant reading exercise show that the phrases ‘Piast Poland’ 
and ‘Piast Myth’ do not occur together with any of the other search terms within 
the corpus searched. The most significant combination of the selected search 
terms is ‘Recovered Territories’ + ‘Oder-Neisse Line’ + ‘Poland’s Eastern 
Territories’. These occur together in just six journal articles but no books.1126 
Controlling for duplicates in the volumes held at the British Library and the 
Library of Congress, a total of just 67 books include at least one of the search 
terms in any of the searchable fields. Of these volumes, just 15 contain any of the 
search terms in the title (Piast Poland x 2; Recovered Territories x 4; Oder-Neisse 
Line x 9). The full-text search at JSTOR produced a total of 368 matches for 
single terms (the majority being for the term ‘Oder-Neisse Line’), yet only 17 
matches for more than one term combined.  
These results, whilst by no means conclusive, do suggest that Anglophone 
historiography has not engaged directly, to any significant extent, with the Piast 
Formula as defined in Chapter 3 of this thesis. The results of similar distant 
reading exercises involving other key pieces of information in the relevant 
                                                 
1126 Schechtman, J. B., 'Postwar Population Transfers in Europe'; Staar, R. F., 'The Church of Silence in Communist 
Poland', The Catholic Historical Review, 42 (1956), 296-321; Staar, R. F., 'New Course in Communist Poland'; Tang, P. S. 
H., 'Experiments in Communism: Poland, the Soviet Union, and China', Studies in Soviet Thought, 26 (1983), 287-370; 
Allen, D., 'An Unacknowledged Consensus: Polish American Views about the Oder-Niesse Line during the Truman 
Administration', Polish American Studies, 57 (2000), 73-83; Service, H., 'Reinterpreting the Expulsion of Germans from 
Poland, 1945-9', Journal of Contemporary History, 47 (2012), 528-50. 
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Anglophone historiography were similarly suggestive of a lack of interest in the 
historic detail of the region and there of the merits of the Piast Formula. One 
important text in relation to the historic status of Silesia, for example, is the 
Treaty of Trentschin, which is rarely mentioned in the Anglophone scholarship on 
Poland, but which is a important element in German historic claims to the 
province.1127 
  
                                                 
1127 For example, I carried out a full electronic text search for the word ‘Trentschin’ on a total of 8 books, 3 PhD theses, and 
6 journal articles, and 2 with relevant titles and containing the words ‘Schlesien’ and ‘Potsdam’. I repeated the search on 8 
books, 2 theses, and 8 journal articles with relevant titles and containing the words ‘recovered territories’. Only one of 
these texts (Kamusella, 1999) referred to the Treaty of Trentschin. The books sampled were: Kühnl, R., Nation, 
Nationalismus, Nationale Frage; Kamusella, T., Dynamics of the Policies of Ethnic Cleansing in Silesia in the 19th and 
20th Centuries; Davies, N., Heart of Europe; Moeller, R. G., War stories: the search for a usable past in the Federal 
Republic of Germany (Berkeley; London: University of California Press, 2001); Kriwat, K., Der andere Holocaust; 
MacDonogh, G., After the Reich; Frank, M. J., Expelling the Germans; Hayashi, T., et al., Regions in Central and Eastern 
Europe: Past and Present (Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University, 2007); Čepič, Z., 1945 - A Break with 
the Past; Niven, W. J., et al., Memorialization in Germany since 1945; Prażmowska, A., Poland: a Modern History; The 
theses sampled were: Harmel, S., 'Die Vertreibung der Deutschen aus den Ostgebieten 1945-48'; Ostrowski, M., 'To Return 
to Poland or Not to Return'; Copsey, N., 'Informed Public Opinion in South-Eastern Poland and Western Ukraine'; Bard, 
R., 'Historical Memory and the Expulsion of Ethnic Germans in Europe, 1944- 1947'; Berger, K. L., 'The Representation of 
the Expulsion of Ethnic Germans in German Literature from the 1950s to the Present'; The journal articles sampled were: 
Moeller, R. G., 'War Stories'; Kostrowicki, J., 'Geography in Poland Since the War'; Leszczycki, S., 'The Application of 
Geography in Poland'; Ther, P., 'Integration of Expellees in Germany and Poland after WW II'; Werblan, A., 'Gomułka and 
the Dilemma of Polish Communism'; Thum, G., 'Die fremde Stadt - Breslau 1945', (2003); Linek, B., 'Recent Debates on 
the Fate of the German Population in Upper Silesia 1945-1950', German History, 22 (2004), 372-405; Yoshioka, J., 'Place 
Name Changes on Ex-German Territories in Poland after World War II'; Stańczyk, E., 'Polish Contact Zones'; Kamusella, 
T., 'International Treaties and the Imagining of Poland's Post-1945 Western Border'; Alvis, R. E., 'Holy Homeland: The 
Discourse of Place and Displacement among Silesian Catholics in Postwar West Germany', Church History, 79 (2010), 
827-59; Demshuk, A., 'Reinscribing Schlesien as Śląsk'. 
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Appendix E: Timeline – Silesia, Poland, Germany 
Year Germans in Eastern 
Europe 
Silesia Poland Germany World Events 
963  Kaiser Otto I of the HRE gives 
Silesia to the Polish prince 
Mieszko I as an Imperial Fief 
  960 start of Sung Dynasty and 
unification of China 
 
965 Byzantium takes possession 
of Cyprus 
965   Baptism of Mieszko I   
981   First recorded contact between Poles 
(“Liakhs”) and Ukrainians: 
expedition led by the Ukrainian 
Prince Volodymyr the Great (c. 958-
1015) 
  
1000  Upper Silesia begins to 
develop separately from the 
remainder of Silesia 
Founding of the See of Gniezno (the 
ecclesiastical province of Poland) 
 Venice starts to dominate trade in 
the Mediterranean 
 
Norway and Iceland Christianised 
and Leif Erikson discovers 
Vinland (Nova Scotia) 
1003-
1018 
  War between the HRE and Boleslaus 
the Brave (992-1025) – ends with the 
Peace of Budziszyn 
  
1025   Founding of Kingdom of Poland: 
Mieszko II Lambert (c. 990-1034) 
was crowned in the same year, and 
ruled, as King of Poland, from 1025 
to 1034 
  
1037   The great pagan rebellion   
1079   Murder of Bishop Stanisław of 
Cracow, the ‘Polish Becket’ 
  
1142 The king of Hungary 
invites Westerners to 
settle in his country 
   1150 the Aztecs become settled 
and take up farming 
1157   Emperor Barbarossa forces Boleslaus 
the Curly to pay homage 
  
1163  Upper Silesia becomes the 
Duchy of Ratibor 
 
Start of Silesian rule 
The kingdom of Poland loses 
effective control of Silesia. 
The Holy Roman Empire of German Nations 
provides backing for an independent (but still 
Polish-run Silesia) 
Work begins on the Cathedral of 
Notre-Dame in Paris 
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Silesia Poland Germany World Events 
independent of Polish kingdom 
under Mieszko II Plątonogi (c. 
1130-1211 and his descendants 
1201 Bishop Albert of Bremen 
founds Riga. The Order of 
the Brothers of the Sword 
conquers Livonia 
   c. 1200 Nibelungenlied composed 
 
1201 Bulgaria recognised by 
Byzantium 
1202  The Duchy of Ratibor annexes 
Oppeln and the new polity is 
renamed the Duchy of Oppeln 
   
1201-
1238 
 The Polish Duke of Silesia, 
Heinrich I, invites German 
settlers 
  1206-1227 reign of Genghis Khan 
1217  Oppeln given ‘deutsches 
Stadtrecht’ 
   
1226 The Knights of the 
Teutonic Order conquer 
Prussia having been 
invited in by Conrad of 
Mazovia (reigned 1229-
1232) 
    
1228  Duke Henryk I Brodaty (c. 
1165-1238) grants German 
Law to the city of Breslau and 
exempts it from services and 
tax payments to Poland 
   
1241  Mongols invade Silesia   First Mongolian incursion into 
Europe 
1254  Beuthen given ‘deutsches 
Stadtrecht’ 
 ‘Gründung des Rheinischen Städtebunds’ 1255-1269 Marco Polo travels to 
Peking and back 
1256   A charter of liberties gave Jews the 
right to reside in Poland under certain 
conditions and marks their first 
official appearance in the area 
  
1259     Second Mongolian incursion into 
Europe 
1261  Breslau receives Magdeburger 
Recht 
  Iceland and Greenland annexed to 
Norway 
1281  The Duchy of Oppeln splits 
into seven smaller duchies: 
  Mongols attempt to conquer 
Japan but fail 
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Silesia Poland Germany World Events 
Beuthen, Oppeln, Ratibor, 
Teschen, Cosel, Auschwitz & 
Zator 
1295   Re-establishment of the Kingdom of 
Poland under Przemysł II (reigned 
1295-1296) 
  
1299  Ratibor given ‘deutsches 
Stadtrecht’ 
   
1300   King Wenzel II of Bohemia crowned 
King of Poland 
 Battle of the Golden Spurs near 
Kortrijk 
1308 The knights of Teutonic 
Order capture Gdańsk 
(henceforth ‘Danzig’) 
    
1335  Treaty of Trentschin – formal 
renunciation of claims or 
pretentions to Silesia for ever 
by Kasimir the III (1310-1370) 
of Poland – Silesia becomes 
feudal property of King John 
of Bohemia and therefore 
ultimately of the Kaiser of the 
HRE 
  1338 start of Hundred Years’ War 
between England and France 
1340   King Kasimir III invades Red 
Ruthenia and annexes the Ukrainian 
principality of Halych 
  
1347-
1348 
 Upper Silesia devastated by 
plague 
 
Formal renunciation of Polish 
sovereignty in Silesia – Treaty 
of Namysłow. Silesia officially 
part of the Holy Roman 
Empire 
   
1348  The King of Bohemia, Karl IV 
(also ruled as Kaiser from 
1355) incorporates Silesia into 
the HRE 
   
1349   Poland occupies Galicia   
1355  Kaiser Karl IV and the Pope 
ratify Silesia’s integration into 
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the HRE 
1364   Congress of Cracow 
 
Foundation of the Cracovian 
Academy (later called the 
Jagiellonian University) 
  
1366   Ruthenia comes under Polish 
dominion 
  
1370   Start of Polish expansion into 
Lithuania 
  
1374  Teschen given ‘deutsches 
Stadtrecht’ 
Statute of Košice  1378-1417 Great Schism 
1385   Union of Krevo: first dynastic link 
between the Kingdom of Poland and 
the Grand Duchy of Lithuania 
  
1386   Queen Jadwiga (1382-1399) of 
Poland marries Jagiełło of Lithuania, 
who called himself Władysław II – 
Poland and Lithuania ruled in 
personal union 
  
1387  Latest date for Breslau’s 
accession to the Hanseatic 
League 
   
1388   The King issues ‘a royal undertaking 
that no member of the nobility could 
be imprisoned without due process of 
law’ 
  
1410   War between Poland-Lithuania and 
the Teutonic Order (1409-1410) 
ended with the defeat of the latter at 
the Battle of Grunwald (Tannenberg) 
on July 15, 1410 
  
1425-
1435 
 Hussite incursions into Upper 
Silesia result in widespread 
devastation 
  1429 Portuguese start settling the 
Azores 
1431 Joan of Arc burnt as a witch 
1434   Statute of neminem captivabimus the 
Polish version of habeas corpus  
  
1453     End of Hundred Years’ War 
between England and France 
1454-   The Thirteen Years’ War, between   
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1466 Poland-Lithuania and the Teutonic 
Order, ended with the Peace of Toruń 
1457  The Duchy of Auschwitz in 
Upper Silesia is ceded to 
Poland 
  1455 start of the War of the Roses 
in England 
1479  The Duchy of Zator in Upper 
Silesia is ceded to Poland 
  1479 Christian Spain united under 
Ferdinand V 
 
1483 Russians start expanding 
into Siberia 
1492     Columbus discovers the Americas 
1496   Introduction of institutional serfdom 
in Poland as a result of King John 
Albert (1492-1501) ‘privilege’ 
granted to the landowning gentry 
  
1501   Union of Mielnik: the first (failed) 
attempt to unite Poland and Lithuania 
  
1505   Parliamentary statute of nihil novi … 
‘nic o nas bez nas’ (‘nothing 
concerning us can be settled without 
us’) 
  
1515   Sigismund I the Old (1506-1548) 
renounces his dynastic claims to the 
thrones of Bohemia and Hungary 
  
1519-
1521 
  War between Poland and Teutonic 
Prussia, in which Poland was 
victorious 
  
1525   Treaty of Kraków signed on April 08, 
1525 and effectively broke Prussia 
out of the Empire and removed it 
from the Catholic sphere of influence 
(the Grand Master of the Teutonic 
Order accepted the Lutheran faith) 
  
1526 The thrones of Bohemia 
and Hungary fell to the 
Habsburgs in 1526 
 End of Piast dynasty in Mazovia and 
incorporation of Mazovia into Poland 
  
1537   First Polish Rebellion (‘War of the 
Hens’): gentry versus the crown 
  
1563-
1570 
  1563-1570: Livonian War involved 
Poland-Lithuania, Muscovy, the 
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Teutonic Order, Sweden and 
Denmark 
1565   Jesuits permitted to operate in Poland   
1569   July 01, Union of Lublin: formal 
foundation of the Commonwealth of 
Poland-Lithuania (included Poles, 
Lithuanians, Byelorussians and 
Ukrainians) 
  
1570   Union of Sandomierz – a union of 
non-Catholics directed against the 
Counter Reformation 
  
1573   First free election (Convocation 
Seym) in the Commonwealth of 
Poland-Lithuania. 
 
The Convocation Seym signed off a 
new constitution known as the 
Henrician Articles 
 
Following the Confederation of 
Warsaw in 1573, Poland became one 
of the most religiously tolerant places 
in Europe 
  
1578   Jesuit College in Vilna becomes and 
academy 
  
1583 The Siebenbürger Saxons 
receive their own 
‘Landrecht’ 
   1582 introduction of the 
Gregorian calendar in Catholic 
countries 
 
1583 Start of British Empire: 
English colony established in 
Newfoundland 
 
1584 Walter Raleigh founds the 
first English colony on the North 
American mainland (Virginia) 
1595   Jan Zamoyski establishes an academy 
at Zamość 
  
1596   Union of Brest – foundation of the 
Uniate Church causes a lasting 
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schism in Orthodox Christianity 
1604-
1606 
    False Dmitri’s invasion of 
Muscovy 
1606   Zebrzydowski Rebellion (1606-1608)  First recorded sighting of 
Australia by Willem Janszoon 
1618    Start of Thirty Years’ War 1616 Dirk Hartog lands in 
Australia 
1624   Iov Boretskyi, metropolitan of the 
restored Orthodox Church in Kiev 
appeals to the Russian Tsar for 
protection against Polish persecution 
  
1632   1632 – Restoration of the Orthodox 
hierarchy 
 Kievan Academy: first institution 
of higher learning in the 
Orthodox Eastern Slav region 
1634   Treaty of Polanowo: Ladislaus IV 
(reigned 1632-1648) renounced his 
claim to the title of Tsar and to the 
throne of Muscovy 
  
1639     Start of the Wars of the Three 
Kingdoms 
1648   The great Cossack Revolution under 
Hetman Bohdan: Ukrainians against 
the Polish regime 
 
1648-1657: Cossack Rebellion under 
Bohdan Chomielnicki 
 
1648 – Cossack massacre of Jews 
End of Thirty Years’ War 1644 Abel Tasman discovers 
Tasmania 
1649   Poles forced to recognise the rule of 
Hetman Chmielnicki in the Ukraine 
  
1651-
1653 
  Polish-Cossack war: ended with the 
Zborów Agreement, which confirmed 
rule of Hetman Chmielnicki in the 
Ukraine 
 End of the Wars of the Three 
Kingdoms 
1654   Treaty of Pereiaslav: Ukraine accepts 
the protectorate of the Russian Tsar – 
beginning of the end for the 
Commonwealth of Poland -Lithuania 
  
1654-
1656 
  War between Muscovy and the 
Commonwealth over possession of 
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the Ukraine. Most of Lithuania 
occupied by the Russians. Ends in 
truce 
1655   Swedish invasion of Poland-
Lithuania (the Swedish Deluge) 
  
1657 Treaty of Wehlau: 
Brandenburg-Prussia 
gains independence under 
the Hohenzollerns 
 Transylvanian invasion of Poland   
1658   Union of Hadiach: intended to raise 
the Ukraine, under the name of the 
Grand Duchy of Ruthenia, to the 
status of an equal partner within a 
Commonwealth of Poland-Lithuania-
Ukraine (the project failed) 
 
Agreement of Hadziacz: this enabled 
the creation of an autonomous Duchy 
of Ruthenia within Poland-Lithuania 
 
Polish Brethren and Czech Brethren 
banished 
  
1660   Treaty of Oliwa: end of long-term 
hostilities with Sweden 
  
1667   Treaty of Andrusovo: Ukraine 
divided along the Dnieper between 
Russia and Poland: end of long-term 
hostilities with Muscovy 
  
1672   Sultan Mohammed IV invades 
Poland – the Turks captured Podolia 
the southern Kiev region 
  
1683   Polish army and other Christian 
forces victorious against Kara 
Mustafa, Grand Vizier of the 
Ottoman Empire 
  
1686   Muscovy retains de facto possession 
of Ukraine 
 
Grzymułtowski Peace: formal 
recognition of territorial changes 
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agreed in the Truce of Andrusovo 
(1667) 
1699   Treaty of Karlowitz: Podolia returned 
by the Turks 
  
1700-
1721 
  Great Northern War   
1701 Friedrich I of Prussia 
crowned in Königsberg 
 
Prussian independence 
recognised internationally 
 
Brandenburg proclaimed 
as a Prussian Kingdom 
    
1718   Last Calvinist delegate expelled from 
the Diet 
  
1724   Blood-bath of Thorn – Catholics v. 
Lutherans 
  
1732   Black Eagles (Russia, Austria and 
Prussia) directed against the interests 
of Poland-Lithuania 
  
1733-
1735 
  War of the Polish Succession   
1740-
1742 
 First Silesian War: Prussia 
annexes parts of Silesia (from 
Austria) 
  1741 Bering discovers the Aleuts 
and the coast of Alaska 
1740-
1748 
    War of the Austrian Succession 
(1740-1748) 
1744-
1745 
 Second Silesian War: Prussia 
v. Austria 
  English-French colonial wars in 
Canada, Louisiana and India 
1756-
1763 
 Third Silesian War: Prussia v. 
Austria 
  1755-1763 War between France 
and England 
1763  Frieden von Hubertusburg: 
most of Silesia to Prussia 
(Hohenzollern dynasty) 
  France forced to cede Canada to 
England 
1767   Russian-supported confederations of 
Lithuanians and Poles Culminating in 
the General Confederation (aka 
Confederation of Radom) 
  
1768   Large-scale peasant rebellion in the   
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Ukraine (Koliivshchyna) following 
the Haidamak revolts directed against 
the Polish nobility 
 
Confederation of Bar (1768-1772) 
 
Turkey declares war on Russia in 
support of the Confederation of Bar 
1769   Cossack massacre of Jews   
1770     Captain Cook arrives in Australia 
1772/3   Habsburgs occupy Galicia 
 
First Polish Partition 
 1772 any slave entering Britain is 
automatically free 
 
1773 Boston Tea Party 
1774 Habsburgs occupy 
Bukovyna 
    
1775     Start of American War of 
Independence 
1783     End of American War of 
Independence 
1791   Constitution of May Third   
1792   Confederation of Targowica: Polish 
oligarchs within landholdings in 
Ukraine accept the protection of 
Catherine II of Russia 
  
1793   Second Polish Partition  First telegrams sent 
 
Louis XVI beheaded 
 
Work starts on the Capitol in 
Washington DC 
1794   National uprising under Tadeusz 
Kościuszko (1746-1817) 
  
1795   Third Polish Partition  1795-1797 Mungo Park’s first 
expedition in the Niger region 
1797   The Partitioning Powers tried to 
abolish the word ‘Poland’ by treaty 
  
1806-
1807 
 Napoleonic wars in Silesia   1806 American pioneers reach the 
Pacific coast 
1807 Tilsiter Frieden: between  Establishment of the Duchy of  First steam ship 
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France and Prussia, which 
resulted in a considerable 
loss of Prussian territory 
Warsaw and the introduction of the 
Napoleonic Constitution 
 
USA and Britain ban maritime 
slave trade 
1811-
1823 
Abolition of serfdom and 
affranchisement of 
peasants in Prussia 
    
1813  Battle of Katzbach: French 
driven out of Silesia by 
combined Russian and 
Prussian troops under 
Marschall Blücher 
Abolition of the Duchy of Warsaw Breslau: March 17: King Friedrich Wilhelm III of 
Prussia (1770-1840) – An mein Volk – evokes the 
unity between the Crown, the state and the nation 
Start of explorations of Australian 
interior 
1815  Silesia annexes part of the 
Oberlausitz from Saxony 
under the aegis of the 
Congress of Vienna 
 
Silesia part of Deutscher Bund 
Establishment of the Kingdom of 
Poland (Congress Poland) and the 
Commonwealth of Cracow 
 Congress of Vienna 
1816  Prussian Province of Silesia 
founded incorporating Upper 
Silesia as a Regierungsbezirk 
  A British fleet attacks Algeria and 
frees Christian slaves 
1830-31   Polish uprising 
 
November 29, 1939: start of the 
November Insurrection 
 
1831: The Great Emigration 
following the collapse of the 
November Insurrection 
 Indian Removal Act in USA 
inaugurates the gradual but 
permanent forced resettlement of 
Native Americans in Indian 
Reservations 
 
July Revolution in Paris 
Secession of Belgium from the 
United Netherlands 
1831   Russo-Polish War   
1844  Silesian Weavers’ Revolt   Britain seizes power from the 
Boers in Natal 
1846   Polish uprising (including the Cracow 
Uprising) 
 
Peasant uprising against the Polish 
landowners and bailiffs (‘the Galician 
Slaughter’) 
 
Abolition of the Commonwealth of 
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Cracow and annexation of Cracow by 
Austria 
 
Galician Jacquerie 
1847    Berlin Trial Mormons found Salt Lake City 
1848   Austrian government recognises the 
existence of a separate Ruthenian 
nationality 
 
Polish uprising 
 
Founding of the National Committee 
in Poznań 
 
Founding of the Polish League in 
Poznań 
Serfdom abolished in the Austrian Empire 
 
Abolition of serfdom and affranchisement of 
peasants in Austria 
 
Springtime of Nations 
 
 
Gold discovered in Sacramento 
1853-
1856 
    Crimean War 
1861     Proclamation of the Kingdom of 
Italy (Unification of Italy) 
1863-
1864 
  Polish uprising 
 
General Red uprising against the 
Tsar. Led by Poles but also 
encompassing the Ukraine, 
Byelorussia, and Lithuania 
 
The Great January Rising 
 Abolition of serfdom and 
affranchisement of peasants in 
Russia 
1864   Abolition of the autonomous 
Kingdom of Poland 
  
1865     All slaves freed in USA 
1867    Austro-Hungarian Ausgleich (creation of Austria-
Hungary) 
 
1871  Silesia part of German Reich  Unification of Germany British Columbia merges with 
Canada 
 
Paris Commune 
 
 
1876     First Jim Crow laws in the USA 
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1878    Congress of Berlin  
1882   The International Social 
Revolutionary Party was founded in 
Warsaw 
  
1892   Founding of the Polish Socialist Party 
(PPS) 
  
1893   Founding of the Social Democracy of 
the Kingdom of Poland (SDKP) 
 
  
1895   Formation of the Polish Peasant Party   
1900   SDKP renamed as the Social 
Democracy of the Kingdom of 
Poland and Lithuania 
  
1903   Vernacular version of the Bible 
published in Ukrainian 
  
1905-06     Russian Revolution 
1908   1908 founding of the clandestine 
Active Combat Union in Galicia 
under the leadership of Józef 
Piłsudski 
  
1914     Start of WWI 
1914-15   Bobrinskii’s occupation of Galicia   
1916   November: Central Powers declare 
the creation of a Kingdom of Poland 
  
1917   March: Ukrainian Central Council 
founded (forerunner of UNR) 
 
November 20: Ukrainian People’s 
Republic (UNR) 
 
December: Establishment of First 
Soviet Ukrainian government 
 Russian Revolution 
1918   January: UNR declares independence 
 
November: Polish Second Republic 
 
November 01: West Ukrainian 
National Republic established 
 
Polish-Ukrainian War for Eastern 
February: Treaty of Brest-Litowsk 
 
January 08: Wilson’s 14-point 
speech 
 
 
November: End of WWI 
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Galicia: On November 01, 1918 
Ukrainians staged a putsch in eastern 
Galicia around the Lwów (L’viv) 
region, which triggered a war 
between Poland and the newly 
formed Western Ukrainian People’s 
Republic, which lasted until July 
1919 
 
December 16: formation of the 
Communist Worker’s Party of Poland 
1919  Territorial losses in Upper 
Silesia to Czechoslovakia 
 
Prussian government divides 
Silesia into two provinces: 
Lower Silesia governed from 
Breslau and Upper Silesia 
governed from Oppeln 
First elections in the new Polish 
Republic 
 Peace Congress in Paris 
 
Treaty of Versailles 
 
January 22: Union of the 
Ukrainian People’s Republic and 
the Western Ukrainian People’s 
Republic 
 
March 10: Ukrainian SSR 
1919-
1921 
 Three ‘Polish Revolts’ put 
down by German 
Selbsschutzverbände 
  Civil war in Ireland Lloyd George 
v. de Valera 
1920   April 22: Ukrainian People’s 
Republic and the Polish Republic 
joined forces against Soviet Russia 
 
  
1921  Oct 20: Genfer Schiedsspruch 
– large parts of German Upper 
Silesia ceded to Poland despite 
a plebiscite in favour of 
remaining part of Germany 
March 17: inauguration of new 
constitution 
 
March 18: Treaty of Riga between 
Poland and Soviet Russia as a result 
of which the Ukraine is partitioned 
between the two states 
 Ireland with the exception of 
Northern Ireland becomes a 
British Dominion 
 
Ukrainian SSR stabilised 
1922  Upper Silesia divided 
following plebiscite 
  Proclamation of the Irish Free 
State – British troops withdraw 
 
The Ukrainian SSR joins USSR 
1923   March 14: the Allied Council of  July 24, Treaty of Lausanne 
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Ambassadors award sovereignty over 
eastern Galicia to Poland 
1925  Silesian NSDAP founded by 
Helmut Brückner – later first 
Gauleiter of Silesia 
  Cyprus becomes a British crown 
colony 
1926   May 12: military putsch by Piłsudski   
1929     Formation of OUN 
1932   January 25: Piłsudski signs a ten-year 
pact of non aggression with the 
USSR 
  
1934   January 26: Piłsudski signs a ten-year 
pact of non aggression with Germany 
  
1936     July 17: start of the Spanish Civil 
War 
1938  April 01, 1938: Upper and 
Lower Silesia are reunited as a 
single province under the 
NSDAP 
 
Following the annexation of 
the Sudetenland, the Silesian 
territories lost to 
Czechoslovakia under the 
terms of the Treaty of 
Versailles were returned to 
Silesia 
 
The new province (Reichsgau) 
of Silesia was enlarged by the 
addition of territories formerly 
belonging to the now dissolved 
Grenzmark Posen-
Westpreußen 
 March 1939 British guarantee to 
Poland 
 
September 1938: Munich Agreement (Great Britain, 
Germany, France & Italy) 
 
 
October 1938: Germany annexes the Sudetenland 
 
November 09: anti-Jewish rioting throughout 
Germany resulting in serious personal injury and 
damage to property 
 
Great Britain recognises Italy’s 
annexation of Ethiopia 
 
 
1939 Ethnic Germans expelled 
from the Baltic States 
under NSDAP auspices in 
order to relieve the state of 
having to protect ethnic 
Germans under Russian 
dominion following the 
May: census records 4.8 
million residents in Silesia 
 
10,500km2 of formerly Polish 
territory and 2.7 million Poles 
annexed to Silesia 
April 06: Polish-British bilateral 
mutual aid declaration 
 
April 28, 1939: German abrogation of 
the German-Polish non-aggression 
pact 
 
Hitler-Stalin Pact of Steel (August 23, 1939) 
 
September 01: Hitler orders the full-scale invasion 
of Poland 
 
September 03: Britain and France declare war on 
Germany 
April 01: end of Spanish Civil 
War 
 
Great Britain blocks Jewish 
immigration to Palestine 
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division of Europe into 
Soviet and German 
controlled spheres of 
interest 
 
 
October 07, 1939 Hitler 
issues the Decree on the 
relocation of the German 
population from European 
states to the German Reich 
and the eingegliederten 
Gebiete 
May 19: French-Polish protocol 
‘concerning the principles of joint 
operations’ in the event of German 
aggression 
 
August 25: Polish-British Treaty of 
Mutual Assistance 
 
August 29: proclamation of the 
general mobilization of the Polish 
army 
 
Sep 01: Hitler responds to an attack 
on Gleiwitz radio station with the 
full-scale invasion of Poland 
 
September 17: Soviet invasion 
 
September 27: Polish surrender 
 
September 28: Eastern Poland 
annexed by the Soviet Union; the 
remainder declared a German 
Reichsprotektorat 
 
End of Second Republic – Fourth 
Partition by Germany and the Soviet 
Union 
 
September 30: formation of the exile 
Polish government in London 
 
October 08, 1939 
Generalgouvernement set up in south 
eastern Poland 
 
October 12, 1939 eingegliederte 
Ostgebiete (remainder of German 
annexed Poland) subdivided into two 
Reichsgaue, Danzig-Westpreußen 
 
September 19: German-Soviet Treaty of Friendship 
 
German–Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation 
and Demarcation (September 28, 1939) 
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and the Wartheland, and two 
Regierungsbezirke, Kattowitz and 
Zichenau 
1939-41     First Soviet occupation of western 
Ukraine 
1941  Apr 01: Silesia re-divided into 
two provinces 
 German invasion of Soviet Union on June 22, 1941 
 
October 1941: Start of organised deportation of the 
Jews from the German Reich 
 
Germany declares war on the USA on December 
11, 1941 
Anglo-Soviet Agreement July 12, 
1941 
 
The OUN declares independence 
 
1942 Britischer 
Kabinettsbeschluss zum 
Transfer der Deutschen 
aus Ostmittel-und Süd-
osteuropa (06.07.1942) 
    
1943     November 28-December 01, 
1943: Tehran Conference 
1943/1944 Britisches 
Regierungskomitee zum 
Transfer deutscher 
Bevölkerungen (1943/44) 
    
1943-54   UPA insurgency   
1944   July 26: Secret agreement between 
the Soviet Union and the Polish 
Lubliner Committee to expel all 
Germans living to the east of Oder-
Neisse Line 
 
December 31: USSR recognises the 
Provisional Government of the 
Republic of Poland 
  
1944-45     Second Soviet occupation of 
western Ukraine 
1945  Jan: Russian offensive 
overruns Silesia 
  February 04-11, Yalta Conference 
1945    May: (07) German surrender  
1945  The part of Silesia to the west 
of the Neisse (Ober Lausitz) 
June 28, 1945 the communist 
provisional government takes 
June: (05) Allied Control Commission assumes 
control of Germany 
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part of the Soviet zone of 
occupation under a Russian 
military dictatorship 
effective control of Poland 
1945   July 05, 1945 the communist 
provisional government recognised 
by London and Washington as the de 
jure government of Poland 
 
July 07, 1945 the Polish government 
signs an agreement with Moscow 
which regulated the new border and 
recognised significant territorial 
losses to the Soviet Union 
 
Nov 09, 1945: Polish-Soviet 
agreement to transfer Byelorussians, 
Ukrainians and Lithuanians to the 
Soviet territories 
 
Nov 11, 1945: Polish-Soviet 
agreement to transfer Poles and Jews 
from the Soviet annexed territories to 
Poland 
Potsdam Conference (17.07-02.08.1945): the Allies 
reset the German-Polish border to run along the line 
formed by the rivers Oder and Neisse 
 
Ethnic Germans driven out of Poland, 
Czechoslovakia and Hungary 
 
1945   October 24, Poland becomes a 
member of the UN 
  
1945  Ethnic Poles expelled from 
Galicia in the Ukraine and 
resettled in Silesia 
 German expellees and 
refugees from Eastern 
Europe arrive in large 
numbers in the western 
zones 
German expellees 
and refugees from 
Eastern Europe arrive 
in large numbers in 
the Soviet zone 
 
1946      Singapore becomes a British 
crown colony 
1947   New Polish constitution  June 10: Soviets 
establish political 
parties and trade 
unions 
 
July: Soviets 
establish five states 
Britain ratifies India 
Independence Bill 
 
British and American troops 
withdraw from the Soviet zone 
1948      Start of Apartheid in South Africa 
 327 
Year Germans in Eastern 
Europe 
Silesia Poland Germany World Events 
1949  The part of Silesia to the west 
of the Neisse (Ober Lausitz) 
part of the GDR 
 Foundation of the FRG Foundation of the 
GDR 
People’s Republic of China 
founded 
1950    March: foundation of 
Landsmannschaft 
Schlesien, Nieder and 
Oberschlesien 
 
1949/50: foundation of the 
Landsmannschaft der 
Oberschlesier 
Görlitzer Vertrag: 
GDR recognises the 
Oder-Neisse line as 
the official border 
between Germany 
and Poland 
Start of Korean War 
1952   New Polish constitution   1953 end of Korean War 
(armistice) 
1955      Start of Vietnam War 
1959   France recognises the Oder-Neisse 
Line 
   
1967      De jure end of racial segregation 
based on Jim Crow laws in the 
USA 
1970    Treaty of Warsaw: FRG 
recognises Poland’s 
borders as inviolable 
 Civil disturbances in Northern 
Ireland – British Army deployed 
1972    Grundlagenvertrag 
December 21, 1972: the 
FRG and the GDR 
formally recognise each 
other as sovereign states 
  
1973    September 18, FRG joins 
the UN 
September 18, GDR 
joins the UN 
 
1975   FRG lends money to Poland in the 
wake of which several tens of 
thousands of ethnic Germans are 
allowed to leave Poland for the FRG 
  Britain holds referendum on its 
continued membership in the EC 
 
End of Vietnam War 
1990    FRG and GDR reunified - Germany  
1990    Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to 
Germany (Two Plus Four Agreement): the eastern 
border of the reunited Germany is fixed for good 
(Oder-Neisse line) 
 
1991    
 
Deutsch-polnische Nachbarschaftsvertrag The Ukraine gains full 
independence 
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1997     Handover of Hong Kong – End of 
British Empire – (apart from 14 
British Overseas Territories)  
2000    Foundation of the Preußische Treuhand GmbH  
2004   Poland accedes to the EU   
2007   Border controls abolished between 
Germany and Poland 
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F.1 The Piast Territories 
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F.2 Piast Territories as a Mythical Composite (see the Piast Formula) 
  
 331 
F.3 The Commonwealth of Poland-Lithuania (Maximum Extension) 
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F.4 Post-Partition Polish Polities 
 
F.4.1 Galicia Lodomeria (1773-1867/1918) 
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F.4.2 Duchy of Warsaw (1807-1815) 
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F.4.3 (Congress) Kingdom of Poland, Grand Duchy of Posen, Republic of Cracow (1815-1864/1918) 
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F.5 The Second Republic 
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F.6 The Polish People’s Republic 
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F.7 The ‘Regained Territories’ (Ziemie Odzyskane) 
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F.8 The Kresy 
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